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IN   MEMORIAM 


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THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM 


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THE 
PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM 

THE  KORNILOV  RISING 


BY 

A.  F.  KERENSKY 

Former  Prime  Mini^ker  of  Russia,  Minister  of 

War  and  Marine  and  Commander-in 

Chief  of  the  Russian  Army 


WITH  FRONTISPIECE 


NEW  YORK 

DODD,  MEAD  AND  COMPANY 

1919 


RETAINED 


Published,  1919.  in  U.  S.  A., 
By  DODD,  MEAD  AND  COMPANY,  INC. 


IN   MEMORIAM 


A.  F.  KERENSKY^S  PREFACE  TO  THE  KORNILOV 

AFFAIR 

Dear  Friends, 

I  send  you  the  stenographic  copies  of  my  fundamental 
statement  on  the  Kornilov  affair  which  have  been  saved 
from  destruction,  with  supplementary  remarks  and  explana- 
tions which  I  have  now  made.  I  place  this  manuscript  at 
your  disposal  and  ask  you  if  possible  to  publish  it,  but  ex- 
actly in  its  present  form.  This  is  necessary,  though  I  my- 
self see  all  its  imperfections  from  a  literary  point  of  view. 
But  this  is  not  a  literary  production,  not  "  memoirs  "  for 
history,  not  the  fruit  of  my  unfettered  creative  faculty. 
This  is  only  a  document,  a  bit  of  real  life,  a  document  which 
can  give  to  those  who  are  really  anxious  to  discover  the 
truth  about  the  Kornilov  affair,  more  information  than  a 
whole  volume  of  "  memoirs,"  because,  without  forcing  any 
one  to  form  an  opinion,  it  gives  every  one  the  opportunity 
of  acting  on  the  lines  of  a  commission  of  inquiry,  of  doing 
the  work  of  such  a  commission  himself,  sorting  out  the 
most  important  facts  of  the  Kornilov  affair,  and  drawing 
his  own  conclusions  about  it. 

To  enable  the  reader  to  judge  fairly  is  my  only  desire. 
My  latest  notes  supplement  the  statement  received  by  the 
Commission  of  Inquiry  w^ith  additional  matter  which  may  in 
part  have  been  forgotten  by  or  unknown  to  those  who  will 
read  the  official  report  of  my  examination. 

Certainly  in  these  notes  I  have  been  unable  to  confine 
myself  all  the  time  strictly  to  the  mere  facts  of  the  case, 
and  to  the  narrow  limits  of  the  story  of  Kornilov's  at- 
tempt, though  I  tried  my  best  to  refrain  from  all  digression, 

V 


vi  PREFACE 

and  especially  from  argument  and  deductions.  I  tried  to 
restrain  myself  because  I  found  that  for  me  at  this  mo- 
ment any  other  language  than  that  of  facts  and  documents 
was  out  of  place. 

Why?  You  know  that  better  than  I.  You  know  bet- 
ter than  I  how  the  enemies  of  the  February  revolution,  my 
enemies  from  the  Right  and  from  the  Left,  took  advantage 
of  the  Kornilov  affair,  and  how  large  was  the  number  of 
those  whose  faith  weakened  before  the  persistent  attacks  of 
my  slanderers.  It  was  not  for  those  who  deliberately 
slandered,  not  for  those  who  deliberately  lied,  that  I  wrote. 
It  is  impossible  to  convince  them  of  anything.  They  them- 
selves knew  perfectly  well  that  they  were  distorting  and 
making  a  mockery  of  the  truth. 

I  wrote  for  those  who  knew  little  or  nothing,  w^ho  in  the 
end  gave  credence  to  what  was  so  insolently  described  as 
**  truth "  in  the  Kornilov  affair.  I  do  not  want  to  con- 
vince them.  Let  them,  dispassionately  and  calmly,  after 
acquainting  themselves  with  the  facts,  not  from  the  words 
of  others,  but  by  their  own  reasoning,  discover  the  truth 
for  themselves  if  not  of  the  whole  Kornilov  affair,  at  least 
of  my  connection  with  it. 

It  is  not  personal  interest  that  urges  me  at  this  terrible 
time  to  think  and  to  write  of  the  Kornilov  affair.  No;  I 
have  seen  and  studied  too  many  people,  not  to  know  the  real 
value  of  popular  love  and  hatred.  At  the  time  when  I  w^as 
at  my  height,  and  the  crowd  bowed  before  me,  I  quietly  said 
to  my  friends :  "  Wait,  and  they  will  come  and  smite  me." 
So  it  always  has  been,  and  so  it  always  will  be.  No  per- 
sonal motive,  I  say,  but  a  public  one  impelled  me  to  write. 
For  now,  when  the  enemies  of  Russia  and  of  the  freedom 
of  all  peoples  have  attained  their  shameful  aims,  w^hen  our 
Motherland  lies  prostrate  in  the  mud,  dishonoured  and  lacer- 


PREFACE  vu 

ated,  when  utter  despair  has  seized  those  who  have  any 
honours  and  conscience  left —  now  those  who  have  attained 
their  aims  must  not  be  allowed  to  justify  their  Judas-like 
crime  by  hypocritically  imputing  it  to  *' the  treason  of 
others,"  and  the  memory  of  the  great  Russian  Revolution, 
which  created  a  new  life  of  truth  and  sincerity,  must  not  be 
shadowed  by  even  the  smallest  doubt  as  to  the  honesty  of 
those  who  strove  for  it  in  life  and  death. 

I  want  to  say  a  few  more  words  about  General  Kornilov. 
I  have  written  many  things  against  him.  But  I  do  not 
desire  that  more  should  be  found  in  my  words  than  I  in- 
tended to  say,  and  that  is  why  I  feel  obliged  to  say  em- 
phatically that  I  have  never  doubted  his  love  for  his  country. 

I  saw  not  in  bad  intention  but  in  a  lack  of  understanding, 
and  in  great  political  inexperience,  the  cause  of  his  actions, 
which  menaced  Russia  with  such  a  vast  upheaval.  I  saw, 
and  many  times  I  tried  to  check  him,  instigated  as  he  was  by 
the  cunning  enemies  of  freedom,  or  by  mere  political 
sharpers. 

I  did  not  succeed;  the  man  who  in  his  own  way  loved 
Russia  passionately  was  doomed  by  some  power  to  bring 
about  the  victory  of  those  who  hated  and  despised  her. 

A.  Kerensky. 

PS. —  A  few  words  about  the  stenographed  copy.  I 
gave  evidence  on  October  8,  19 17.  It  took  several  days  to 
decipher  the  notes  of  the  evidence,  and  only  five  or  six  days 
before  October  25th  I  received  it  to  revise  and  sign.  I  had 
not  time  to  do  so.  The  final  official  text  of  my  evidence  be- 
fore the  Commission  of  Inquiry  was  not  ready  when  the 
Bolshevik  havoc  began. 

Having  at  length  an  opportunity  to  look  through  this  text, 
I  felt  I  had  the  right  to  correct  it  editorially  and  stylisti- 


yiii  PREFACE 

cally,  to  shorten  it  here  and  there,  and  in  some  places  to  add 
a  few  additional  words,  of  course  without  changing  the 
meaning  and  tone  of  the  evidence;  in  two  places  I  found  it 
expedient  to  change  slightly  the  order  of  the  account,  so  as 
to  bring  together  separated  pieces  of  evidence  about  the  same 
point. 

I  think  that  the  publication  of  the  whole  original  official 
report  of  the  Inquiry  will  be  useful  also  as  a  picture  of  the 
judicial  examination  of  one  whom  General  Alexeiev  called 
the  "  Master  of  Destiny."  It  will  enable  every  one  to  recall 
that  period,  still  near  but  already  so  distant,  when  judicial 
inquiry  and  courts  of  justice  were  absolutely  free  and  inde- 
pendent of  those  in  power,  that  brief  chapter  in  the  history 
of  Russia  when  "  this  bourgeois  prejudice  "  in  favour  of  im- 
partial justice  was  not  trampled  on  to  speed  a  return  to  the 
traditional  Moscow  period  of  "  Shemiaka  trial."  ^ 

iThe  name  of  Prince  Demetrius   Shemiaka  of  Halitsh   (1420-53) 
stands  in  Russia  for  a  dishonest,  venal,  partial  judge. 


CONTENTS 


PAGE 

Preface  to  the  Russian  Edition v 

Introduction xiii 

CHAPTER  I 

From  Kornilov's  Appointment  as  Commander-in-Chief  Until 
THE  Moscow  Conference.    Reorganization  of  the  Army 
§  I.  Reasons    for   appointing   Kornilov.     Points    in    favour 
and  against  him.     Situation  at  the  front    Conference 

at  Headquarters  on  July  i6th,  1917 I 

§  2.  "Irresponsible    influences"    on    Kerensky.    Conversa- 
tion in  the  railway  carriage 21 

§  3.  Kornilov's    requests.    Their   essence   and   their   illegal 
form.    The    incident    of    Tcheremissov's   appointment. 

Why  Kornilov  was  not  dismissed 26 

§  4. /Kornilov's  memorandum  of  the  loth  of  August.    Sup- 
port of   Savinjccv.   Filonenko  and  Kokoshkin.    Hopes 

of  the  Right  at  the  Moscow  Conference 33 

1.5''  Conspiracy   at   Headquarters.     Suspicions   against  Lu- 
I  komsky    and     Tikhmenev.    The    personages     around 

Kornilov 40 

§  6.  Kornilov's  journey  to  Petrograd  and  his  memoranda 
of  the  3rd  and  the   loth  of  August.    Incident  at  the 

Cabinet   meeting 45 

§  7.  Open  and  secret  activities  of  the  Main  Committee  of 
Officers*  League.    Attacks  upon  the  Provisional  Gov- 
ernment.   Campaign   in    the    newspapers.     Preparation 
_,  of  the  coup  d'etat.    Measures  against  the  Committee  .     51 
§  8,  Details  about  the  3rd  and  the  loth  of  August.    Con- 
j  versation  of  Kornilov  with  Kerensky.    Incident  with 

\  ^avinkpv 64 

§  9.  Reorganization  of  army  and  Provisional  Government. 
False  steps  in  Gutchkov's  administration.  Efforts  to 
liquidate  them.  Necessity  of  utmost  prudence  ...  70 
§  10.  Kornilov's  speech  at  the  Moscow  Conference.  More 
about  Kornilov's  memoranda.  The  attitude  of  Korni- 
lov towards  the  Government 60 

ix 


X  CONTENTS 

CHAPTER  II 

Preparation  of  the  Rebellion  and  Its  Beginning  pagb 

§  II.  Conspiracy  at  the  Moscow  Conference.  Movements  of 
troops.    Resolutions    about    Kornilov's    irremovability. 

Kornilov's  conduct  in  Moscow 86 

§  12.  Pretended  danger  of  a  Bolshevik  rebellion.  Weakness 
j  of  Bolshevism  on  the  eve  of  the  Kornilov  rebellion. 
/  Its  rapid  increase  after  the  rebellion  and  as  a  conse- 

!   quence  of  it 95 

§  13.  Reasons  for  summoning  the  third  corps  to  Petrograd. 
Proclamation  of  martial  law  in  Petrograd.  Disarma- 
ment of  Kronstadt.  Work  on  fortifications  in  Finland  103 
§  14.  The  summoning  and  the  movements  of  the  third  corps 
against  Petrograd.  Its  role  in  the  plans  of  the  con- 
spirators.   Suicide  of  General  Krimov 11 1 

§  15.  More  about  the  circumstances  of  the  summoning  of 
I  the  third  corps.    Journeys  to  Headquarters  of  ,^avin- 

[kov,  Mironov  and  Terestchenko '.121 

§  16.  First  visit  of  V.  Lvov  to  Kerensky 127 

§  17.  Second  visit  of  V.  Lvov  to  Kerensky.    Kornilov's  de- 
mands for  transference  of  power  to  him.     Kerensky's 
conversation  with  Kornilov  by  direct  telegraphic  wire. 
^'    Second  conversation  with  V.  Lvov  in  presence  of  a 

^   witness        131 

§  18.  Was   V.   Lvov   acting  under   Kornilov's   instructions? 

Kornilov's  conversation  with  _Savinkov  by  wire.    Kor- 

"^'       nilov's    conversation    with    Trubetzkoy.    Confirmation 

by  Alexeiev 141 

§  19.  Kerensky's     alleged     complicity.    History     of     Lvov's 

mission 146 

§  20.  Details  about  the  26th  of  August.    Lvov's  visit      .     .  154 

CHAPTER  III 

Liquidation  of  the  Rebellion.    Roles  of  Various  Personages 
§  21.  The   theory   of    a   "misunderstanding   due   to    Lvov." 
\\  Various  opinions  of  Savinkov.    The  criminal  action  of 
V  Kornilov.    His    appeal.''  Impossibility    of    delay    with 

p.  counter-measures 161 

§  22.  Extraordinary  powers  delegated  to  Kerensky.  Resig- 
nation of  ministers.  Subsequent  reproaches  of  non- 
democratic  conduct.  Formal  defects  of  the  telegram 
ordering  Kornilov's  dismissal;  disputes  about  its 
validity 166 


CONTENTS  xi 

PAGE 

§  2Z.  Kerensky's  appeal  to  the  population.  Kornilov's  at- 
tempt to  justify  his  actions  by  the  appearance  of  this 
appeal.  Rebellious  actions  of  Kornilov  before  the 
appeal.  Text  of  Kerensky's  and  Kornilov's  appeals. 
Impossibility  of  delay  in  view  of  the  presence  of  Kor- 
nilovists  in  Petrograd 177 

§  24.  The    days    of    the    rebellion.    Conduct    of    Miliukov. 

Terestchenko,  Nekrassov  and  others 183 

§  25.  Filonenko's  role.  Divulgence  on  the  29th  of  August 
of  his  activities  at  Headquarters.  His  participation  in 
the  schemes  for  a  dictatorship.  His  ambiguous  posi- 
tion  at   Headquarters 199 

§  26.  Savinskov's  role^  His  friendship  with  Filonenko.  His 
non-^'artrcTpation  in  the  conspiracy.  His  deception  _^ 
NjT  I  Kornilov.  Transgression  by  Savinkqy  of  his  powers. 
V'  L    Hi-s    r<»<5iornation 


€<S 


-yHis  resig:nation 210 

^27^efinition  of  the  crime.    The  accomplices     ....  219 

§  28.  Liquidation  of  the  rebellion.  Movements  of  the  mili- 
tary against  Headquarters.  Excitement  of  the  democ- 
racy. Slowness  of  General  Alexeiev,  Successful  ef- 
forts of  the  Provisional  Government  to  suppress  the 
rebellion  without  bloodshed 224 

§  29.  Kornilov's     accomplices.    General     Alexeiev's     letter.  ,) 

Accusations  against  Ketensky,  Savinkov  and  Filonenko.  '*' ' 

Participation  of  financial  circlerTflS^flie  reality  of  an 
organized  conspiracy 229 

§  30.  Summoning  of  the  troops  and  the  Soviets.  Savinkoy's 
statement.  Represenattives  of  the  Soviets  in  the  JPro- 
VI  sionat  Government 233 

§  31.  Some  details  about  the  conspiracy.  Participation  of 
Cossacks  and  officers.  Arrest  of  Lvov.  Zavoiko's 
character 236 

§  32.  Political  situation  of  Russia  at  the  time  of  the  rebellion. 

Impossibility  of  a  dictatorship;  necessity  of  a  coalition  240 

§  33.  Various     details:    The     text     of     Lvov's     statement. 
Kerensky's  actions  on  the  26th  of  August.     Criminal 
nature  of  Krimov's  intentions.    More  about  Savinkov's       X 
actions.    More    about    Filonenko.    Attacks    upoii*  the' 
provisional  Government 244 

CHAPTER  IV 
Kerensky  and  Kornilov 

A  reply 249 

A  "  Who's  Who  "  and  "  Where's  Where  "  of  People  and  Places 

OCCUKRING  in   the  TeXT 279 


INTRODUCTION  ^ 

After  the  breaking  of  the  Russian  front  near  Tarnopol 
on  the  19th  of  July,  191 7,  it  was  decided  to  replace  the 
Commander  of  the  South-western  front,  General  Gutor, 
and  later  also  the  Commander-in-Chief,  General  Brus- 
silov,  and  the  choice  fell  on  General  Kornilov.  Kornilov's 
good  qualities  and  defects  were  both  well  known  to  the 
Provisional  Government,  but  at  this  moment  his  good 
qualities  made  him  the  only  suitable  candidate.  His  de- 
fects, especially  his  impetuosity  in  success,  did  not  then 
seem  to  offer  any  danger;  moreover,  the  views  that  he 
professed  seemed  to  exclude  the  possibiHty  of  a  conflict. 
He  advocated  the  cessation  of  a  further  offensive;  he, 
alone  among  the  generals,  attributed  the  responsibility  for 
the  failure  not  only  to  the  soldiers,  but  also  to  the  offi- 
cers. He  spoke  with  sympathy  of  the  army  elective  or- 
ganizations, of  the  commissaries,  and  so  forth.  Therefore 
the  appointment  of  Kornilov  was  due  to  serious  con- 
siderations in  his  favour,  and  not  at  all  to  "  irresponsible 
influences  "  on  the  Premier,  Kerensky. 

But  after  his  appointment  Kornilov  immediately  revealed 
his  dangerous  side.  In  his  telegram  accepting  the  duties 
of  Commander-in-Chief  he  made  a  series  of  demands  re- 
garding reforms  in  the  army.  These  reforms  were  accept- 
able in  their  essence;  they  were  even  approved  in  prin- 
ciple, and  were  already  being  worked  out  by  the  Pro- 
visional  Government   before   Kornilov's   nomination,    but 

1  This  introduction  gives  a  resume  of  the  events  discussed  in  the  book. 

xiii 


xiv  INTRODUCTION 

Kornilov  presented  his  demands  in  an  inadmissible  form. 
He  interpreted  his  rights  as  Commander-in-Chief  in  an  even 
broader  way  than  did  the  Grand  Duke  Nicholas,  and  he 
assumed  towards  the  Provisional  Government  such  a  tone 
as  compelled  Kerensky  to  propose  his  immediate  dismissal 
to  the  Provisional  Government.  Kornilov  was,  however, 
permitted  to  retain  his  command,  partly  to  avoid  changes 
in  the  High  Command  at  that  critical  moment,  and  partly 
because  his  conduct  was  ascribed  to  the  influence  of  adven- 
turers surrounding  him  at  Headquarters.  After  the  events 
of  the  beginning  of  July,  191 7  (the  breaking  of  the  front 
and  the  Bolshevik  rebellion  in  Petrograd),  the  Provisional 
Government,  supported  by  the  whole  of  the  country  and  in 
particular  by  the  democracy,  quickly  took  a  series  of  ener- 
getic steps,  including  the  restoration  of  capital  punishment 
at  the  front,  and  occupied  itself  in  further  planning  for  the 
reorganizing  of  the  army.  In  spite  of  this,  Kornilov,  sup- 
ported by  ^Savinkov,  started  an  energetic  campaign  against 
the  Provisional  Government.  On  his  arrival  in  Petrograd 
on  the  3rd  of  August  for  the  purpose  of  giving  the  Provis- 
ional Government  an  account  of  the  military  situation, 
Kornilov  brought  with  him  a  memorandum  in  which  he  de- 
manded a  series  of  army  reforms,  but  the  discussion  of  the 
proposed  changes  in  the  army  was  delayed,  and  Kornilov's 
memorandum  was  handed  to  the  War  Ministry  to  be 
brought  into  agreement  with  the  proposals  of  the  War  Min- 
ister. In  this  way  was  prevented  the  publication  of  Korni- 
lov's  memorandum  in  a  form  so  exceedingly  sharp  and  tact- 
less that  it  would  inevitably  have  led  to  his  retirement. 

In  the  meantime  the  attack  on  the  Provisional  Govern- 
ment by  those  in  favour  of  *'  decisive  measures "  was 
being  continued.  Kornilov's  memorandum  of  the  3rd  of 
August  was  handed  over  to  Savinkov,  the  Deputy  Min- 


INTRODUCTION  xv 

ister  of  War,  for  the  purpose  of  co-ordinating  it  with 
the  plans  of  the  War  Minister.  Savinkov,  who  all  the 
time  was  attempting  to  carry  on  a  personal  line  of  politics 
without  taking  into  consideration  the  directions  of  his  chief, 
the  War  Minister,  wanted  to  benefit  by  this  occasion  and, 
with  Kornilov's  help,  to  force  the  Government  to  accept 
quickly,  en  bloc,  a  program  of  most  serious  military 
measures  at  the  front  and  at  the  rear  without  these  meas- 
ures having  first  received  the  sanction  of  Kerensky,  the 
Prime  Minister  and  the  Minister  of  War,  and  even  without 
previously  reporting  to  him  about  them. 

This  attempt,  made  immediately  before  the  Moscow  Con- 
ference, did  not  succeed,  but  still  it  created  great  excite- 
ment in  political  circles.  This  excitement  might  have  mani- 
fested itself  at  the  Moscow  Conference  in  an  acute  form, 
and  the  Government  took  measures  to  save  the  unity  of 
the  country  and  to  safeguard  the  army  from  all  possible 
disputes.  Finally,  the  Moscow  Conference  w^ent  of¥  with- 
out a  hitch.  General  Kornilov  made  a  speech  which  did 
not  realize  the  expectation  of  the  extremists,  as  it  differed 
from  the  War  Minister's  speech  enunciating  his  program 
only  by  its  tactless  form  and  a  brief  allusion  to  the  necessity 
of  "  measures  in  the  rear,  at  the  front,  on  the  railways 
and  in  the  factories." 

The  regeneration  of  the  fighting  capacity  of  the  army  was 
the  task  of  the  Prime  Minister,  Kerensky,  from  the  very 
first  moment  when  he  took  over  office  from  Gutchkov. 
It  was  necessary  to  liquidate  the  tendency  of  army  reforms 
which  had  been  carried  out  during  the  first  two  months 
of  the  Revolution,  but  in  striving  with  this  object  the  War 
Minister,  Kerensky,  could  not  permit  the  too  harsh  and 
premature  steps  which  were  demanded  by  the  irresponsible 
partisans  of  "  strong  power."     Such  steps  could  give  only 


xvi  INTRODUCTION 

a  negative  result  in  the  unbalanced  conditions  in  which 
the  country  then  was.  After  the  Moscow  Conference, 
Savinkov  admitted  that  the  plan  of  reforms  traced  by  the 
War  Minister  coincided  in  the  main  lines  with  his  and 
Kornilov's  wishes.  He  admitted  also  that  his  conduct  dur- 
ing the  period  just  before  the  Moscow  Conference  was 
a  breach  of  discipline,  and  after  this  the  Prime  Minister 
recalled  the  order  for  Savinkov's  resignation. 

But  all  the  danger  from  the  activities  of  too  hasty  **  re- 
formers *'  was  nothing  in  comparison  with  the  terrible  con- 
sequences of  the  secret  intrigue  which  was  carried  on  at  the 
same  time  at  Headquarters  and  in  other  places  with  the 
object  of  making  a  forcible  coup  d'etat,  and  which  already 
by  the  time  of  the  Moscow  Conference  had  attempted 
to  accustom  Russia  and  Kornilov  himself  to  the  idea  of 
the  military  dictatorship  of  the  latter.  Information  about 
conspiracies  began  to  reach  the  Provisional  Government  as 
early  as  July,  191 7;  the  break  through  near  Tarnopol  deeply 
touched  the  feeling  of  national  pride ;  moreover,  after  the 
abortive  Bolshevik  rising  many  thought  that  a  courageous 
and  well  organized  assault  on  the  Government  was  sure 
to  succeed.  Parallel  with  the  open  propaganda  of  the 
idea  of  a  military  dictatorship,  secret  work  was  going  on. 
At  the  first  stage  separate  conspirative  circles  were  organized 
in  which  some  military  elements  took  an  active  part,  among 
them  a  part  of  the  members  of  the  Main  Committee  of  the 
old  Russian  Officers'  League.  Later,  these  circles  united, 
and  the  technique  of  the  conspiracy  improved.  Some  du- 
bious persons,  such  as  Aladin  and  Zavoiko,  were  accepted  in 
their  midst ;  they  formed  the  link  between  the  military  con- 
spirators, the  civil  politicians,  and  the  financial  circles  that 
were  supporting  them.  In  this  way  a  real  organization 
was  created,  which  later  took  such  a  definite  shape  that 


INTRODUCTION  xvii 

General  Alexeiev  could  menace  it  with  revelations  at  the 
trial  of  General  Kornilov,  should  the  civil  participants, 
who  remained  unknown,  withhold  financial  help  from  the 
families  of  the  arrested  conspirators.  At  one  time  the 
partisans  of  *'  strong  power  "  sent  out  feelers  to  Kerensky ; 
not  meeting  with  any  sympathy  there,  they  directed  their 
attention  to  Kornilov.  "  Kerensky  does  not  want  to  be 
a  dictator;  then  we  will  give  him  one,"  said  V.  Lvov. 
At  the  moment  of  the  All-Russian  Conference  in  Mos- 
cow on  the  I2th-25th  of  August,  the  idea  of  Kornilov's 
dictatorship  was  already  quite  ripe,  and  the  prepara- 
tion of  the  coup  d'etat,  anticipating  the  sympathy  of  the 
Conference,  was  in  full  swing.  A  "  reliable "  Cossack 
detachment  was  summoned  to  Moscow,  and  the  officer- 
cadets  who  were  guarding  the  building  where  the  Con- 
ference took  place  were  given  notice  that  a  proclamation 
of  dictatorship  was  possible  during  the  Conference.  A 
whole  series  of  organizations,  before  the  Conference,  carried 
threatening  resolutions  to  the  effect  that  Kornilov  must 
not  be  dismissed.  A  ceremonious  entry  of  Kornilov  into 
Moscow  was  being  organized ;  various  public  men  "  in- 
troduced **  themselves  and  presented  "  memoranda."  A 
pamphlet  was  distributed  in  Moscow  entitled  ''Kornilov 
—  The  People's  Leader." 

Contrary  to  the  expectations  of  the  conspirators,  the  desire 
of  all  parts  of  the  population  for  union  and  the  force  of 
the  Provisional  Government  became  so  evident  at  the  Mos- 
cow Conference  that  all  plans  to  profit  by  the  Moscow 
Conference  had  to  be  postponed;  on  the  other  hand  the 
conspirative  preparation  of  the  coup  d'etat  became  more 
intense.  A  few  days  later  Aladin  attempted  through  the 
intermediary  of  Prince  George  Lvov  to  obtain  an  audience 
with  Kerensky;  having  failed,  he  and  his  friends  deter- 


xviii  INTRODUCTION 

mined  to  use  V.  Lvov  for  this  purpose,  knowing  that  his 
position  as  a  former  member  of  the  Provisional  Govern- 
ment made  it  possible  for  him  without  difficulty  to  obtain 
an  audience  with  the  Prime  Minister. 

Oh  the  31st  of  August  Lvov,  who  was  prepared  suit- 
ably by  Aladin  and  Dobrinsky,  went  to  Fetrograd,  where 
he  was  received  by  the  Prime  Minister,  but  he  lim- 
ited himself  to  a  conversation  of  a  general  character 
about  the  necessity  for  strengthening  the  Government's 
authority  by  the  inclusion  in  it  of  new  elements  with 
"  power  "  behind  them.  Kerensky  did  not  attach  any  im- 
portance to  this  visit,  as  at  that  time  many  people  came 
to  him  whose  conversation  was  of  this  character.  Lvov 
returned  to  Moscow  and  went  immediately  to  Headquarters 
with  a  letter  from  Aladin  to  Zavoiko.  The  meaning  of 
this  sending  of  Lvov  to  Kerensky,  as  well  as  of  Aladin's 
attempt  to  interview  the  Prime  Minister,  was  that  the  con- 
spirators wished  to  secure  for  themselves  means  of  contact 
with  the  Prime  Minister  independent  of  the  ordinary  chan- 
nels of  communication  between  Headquarters  and  the  Gov- 
ernment. 

At  the  same  time  at  Headquarters  Kornilov  and  his 
friends  were  working  out  the  final  plan  of  "  military " 
pressure  on  the  Provisional  Government.  It  is  difficult 
to  determine  exactly  when  Kornilov  became  a  conscious 
participant  in  the  conspiracy  and  the  head  of  the  movement 
directed  against  the  Government.  In  the  first  informa- 
tion about  the  conspiracies  his  name  was  not  mentioned, 
but  already  on  the  3rd  of  August,  in  the  conversation 
with  Kerensky,  Kornilov  spoke  about  a  military  dictator- 
ship as  about  a  possibility  which  might  become  a  neces- 
sity. At  the  Moscow  Conference  the  behaviour  of  Kor- 
nilov   towards    the    Provisional    Government    was    very 


INTRODUCTION  xix 

provocative.  On  the  23rd  of  August,  at  Headquarters, 
Kornilov  spoke  harshly  to  Savinkov  about  the  Provisional 
Government;  he  found  the  continuation  of  Kerensky's 
power  to  be  obnoxious  and  unnecessary  and  so  on.  But 
on  the  following  day,  on  the  24th  of  August  (6th  of 
September,  N.S.),  before  Savinkov's  departure  to  Petro- 
grad,  Kornilov  told  him  that  he  was  going  loyally  to 
support  the  Provisional  Government;  he  asked  him  to 
inform  Kerensky  of  this,  and  Savinkov  went  away  reassured. 
Now  on  this  day  the  work  of  the  conspirators  was  already 
in  full  swing. 

The  presence  at  Headquarters  of  the  Deputy-Minister 
of  War,  Savinkov,  from  the  22nd  to  the  24th  of  August 
was  called  for,  amongst  other  reasons,  by  the  necessity 
for  clearing  up  the  conditions  for  the  transference  of  the 
army  of  the  Petrograd  Military  District  to  the  Commander- 
in-Chief,  also  the  conditions  for  sending  a  military  detach- 
ment from  the   front  at  the  disposal  of  the  Provisional 
Government  in  connection  with  the  proclamation  of  martial 
la\y.  in  Petrograd.     The  proclamation  of  martial  law  in 
Petrograd  was  necessitated  by  the  military  situation  created 
after  the  fall  of  Riga,  which  had  brought  the  battle  front 
nearer  to  the  capital,  by  the  necessity  for  transferring  the 
Government  institutions  to   Moscow,   by   the   increase   in 
numbers  of   refugees    from  the  Baltic  provinces  and   in 
the  licence  of   the  Petrograd  garrison,   by  the  proposed 
transfer  of  the  other  troops  of  the  Petrograd  Military  Dis- 
trict to  the  command  of  General   Kornilov,  and  by  the 
possibility  of  riots  and  various  attempts  from  the  Left  and 
from  the  Right. 

All  these  considerations  compelled  the  Government  to 
demand  for  its  own  use  a  well  disciplined  army  force. 
Savinkov,  in  transmitting  this  order  of  the  Provisional 


XX  INTRODUCTION 

Government  to  the  Commander-in-Chief,  pointed  out  that 
the  strict  conditions  for  sending  troops  for  the  use  of 
the  Provisional  Government  were  that  the  detachment  to 
be  dispatched  should  not  include  the  Caucasian  "  Savage 
Division,"  which  was  not  reliable  from  the  Government's 
standpoint,  and  that  General  Krimov  should  not  be  appointed 
to  command  it.  General  Kornilov  definitely  promised 
S&vinkov  on  the  21st  of  August  to  fulfil  exactly  the  pro- 
posal of  the  Provisional  Government  and  not  to  send  to 
Petrograd  either  Krimov  or  the  *'  Savage  Division  " ;  but 
on  the  following  day  the  3rd  Cavalry  Corps  was  already 
moving  towards  Petrograd,  with  the  "  Savage  Division  " 
at  its  head,  and  the  whole  under  the  command  of  General 
Krimov,  who  had  received  definite  instructions  from 
Kornilov.  It  was  proved  later  that  General  Krimov,  who 
had  been  nominated  as  commander  of  one  of  the  armies 
of  the  South-western  front  in  order  to  divert  attention 
from  him,  had  been  already,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  for  some 
time  at  Headquarters  working  out  a  plan  of  military  pres- 
sure upon  the  Government.  Owing  to  the  events  of  the 
26th  of  August  (September  8th,  N.S.),  which  will  be 
mentioned  later,  the  Provisional  Government  had  time 
to  take  measures;  Krimov's  army  did  not  reach  Petrograd 
(where  he  was  expected  by  the  local  conspirative  organ- 
izations), and  he  committed  suicide.  But  the  role  of  this 
unit  was  so  important  in  carrying  out  the  conspiracy  that 
it  was  only  after  Kornilov  had  learned  the  fate  of  this 
detachment  that  he  took  actual  measures  to  put  an  end 
to  the  adventure. 

While  General  Krimov's  detachment  was  approaching 
the  capital,  the  conspirators  attempted  to  get  hold  of  the 
power  "  legally  "  by  terrorizing  the  Government.  On  the 
26th  of  August  (8th  of  September,  N.S.)  Lvov,  who  had 


INTRODUCTION  xxi 

arrived  in  Petrograd  from  Headquarters,  presented  an 
ultimaturn  to  the  Prime  Minister  in  the  name  of  Kornilov. 
The  Provisional  Government  must  give  up  its  power  the 
same  evening,  transferring  it  to  General  Kornilov,  who 
would  form  a  new  Government.  Kerensky  and  Savinkov 
must  immediately,  during  the  night  of  the  26ih~2y\h  of 
August,  depart  for  Headquarters,  as  Kornilov  proposed 
to  offer  them  posts  as  ministers  in  his  Cabinet  and  would 
not  take  the  responsibility  for  their  lives  if  they  remained 
in  Petrograd.  At  the  request  of  Kerensky,  Lvov  on  the 
spot  put  in  writing  Kornilov's  demands;  then  Kerensky 
asked  Kornilov  to  come  to  the  direct  telegraphic  wire, 
and  Kornilov  himself  repeated  to  him  the  proposal  to  come 
immediately,  confirmed  Lvov's  authority,  and  indirectly 
confirmed  all  that  had  been  said  by  the  latter.  To  gain 
time  Kerensky  promised  Kornilov  to  come  to  Headquarters, 
and  at  the  same  time  took  immediately  all  steps  to  cope 
with  the  rebellion  at  its  very  commencement.  In  the  mean- 
while, after  the  above  "  favourable  conversation  "  by  the 
direct  wire,  the  most  prominent  political  men  in  opposition 
to  the  Government  were  invited  to  Headquarters;  the  ulti- 
mate form  of  the  dictatorship  was  being  finally  settled  and 
the  composition  of  the  Government  agreed  upon.  But  on 
the  following  day,  the  27th  of  August,  a  wire  was  re- 
ceived from  the  Prime  Minister  ordering  Kornilov  to 
surrender  his  office  immediately  and  to  come  to  Petro- 
grad. Kornilov  did  not  obey  this  order,  but  confirmed  to 
Savinkov  by  the  direct  wire  his  refusal  to  submit  to  the 
Government.  On  the  same  day  appeared  Kerensky's  appeal 
to  the  population  about  the  Kornilov  rebellion  and  Korni- 
lov's appeal  saying  that  he  was  "  provoked  "  to  make  the 
rebellion  and  that  he  was  acting  against  the  Government, 
which  was  submitting  to  the  "  Bolshevik  majority  of  the 


xxii  INTRODUCTION 

Soviets  '*  and  "  working  in  agreement  with  the  plans  of 
the  German  General  Staff." 

Thus  the  armed  revolt  against  the  Government  began. 
For  two  days,  while  this  attempt  was  being  crushed,  differ- 
ent "  conciliators  "  besieged  the  Prime  Minister,  attempt- 
ing to  persuade  him  to  compromise  "  as  the  real  force  is 
on  the  side  of  Kornilov."  But  already  on  the  29th  of 
August  it  became  evident  that  the  whole  of  the  real  force  of 
the  country  was  against  Kornilov,  and,  as  had  been  predicted 
to  him  by  Kerensky  himself  some  time  before,  Kornilov 
found  himself  in  splendid  isolation.  On  the  13th  of  August 
the  rebellion  was  definitely  and  bloodlessly  suppressed.  It 
was  easy  to  deal  with  it.  Kornilov  was  not  backed  by  a  sin- 
gle important  political  organization,  nor  could  he  rely  upon 
the  force  of  any  class.  Owing  to  their  political  inexperience, 
Kornilov  and  those  of  the  officers  who  were  with  him  mis- 
took for  a  real  force  the  grumbling  of  the  "  man  in  the 
street,"  irritated  by  the  Revolution,  but  passive  by  nature, 
together  with  the  instigation  of  various  adventurers  and  the 
promises  of  support  from  isolated  politicians.  The  finan- 
cial help  of  a  certain  group  of  banking-houses  artificially  ex- 
aggerated the  dimensions  of  the  movement. 

But  Kornilov's  adventure,  though  predestined  to  fail, 
played  a  fatal  part  in  Russia's  destiny,  as  it  shook  pro- 
foundly and  painfully  the  consciousness  of  the  popular 
masses.  This  shock  was  the  more  serious  as  it  was  unex- 
pected. An  adventure  of  a  small  group  was  transformed 
in  the  inflamed  imagination  of  the  masses  to  a  conspiracy 
of  the  whole  of  the  bourgeoisie  and  of  all  the  upper  classes 
against  democracy  and  the  working  masses.  The  Bol- 
sheviks, who  up  to  the  13th  of  August  were  impotent, 
became  masters  in  the  Petrograd  Soviet  of  Workmen's 
and  Soldiers'  Delegates  on  the  7th  of  September,  gain- 


INTRODUCTION  xxiii 

ing  a  majority  there  for  the  first  time  during  the  whole  ^ 
period  of  the  Revolution.  The  same  happened  everywhere 
with  lightning  rapidity.  Massacres  of  officers  again  began ; 
again  the  commanding  officers  lost  all  their  authority. 
Throughout  the  whole  country,  as  in  the  first  days  of  the 
March  Revolution,  there  appeared  spontaneous  organizations 
which  seized  the  functions  of  governmental  power  under 
the  pretext  of  fighting  the  counter-revolution.  In  the  sol- 
diers' and  workmen's  masses  the  authority  of  the  leaders, 
who  were  fighting  against  the  cry  of  "  All  authority  to  the 
Soviets  "  and  who  were  defending  the  idea  of  a  national 
power  basing  its  authority  on  the  will  of  the  whole  people, 
was  annihilated.  The  wave  of  anarchy  broke  the  Russian 
front  and  overflowed  the  State.  Nobody  will  ever  succeed, 
in  breaking  the  fatal  link  between  the  27th  of  August  (Sep- 
tember 9th,  N.S.)  and  the  25th  of  October  (November 
7th,  N.S.)   1917. 


THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM 

MINUTES  OF  THE  EXAMINATION  OF  A.  F.  KE- 
RENSKY  BY  THE  COMMISSION  OF  INQUIRY 
INTO  THE  KORNILOV  AFFAIR 

(AH  the  dates  in  this  section  of  the  book  —  when  not  otherwise  stated 

—  are  Old  Style,  which  is  thirteen  days  behind   the  chronology  of 

Great  Britain,  etc.). 

CHAPTER  I 

§1 

*  [The  Investigation  Commission  specially  appointed  by  the 
Provisional  Government  for  the  Kornilov  affair  planned  its 
work  upon  a  very  broad  basis,  embracing  the  whole  period 
preceding  the  revolt  and  beginning  from  the  8th  of  July, 
when  General  Kornilov  was  appointed  Commander-in-Chief 
of  the  South-western  front. 

Although  strictly  speaking,  none  of  the  events  preceding 
the  August  days  had  direct  connection  with  General  Komi- 
lov*s  movement  of  the  26th-30th  of  August,  as  subject  to 
prosecution,  yet  this  widening  of  the  scope  of  judicial  inves- 
tigation to  include  the  terrible  days  of  the  3rd-5th  of  July 
had  a  profound  inner  meaning. 

The  scope  of  action  of  the  Investigation  Commission  could 
not  be  narrowed,  because  the  events  of  those  July  days 
(3rd-6th),  days  of  the  first  Bolshevik  riot,  days  of  the 

^The    square    brackets    denote   the    explanations    and    supplements 
added  by  A.  F.  Keren  sky  to  the  stenographic  report  of  the  examination. 
All  English  words  in  italics  are  underlined  by  A.  F.  K. 

1 


x>  THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM 

Tarnopol  disgrace,  promoted  General  Kornilov  to  the  high- 
est post  in  the  army,  and  created  throughout  Russia  that 
novel  atmosphere  of  wounded  patriotism  which  originated 
the  subsequent  events  of  the  26th-30th  of  August. 

I  will  not  dwell  in  detail  upon  the  events  which  preceded 
the  appointment  of  General  Kornilov  as  Commander-in- 
Chief  of  the  South-western  front.  I  think  no  Russian  can 
have  forgotten  those  two  dates  (the  i8th  of  June  and  the 
6th  of  July,  1 91 7),  the  great  impulse  of  self-sacrifice  of  the 
troops  of  the  i8th  of  June,  and  the  sombre  orgy  of  the  dev- 
astators of  Tarnopol  and  Kalusch. 

Who  does  not  recollect  the  time  when  the  hopes  of  salva- 
tion and  honourable  peace  reborn  in  Russia  were  smashed 
by  the  double  blow  dealt  to  the  Russian  army  by  the  German 
Government,  alarmed  for  its  future?  Haviag  tolerated  the 
fall  of  the  Chancellor  Bethmann-Hollweg  and  a  liberal 
tendency  in  Vienna  after  the  i8th  of  June,  the  rulers  of  the 
Central  Powers  decided  to  employ  extreme  measures  in 
their  attempt  to  prevent  the  regeneration  of  the  Russian 
army  and  to  blow  up  the  Russian  front. 

One  example  is  sufficient  to  give  an  idea  of  how  this  work 
was  organized  by  the  German  General  Staff. 

I  was  at  the  western  front  near  Molodetchno  at  the  time 
of  the  Bolshevik  "  revolt ''  of  the  3rd-5th  of  July.  Our 
troops  were  preparing  to  launch  an  offensive.  Here,  while 
visiting  the  front  trenches,  where  as  yet  nothing  was  known 
of  the  Petrograd  events,  one  of  my  aides-de-camp  took  from 
a  group  of  soldiers  a  fresh  copy  of  the  Bolshevik  paper 
The  Comrade,  published  in  Vilna  by  the  German  Gen- 
eral Staff  for  the  benefit  of  the  Russian  soldiers.  This  copy 
contained  an  article  upon  "  Russia  and  the  Offensive," 
dated  *'  Petrograd,  July  3rd  "  (June  20th,  old  style),  which 
with   strange   foresight  made    the    following    statement: 


THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM  S 

''According  to  news  received  from  Russia,  the  Russian 
offensive  in  Galicia  has  excited  great  indignation  among  the 
Russian  people.  Tremendous  crowds  assemble  in  all  the 
large  towns  to  protest  against  this  mass  slaughter  of  Rus- 
sia's sons.  Indignation  against  England,  whom  all  consider 
to  be  the  originator  and  cause  of  the  prolongation  of  this 
terrible  war,  increases  daily.  Kerensky  is  openly  de- 
nounced as  a  traitor  to  the  people.  A  huge  manifestation 
has  taken  place  in  Moscow,  whither  Cossacks  have  been  sent 
to  quell  the  disturbance.  The  present  situation  cannot  last. 
Russkoe  Slovo  states  that  martial  law  has  been  lately  en- 
forced again  in  Petrograd.  A  great  many  Left  Socialists 
have  been  arrested  during  the  past  week.  The  paper  adds 
that  many  of  the  extreme  Left  leaders  were  obliged  to  leave 
Petrograd  for  the  interior  of  Russia.'* 

Naturally,  the  ground  was  well  prepared  for  the  recep- 
tion of  the  Russian  accounts  of  the  real  disorders  of  July 
3rd-5th,  which  reached  the  front  trenches  a  few  days  later ; 
and  were  described  by  the  well-known  and  widely  circulated 
"  Russian  "  newspapers  of  the  front  as  a  revolt  of  the  pro- 
letariat against  the  government  of  "  the  traitor  Kerensky," 
who  had  sold  himself  to  the  capitalists  of  England  and 
France. 

The  same  kind  of  attack  from  the  front  and  the  rear 
was  launched  against  the  Russian  soldier  mass  all  along 
the  front  from  the  Carpathians  to  Riga. 

The  break-through  of  the  Germans  at  Tarnopol  com- 
pletely unbalanced  our  higher  command,  and  yet  it  was 
necessary  to  do  the  utmost  to  re-establish  the  front  as 
speedily  as  possible.  General  Kornilov,  Commander  of  the 
8th  Army,  was  at  that  time  appointed  Commander-in-Chief 
of  the  South-western  front. 

The  narrative  of  my  deposition  begins  from  that  mo- 


4  THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM 

ment;  the  beginning  of  it,  as  being  of  no  importance,  is 
omitted. 

General  Gutor,  whose  name  is  mentioned  at  the  beginning 
of  the  deposition,  had  in  May  been  appointed  Commander- 
in-Chief  of  the  South-western  front.  The  commanders  of 
the  other  fronts  were :  Northern  front,  General  Klembov- 
sky ;  Western,  General  Denikin ;  Rumanian,  General  Stcher- 
batchov;  General  A.  Brussilov  was  Generalissimo,  with 
General  Lukomsky  as  Chief  of  General  Staff.] 

Kerensky. —  General  Kornilov  was  appointed  Command- 
er-in-Chief of  the  South-western  front  under  the  following 
circumstances.  General  Gutor  lost  his  head,  and  Kornilov 
seemed  to  me  the  only  man  at  the  front  capable  of  imme- 
diately replacing  him.  It  seemed,  then,  that  the  danger- 
ous tendency  of  his  character  —  a  too  great  impetuosity 
in  case  of  success  —  would  present  no  danger  during  a 
retreat.  For  the  time  when  that  tendency  could  become 
dangerous  was  still  far  distant.  The  retreat  would  bring 
into  play  all  his  positive  qualities :  decision,  organizing 
talent,  his  initiative  and  independence.  That  is  the  reason 
for  his  appointment  to  the  South-western  front.  There 
was  no  one  else.  Personally,  I  considered  these  reasons 
as  all-sufficient. 

[The  decision  to  exercise  actively  the  extensive  rights 
of  a  military  commander,  the  daring  to  act  without  fear 
of  responsibility,  without  hiding  behind  another's  back 
—  these  were  the  qualities  most  needed  at  the  time.  Un- 
fortunately, these  qualities  were  seldom  to  be  found  among 
our  higher  army  command.  It  must  be  remembered  that 
the  active  struggle  against  the  disruption  of  the  army, 
against  the  **  soft-skins  "  and  the  **  bag-men,"  ^  the  defeat- 

1  Cowardly  soldiers  and  soldiers  travelling  about  buying  and  specu- 
lating. 


THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM  5 

ists  and  pro-Germans,  a  struggle  which  often  necessitated 
the  use  of  armed  force,  was  almost  entirely  carried  on 
by  the  War  Minister's  commissaries  and  army  commit- 
tees. 

Nearly  the  whole  staff  of  the  higher  command  were,  so 
to  speak,  "  not  there "  for  all  practical  purposes  during 
the  period  (May-June)  of  the  most  strenuous  efforts  for 
the  re-establishment  of  military  efficiency  on  all  the  fronts. 
And  yet  a  true  regeneration  of  the  army  could  not  be 
achieved  without  authoritative  leaders,  recognized  as  such 
by  the  whole  mass  of  the  army.  Therefore,  I  think  it 
obvious  why  every  conspicuous  personality,  every  man  of 
initiative  and  action,  met  with  the  entire  support  of  the 
Minister  of  War  and  received  promotion.  Therefore  it  is 
also  obvious  why  I  promptly  and  decidedly  promoted  Gen- 
eral Kornilov,  in  spite  of  the  original  "  ultimative  "  methods 
of  his  activity. 

If  we  recall  the  whole  military-political  situation  at  the 
beginning  of  July,  19 17,  it  becomes  obvious  that  the  sub- 
stance of  General  Komilov's  "  demands,"  was  by  no  means 
an  America  discovered  by  him,  but  a  somewhat  peculiar 
formula  applied  by  him  to  the  measures  partly  passed,  partly 
planned  by  the  Provisional  Government  and  fully  corre- 
sponding to  the  frame  of  mind  of  all  responsible  democratic 
and  liberal  circles. 

Russia  was  shaken  and  stunned  by  this  combined  blow 
—  by  the  bolshevik  attempt  to  "  break  up  the  inner  front  ** 
at  Petrograd  and  the  actual  piercing  of  the  front  of  the 
nth  Army  at  Tarnopol.  The  bolshevik  attempt  was  al- 
most immediately  suppressed.  The  task  of  stemming  the 
German  invasion  was  a  hundredfold  more  difficult.  Prompt 
and  heroic  measures  were  necessary,  and  their  adoption  be- 
came all  the  more  easy,  as  all  Russia  was  extraordinarily 


6  THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM 

unanimous  in  her  estimate  of  the  current  events  and  of 
the  measures  to  be  taken  against  the  double  enemy. 

"  The  meeting  of  the  committees  of  the  N  corps  "  (ac- 
cording to  a  telegram  received  by  me)  "  considers  promoters 
of  discontent,  traitors  and  men  who  incite  others  to  breaches 
of  discipline  and  disobedience  to  battle-orders  to  be  inad- 
missible in  our  ranks.  We  demand  of  all  regimental  com- 
mittees the  immediate  arrest  of  all  such  individuals  and 
the  bringing  of  them  up  for  trial  to  the  army  committees. 
We  demand  that  all  comrades  of  our  corps  should  detain 
every  individual  appearing  in  the  trenches  or  quarters  of  a 
unit  to  which  he  does  not  belong ;  all  such  individuals  should 
be  brought  to  the  regimental  committees  for  identification." 

The  executive  committee  of  the  South-western  front  and 
the  army  committee  of  the  nth  Army,  reporting  to  me  on 
the  situation  created  after  the  6th  of  July,  in  a  joint  tele- 
gram dated  July  8th,  declared  that  the  members  of  the 
frontal  army  committee  and  the  commissaries  "  unanimously 
admit  that  the  situation  demands  the  adoption  of  the  most 
extreme  measures,  as  it  is  urgent  to  stop  at  nothing  to  save 
the  Revolution  from  peril.  Today,  with  the  consent  of  the 
commissaries  and  the  committees,  the  Commander-in-Chief 
of  the  South-western  front  and  the  Commander  of  the 
nth  Army  have  issued  the  order  to  shoot  deserters. 
Let  the  whole  country  learn  the  whole  truth.  Let  her 
shudder  and  form  the  resolve  to  punish  the  faint-hearted, 
who  betray  and  destroy  Russia  and  the  Revolution." 

On  July  nth  the  Central  Executive  Committee  of  the 
Social  Revolutionists  and  Social  Democrats  and  the  Execu- 
tive Committee  of  the  Soviet  issued  a  proclamation  "  to 
all  the  people,"  peasants,  workmen  and  workwomen,  to 
all  councils  and  committees,  to  the  army.  In  this  procla- 
mation the  C.E.C.  made  the  followinsr  statement:     "We 


THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM  7 

acknowledge  the  Provisional  Government  as  the  govern- 
ment for  the  saving  of  the  Revolution.  We  acknowledge 
it  to  be  a  government  invested  with  full  and  unlimited 
powers.  Let  its  orders  be  law  to  everybody.  Any  one 
disobeying  any  battle-order  of  the  Provisional  Government 
is  a  traitor.  For  coivards  and  traitors  there  is  no  mercy. 
Remember  that  only  a  hard  struggle  will  bring  peace  to 
Russia  and  to  all  peoples.  By  retreating  you  will  lose  both 
land  and  freedom,  you  will  lose  peace.  Victorious  German 
Imperialists  will  force  you  to  fight  again  and  again  for 
their  interests.  Let  there  be  no  traitors  nor  cowards  among 
you.     Only  one  way  is  open  to  you  —  forward.'* 

On  July  13th  the  "  Isvestia  of  the  Council  of  S.  &  W. 
D.'*  ^  published  the  following,  in  an  article  entitled: 
**  Faced  by  an  Imminent  Peril."  "  The  work  of  irrespon- 
sible demagogues  has  already  borne  its  bloody  fruit  upon 
the  battle-field.  Dissension  and  confusion  have  penetrated 
the  ranks  of  the  army.  .  .  .  And  the  army's  force  and 
efificiency  have  vanished  like  a  phantom.  .  .  .  The  army  is 
dissolved  and  broken-up,  dismembered  units  are  in  flight 
before  the  enemy.  .  .  .  Our  armies  are  retreating;  worse 
still  —  they  are  running  away,  maddened  by  war.  We 
tremble  for  the  fate  of  Russia  and  the  Revolution,  and 
we  are  filled  with  shame.  The  troops^  which  fought  bravely 
beneath  the  rod  of  Tsarism,  have  become  a  mob  of  miser- 
able cowards  now  that  the  banner  of  liberty  is  hoisted  above 
them:  it  is  a  disgrace." 

As  if  answering  the  feeling  of  inspired  alarm  which  had 
taken  possession  of  all  the  democratic  centres,  the  army 
commissaries  of  the  South-western  front,  with  B.  V.  Savin- 
koy  at  their  head,  sent  the  following  telegram :  "  We  feel 
bound  by  our  conscience  to  declare  what  measures  are  to 
1  Soldiers  and  Workmen's  Deputies. 


8  THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM 

be  taken.  There  is  no  choice :  death-penalty  for  those  who 
refuse  to  risk  their  lives  for  their  country,  for  land  and 
liberty.'*  By  this  time  my  answer  to  the  above-quoted 
telegram  of  the  Executive  Committee  of  the  South-western 
front  had  been  already  received  at  the  front.  **  I  fully 
approve  the  truly  revolutionary  and  highly  proper  decision 
adopted  by  the  Executive  Committee  of  the  South-western 
front  at  this  crucial  moment." 

Upon  the  background  of  this  great  tide  of  patriotism, 
which  swept  over  the  whole  country,  the  contents  of  the 
telegram  sent  by  the  Commander  of  the  nth  Army  (General 
Baluev)  were  but  the  natural  expression  of  the  general 
feeling.  "  Having  become  acquainted  with  the  spirit  of  the 
army,  I  am  horror-struck  at  the  peril  and  disgrace  that 
threaten  Russia.  Time  presses.  All  the  high  command 
and  officers'  staff  are  powerless  to  do  anything  except  sac- 
rifice their  lives.  Paragraph  14  of  the  Declaration  (i.e. 
the  right  of  shooting  on  the  spot)  cannot  be  executed, 
because  the  chief  is  single-handed  against  hundreds  and 
thousands  of  armed  men,  bent  upon  flight.  ...  As  a  faith- 
ful son  of  Russia,  having  devoted  my  life  to  the 
service  of  my  country,  I  consider  it  my  duty  to  declare 
to  the  Government  that  Russian  democracy  and  the  Revo- 
lution are  perishing."  (The  general  further  proposes  a 
series  of  measures  concluding  with  the  death-penalty,  and 
adds:)  "I  hold  that  the  suppression  of  the  death-penalty 
in  the  army  was  a  mistake:  if  the  Government  sends  men 
to  die  from  enemy  bullets,  why  does  it  grant  cowards 
and  traitors  the  possibility  of  escape?  " 

The  solidarity  of  opinion  is  clearly  emphasized  by  the 
following  extract  from  General  B.'s  telegram :  "  All  litera- 
ture circulated  at  the  front  must  be  approved  by  the  Council 
of  S.  &  W.  D.  and  the  army  committees." 


THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM  9 

No  wonder  General  Kornilov,  suffering  the  same  great 
anxiety  as  other  patriots,  expressed  the  general  opinion; 
but  with  characteristic  eccentricity  he  concluded  his  famous 
telegram  of  the  nth  of  July  concerning  the  death-penalty 
with  the  following  announcement :  "  Enough !  I  declare 
that  if  the  Government  does  not  confirm  the  measures 
proposed  by  me,  and  thereby  deprives  me  of  the  only  means 
of  saving  the  army  and  using  it  for  the  fulfilment  of  its 
true  object,  the  defence  of  the  country  and  of  liberty,  I, 
General  Kornilov,  will  arbitrarily  resign  my  post  of  Com- 
mander-in-Chief." 

Such  was  the  will  of  the  country  for  its  salvation.  It 
could  not  be  otherwise.  The  Provisional  Government  had 
not  underrated  the  certainty  of  obtaining  universal  support 
when  it  demanded  decisive  action  at  the  most  critical  mo- 
ment. 

The  front  of  the  nth  Army  was  pierced  upon  the  6th 
of  July;  the  law  committing  for  high  treason  all  persons 
guilty  of  inciting  officers  and  soldiers  to  disobedience  of 
military  orders  in  wartime  was  published  on  the  same  day. 
General  Kornilov  was  appointed  Commander-in-Chief  of 
the  South-western  front  in  the  night  of  the  7th-8th  of 
July.  On  the  morning  of  the  8th  of  July  I  issued  the 
following  order,  No.  2S :  "  After  reading  the  reports  pre- 
sented to  me  dealing  with  events  at  the  South-western 
front,  and  particularly  the  grievous  events  which  took  place 
in  the  nth  Army,  I  consider  it  my  duty  once  again  to 
call  attention  to  the  unflinchingly  gallant  conduct  of  the 
commanding  and  officers'  personnel,  proving  their  devo- 
tion to  liberty  and  the  Revolution,  and  their  unalterable 
love  of  their  country.  I  command  discipline  to  be  re- 
established in  the  army  with  the  full  use  of  revolutionary 
authority,  including  armed  force,  to  save  the  army.     The 


10  THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM 

disruption  of  the  army  cannot  be  tolerated.  All  criminal 
elements,  engaged  in  written  or  oral  propaganda  inciting 
to  disobedience  and  refusal  to  carry  out  battle-orders, 
must  be  immediately  eliminated  from  the  army." 

On  the  1 2th  of  July  the  Provisional  Government  (from 
V.  N.  Lvov  ^  to  V.  M.  Tchernov)  passed  a  unanimous 
vote,  temporarily  re-establishing  the  death-penalty  at  the 
front  and  setting  up  revolutionary  martial  tribunals.  On 
the  13th  of  July  the  Ministers  of  War  and  of  Home  Affairs 
obtained  the  right  to  suppress  papers  and  periodicals  "  in- 
citing to  disobedience  to  military  chiefs,  to  revolt  and 
civil  war."  I  also  received  the  right  to  close  meetings, 
dissolve  congresses,  etc.  A  whole  series  of  laws  and  meas- 
ures was  adopted  by  the  Government  in  less  than  a  fort- 
night. 

Of  course  (I  must  again  repeat  it)  all  this  was  rendered 
possible  by  the  extraordinary  unanimity  of  all  classes  of 
Russian  society  and  by  the  proof  given  by  all  governmental 
and  social,  especially  democratic,  circles  of  a  thorough  un- 
derstanding of  the  existing  situation.  It  was  the  beginning 
of  a  remarkable  sobering  of  the  populace,  a  rapid  growth 
of  a  consciousness  of  responsibility  towards  the  State,  a 
period  of  an  unheard-of  decline  of  anarchic-bolshevik  in- 
fluence upon  the  masses.  It  became  the  Government's  task 
to  accentuate  these  tendencies,  to  strengthen  the  unity  of 
the  all-national  front.  At  the  same  time  the  Government 
was  obliged  to  keep  a  close  watch,  lest  the  reaction  against 
Left  Maximalism  should  lead  to  a  Maximalism  from  the 
Right] 

I  recollect  that  A.  A.  Brussilov  (who,  by  the  way,  like 
all  the  commanding  officers  and  military  authorities,  greatly 

iHigh  Procurator  of  the  Holy  Synod;  not  to  be  confounded  with 
Prince  Procurator  Lvov,  the  former  Premier. 


THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM      11 

distrusted  Kornilov's  somewhat  naive  impetuosity)  at  first 
disapproved  of  Kornilov's  appointment  to  Gutor's  post,  and 
I  was  obliged  to  use  a  certain  amount  of  p;-essure  to  over- 
come his  (Brussilov's)  hesitation.  I  adduced  the  same  rea- 
sons in  favour  of  Kornilov  to  Brussilov  which  I  have 
given  you. 

Chairman.^  —  Concerning  the  conference  of  July  i6th 
at  the  Staz'ka  (Headquarters).  What  were  the  views  ex- 
pressed at  that  conference,  and  did  it  not  become  the  cause 
which  subsequently  brought  about  Kornilov's  succession  to 
Brussilov  ? 

Kerensky. —  The  conference  of  July  i6th  certainly  played 
a  part  in  Kornilov's  appointment.  I  must  say,  this  con- 
ference produced  upon  me  and  upon  all  my  colleagues 
(Terestchenko,  Baranovsky  and  others)  a  disheartening  im- 
pression, absolutely  disheartening.  I  called  this  conference 
upon  my  own  initiative  and  asked  Brussilov  to  invite  all 
the  military  authorities  he  could  bring  together.  .  .  .  You 
know  the  names.     There  is  no  need  to  repeat  them. 

Chairman. —  No. 

[The  members  present  at  the  conference  of  July  i6th 
^t  the  Stavka  were:  Kerensky,  Premier  and  Minister 
of  War  and  Marine ;  Terestchenko,  the  Minister  of  Foreign 
Affairs ;  General  Alexeiev,  attached  to  the  Provisional  Gov- 
ernment; Generalissimo  Brussilov;  his  Chief-of-Staff,  Gen- 
eral Lukomsky ;  General  Klembovsky,  Commander-in-Chief 
of  the  Northern  front;  General  Denikin,  Commander-in- 
Chief  of  the  Western  front;  his  Chief-of-Staff,  General 

1  The  Commission  which  examined  me  consisted  of  the  following 
members:  Chairman;  chief  military  and  naval  prosecutor,  Shablov- 
sky ;  appointed  members :  Kolokolnikov,  Ukraintsev,  Raupakh ;  elected 
members :  members  of  the  Central  Executive  Committee  of  the  Council 
of  Soldiers  and  Workmen's  Deputies,  Krokhmal  and  Liber.  The  ex- 
amination took  place  in  my  study  at  the  Winter  Palace. 


'^.^^^ 


1^  THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM 

Markov;  General  Ruzsky,  former  Commander-in-Chief  of 
the  Northern  front;  Chief  Engineer  General  Velitchko; 
Savinkov,  Commissary  of  the  South-western  front;  officials 
of  tEe*War  Minister's  cabinet  and  of  the  Generalissimo's 
staff. 

The  conference  was  called  for  purely  strategical  military 
purposes.  It  was  of  the  greatest  importance  for  the  Pro- 
visional Government,  and  particularly  for  the  War  Min- 
ister, to  form  a  circumstantial  and  impartial  view  of  the 
real  situation  at  the  front  and  of  the  strategical  conse- 
quences of  the  break  through ;  to  sketch  out  a  plan  of  future 
military  policy,  etc.  This  last  item  was  particularly  im- 
portant to  the  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs,  who  therefore 
accompanied  me  to  the  conference.  We  desired  to  hear 
the  opinion  of  men  with  a  three  years'  war  experience, 
men  who  had  passed  through  the  hard  school  of  the  debacle 
of  1915  and  the  adversities  of  1916.  The  observations 
I  had  made  concerning  the  preparation  and  the  carrying- 
out  of  the  offensive  of  1917  filled  me  with  the  gravest 
fears  and  misgivings.  And  I  desired  that  the  immediate 
problems  of  defence  should  be  defined,  however  generally, 
by  a  conference  of  the  most  experienced  former,  present 
and,  maybe,  future  chiefs.  Naturally,  these  fears  engen- 
dered certain  doubts  as  to  the  expediency  of  General  Brus- 
silov's  remaining  at  the  post  of  Generalissimo. 

Alas!  No  leaders  were  to  be  found  at  this  conference, 
not  even  ordinary  military  specialists  attaining  the  modern 
war-standard.  There  were  none,  not  from  lack  of  capacity 
in  those  present,  but,  I  am  firmly  convinced,  from  lack  of 
wish  to  reveal  it.  The  possibility  of  settling  old  scores 
obscured  everything  else.  All  the  misfortunes,  the  catas- 
trophes, the  disgrace,  the  horror  of  the  first  three  years 
of  war  no  longer  existed  for  them.     Everything  had  gone 


THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM      13 

well  in  the  past.  The  reason  of  all  reasons,  the  source 
of  the  July  debacle,  lay  solely  and  exclusively  in  the  Revo- 
lution and  its  influence  upon  the  Russian  soldier.  Soldau, 
Warsaw,  Kovno,  Peremyshl,  San,  Kovel,  Mitava,  etc.,  etc. 
—  all  these  had  not  been,  had  never  been.  .  .  .  The  wine 
of  hate  for  all  things  new  had  gone  to  those  old  wise 
heads.  Russia  and  the  Provisional  Government  obtained 
no  counsel,  no  aid  from  the  military  chiefs.  On  the  other 
hand,  here  for  the  first  time  General  Denikin  outlined  the 
program  of  the  *' revanche"  that  "music  of  the  future" 
of  military  reaction,  which  inspired  many  and  many  a 
partisan  of  Komilov's  movement.  Some  points  of  Deni- 
kin's  program  had  already  been  presented  to  the  Provisional 
Government  in  the  form  of  demands.  Thus  at  the  very 
beginning  of  the  Tarnopol  break  through  the  Main  Com- 
mittee of  the  Army  and  Navy  Officers'  League,  in  a  highly 
significant  telegram  addressed  to  the  Provisional  Govern- 
ment, spoke  as  follows :  "  We  insist  upon  the  re-establish- 
ment of  full  powder,  authority  and  disciplinarian  rights  to 
commanders  of  all  ranks."] 

Kerensky. —  Kornilov  was  not  present  at  this  conference. 
He  received  a  telegram  from  the  Stavka  which  seemed  to 
imply  that  his  presence  was  not  desired.  I  cannot  recall 
the  exact  text,  but  the  tenor  of  it  was  to  that  effect:  *'  In 
view  of  the  critical  situation  at  the  South-western  front 
you  will  be  unable  to  come." 

[General  Kornilov,  speaking  of  this  telegram  in  his  state- 
ment, says :  "  I  received  the  telegram  No.  5067  from  the 
Generalissimo  to  the  effect  that,  owing  to  the  situation  at 
the  South-western  front,  my  arrival  at  the  Stavka  is  con- 
sidered to  be  impossible,  and  that  I  am  invited  to  present 
my  considerations."] 

In  the  midst  of  all  the  disheartening  opinions  and  pro- 


14  THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM 

posals  expressed  by  all  the  generals  present,  the  telegram 
from  Kornilov  seemed  to  shed  a  faint  ray  of  light.  It 
was  deeply  oppressive,  but  still  it  contained  a  more  im- 
partial attitude  towards  the  soldier  mass  and  the  com- 
manding staff.  I  must  say,  that  all  the  generals,  particu- 
larly Alexeiev,  Ruzsky  and  Denikin,  evinced  a  complete 
lack  of  strategical  and  political  insight.  According  to  them 
the  state  of  mind  of  the  private  soldiers  lay  at  the  root 
of  all  the  evil.  For  instance,  one  of  them  considered  that 
the  only  reform  necessary  to  prevent  soldiers  from  deserting 
was  the  immediate  re-establishment  of  the  salute. 

[The  general  alluded  to  in  the  last  sentence  was  not 
Denikin.] 

Such  were  the  judgments  expressed.  And  upon  such  a 
background  General  Komilov's  opinion,  that  the  present 
calamities  were  not  solely  due  to  the  soldiers'  demoraliza- 
tion, but  also  to  the  original  and  long-standing  deficiency 
of  the  commanding  staff;  that  therefore,  simultaneously, 
with  punitive  measures  immediate  steps  should  be  taken 
for  the  purifying  of  the  commanding  body  —  such  a  view 
tended  to  produce  the  impression  that  here  was  a  man 
with  a  deeper  and  wider  outlook  upon  the  situation  than 
that  of  his  compeers.  Lately  it  became  obvious  to  me, 
by  the  style  of  the  telegram,  that  it  had  not  been  drafted 
by  him.  Strange  to  say,  all  General  Kornilov's  appoint- 
ments after  he  became  Generalissimo  were  based  upon  an 
inverted  principle.  He  immediately  began  to  promote  and 
reinstate  men  belonging  to  the  oldest  traditions.  Take, 
for  instance,  the  wholesale  dismissal  of  the  commanding 
staff  of  the  South-western  front,  which  occurred  as  soon 
as  General  Kornilov  transferred  thither  Generals  Denikin 
and  Markov.  They  started  a  general  removal  of  all  com- 
manders sympathizing  with  the  new  army  organizations. 


THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM     15 

I  was  obliged  to  come  into  serious  conflict  with  Kornilov, 
who  was  bent  upon  promoting  to  a  high  post  General  Lechit- 
sky,  an  officer  utterly  inacceptable  under  the  existing  novel 
conditions.  In  fine,  Kornilov's  policy  was  in  such  absolute 
contradiction  to  the  contents  of  his  own  telegram  produced 
at  the  conference  of  July  i6th,  that  I  believe  this  telegram 
to  have  been  written  either  by  Savinkov  or  by  Filonenko; 
I  cannot  be  certain  which  of  the  two,  but  that  one  of 
them  wrote  it. 

[General  Kornilov's  constant  tendency  to  appoint  to  posts 
of  high  command  partisans  of  the  pre-revolutionary  methods 
of  army  administration  and  his  passive  attitude  towards 
the  absolutely  inadmissible  conduct  of  some  commanders  in 
their  treatment  of  the  soldiers,  his  indifference,  to  say  the 
least  of  it,  towards  the  campaign  set  up  by  some  of  the 
commanders  and  staffs  against  the  army  organizations, 
drove  me  to  despair.  I  was  completely  bewildered,  until 
I  realized  that  General  Kornilov  had  two  programs — • 
one  for  presenting  to  the  Provisional  Government  and  an- 
other for  daily  practice.  For  instance,  one  of  his  reports 
upon  army  organizations  presented  to  the  Provisional  Gov- 
ernment ran  thus :  "  It  is  surely  matter  for  wonder  that 
the  young  elected  bodies  have  scarcely  ever  swerved  from 
the  right  path,  and  have  so  often  proved  themselves  quite 
equal  to  the  situation,  even  to  making  the  supreme  sacri- 
fice in  blood  in  their  valorous  military  activity.  The  com- 
mittees symbolizing  in  the  eyes  of  the  masses  the  existence 
of  the  Revolution  guarantee  the  calm  acceptance  of  all 
measures  at  the  front  and  in  the  rear  indispensable  for 
the  salvation  of  the  army  and  the  country."  In  practice, 
however,  the  battle-front  which  was  the  most  highly  or- 
ganized (namely  the  South-western  front)  became  speedily 
disintegrated  owing  to  the  course  adopted  by  Generals  Deni- 


16     THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM 

kin  and  Markov,  ardently  supported  by  the  "  driller/'  Gen- 
eral Selivachov,  and  the  recent  "  democrat,"  General 
Erdely.  And  yet  the  services  rendered  by  the  Executive 
Committees  and  the  commissaries  of  the  South-western 
front  in  the  raising  of  the  army  efficiency  and  the  struggle 
against  anarchy  at  the  time  of  the  break  through  were 
absolutely  invaluable.  I  regret  being  obliged  to  en- 
dorse the  following  estimate  of  General  Denikin's  policy 
stated  in  a  resolution  of  the  South-western  front  Executive 
Committee :  "  From  the  moment  of  General  Denikin's  ap- 
pointment to  the  post  of  Commander-in-Chief  of  the  South- 
western front,  the  staff  began  directly  to  oppose  all  elected 
army  organizations.  .  .  .  Great  partiality  was  practised  in 
relation  to  the  commanding  body.  Officers  violating  the 
rights  acquired  by  the  Revolution  are  encouraged,  while 
those  working  in  touch  with  the  elected  organizations  are 
persecuted."  The  staff  not  only  longed  to  violate  these 
rights,  but  actually  attempted  to  restore  corporal  punish- 
ment and  resort  to  blows.  By  the  way,  General  Alexeiev, 
in  his  well-known  letter  to  P.  N.  Miliukov,  gives  the  fol- 
lowing explanation  of  the  hostile  attitude  of  the  Executive 
Committee  of  the  South-western  front  towards  Denikin  and 
Markov.  "  The  committee  had  accounts  to  settle  with  Deni- 
kin and  Markov,  who  put  a  stop  to  the  committee's  grabbing 
of  public  money."  I  consider  it  my  duty  to  refute  this 
entirely  false  accusation.  The  Executive  Committee  of  the 
South-western  front  was  one  of  the  most  serious,  self- 
denying,  patriotic  army  organizations  which,  after  the  6th 
of  July,  raised  a  protest  against  the  "  soft-skins  "  ^  and 
authoritatively  supported  the  Government  in  its  struggle 
against  the  Bolshevik  soldier  rabble.] 

1  Cowardly  soldiers. 


THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM      17 

Chairman. —  By  the  way,  d  propos  of  this  conference, 
Denikin  took  part  in  it. 

Kerensky. —  Yes. 

Chairman. —  He  stated  that  his  views  upon  the  imme- 
diate reforms  needed  in  the  army  received  your  approval. 

Kerensky. —  No.  Denikin  is  a  good  and  brave  man. 
You  see,  when  I  arrived  at  the  conference  (remember,  that 
it  assembled  at  the  moment  of  defeat,  not  success),  I  saw 
at  once  that  all  the  generals'  pent-up  resentment  against 
me  and  the  new  regime  was  ready  to  burst  out.  But 
Alexeiev,  Brussilov  and  Ruzsky,  men  better  versed  in  diplo- 
macy, restrained  themselves,  although  boiling  with  indigna- 
tion, while  Denikin  behaved  like  a  simple,  straightforward 
soldier.  His  speech  was  such  as  not  one  of  them,  under 
any  other  Government,  would  have  ever  dared  address  to 
the  Head  of  the  Government.  Such  a  speech  would  not 
even  have  been  listened  to  under  the  old  regime.  It  con- 
tained personal  attacks  on  me.  ...  So,  after  Denikin's 
speech,  in  order  to  emphasize  that  I  took  a  different  view 
of  such  plain-speaking  from  that  of  the  old  regime,  and 
valued  liberty  of  opinion,  as  well  as  to  avert  a  scandal  (the 
other  generals  were  nonplussed),  I  rose,  held  out  my  hand 
to  him,  and  said :  "  Thank  you,  General,  for  the  courage 
of  frankly  stating  your  opinion."  I  meant  to  show  my 
appreciation  of  his  behaviour,  not  of  his  speech.  Later,  I 
opposed  Denikin's  point  of  view  and  defended  my  own. 
However,  Denikin  only  sharply  expressed  the  opinion  silently 
shared  by  all  the  others.  The  immediate  dissolution  of 
all  elected  bodies,  the  abolition  of  all  rights  proclaimed  in 
the  Declaration,  the  resumption  of  full  authority  and  disci- 
plinarian rights  by  the  commanding  officers,  including  the 
re-establishment  of  the  salute  —  such  was  General  Denikin's 


18  THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM 

program.  [In  a  word,  it  meant  the  immediate  return  to 
the  old  order  in  the  army.]  However,  even  his  adherents 
there  present  admitted  that  such  wholesale  reaction  was 
impossible  at  such  short  notice. 

General  Denikin  himself,  in  his  telegram  of  August  27th, 
No.  145,  addressed  to  the  Provisional  Government  upon 
Kornilov's  dismissal,  refers  to  his  speech  at  the  Stavka 
Conference  on  July  6th  in  the  following  terms :  "  On  July 
6th,  at  the  Conference  with  members  of  the  Provisional 
Government,  I  declared  that  by  a  series  of  acts  it  had 
destroyed  and  corrupted  the  army  and  trampled  our  battle- 
standards  in  the  mud."  He  was  so  firmly  persuaded  that 
no  Government  would  have  tolerated  such  open  criticism 
and  attacks  from  its  subordinate,  that  he  "  considered  his 
being  allowed  to  remain  Commander-in-Chief  as  a  sign  of 
the  Government's  confession  of  its  heavy  sin.'*  ...  He 
never  understood  that  a  Government,  acting  upon  the  prin- 
ciple of  right  and  truth,  can  and  must  listen  calmly  to 
every  honest  and  independent  opinion. 

[What  irony  of  Fate!  General  Denikin,  arrested  as 
Kornilov's  accomplice  at  the  South-western  front,  was  saved 
from  the  fury  of  the  maddened  soldiers  by  the  members 
of  the  Executive  Committee  of  the  South-western  front  and 
by  the  Commissaries  of  the  Provisional  Government.  I 
remember  with  what  emotion  the  never-to-be-forgotten  N. 
N.  Dukhonin  and  I  read  the  account  of  how  a  handful  of 
brave  men  escorted  the  arrested  Generals  Markov,  Denikin 
and  others  across  the  town,  through  a  crowd  of  thousands 
of  soldiers  thirsting  for  their  blood;  how  they  boarded  a 
train  and,  having  cleared  the  rails  by  force,  drove  them 
safely  out  of  Berditchev.  How  very  unfair  is  General 
Alexeiev's  statement  in  his  letter  to  Miliukov,  that  "the 
passions  and  hatred  of  the  rude  mob  and  soldiery  of  Ber- 


THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM      19 

ditchev  were  artificially  fostered  by  the  unclean  wretched 
personality  of  Mr.  N.  and  the  corrupt  personnel  of  the 
committee  revealing  demagogic  tendencies,"  and  that  **  if 
the  base  agents  at  Berditchev,  gambling  with  the  rude  pas- 
sions of  the  rabble,  fail  to  play  their  game  —  court-martial 
and  execution  at  Berditchev  —  they  have  other  means  at 
their  command,  namely  lynching  by  an  insulted  democracy." 
N.  N.  Dukhonin's  own  fate  has  given  a  striking  example 
that,  with  leaders  actually  playing  with  the  passions  of  the 
mob,  the  victims  are  doomed  to  perish.] 

Chairman. —  Did  not  this  conference  provide  a  basis  for 
the  subsequent  replacing  of  General  Brussilov  by  Kornilov? 

Kerensky. —  Yes  —  in  a  way.  We  had  generally  a  very 
limited  choice.  To  my  mind,  General  Brussilov  could  not 
remain.  Besides,  he  seemed  quite  at  a  loss  what  to  do  next, 
and  was  obviously  utterly  unable  to  continue  the  policy  of 
leaning  more  upon  the  common  soldiery  than  upon  the 
commanding  body.  Meanwhile  the  situation  was  such  that 
events  might  have  developed  with  catastrophic  suddenness, 
if  there  had  been  no  firm  hand  to  control  the  entire  front. 
We  expected  a  further  development  of  the  German  offen- 
sive. On  the  other  hand,  I  was  obliged  to  consider  the 
fact  that  the  appointment  of  an  adherent  of  Denikin's 
policy  would  provoke  a  simultaneous  revolt  among  all  the 
troops.     These  reasons  settled  the  question. 

Chairman. —  And  were  there  no  hints  or,  perhaps,  polit- 
ical considerations  of  a  certain  kind  pointing  to  General 
Brussilov's  reactionary  tendencies,  or  even  counter-revolu- 
tionary aspirations?  Or  were  there  no  such  data,  nothing 
but  hesitation  and  indecision  ? 

Kerensky. —  I  had  observed  even  before  the  debacle  that 
strictly  speaking,  the  Stavka  had  no  plan;  there  was  no 
stability;  they  never  seemed  to  anticipate  events,  but  to 


so  THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM 

follow  in  their  train.  For  instance,  I  remember  Brussilov^s 
consternation  when  the  offensive  did  not  develop  as  rapidly 
as  was  expected.  I  saw  he  was  quite  incapable  of  dis- 
entangling the  situation  on  all  the  fronts  taken  as  a  whole. 
But  there  were  no  data  whatever  as  to  Brussilov's  being 
a  counter-revolutionary.  Simply  I  deemed  it  impossible 
for  him  to  remain  at  the  head  of  the  army,  owing  to  his 
lack  of  a  definite  orientation.  At  this  conference  he  op- 
posed no  opinion  of  his  own  to  all  the  arguments  expressed 
by  the  commanders  [passively  submitting  to  the  general 
tendency] . 

All  this  created  such  a  situation  that,  if  Brussilov  had 
remained,  we  should  have  faced  coming  events  in  total 
ignorance  of  our  next  move.  We  could  not  tell  what  course 
we  should  adopt  on  the  morrow,  what  would  happen  to  the 
army,  whether  we  should  advance  simultaneously  in  all 
directions,  etc. 

[The  scheme  of  the  offensive  of  July,  191 7,  consisted  of 
a  series  of  attacks  to  be  delivered  against  the  enemy  on 
all  the  fronts  in  succession,  thereby  preventing  the  con- 
centration of  his  forces  on  the  point  of  attack.  The  suc- 
cess of  this  general  offensive  depended  upon  its  rapid  devel- 
opment, but  in  reality  all  calculations  were  upset  from  the 
start,  the  connection  between  the  operations  at  various  fronts 
severed,  with  the  consequence  that  the  entire  aim  of  the 
operation  was  frustrated.  As  soon  as  this  state  of  things 
became  evident  I  advised  General  Brussilov  before  the  6th 
of  July  to  stop  the  general  offensive.  But  I  met  with  no 
approval.  Separate  offensives  were  continued  at  different 
fronts,  but  all  spirit  and  sense  had  forsaken  them.  Noth- 
ing remained  but  the  inertia  of  movement,  which  only  tended 
to  augment  the  ruin  and  dissolution  of  the  army.  I  remem- 
ber that  Kornilov's  telegram  of  the  nth  of  July,  pointing 


THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM     21 

to  the  necessity  of  "  immediately  stopping  the  offensive  on 
all  fronts,"  played  an  important  part  in  his  appointment  to 
the  post  of  Generalissimo.] 

§2 

Chairman. —  Has  not  a  certain  conversation  taken  place 
with  Savinkov  and  Filonenko  in  a  railway  car,  concerning 
the  conference,  which  explains  our  previous  question? 

Kercnsky. —  I  do  not  know  which  conversation  you  refer 
to.     There  were  several  conversations. 

Chairman. —  About  replacing  Brussilov  by  Kornilov. 

Kerensky. —  I  should  like  to  say  that  Savinkov  ought 
to  be  distinguished  from  Filonenko.  As  far  as  I  can 
remember,  Savinkov  accompanied  me  to  the  conference. 
.  .  .  Oh,  no  —  he  arrived  from  the  South-western  front 
[though  at  my  summons].  He  was  commissary  at  that 
time.  At  first  I  did  not  even  know  that  Filonenko  was 
at  the  Stavka.  I  was  acquainted  with  Savinkov's  w^ork 
at  the  South-western  front;  I  had  spoken  to  him,  whereas 
Filonenko  was  personally  very  little  known  to  me.  I  met 
him  almost  for  the  first  time  at  the  Stavka.  After  the 
conference  of  July  i6th  conversations  did  take  place  in  the 
railway-car.  I  do  not  remember  whether  Filonenko  was 
present  or  not,  but  I  do  not  think  he  could  speak  in  the 
same  way  as  Savinkov  would. 

Chairman. —  Perhaps  in  connection  with  this  conference 
conversations  had  taken  place  concerning  changes  in  the 
Government.  Who  wxre  the  Cabinet  Ministers  proposed, 
or  what  were  the  changes  anticipated? 

Kerensky. —  I  do  not  at  all  remember  what  happened  on 
the  train.  I  was  then  already  Prime  Minister.  ...  I  do 
not  remember  whether  the  crisis  was  over  then  or  not.     It 


22  THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM 

seems  as  if  all  this  happened  before  the  Cabinet  had  been 
reformed.  I  cannot  say.  I  do  not  remember.  If  the 
Cabinet  was  incomplete,  then  the  conversation  did  take  place. 
That  crisis  lasted  a  long  time,  a  whole  month,  I  believe, 
and  ended  in  my  resigning.  It  was  the  only  way  to  force 
public  opinion  to  come  to  any  decision.  Generally,  I  must 
say,  concerning  your  references  to  different  conversations 
in  which  I  took  part,  that  conversations  are  freely  going 
on  around  me.  I  never  forbid  any  one,  not  even  a  sub- 
lieutenant (let  alone  a  commissary),  to  express  his  opinion, 
give  advice,  etc.  But  such  talk  seldom  influences  subse- 
quent events. 

[During  the  examination  proper  these  questions  concern- 
ing conversations  in  the  railway-carriage  seemed  to  me 
rather  unnecessary  and  irrelevant.  But  now,  having  become 
acquainted  "  at  leisure  "  with  the  different  statements  upon 
the  Kornilov  affair,  I  see  the  use  that  was  attempted  to  be 
made  of  such  conversations  and  find  it  necessary  to  discuss 
the  matter  more  fully. 

Now  I  understand  that  the  Commission  of  Inquiry  was 
trying  to  clear  up  the  question  of  the  "  irresponsible  influ- 
ences **  upon  the  Prime  Minister.  Here  are  those  of  the 
statements  touching  upon  this  question  and  made  in  con- 
nection with  the  Kornilov  affair  with  which  I  became  ac- 
quainted. General  Kornilov  says  that  he  "  openly "  de- 
clared to  Savinkov  that  he  considered  "  Kerensky  a  man  of 
weak  character,  easily  influenced  by  others."  Savinkov. 
relates :  "On  the  way,  I  learnt  in  the  train  from  A.  F.  Ker- 
ensky that  he  had  summoned  me  from  the  Southwestern 
front  in  view  of  formation  of  a  new  Cabinet  based  upon  the 
principle  of  a  strong  revolutionary  power.  .  .  .  However, 
after  our  arrival  at  Petrograd,  Kerensky*s  combination  did 


THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM      2S 

not  come  into  existence.  The  problem  of  a  strong  revolu- 
tionary power  remained  unsolved,  but  General  Kornilov 
was  appointed  Generalissimo,  Filonenko  Commissary-in- 
Chief,  and  I  Deputy  Minister  of  War."  "  On  the  way," 
says  Filonenko,  *'  we  drew  the  Prime  Minister's  attention 
to  the  urgent  necessity  of  creating  a  strong  authority,  and 
were  energetically  supported  by  M.  I.  Terestchenko.  The 
question  of  forming  an  inner  *  War  Cabinet '  of  Govern- 
ment members  was  particularly  discussed.  .  .  .  This  idea, 
which  received  A.  F.  Kerensky's  full  approval,  was  warmly 
supported  by  Terestchenko.  ..."  Lastly,  in  S^vinkov's 
supplementary  statement  there  was  a  special  clause  4:"** On 
irresponsible  advisers,"  which  ran  as  follows:  "I  became 
convinced  that  both  N.  V.  Nekrassov  and  M.  L  Terestchenko 
with  Kerensky's  knowledge  interfere  in  the  affairs  of  the 
Military  Department."  But  both  Nekrassov  and  Terest- 
chenko were  fully  constituted  members  of  the  Provisional 
Government  and  as  such  had  full  right  to  "  interfere,"  even 
without  my  "  knowledge,"  in  the  affairs  of  any  department. 
They  not  only  possessed  that  right,  but  it  was  their  duty  to 
do  so,  as  members  of  the  Provisional  Government  jointly 
responsible  for  each  other.  Besides,  V.  N.  Nekrassov  was 
then  my  Deputy,  and  M.  L  Terestchenko  Minister  for  For- 
eign Affairs.  Military  problems  touched  them  both  very 
closely.  I  consulted  them  upon  questions  of  military  policy 
more  frequently  than  any  other  ministers.  Only  a  man  very 
unversed  in  statesmanship  could  in  this  case  speak  of  "  irre- 
sponsible influences."  "  Besides  which,"  continues  Savinko, 
"  I  became  convinced  that  A.  F.  Kerensky  is  advised  upon 
affairs  of  state  by  persons  not  belonging  to  the  Provisional 
Government.  Thus  Colonel  Baranovsky  and  Flag-Captain 
Muraviev,  and  also,  to  the  best  of  my  belief,  Gotz  and  Sen- 


24j  the  prelude  to  BOLSHEVISM 

sinov  offered  advice  about  the  formation  of  a  new  Cabinet, 
while  Messrs.  Balavinsky  and  Virubov  discussed  V.  N. 
Lvov's  '  ultimatum.'  " 

Balavinsky  and  Virubov,  as  will  be  seen  later,  rendered 
me  very  important  services  upon  the  evening  of  the  26th  of 
August  —  and  that  is  all.  I  will  also  dilate  further  on  the 
circumstances  in  which  Colonel  Baranovsky  and  Flag-Cap- 
tain  Muraviev  have  expressed  their  views.  Concerning  the 
hints  as  to  the  influence  of  Gotz  and  Sensinov,  I  could 
greatly  enlarge  the  list  of  "  irresponsible  advisers  "  by  add- 
ing to  it  the  representatives  of  other  political  parties  (C.-D., 
S.-R.,  S.-D.,  etc.)/  whom  I  invariably  consulted  every  time 
the  Government  was  reformed.  I  do  not  think  it  possible 
to  form  a  serious  Cabinet  without  learning  the  wishes  and 
tendencies  of  the  political  parties  called  upon  to  support  the 
Government. 

When,  however,  the  question  was  not  of  a  political  agree- 
ment for  the  formation  of  a  coalitionary  Government,  but 
one  of  a  measure  of  administration  —  then  the  most  in- 
fluential "  irresponsible  advisers  "  remained  powerless,  even 
"  Gotz  and  Sensinov.'*  For  instance,  both  of  them  decidedly 
protested  in  the  name  of  the  S.-L  party  against  B.  V.  Savin- 
kov's  appointment  as  Deputy  Minister  of  War,  and  yet  he 
was  appointed  in  spite  of  them. 

"  Moreover,"  continues  Savinkov  in  his  disclosures,  **  Col- 
onel Baranovsky  often  expressed  his  views  concerning  the 
appointments  and  dismissals  of  persons  belonging  to  the 
high  command."  But  Colonel  Baranovsky  was  chief  of  my 
Military  Cabinet,  whose  duty  it  was  to  give  me  correct  in- 
formation and  conclusions  upon  all  military  questions  which 
came  before  me.     Moreover,  the  only  effect  of  his  opinion 

1  C.-D.  =  Constitutional  Democrats;  S.-R.  ==  Socialist  Revolutionists; 
S.-D.  =  Social  Democrats. 


THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM      25 

about  the  staff  of  the  military  department  was  in  helping  me 
to  examine  each  case  more  fully.  §avinkov  even  added  my 
eighteen-year-old  aides-de-camp  to  the  list  of  my  "  irre- 
sponsible advisers."  Well,  here  he  beats  me,  and  I  am 
powerless  to  refute  this  accusation. 

I  have  purposely  dwelt  upon  these  details  to  give  an  ex- 
ample of  how  history  is  written  and  legends  created.  The 
events  of  the  3rd-5th  of  July  in  Petrograd,  the  break-up  of 
the  front,  the  Government  crisis,  complications  with  dif- 
ferent nationalities,  economic  difficulties,  the  food  crisis  — 
offered  problems  which  the  Government,  diminished  numeri- 
cally (the  cadets  having  only  just  left  it)  had  to  cope  with 
all  at  once. 

On  me  devolved  primarily  the  task  of  dealing  with  these 
matters :  for  almost  twenty-four  hours  at  a  stretch  I  had  to 
divide  my  time  between  supreme  State  Government,  Home 
policy,  reports  of  the  Ministries  of  War  and  Marine,  and 
continuous  trips  to  the  front  or  the  Stavka.  At  such  a 
time,  the  railway-car  meant  rest  —  a  respite,  when  one  could 
cease  to  be  Prime  Minister  and  just  sit  quietly  and  listen,  and 
when  one  could  also  allow  one's  companions  to  indulge  in  un- 
conventional talk  upon  all  subjects;  for  my  closest  collabo- 
rators also  worked  like  convicts  when  not  on  the  train.  And 
now  such  a  railway-respite  assumes  historical  significance, 
the  chance  companions  of  a  casual  talk  upon  the  burning 
topics  of  the  day  transform  it  into  a  political  event  of  which 
they  were  the  centre.  And  when  later  the  Provisional  Gov- 
ernment does  not  act  upon  "  our  report,"  naturally  all  the 
blame  is  laid  upon  other  advisers,  who  had  played  upon  the 
"  weakness  "  of  the  Premier.  Men  who  wish  to  govern  must 
possess  the  art  of  listening  silently  and  letting  others  speak 
out  their  thoughts,  for  this  brings  one  into  closer  touch  with 
the  yet  unconscious  hopes  and  aspirations  of  different  social 


S6  THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM 

circles.  We  were,  of  course,  not  exempt  from  work  even 
on  the  train.  So  on  this  occasion  I  listened  attentively  to 
all  Savinkov's  conclusions  upon  military  questions  and  to 
his  character-sketch  of  General  Kornilov,  as  both  of  them 
were  destined  to  occupy  more  responsible  posts  in  the 
future.] 

§3 

Chairman. —  What  was  your  attitude,  sir,  and  that  of  the 
Provisional  Government,  towards  General  Kornilov's  pro- 
posals regarding  the  enforcement  of  army  discipline  and  the 
restoration  of  order  at  the  front  and  in  the  rear?  —  also 
as  regards  his  program  and  demands  after  he  was  appointed 
Generalissimo  ? 

Kerensky. —  Well,  you  see,  here  you  must  take  both  sides 
of  the  question :  the  substance  of  his  desires  and  the  outward 
forms  he  wished  them  to  assume.  In  substance  his  scheme 
was  already  partly  being  worked*  out  by  the  Provisional 
Government  and  was  expected  to  be  put  into  practice  accord- 
ing to  the  plan :  co-ordination  of  relations  between  the  com- 
mittees, the  commissaries  and  the  commanding  staff;  defi- 
nition of  rights  and  duties ;  army  discipline,  such  as  the  re- 
establishing and  enforcing  of  the  officers'  authority,  etc. 
All  this  was  already  being  worked  out.  The  only  novelty 
that  presented  itself  was  this:  proposals  became  demands, 
presented  to  the  Provisional  Government  by  General  Kor- 
nilov. This  was  strongly  emphasized.  Moreover,  he  spe- 
cially insisted  on  reprisals,  such  as  death-penalty,  revolu- 
tionary tribunals  in  the  rear,  etc.  Part  of  the  Provisional 
Government  advocated  the  full  acceptance  of  General  Kor- 
nilov's *'  demands."  Myself  and  the  majority  of  the  Gov- 
ernment were  of  opinion  that  Kornilov's  demands,  like  all 
the  proposals  of  other  commanders,  however  highly  placed. 


THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM  27 

could  only  serve  as  material  for  free  discussion  by  the  Pro- 
visional Government,  as  we  could  not  on  principle  deviate 
from  our  adopted  course  of  action,  which  consisted  in  gradu- 
ally introducing  necessary  measures  without  creating  undue 
shocks  in  the  army  and  the  country.  As  to  the  form  of 
Komilov's  demands,  here  the  Provisional  Government  as  a 
body  was  obliged  to  protest  emphatically  against  Kornilov's 
ultimative  manner  of  addressing  the  Government,  in  order 
to  safeguard  the  rights  and  the  prestige  of  the  Provisional 
Government  as  the  Supreme  Authority  of  the  State. 

General  Kornilov's  first  ultimatum  was  presented  imme- 
diately after  his  appointment  as  Generalissimo  and  before  he 
had  even  left  Bendery.  1  sent  him  the  customary  telegram 
of  congratulation,  expressing  the  hope  that  under  his  com- 
mand, etc.  ...  in  short,  all  that  is  usually  said  upon  such 
occasions.  It  seemed  to  me  that  the  man  honestly  desired 
to  and  would  work.  In  reply  to  my  telegram  I  at  once  re- 
ceived the  first  ultimatum.  You  know,  the  Tcheremissov 
affair.  I  told  the  Provisional  Government  that  we  must  dis- 
miss Kornilov  at  once ;  that  if  we  wanted  to  restore  discipline 
in  the  army,  we  must  begin  by  giving  an  example  in  high 
quarters.  My  proposal  was  not  accepted,  and  Kornilov  in- 
terpreted our  indulgence  as  a  sign  of  impotence. 

[As  a  matter  of  fact,  General  Kornilov  during  the  first 
twenty-four  hours  of  his  Generalissimoship  managed  to  send 
me  two  ultimative  telegrams,  but  I  did  not  deal  with  them  in 
the  same  way.  I  simply  made  a  note  of  the  first  telegram. 
I  did  not  report  it  to  the  Provisional  Government,  although 
it  contained  neither  more  nor  less  than  the  "  terms  "  upon 
which  General  Kornilov  consented  to  remain  Generalissimo. 
Here  is  the  text  of  this  ultimatum :  "  As  a  soldier  bound 
to  give  an  example  of  military  discipline  I  obey  the  order  of 
the  Provisional  Government  appointing  me  to  the  post  of 


28  THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM 

Generalissimo;  but  now  as  Generalissimo  and  a  citizen  of 
free  Russia  I  declare  that  I  shall  remain  at  this  post  only  so 
long  as  I  am  conscious  of  being  useful  to  my  country  and  to 
the  established  regime.  According  to  the  above  statement  I 
declare  that  I  accept  this  appointment  upon  the  following 
terms:  (i)  responsibility  only  before  my  conscience  and 
before  the  whole  people;  (2)  absolute  non-interference  with 
my  imperative  orders,  including  appointments  to  the  high 
command;  (3)  extension  of  all  measures  lately  adopted  at 
the  front  to  all  districts  in  the  rear  where  there  are  army 
reserves;  (4)  acceptance  of  my  proposals  stated  in  my  tele- 
gram to  the  Generalissimo  at  the  Conference  of  July  i6th, 
at  the  Stavka.   ..." 

Today,  upon  the  background  of  the  events  which  suc- 
ceeded them,  these  "  terms,"  drawn  up  by  Zavoiko,  produce 
a  far  less  na'ive  impression  than  they  did  on  the  20th  of 
July,  19 1 7.  Then,  if  treated  seriously,  an  official  discussion 
of  the  ultimatum  of  General  Kornilov,  acting  ''  now  as 
Generalissimo,"  would  have  resulted  in  one  inevitable  conse- 
quence (see  Clauses  i  and  2  of  the  terms) — General  Kor- 
nilov's  immediate  dismissal  from  his  post,  with  committal 
for  trial  according  to  military  statute.  And  yet  the  entire 
document  gave  proof  of  such  absence  of  even  an  elementary 
know^ledge  of  statesmanship  that  it  seemed  impossible  to  re- 
prove this  gallant  soldier,  who  clearly  had  signed  a  docu- 
ment foisted  upon  him  by  "  chance  persons."  At  that  time 
I  could  have  entirely  shared  Prince  G.  N.  Trubetzkoy's  later 
expressed  opinion  of  General  Kornilov. 

"  My  general  opinion  of  Kornilov,"  wrote  Prince  Trubetz- 
koy,  "  is,  that  he  is  above  all  a  soldier  unable  to  grasp  com- 
plicated political  matters,  and  as  such  he  offers  a  particularly 
remarkable  sample  of  our  commanding  staff."  I  recollect 
that,  after  reading  the  Generalissimo's  terms,  I  handed  over 


THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM      29 

the  telegram  to  Savinkov  and  Baranovsky.  They  both  said 
it  was  unworthy  of  notice,  and  Savinkov  added  that  this 
action  showed  that  the  General  had  been  again  influenced  by 
the  unscrupulous  adventurers  who  surrounded  him,  and  that, 
after  receiving  corresponding  explanations,  Kornilov  would 
acknowledge  his  mistake. 

If  you  bear  in  mind  that  those  were  times  when  "  all  and 
sundry  "  addressed  nothing  but  "  demands  "  to  the  Pro- 
visional Government,  that  the  relation  of  a  person  demand- 
ing something  to  somebody  of  whom  he  demands  it  was  the 
only  accepted  form  of  relation  to  the  authorities;  if  you 
understand  an  attitude  entirely  comprehensible  in  the  case 
of  a  people  intoxicated  with  liberty  after  long  years  of 
slavery,  whose  imperious  mode  of  address  was  adopted  by  a 
street  meeting  and  the  State  Duma  Conference,  by  the 
spokesman  of  the  "  revolutionary  democracy  '*  and  the  Cen- 
tral Committee  of  the  Officers'  League  —  if  you  bear  all 
this  in  mind,  you  will  understand  why  I  considered  General 
Kornilov's  terms  as  mere  literature.  Added  to  that  was  the 
extraordinary  critical  position  at  the  front,  which  had  to  be 
dealt  with  with  the  utmost  circumspection,  and  clamoured 
not  for  "politics"  but  for  military  art;  and  I  think  that 
every  impartial  critic  will  understand  why  I  could  not  deal 
with  Kornilov's  telegram  otherwise  than  by  locking  it  up  in 
my  desk. 

General  Tcheremissov's  affair  was  quite  another  matter. 
This  time  I  had  to  deal  not  with  mere  literature  but  with  a 
very  decisive  act,  which  called  for  instant  repudiation  by  the 
Supreme  Authority.  In  his  statement  to  the  Commission 
of  Inquiry  General  Kornilov  himself  gives  the  following 
narrative  of  his  Tcheremissov  "conflict"  with  the  Pro- 
visional Government : 

''  On  the  iQth  of  July  I  was  appointed  Generalissimo  by 


30  THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM 

order  of  the  Provisional  Government.  I  telegraphed  a  re- 
ply, stating  upon  what  terms  I  considered  it  possible  to 
accept  that  post.  One  of  the  terms  was  the  absolute  non- 
interference of  the  Provisional  Government  in  all  appoint- 
ments to  the  high  command.  ...  In  reply  I  received  a 
telegram  from  the  Minister  of  War,  recognizing  my  right 
to  appoint  my  own  collaborators,  and  the  next  day  I  learnt 
from  the  Press  news  that  General  Tcheremissov  had,  with- 
out my  knowledge,  been  appointed  Commander-in-Chief  of 
the  Southwestern  front.  I  was  obliged  to  telegraph  to  the 
Minister  of  War,  asking  him  to  cancel  this  appointment  and 
warning  him  that  otherwise  I  should  find  it  impossible  to 
accept  the  Supreme  Command.  On  the  20th  of  July  I  wired 
to  Savinkov  telling  him  that  before  receiving  a  decisive  an- 
swer to  my  telegrams  I  would  not  start  for  the  Stavka.'' 

In  the  first  place,  the  simultaneous  appointments  of  Gen- 
erals Kornilov  and  Tcheremissov  by  order  of  the  Senate 
were  made  on  the  i8th  of  July,  i.e.  before  Kornilov  pre- 
sented his  terms,  and  therefore  my  answer  to  General  Kor- 
nilov's  telegrams  of  July  19th  could  have  no  connection  with 
the  events  of  July  i8th.  Then  my  answer  contained  no 
assent  to  the  terms  of  "  non-interference  *' ;  I  only  recognized 
General  Kornilov's  right  as  Generalissimo  to  make  such  ap- 
pointments to  the  commanding  staff  as  are  within  the  juris- 
diction of  a  Generalissimo,  but  this  right  had  never  been 
disputed.  The  fact  is  that  the  Statute  concerning  the  rights 
of  the  Generalissimo,  which  had  been  drawn  up  for  the 
Grand  Duke  Nicholai  Nicholaevitch,  gave  the  Generalissimo 
the  right  of  appointment  to  commanding  posts,  subject  to 
the  presentation  of  the  candidates  for  confirmation  by  the 
Supreme  Authority.  This  Statute  remained  in  force  after 
the  Revolution,  the  power  of  the  Sovereign  being  trans- 
ferred to  the  Provisional  Government.     In  practice,  both 


THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM  31 

before  and  after  the  Revolution  the  mutual  relations  be- 
tween the  Supreme  Authority  and  the  Stavka  concerning 
appointments  to  the  High  Command  consisted  in  each  case 
in  a  preliminary  agreement.  I  cannot  recall  a  single  in- 
stance of  the  Provisional  Government  appointing  any  one 
to  the  army  without  previously  consulting  the  Stavka,  or  of 
refusing  the  confirmation  of  an  appointment  made  by  the 
latter.  On  the  other  hand,  I  must  bear  witness  that  neither 
General  Alexeiev  nor  General  Brussilov  ever  exercised  their 
rights  in  cases  of  importance  without  first  privately  consult- 
ing the  Premier  or  the  Minister  of  War.  Naturally,  Gen- 
eral Kornilov's  attempt  to  give  such  a  wide  interpretation  of 
the  Generalissimo's  rights  as  to  make  him  completely  inde- 
pendent of  the  Government  was  doomed  to  failure.  In 
Kornilov's  time  the  Provisional  Government  made  as  much 
use  as  ever  of  its  right  of  control  and  final  confirmation  of 
all  appointments,  decidedly  interfering,  when  necessary, 
with  the  Stavka's  activity.  Thirdly,  and  that  is  the  most 
important  point.  General  Kornilov,  in  spite  of  my  telegram, 
continued  to  insist  upon  General  Tcheremissov's  dismissal, 
and  threatened  to  abandon  his  post  in  the  middle  of  the 
enemy  offensive.  Having  accepted  the  post  of  Generalis- 
simo on  the  19th  of  July,  Kornilov  arbitrarily  delayed  en- 
tering upon  his  duties  for  five  days  until  the  24th  of  July. 
This  was  no  longer  literature,  but  a  serious  breach  of  mili- 
tary duty,  which  threatened  the  country  with  grave  conse- 
quences. 

I  plead  guilty  for  not  having  finally  insisted  upon  Kor- 
nilov's immediate  dismissal,  but  .  .  .  but  those  were  such 
awful  times,  there  was  such  sore  need  of  a  strong  person- 
ality at  the  front.  Besides,  General  Tcheremissov's  re- 
maining under  the  existing  circumstances  at  the  post  of 
Commander-in-Chief  of  the  South-western  front  could  only 


S2  THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM 

bring  harm.  When  judging  this  **  conflict  "  one  must  bear 
in  mind  that  General  Tcheremissov,  commanding  one  of  the 
8th  Army  corps,  had  deHvered  a  successful  attack  at  Galitch 
and  had  added  fresh  laurels  to  General  Kornilov's  fame. 
At  the  time  of  my  visit  to  the  8th  Army,  just  before  the 
Galitch  offensive.  General  Kornilov  spoke  very  highly  of 
Tcheremissov,  and  my  personal  impression  of  Tcheremissov 
was  that  of  a  man  capable  of  commanding  troops  in  the 
novel  post-revolutionary  conditions.  In  the  opinion  of 
every  unprejudiced  person  General  Tcheremissov  appeared 
as  General  Kornilov's  most  natural  successor  at  the  South- 
western front.  And  when,  under  pressure  of  the  moment,  I 
appointed  them  both  on  the  i8th  of  July,  I  had  no  idea  of 
creating  a  **  conflict." 

Since  then  I  received  weekly  ultimatums  from  General 
Kornilov.  I  here  again  repeat  that  I  struggled  most  de- 
cidedly against  these  ultimatums  and  against  this  matter  of 
treating  the  Provisional  Government.  I  struggled  from 
first  to  last. 

This  struggle  was  all  the  more  difficult  because  I  could 
and  would  not  use  the  favourite  method  of  both  the  Right  and 
Left  parties  —  demagogy.  You  have  but  to  open  the  papers 
of  that  period  to  see  the  organized  demagogic  campaign  led 
by  the  Stavka  by  means  of  special  correspondents,  inter- 
views and  declaration  telegrams,  which  appeared  in  the 
Press  before  reaching  the  Premier's  study  —  all  of  which 
produced  an  echo  from  the  demagogues  of  the  Left.  Ob- 
serving the  play  of  these  passions,  the  Government  tried  by 
all  means  to  calm  the  social  atmosphere,  to  support  the 
authority  of  the  Stavka  as  the  supreme  military  centre  in 
the  eyes  of  democracy,  to  keep  General  Kornilov  within 
bounds  in  such  a  way  as  not  to  increase  the  differences  in 
the  army.     During  those  long  weeks  of  struggle  there  wa«i 


THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM  33 

not  a  single  instance  of  a  hostile  act  done  by  any  member 
of  the  Government  against  the  Stavka.  On  the  contrary, 
when  General  Kornilov  arrived  at  Petrograd  on  the  3rd 
of  August,  I  took  the  opportunity  of  feting  him  at  a  meet- 
ing of  the  Provisional  Government  and  of  having  the  fact 
printed  in  all  the  papers.  Just  before  and  during  the  Mos- 
cow Conference,  as  will  be  seen  later,  the  Government  took 
steps  to  prevent  Kornilov  from  compromising  himself.  The 
Government's  conflict  with  Kornilov  assumed  the  shape  of  a 
passive  resistance,  the  main  point  of  it  being  the  prevention 
of  him  and  his  adherents  from  taking  one  step  beyond  the 
limits  drawn  by  the  Provisional  Government,  so  that  all 
his  attempts  to  use  the  Provisional  Government  as  a  means 
for  the  attainment  of  his  own  ends  proved  a  failure.  The 
Provisional  Government  executed  the  will  of  the  whole 
people  as  expressed  in  the  agreement  between  all  the  politi- 
cal parties  which  had  delegated  their  representatives  to  the 
Provisional  Government,  and  the  only  way  of  forcing 
it  to  deviate  from  such  an  all-national  program  in  the  in- 
terests of  one  separate  party  was  to  overthrow  it  —  an 
attempt  which  failed  on  the  27th  of  August  and  succeeded 
on  the  25th  of  October.] 

§4 

Chairman. —  Did  Kornilov  always  address  his  demands 
for  reform  in  the  army  and  the  rear  to  you  personally,  or 
through  Savinkov,  and  were  you  always  acquainted  with 
them? 

Kerensky. —  No;  and  I  must  say  that  the  most  critical 
period  was  at  the  time  of  the  possible  prevention  of  the 
Moscow  Conference  (loth-iith  of  August),  on  the  very 
eve  of  its  meeting,  when  without  my  knowledge  Kornilov 


34j  the  prelude  TO  BOLSHEVISM 

was  summoned  to  Petrograd.  Although  he  refused  to  come 
[owing  to  the  grave  situation  at  Riga],  the  Ministry  of 
War,  that  is  Savinkov  and  Filonenko,  insisted  upon  his  ar- 
rival. When  t  heard  of  this  insistence  (about  midnight 
on  the  eve  of  the  Generalissimo's  arrival  at  Petrograd)  I 
sent  the  following  telegram  to  Kornilov :  "  The  Provisional 
Government  has  not  summoned  you,  does  not  insist  upon 
arrival,  and  will  not  be  responsible  for  it  in  view  of  the 
strategic  situation."  In  spite  of  that  Kornilov  arrived  and 
presented  me  with  a  memorandum  [to  be  brought  that  eve- 
ning before  a  meeting  of  the  Provisional  Government],  sup- 
posed to  have  been  jointly  drawn  up  by  the  Minister  of  War 
and  the  Generalissimo.  But  /  had  never  seen  it  before  it 
was  shown  to  me  by  the  Generalissimo.  Neither  had  Kor- 
nilov seen  it  before  his  arrival  at  Petrograd,  but  he  supposed 
I  was  acquainted  with  it.  Here  he  had  sat  on  that  little 
chair  and  I  in  this  arm-chair,  and  it  seemed  to  me  that  I  had 
succeeded  in  persuading  him  that,  whatever  opinion  one 
might  have  of  the  memorandum  itself,  it  was  impossible  to 
issue  a  document  in  the  name  of  the  Minister  of  War  of 
whose  contents  I,  then  Minister  of  War,  knew  nothing  [and 
that  therefore,  before  I  became  thoroughly  acquainted  with 
it,  it  could  not  be  discussed  by  the  Provisional  Government] . 

Kornilov  agreed  to  this,  took  this  document,  and  de- 
parted. He  returned,  however,  in  the  evening  in  a  totally 
changed  frame  of  mind  and  declared  that  he  was  fully  in 
accord  with  §avinko  and  Filonenko  and  had  already  signed 
the  memorandum. 

Chairman. —  Therefore  this  memorandum  did  not  pro- 
ceed from  him,  but  was  apparently  written  by  Savinkov  ? 

Kerensky. —  It  seems  to  have  been  drawn  up  by  Filon- 
enko. 

[As  will  ultimately  be  seen,  my  deposition  at  this  point 


THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM      85 

refers  to  the  so-called  second  report  of  General  Kornilov. 
This  document  ought  to  have  been  brought  before  the  Pro- 
visional Government  instead  of  the  first  report  of  the  Su- 
preme Command  which  he  proposed  to  lay  before  the 
Government  on  August  3rd,  but  the  reading  of  which  was 
postponed  until  its  contents  were  approved  by  the  Minister 
of  War.  Thus  the  very  origin  of  this  second  report  proves 
that,  even  if  I  did  not  entirely  agree  with  all  it  contained, 
my  knowledge  of  its  essential  contents  was  an  indispensable 
preliminary  condition  of  its  being  laid  before  the  Provisional 
Government.  From  General  Kornilov's  deposition  it  is  evi- 
dent that  his  decision  to  sign  the  report  of  Savinkov  and 
Filonenko,  at  6  p.  m.  on  August  loth,  was  brought  about 
by  Savinkov's  declaring  that  although  "  the  memorandum 
had  not  actually  been  laid  before  A.  F.  Kerensky  for  his 
final  revision,"  he  had  reported  to  him  (Kerensky)  **  bit  by 
bit  in  the  course  of  its  preparation,  and  that  in  any  case  the 
contents  of  the  report  were  known  to  the  Prime  Minister." 
In  reality  I  was  only  informed  of  the  first  clause  relating  to 
"  the  introduction  of  military  courts-martial  at  the  rear." 
However,  Savinkov  in  his  deposition  changes  the  definite 
word  "  contents "  into  the  vague  term  "  substance  of." 
**  This  memorandum,"  says  Savinkov,  *'  apart  from  the 
projects  of  bills  of  Committees  and  Commissaries,  contains 
within  itself  other  projected  measures:  (i)  The  establish- 
ment of  revolutionary  courts-martial  at  the  rear;  (2)  the 
restoration  of  disciplinary  powers  to  commanding  officers; 
(3)  the  militarization  of  the  railways;  (4)  the  militarization 
of  such  enterprises  as  were  working  for  the  defence.  A,  F. 
Kerensky  was  kept  informed  by  me  to  some  extent  of  the 
preparation  of  such  a  report  by  the  War  Of^ce,  since  on 
several  occasions  I  laid  before  him  the  substance  of  it,  em- 
phasizing more  especially  the  bill  of  the  military-revolu- 


36  THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM 

tionary  courts-martial  by  which  it  acquired  a  decisive  impor- 
tance. Kerensky  did  not  express  his  views  as  to  the  meas- 
ures proposed  by  me  until  August  8th,  when  at  the  Ministry 
of  War  he  declared  to  me  categorically  that  in  no  case,  and 
under  no  conceivable  circumstances,  would  he  sign  such  a 
document.  After  this  declaration  of  his,  I  said  that  in  that 
case  the  report  to  the  Provisional  Government  would  be 
presented  by  General  Komilov  and  I  sent  in  my  resigna- 
tion." 

This  deposition  depicts  in  sufficiently  high  colours  the  rela- 
tions between  the  Deputy-Minister  of  War  and  the  War 
Minister;  but  an  indispensable  commentary  on  Savinkov's 
cautious  words  will  be  found  in  the  conversation  by  tele- 
gram between  Filonenko  and  the  Commissary  of  the  South- 
western front,  Gobetchia,  on  August  27th.  "  You  know 
our  rule,'*  said  Filonenko,  **  to  act  always  with  the  cogni- 
zance not  only  of  our  allies,  but  of  our  real,  or  presumed, 
enemies  as  well.  Therefore  we  have  informed  the  Prime 
Minister  betimes  of  the  fact  that  I  am  writing  a  report, 
that  Boris  Victorovitch  ^  is  in  constant  touch  with  me,  and 
that  General  Kornilov  fully  shares  our  views  on  the  state 
of  things.  .  .  .  The  Premier  did  not  find  it  possible  to 
lay  such  a  report  before  the  Provisional  Government  for 
consideration.  We  then  warned  him  that  it  would  be  pre- 
sented to  the  Provisional  Government  all  the  same  by  one 
who  had  the  right  to  do  so,  that  is  to  say,  by  the  Com- 
mander-in-Chief. Unfortunately  the  Premier  did  not 
value  our  sincerity,  nor  the  frank  line  of  action  we  adopted. 
...  I,  bidding  good-bye  (Filonenko  had  to  proceed  to 
Headquarters  on  the  evening  of  August  loth),  assured 

1  Familiar  appellation  of  Savinkov,  according  to  the  Russian  custom 
of  calling  a  person  by  his  prenomen  plus  his  father's  prenomen. 


THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM  37 

Savinkov  that  in  this  extraordinary  political  convict  he  had, 
of  course,  a  right  to  the  support  of  his  adherents." 

Thus,  on  account  of  a  poHtical  quarrel,  it  was  con- 
sidered possible  to  command  the  presence  of  General  Kor- 
nilov  in  spite  of  the  fact  that  "  the  changes  in  the  strategic 
situation  demanded  his  presence  at  Headquarters,"  as,  ac- 
cording to  Savinkov,  Kornilov  had  declared  to  him  in  per- 
son, on  August  9th,  by  telegram.  (These  were  the  critical 
days  of  Riga.) 

Savinkov,  fully  realizing  how  serious  was  his  action, 
assured  General  Kornilov,  according  to  the  statement  of 
the  latter,  that  "  the  summons  to  Petrograd  was  made  with 
the  knowledge  of  the  Provisional  Government."  In  his  own 
deposition  Savinkov  speaks  as  follows :  "  I  summoned 
General  Kornilov  to  Petrograd  in  the  full  conviction  that  I 
was  acting  entirely  in  agreement  with  Kerensky,  for:  (i) 
on  August  3rd,  General  Kornilov  notified  me  that  he  was 
coming  to  Petrograd  for  the  discussion  of  the  memorandum, 
and  his  declaration  had  met  with  no  objection  on  Kerensky*s 
part;  (2)  on  August  7th,  General  Kornilov  telegraphed  to 
Kerensky  and  received  no  objection;  (3)  on  August  8th,  I 
referred  the  matter  to  Kerensky  and  encountered  no  opposi- 
tion. The  fact  of  Kerensky's  having  sent  a  telegram  to \ 
Kornilov  on  the  9th,  intimating  that  his  journey  to  Petrograd  / 
was  unnecessary,  which  did  not  find  the  General  at  Head-  / 
quarters,  was  not  known  to  me."  While  so  precisely  demon-' 
strating  that  on  August  3rd,  7th  and  8th  he  had  good 
grounds  for  his  conviction  that  he  was  acting  in  complete 
agreement  with  me,  Savinkov  has  forgotten  that  he  himself 
was  only  informed  on  August  9th  of  General  Kornilov's  re- 
fusal to  come  to  Petrograd;  while  as  to  Savinkov^s  being 
ignorant  of  my  telegram  sent  to  catch  General  JKornilov,  the 


38  THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM 

matter  is  easily  explained:  it  was  sent  late  in  the  evening, 
after  I  had  accidentally  learnt  of  the  unauthorized  and  re- 
peated invitation  to  Kornilov,  which,  it  is  to  be  regretted, 
I  did  not  learn  from  Savinkpy  personally.] 

Raiipakh. —  This  was  on  August  loth? 

Keremky. —  All  this  took  place  on  August  loth,  and  early 
on  August  nth  Kokoshkin  came  to  me  with  the  intimation 
that  he  would  resign  at  once  if  General  Kornilov' s  pro- 
gram was  not  accepted  that  day.  The  tension  was  great, 
but  I  succeeded  in  smoothing  things  over. 

[It  is  only  necessary  to  remember  the  exceptional  tension 
of  political  passion  under  pressure  of  which  the  Moscow 
Conference  met  and  was  inaugurated,  in  order  to  realize 
what  a  sense  of  bewilderment  came  over  me  on  Kokoshkin's 
appearance  with  his  resignation  —  for  I  was  in  the  very 
centre  of  this  area  of  tension.  This  matutinal  interview 
with  Kokoshkin  was  one  of  the  stormiest  of  my  political 
encounters.  But  today  I  rejoice  to  remember  the  passion- 
ate flame  of  love  for  his  country  which  he  felt  in  the  depths 
of  his  soul ;  a  love  which  so  soon  consumed  him  on  the  mar- 
tyr's pyre;  a  love  which  then  made  it  possible  for  us,  in 
fine,  to  speak  independently  of  party,  and  above  all  party 
feeling,  the  fraternal  language  of  the  sons  of  one  mother  — 
Russia. 

The  departure  of  one  group  of  ministers  from  the  Pro- 
visional Government  on  account  of  Kokoshkin  would  prob- 
ably have  been  followed  by  the  resignation  of  the  remaining 
ministers  on  the  eve  of  the  opening  of  the  Conference  for 
the  same  reason  as  in  the  case  of  Kokoshkin  —  the  "  de- 
mands "  of  Kornilov.  This  would  have  made  any  further 
preservation  of  national  equilibrium  an  impossibility.  The 
Government,  however,  was  only  too  well  aware  of  the  state 
of  the  country  to  risk  a  disastrous  attempt  at  government 


THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM     39 

by  a  *'  homogeneous  "  Cabinet,  and  was  compelled  to  put 
aside  any  subject  of  which  the  *' Bolsheviks  from  the 
Right ''  ^  might  take  advantage  for  an  attempt  (which  was 
being  prepared  for  the  Moscow  Conference)  to  create  a  so- 
called  "  strong  authority  "  and  in  any  case  to  deviate  the 
course  of  the  Government  towards  the  Right.  Of  course, 
such  an  attempt  could  only  have  brought  to  cruel  shame 
those  who  took  part  in  it.  Its  danger  might  only  have  lain 
in  the  fact  that  it  would  have  thrown  towards  the  Left  the 
leaders  of  democratic  circles  which  at  this  juncture  were 
following  sincerely  and  honourably  in  the  steps  of  the  Gov- 
ernment. I  think  the  Moscow  Conference  proved  that  the 
hypothesis  that  the  masses  of  the  nation  might  at  that  time 
have  been  detached  from  the  Provisional  Government  in 
order  to  follow  a  course  more  to  the  Right  was  a  harmful 
Utopianism,  because  such  dreams,  impotent  to  bring  forth 
results,  were  only  effective  in  producing  irritation  in  the 
masses  and  increasing  their  distrust  of  the  classes.  At  that 
time,  at  the  Moscow  Conference,  the  Utopians  of  the  Right 
were  shown  their  proper  place  without  serious  trouble,  but 
no  lessons  of  facts  and  realities  could  disillusion  them,  and 
they  continued  to  clamour  just  enough  to  become  a  con- 
venient weapon  in  the  hands  of  the  demagogues  of  the  Left 
to  rouse  the  wild  beast  in  the  masses,  who  in  the  end  has 
broken  his  cage  and  run  amuck. 

Later,  after  the  Moscow  Conference,  I  laid  matters  before 
Savinkov  and  persuaded  him  not  to  resign.  When  it 
seemed  that  at  Moscow  everybody  realized  clearer  that  it  is 
impossible  to  attack  the  Provisional  Government  on  this 
ground,  I  decided  that  it  was  not  worth  while  to  follow  up 
any  further  all  the  consequences  of  this  episode  of  the 
memorandum  and  summons  to  Kornilov. 

1  The  Absolutists. 


40  THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM 

Of  course  this  decision  may  appear  to  have  been  wrong, 
but  I  did  not  perceive  in  Savinkov's  doings  any  evil  design, 
and  only  saw  in  them  an  extreme  manifestation  of  his 
militant  temperament.  But  in  any  case  his  resignation 
would  not  have  averted  Kornilov's  proceedings,  because  I 
am  convinced  that  the  events  of  August  27th-29th  had  been 
prepared  behind  Savinkov's  back.  I  think  it  will  be  evident 
to  the  reader  later  that  this  deduction  was  correct.] 

§5 

Chairman. —  Were  reports  made  to  you  by  Filonenko  con- 
cerning the  conspiracy  at  Headquarters,  and  on  what  were 
they  based?  Especially  as  regards  Lukomsky  and  Tikh- 
meniev  ? 

Kerensky. —  I  read  in  the  newspapers  that  certain  wit- 
nesses attach  some  great  importance  to  the  alleged  "  fact " 
that  I  was  informed  of  a  plot  almost  under  the  direction  of 
Lukomsky,  and  nevertheless  paid  no  attention  to  it.  .  .  . 
As  a  matter  of  fact,  the  affair  was  quite  otherwise.  There 
was  some  talk  of  Lukomsky,  but  under  the  following  cir- 
cumstances. A  day  or  two  after  Filonenko  was  elected 
Commissary  to  the  Supreme  Command,  Savinkov  told  me 
that  Filonenko  had  "  discovered  "  something,  and  that  he 
insisted  on  the  immediate  dismissal  of  Lukomsky.  I  re- 
plied by  asking  how  he  had  learnt  it,  seeing  he  had  only 
just  arrived  from  Headquarters.  Then  Filonenko  came 
here  and  said  to  me :  "  I  do  not  trust  General  Lukomsky  and 
I  insist  on  his  immediate  dismissal."  I  answered  that  I 
could  not  do  this  because  it  was  quite  impossible  to  dismiss 
the  Chief  of  the  Staff  of  the  Generalissimo  without  any 
grounds  or  information;  that  my  position  would  be  ridicu- 
lous, and  it  would  be  said  that  this  was  autocracy  in  its 


THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM  41 

most  inadmissible  form  —  to  dismiss  one  man  for  who- 
knows-what  one  day,  and  another  one  the  next.  So  far, 
General  Lukomsky  had  carried  out  his  duties  conscien- 
tiously, and  there  was  nothing  against  him.  "If  you  bring 
me  positive  information,  that  will  be  another  matter,'*  I 
said. 

Shablovsky, —  And  he  produced  no  facts? 

Kerensky. —  He  produced  none ;  he  only  said :  "  I  declare 
that  I  utterly  distrust  Lukomsky  and  insist  on  his  immediate 
dismissal."  M.  I.  Terestchenko,  who  was  at  Headquarters 
at  that  time,  came  and  told  me  that  the  feeling  there  was 
extremely  serious  because  Filonenko  led  a  most  persistent 
campaign  against  Lukomsky.  After  this  I  received  no  fur- 
ther communications  regarding  Lukomsky  except  that  in- 
formation reached  me  that  the  people  there  managed  to  get 
on  together  better  than  before. 

Shablovsky. —  In  connection  with  this  indication  by 
Filonenko  of  the  lack  of  any  data  which  would  confirm  his 
desire  to  see  Lukomsky  dismissed,  did  you  not  explain  to 
Filonenko  that  as  Commissary  to  the  Supreme  Command 
he  ought  to  maintain  good  relations  with  the  Chief  of  the 
Staff? 

Kerensky. —  I  spoke  thus :  I  consider,  generally  speaking, 
that  such  behaviour  was  undesirable,  and  that  without  suf- 
ficient grounds  such  assertions  should  never  be  made  to  me. 
Also  I  insisted  that  the  relations  between  himself,  as  the 
Commissary  attached  to  the  Commander-in-Chief,  and  the 
Chief  of  the  Staff  should  be  correct. 

Chairman. —  And  did  you  say  that  in  the  meantime  you 
did  not  suspect  Lukomsky  of  being  a  counter-revolutionary? 

Kerensky. —  Yes.  Because  there  was  no  sort  of  evidence 
to  that  effect.  [General  Lukomsky's  appointment  to  the 
post  of  Chief  of  the  Staff  was  made  at  the  same  time  as 


4»  THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM 

that  of  General  Brussilov  (who  became  Commander-in- 
Chief).  Comparatively  young,  energetic,  very  intelligent, 
an  accomplished  specialist,  with  great  experience  in  ad- 
ministrative and  military  matters.  General  Lukomsky  car- 
ried out  his  duties  as  Chief  of  the  Staff  during  an  extremely 
difficult  phase  of  the  war  in  an  exemplary  way,  under- 
standing how  to  limit  tactfully  the  circle  of  his  duties  and 
never  mixing  himself  up  in  politics.  Therefore  what  after- 
w^ards  happened  —  the  union  between  Lukomsky  and  Gen- 
eral Kornilov  —  was  incomprehensible  to  me.  Now  that  I 
am  acquainted  in  detail  with  all  that  took  place  at  Head- 
quarters previous  to  August  27th,  and  that  the  role  played 
there  by  Filonenko  himself  became  clear  to  me,  I  understand 
why  Lukomsky  at  the  last  moment  proved  to  be  at  one  with 
Kornilov.  But  then,  at  the  close  of  July,  the  cam- 
paign against  Lukomsky  could  be  explained  as  being  (as  it 
seems  in  fact  to  have  been)  merely  an  effort  to  rid  Head- 
quarters of  a  man  who  was  distrusted.  Here  is  a  char- 
acteristic passage  from  a  statement  of  Prince  Trubetzkoy 
which  confirms  my  conjectures :  "  I  must  say  that  as  early 
as  August  24th,  having  called  on  Lukomsky  after  a  dis- 
cussion with  General  Kornilov,  I  pointed  out  to  the  former 
the  people  who  surrounded  Kornilov,  enlarging  upon  the  pos- 
sible harm  to  him  from  their  influence.  Lukomsky,  agree- 
ing with  me  entirely  on  this  point,  remarked  that  he  had 
been  kept  altogether  out  of  the  recent  political  discussions 
.  .  .  and  that  he  had  raised  the  question  as  to  whether  he 
possessed  Kornilot/s  confidence  or  no,  after  which  he  was 
informed  in  a  general  way  of  the  political  movements." 
Elsewhere,  Trubetzkoy  relates  how,  on  August  27th,  Lukom- 
sky, in  his  presence,  asked  Kornilov  "  to  make  it  possible 
for  them  to  converse  in  private,  if  only  for  a  few  minutes." 
I  do  not  think  that  the  effort  to  get  rid  of  Lukomsky  in 


THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM  43 

July  v/as  made  without  Kornilov  being  aware  of  it,  because 
his  wish  to  change  the  Chief  of  the  Staff  was  known  to 
me,  and  it  was  only  at  the  Moscow  Conference  that  Kor- 
nilov told  me  that  he  had  come  to  an  agreement  with  Lu- 
komsky.] 

Chairman. —  More  particularly,  sir,  as  regards  Tikhme- 
niev,  was  not  his  dismissal  demanded  on  similar  grounds, 
namely  that  he  was  something  like  the  head  of  the  plot,  and 
had  not  the  prejudice  against  him  some  foundation? 

Kerensky. —  I  must  confess  that  the  incident  relating  to 
Tikhmeniev  passed  before  me  as  in  a  dream.  I  heard  that 
a  telegram  had  been  sent  to  summon  Tikhmeniev  to  the 
Ministry  of  War,  that  when  on  his  way  thither  he  was  sent 
back  again,  and  that  all  this  was  done  on  account  of  that 
telegram  from  Filonenko  to  Savinkov,  a  phrase  of  which 
was  found  later  in  a  note-book  in  the  possession  of  Kor- 
nilov when  he  was  arrested  —  about  "  the  pale  horse/*  ^ 
This  story  did  not  reach  me  officially.  All  this  fuss  was 
grounded  on  the  fact  that  almost  immediately  after  his  ar- 
rival at  Headquarters  Filonenko  sent  Savinkov  a  code  tele- 
gram to  the  effect  that  Tikhmeniev  was  leading  troops 
("the  pale  horse")  against  Kornilov  ("the  Myrta"). 
Afterwards  Filonenko  explained  this  telegram  by  the  fact 
that  just  at  this  time  the  Third  Army  Corps  was  moved 
from  the  South  to  Headquarters. 

Shahlovsky. —  Did  not  Colonel  Baranovsky  then  specially 
vouch  for  Tikhmeniev,  saying  that  so  far  no  kind  of  sus- 
picion had  been  aroused  by  him,  and  did  not  that  serve  to 
rehabilitate  Tikhmeniev  ? 

Kerensky. —  There  was  some  conversation  on  Lukomksy's 
account,  but  the  story  about  Tikhmeniev  did  not  reach  me. 
Some  one  just  mentioned  that  a  curious  telegram  was  re- 

1 "  The  Pale  Horse  "  is  a  well-known  novel  by  B.  V.  Savinkov. 


44  THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM 

ceived  which  had  very  mysterious  contents.  Perhaps  I  am 
confusing  matters,  but  it  seems  to  me  this  was  how  it  stood. 
[General  Tikhmeniev  was  the  Chief  of  the  Military  Trans- 
port at  Headquarters,  consequently  orders  for  the  trans- 
port of  troops  were  sent  out  from  there  signed  by  this  gen- 
eral. But  Tikhmeniev  could  only  give  such  directions  after 
having  received  corresponding  orders  from  the  Staff.  Con- 
sequently, the  duties  of  Chief  of  the  MiHtary  Transport 
were  purely  technical  and  administrative.  The  case  of  Gen- 
eral Tikhmeniev  is  quite  unimportant,  almost  farcical;  it 
was  touched  upon  by  the  Commission  of  Inquiry  evidently 
in  connection  with  that  version  of  it  which  was  so  persist- 
ently expounded  by  Filonenko  and  a  few  others  :  there  was  a 
plot,  but  all  the  threads  of  it  centred  in  the  Staff,  and  Ker- 
ensky,  being  reassurred  by  Baranovsky,  closed  his  eyes  to 
this.  ...  In  reality  the  misunderstanding  with  Tikh- 
meniev happened  because,  at  the  time  of  General  Kornilov's 
arrival  at  Headquarters,  the  Third  Army  corps  also  went 
there,  having  been  summoned  after  the  events  of  July  3rd- 
5th  to  station  itself  in  the  region  of  Headquarters.  The 
fact  was  that,  having  received  false  intelligence  of  the  vic- 
tory of  the  Bolsheviks  in  Petrograd,  their  comrades  of  the 
Soviet  of  Mohilev  (where  the  Pleadquarters  were)  tried  to 
achieve  a  similar  result  at  Headquarters,  and  appeared  be- 
fore General  Brussilov  with  a  proposal  to  recognize  them  as 
Authority.  In  a  discussion  on  this  subject  it  came  out  that 
Headquarters  were,  in  reality,  completely  without  protection 
against  such  insolence.  Now,  to  create,  even  temporarily, 
entanglements  in  the  working  at  Headquarters  would  be  a 
very  attractive  plan,  and  not  only  for  Russian  Bolsheviks. 
.  .  .  Therefore  we,  with  Brussilov,  decided  to  strengthen 
the  defences  at  Headquarters.     This  is  all.] 


THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM  45 

§6 

Chairman. —  Then,  what  about  Kornilov's  arrival  on 
August  3rd,  its  reason,  aims,  and  all  that  took  place  there? 
Both  Kornilov  and  Savinkov  express  themselves  explicitly 
on  this  subject. 

Kerensky. —  On  the  3rd  of  August,  Kornilov  arrived  in 
order  to   .    .    . 

Raupakh. —  To  report  on  the  strategical  situation  .    .    . 

Kerensky. —  Yes,  yes.    .    .    . 

Chairman. —  They  refer  to  a  memorandum  which  Savin- 
kov wrote  to  Kornilov  and  transmitted  through  the  MinisteF 
Terestchenko.  In  this  connection  Kornilov  makes  an  ex- 
tended deposition ;  he  says  in  it  that  then  a  complete  change 
came  about  in  his  ideas   .    .    . 

Kerensky. —  In  his  deposition  he  states  what  I  said. 
Please  do  not  repeat  it  all  here. 

Shahlovsky. —  Yes,  and  Savinkov  gave  him  a  note.  .  .  , 
Was  Kornilov  summoned  By  the  Government,  or  did  he 
come,  as  on  August  loth,  on  the  invitation  of  Savinkov? 

Kerensky. —  I  cannot  say  on  whose  initiative  it  was  — 
whether  the  Government  summoned  him,  or  whether  he  ex- 
pressed a  desire  to  present  a  report.  We  usually  observed 
the  following  procedure:  the  Commander-in-Chief  used  to 
come  in  order  personally  to  review  generally  the  military 
situation  and  to  confer  with  the  Provisional  Government 
upon  the  essential  questions  relating  to  the  front.  In  any 
case  Kornilov's  coming  on  August  3rd  was  quite  straight- 
forward. On  whose  initiative  he  came  is  of  no  importance. 
He  arrived,  and  on  the  same  day  a  special  sitting  of  the 
Provisional  Government  was  called,  at  which  Kornilov  pro- 
duced a  report.     That  report  had  the  following  antecedents. 


46  THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM 

Kornilov  brought  with  him  a  memorandum  (which  was  cer- 
tainly not  written  by  him  personally,  but  by  somebody  at 
Headquarters)  of  such  a  nature  that  I  considered  it  impos- 
sible to  read  it  out  before  the  Provisional  Government. 
It  set  forth  a  whole  series  of  measures,  the  greater  part 
of  which  were  quite  acceptable,  but  formulated  in  such 
a  way  and  supported  by  such  arguments  that  the  an- 
nouncement of  them  would  have  led  to  quite  opposite  re- 
sults. At  any  rate,  there  would  have  been  an  outburst, 
and  after  making  the  memorandum  public  it  would  have 
been  impossible  to  retain  Kornilov  as  Commander-in-Chief. 
I  then  requested  the  Deputy  Minister  for  War  so  to  arrange 
matters  that  this  report  should  not  be  read  before  the  Pro- 
visional Government.  It  was  resolved  that  the  memoran- 
dum should  be  revised  in  conjunction  with  the  Minister  for 
War  (i.e.  myself),  to  make  it  acceptable  to  Headquarters, 
to  public  opinion,  and  to  me;  and  that  on  that  particular 
day  General  Kornilov  should  only  report  upon  the  strategic 
situation  of  the  army  and  upon  possible  military  events.  By 
the  way,  I  do  not  know  whether  you  are  aware  that  in  the 
second  memorandum  presented  on  August  loth  there  ap- 
peared two  entirely  new  clauses  relating  to  factories  and 
ways  of  communication. 

Shablovsky. — ^  Which  did  not  figure  in  the  report  of 
August  3rd  ? 

Kerensky. —  No.  Both  these  clauses  were  very  like  a 
production  by  a  Stchedrin  official.^  They  were  not,  as  it 
appears,  known  to  Kornilov  before  he  came  to  Petrograd 
on  August  loth.  On  that  day,  we  —  that  is  to  say,  Nekras- 
sov,  Terestchenko  and  myself  —  insistently  asked  Kornilov 
at  any  rate  not  to  touch  upon  these  clauses  at  the  Moscow 
Conference.     At  the  same  time  we  said  that  if  he  made 

1  Stchedrin,  a  famous  Russian  satirist. 


THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM  47 

these  clauses  ptrblic,  there  would  simply  be  a  great  scandal. 
As  a  matter  of  fact,  if  any  one  had  desired  the  downfall  of 
Kornilov  at  the  Moscow  Conference,  it  would  only  have 
been  necessary  to  let  him  read  his  report  in  public,  and  espe- 
cially the  two  clauses  dealing  with  factories  and  ways  of 
communication.     Then  all  would  have  been  at  an  end. 

I  well  remember  how  Nekrassov  and  Terestchenko,  with 
the  greatest  tenderness  for  the  General's  feelings,  tried  their 
utmost  to  bring  things  home  to  him ;  and,  pointing  to  their 
own  experiences  in  the  Duma,  in  the  War  Industries  Com- 
mittee, and  other  public  organizations,  endeavoured  to  make 
it  clear  to  him  that  all  his  proposed  measures  for  the  regen- 
eration of  the  rear  —  the  militarization  of  the  railways  and 
factories  —  had  already  been  brought  forward  by  the  Minis- 
ters of  the  old  regime,  and  were  even  then  rejected,  not  only 
by  public  opinion,  but  even  by  official  experts ;  that  it  was 
impossible,  for  instance,  to  condemn  an  engineer  to  death 
for  some  technical  error,  or  to  attach  the  workers  to  their 
factories  under  the  threat  of  repressive  measures,  and  so  on; 
how  for  General  Kornilov  to  come  forward  with  such  proj- 
ects borrowed  from  the  archives  of  bureaucracy  would 
hardly  increase  his  authority,  and  so  on.  But  all  in  vain. 
The  general,  much  too  simple  in  matters  of  state-administra- 
tion and  economics,  who,  without  bothering  about  thinking 
it  out,  had  signed  this  school-boyish  composition  in  the  style 
of  Ugrium-Burcheev,^  would  not  believe  a  word  of  what 
the  two  ministers  said,  and  was  convinced  that  the  Provi- 
sional Government,  on  some  pretext  or  other,  did  not  wish 
all  Russia  to  know  of  his  new  program  for  the  country's 
salvation.  Moreover,  General  Kornilov  was  so  persuaded 
of  the  unique  importance  of  this  report,  that  in  his  speech 
at  the  Moscow  Conference  he  even  attributed  the  authorship 

1 A  character  in  "  History  of  a  Town,"  by  Stchedrin. 


48  THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM 

of  it  to  himself  (**  My  report  was  presented  to  the  Pro- 
visional Government,  and  this  document  was  signed  without 
any  hesitation  by  the  Deputy  Minister  for  War,  Savinkov, 
and  the  Commissary  attached  to  the  Supreme  Command, 
Filonenko  "). 

On  August  3rd  all  was  carried  out  as  decided.  At  the 
sitting  of  the  Provisional  Government  General  Kornilov 
made  a  report  on  the  strategical  situation,  stating  that  he 
will  report  on  the  proposed  measures  for  the  regeneration 
of  the  army  during  his  next  visit.  As  regards  the  deposi- 
tion of  Kornilov  concerning  a  note  received  by  him  from 
Savinkov  during  the  sitting  of  August  3rd,  I  do  not  know 
what  Savinkov  wrote  to  General  Kornilov.  I  do  not  wish 
at  present  to  decide  whether  Kornilov  interpreted  sincerely 
or  not  my  words  in  regard  to  this  document,  but  the  con- 
versation we  had  with  him  was  on  a  quite  different  subject. 
He  reported,  at  great  length,  on  the  question  of  the  pro- 
posed offensive  operations  on  the  South-Western  front, 
and  on  a  whole  series  of  other  measures,  and  afterwards 
he  began  to  talk  of  various  technical  matters  in  detail. 
Then  I  turned  to  him  and  said,  "  General,  these  details  are 
not  at  all  necessary  here,'*     That  is  all. 

Shahlovsky. —  .  .  .  Thus,  the  general  strategical  situa- 
tion was  sketched  out  ? 

Kerensky. —  More  than  that;  he  even  spoke,  as  I  have 
said  already,  about  the  preparations  made  for  an  offensive 
on  the  South-Western  front.  Only  after  I  perceived  that 
all  that  was  essential  had  been  reported,  I  said  to  the  Gen- 
eral that  these  details  were  unnecessary  here.  It  should  be 
stated  —  and  members  of  the  Provisional  Government  can 
confirm  this  —  that  I  always  endeavoured  to  keep  the  sit- 
tings of  the  Provisional  Government  as  brief  as  possible, 
and  used  to  cut  short  even  Ministers  ruthlessly  when  once  I 


THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM  49 

saw  that  the  essence  of  the  matter  had  been  laid  before 
us.   .    .    . 

Krokhmal. —  There  was  not  in  it  a  thought  of  the  neces- 
sity of  secrecy? 

Kerensky. — I  had  no  such  thought.  Simply,  if  it  had 
happened  to  be  a  member  of  the  Provisional  Government 
or  an  intimate  friend,  I  should  have  said :  "  Ivan  Ivanovitch, 
enough.  The  matter  is  now  clear."  I  did  not  wish 
to  .    .    . 

Krokhmal. —  Offend  him  ? 

Kerensky. —  To  place  him  in  an  awkward  position,  and  I 
said : ''  General,  these  details  are  quite  unnecessary  here.'' 

Shablovsky. —  But  what  was  in  Savinkov's  note? 

Kerensky. —  I  do  not  know.  It  was  addressed  to  Kor- 
nilov. 

Shablovsky. —  Yes,  the  note  came  to  Kornilov  from 
Savinkov,  and  in  his  deposition  he  now  insists  upon  this 
note!! 

Kerensky. —  I  think  it  likely  that  this  happened  after- 
wards, and  that  it  was  not  a  note,  but  a  conversation.  I  sat 
beside  Kornilov  and  should  have  noticed  if  a  document  had 
been  handed  over  to  him.  Even  if  this  had  been  done  be- 
hind my  back  I  should  have  seen  Kornilov  stretch  out  h  s 
hand. 

Shablovsky. —  This  episode  is  not  within  your  recollec- 
tion ? 

Kerensky. —  I  do  not  remember  it. 

[In  order  to  form  a  clear  judgment  as  to  which  note  it 
was  that  the  Commission  of  Inquiry  was  so  anxious  to  be 
enlightened  upon,  and  why,  I  will  quote  the  depositions  on 
that  subject  of  Kornilov  and  Savinkov  which  are  known  to 
me.  Speaking  of  the  sitting  of  the  Provisional  Govern- 
ment on  August  3rd,  General  Kornilov  added :  "  I  con- 


50  THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM 

sider  it  my  duty  to  observe  that  when  I  touched  upon  the 
question,  which  is  the  front  where  it  might  be  possible  to 
carry  out  an  attack  under  certain  conditions,  the  Prime 
Minister,  who  was  sitting  beside  me,  turned  round  and 
warned  me  in  a  whisper  that  this  question  must  be  handled 
circumspectly.  Shortly  afterwards  Savinkov's  note  was 
handed  in  to  me  with  a  similar  warning.  I  was  filled  with 
consternation  and  indignation;  that  in  the  Council  of  the 
Ministers  of  Russia  the  Commander-in-Chief  could  not, 
without  risk,  touch  upon  questions  about  which  he  deemed 
it  necessary,  in  the  interests  of  the  defence  of  the  country, 
to  keep  the  Government  informed!  But  at  the  close  of  the 
sitting  it  became  evident  to  me,  from  a  few  words  spoken 

by  Savinkoy,  that  the  warning  concerned  the  Minister " 

About  this  same  episode  Savinkov  says :  "  During  the  sitting 
of  the  Provisional  Government  I  sent  Kerensky  a  note  con- 
taining approximately  the  following :  *  Does  the  Prime 
Minister  feel  sure  that  the  communication  by  General  Kor- 
nilov  of  the  secrets  of  our  Government  and  its  Allies  will 
not  become  known  through  "  comrades  "  to  our  enemies? ' 
Moreover,  at  the  close  of  the  sitting  I  said  to  General  Kor- 
nilov  that  unfortunately  I  was  not  certain  that  all  which 
was  said  in  the  sittings  of  the  Provisional  Government  was 
kept  secret.  Of  course,  I  had  no  intention  of  casting  sus- 
picion on  any  of  the  Ministers  as  having  relations  with  the 
enemy,  but  I  knew  that  some  members  of  the  Government 
were  in  frequent  and  friendly  communication  with  members 
of  the  Soviet,  among  whom,  according  to  information  from 
the  Intelligence  Department,  were  persons  suspected  of  in- 
tercourse with  the  enemy.  Besides  which  I  knew  that  an 
officer  of  the  Austrian  army  (Otto  Bauer)  had  been  invited 
to  attend  a  meeting  of  the  Soviet."     From  these  two  depos:- 


( 


THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM     51 

tions  it  would  appear  that  Kornilov  did  not  receive  a  note 
from  Savinkov,  and  that  I  did  receive  such  a  note  from  the 
latter,  which  note  I  immediately  tore  up  (I  remember  so 
much).  Savinkov  was  very  cautious,  being  as  he  was  in 
close  touch  with  the  Military  Intelligence  Department  and 
studying  all  the  reports  of  the  Secret  Service.  Thus,  in  an- 
other part  of  his  deposition  he  says :  "  Zavoiko  was  sus- 
pected of  taking  part  in  the  plot,  and,  at  the  same  time,  my 
attention  was  drawn  to  him  by  the  Intelligence  Department, 
on  account  of  his  excellent  relations  with  a  Mr.  Kurtz,  who 
had  been  exiled  to  Ribinsk  on  suspicion  of  being  a  German 
spy." 

Such  is  the  history  of  the  note  at  the  sitting  of  August 
3rd.  The  reason  why  the  Commission  of  Inquiry  became 
interested  in  this  story  and  why  I  am  now  telling  it  in  detail, 
is  that  it  furnished  General  Kornilov  with  grounds  which  he 
deemed  sufficient  for  an  infamous  statement  —  that  "  the 
Provisional  Government  is  acting  in  complete  agreement 
with  the  plans  of  the  German  General  Staff."  This  accusa- 
tion appears  in  his  famous  first  manifesto  "to  the  Russian 
people,"  which,  by  the  way,  was  the  work  of  the  friend  of 
Mr.  Kurtz  —  Mr.  Zavoiko.] 

§7 

Chairman. —  Did  not  the  General,  then  Colonel,  Baranov- 
sky  visit  Headquarters  on  August  3rd-4th?  For  what 
reason  Was  this  journey  undertaken?  We  wish  to  receive 
evidence  as  to  when  more  definite  reports  began  to  come  in 
regarding  the  possible  plot  at  Headquarters. 

Kerensky. —  This  is  an  old  story.  Long  before  Baranov- 
sky's  journey. 


52  THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM 

Shablovsky. —  Earlier  than  August  3rd-4th  ? 

Kerensky, —  You  know  that  at  the  Moscow  Conference 
an  attempt  was  made  .    .    . 

Shablovsky. —  This  was  later  .  .  .  but  on  August  3rd- 
4th? 

Kerensky. —  Why  did  Baranoysky  visit  Headquarters? 
Perhaps  at  that  time  arose  the  question  of  proclaiming  the 
establishment  of  martial  law  in  connection  with  the  Riga 
events. 

Krokhmal. —  No ;  Riga  was  taken  after  the  Moscow  Con- 
ference. 

Raupakh. —  Baranovsky  went  on  August  23rd  ? 

Kerensky. —  Yes ;  he  went  there  when  it  was  necessary  to 
decide  the  question  of  separating  .    .    . 

Liher. —  This  is  a  different  visit ;  it  was  no  doubt  in  con- 
nection with  the  separation  of  the  territory  of  Petro- 
grad.   .    .    . 

Shablovsky. —  This  was  when  he  went  with  Savinkov,  on 
August  23rd-24th;  but  on  the  3rd-4th  he  went  there  on 
account  of  the  peculiar  relations  which  had  already  existed 
between  Headquarters  and  the  Provisional  Government. 
The  question  of  superseding  the  Commander-in-Chief  had 
not  yet  arisen? 

Krokhmal. —  Why,  Kornilov  was  here  on  August  3rd. 
I  must  remind  you  that  Baranovsky 's  journey  was  after 
this. 

Ukrainzev. —  Colonel  Baranovsky  was  to  have  gone  to 
Kiev  to  see  his  sick  mother  (or  was  it  his  father?),  and 
stopped  at  Headquarters  on  the  way. 

Kerensky. —  Yes.  He  went  to  Kiev  to  his  father,  who 
was  ill.  I  wish  to  be  accurate,  and  I  am  afraid  of  stating 
positively  whether  I  asked  him  to  go  to  Headquarters,  or 
whether  he  went  of  his  own  accord.     Let  us  assume  that  it 


THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM      63 

was  I  who  asked  Baranovsky  to  go  there.  The  question  of 
the  moment  might  have  been  to  make  clear  what  was  the 
position  of  the  League  of  Officers.  I  must  say  that  from 
July  3rd-5th  the  League  of  Officers  had  taken  up  a  some- 
what aggressive  attitude  towards  the  Provisional  Govern- 
ment and  was  addressing  to  the  latter  telegrams  in  the  spirit 
of  the  ''  Bolshevism  from  the  Right  " :  "  We  ask  this,"  ''  we 
demand  that/'  "  we  protest,"  etc.  When  I  came  to  Head- 
quarters, Novosiltsev  always  met  me  with  a  good  deal  of 
opposition.  There  may  often  be  something  in  the  attitude 
of  people  —  especially  in  political  and  social  matters  — 
which  one  feels  clearly,  although  one  may  not  be  able  to  pro- 
duce any  documentary  justification  for  the  conclusions  one 
draws  from  it.  The  tension  in  the  atmosphere  at  Head- 
quarters, especially  among  the  Central  Committee  of  the 
League  of  Officers,  had  long  been  felt ;  and  a  month,  or  per- 
haps more,  before  all  these  events  —  about  the  end  of  July 
—  I  received  precise  information  of  a  plot  which  was  being 
prepared  among  the  officers  and  had  its  centres  in  Petrograd 
and  at  Headquarters. 

Shahlovsky. —  At  the  end  of  July? 

Kerensky. —  Yes,  perhaps  even  earlier ;  it  can  be  verified 
in  this  way:  when  was  the  law  passed  giving  the  right  to 
arrest  officers  when  not  on  duty  and  to  send  them  into 
exile  ? 

Liber. —  I  believe,  on  July  9th. 

Kerensky. —  No,  later.  A  week  or  two  before  this  law 
was  promulgated,  I  was  thinking  out  the  way  to  organize 
the  struggle  against  the  plotters.  Ultimately,  the  legal 
measure  which,  as  early  as  the  month  of  April,  I,  as  Minister 
of  Justice,  had  brought  in  for  formal  purposes,  now  be- 
came necessary  in  practice.  Of  course  I  kept  the  Pro- 
visional Government  informed  of  this  new  phenomenon,  the 


64  THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM 

*' plots  wave."  At  this  time  occurred  the  arrests  of  the 
Grand  Dukes,  but  it  appeared  that  we  were  purposely  put  on 
the  wrong  track.  Baranovsky  went  to  Headquarters  in 
order  to  investigate  the  state  of  mind  of  the  people  there, 
and  to  throw  some  light  upon  what  they  were  doing  there 
at  the  League  of  Officers.  Another  time,  after  going  there 
with  Savinkov,  he  said  to  me  among  other  things  on  his  re- 
turn: "The  atmosphere  at  Headquarters  is  desperate  just 
now ;  they  absolutely  can  not  stand  you." 

[I  consider  it  necessary  to  emphasize  sharply  the  fact 
that  Colonel  Baranovsky 's  journey  to  Headquarters  was  not 
and  could  not  have  been  in  any  way  connected  with  ques- 
tions of  political  investigation.  The  plotting  at  the  League 
of  Officers  was  a  sort  of  smugglers'  business,  and  the  in- 
vestigation of  that  matter  was  being  done  separately.  From 
the  midst  of  the  Central  Committee  of  the  League  of  Of- 
ficers were  recruited  the  active  conspirators;  its  members 
in  various  places  were  also  the  agents  of  the  conspiracy  on 
the  spot :  on  the  other  hand,  they  also  determined  the  char- 
acter of  the  legal  declarations  or  actions  of  the  League. 
Now,  Colonel  Baranovsky  was  interested  in  the  League  of 
Officers  precisely  as  in  a  legitimate  social  organization  —  an 
organization  of  which  the  object  was  exceedingly  useful 
and  necessary  —  although  in  the  activities  of  this  Central 
Committee  features  were  appearing  which  became  more 
and  more  disquieting  to  me  both  as  Prime  Minister  and 
Minister  of  War.  In  its  conception  and  rules,  the  League 
of  Officers  was  a  professional,  non-party  organization. 
"The  League  of  Officers  of  the  Army  and  Navy"  (it  is 
stated  on  the  first  page  of  its  statutes)  "  is  a  professional 
League.  ...  It  has  no  political  platform,  and  pursues 
no  political  aims.  Every  member  of  the  League  has  a  full 
right  freely  to  form  his  political  views.     Members  bind 


THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM  55 

themselves  not  to  carry  political  intolerance  into  their  pro- 
fessional relations  and  the  everyday  life  of  the  Army  and 
Navy."  This  is  an  entirely  correct  definition  of  the  char- 
acter of  every  professional  Union.  Of  course,  it  would  be 
absurd  to  expect  a  completely  non-political  attitude  from 
any  professional  association  in  Russia  during  the  summer  oi 
19 1 7,  but  a  professional  Union,  and  still  more  its  admin- 
istrators, never  should  or  could  behave  like  a  militant  and 
"  intolerant "  political  body.  Now,  the  Central  Committee 
of  the  League  of  Officers  violated  this  ABC  of  a  profes- 
sional organization,  and  also  its  own  rules,  in  a  radical 
manner.  It  is  true  that  on  July  25th  of  the  previous  year 
the  "  Messenger  of  the  Central  Committee  of  the  League  of 
Officers  of  the  Army  and  Navy  *'  concluded  its  leading 
article  as  follows :  *'  In  this  article  we  reply  to  past  and 
future  accusations  against  the  League  attributing  to  it  politi- 
cal activities,  in  order  that  we  may  point  out  to  those  who 
wish  to  implicate  us  in  politics  that  the  League  refuses  to  go 
that  way.  Its  mission  is  far  wider,  its  activities  more  use- 
ful, for  it  aims  at  making  it  possible  for  every  officer  of  the 
Russian  revolutionary  army  and  navy  to  fulfil  his  duties 
under  the  most  favourable  conditions,  in  the  firm  belief  that 
the  League  will  afford  him  full  and  organized  support  in 
his  efforts  to  promote  the  interests  and  greatness  of  his 
native  land."  But,  in  its  conception  of  "  the  most  favour- 
able conditions  "  under  which  officers  can  "  fulfil  their  duty  " 
the  Central  Committee  introduced  an  entire  political  pro- 
gram, and,  in  the  name  of  the  whole  body  of  officers,  made 
very  definite  and  sharp  demands,  and  put  forward  trenchant 
political  declarations.  In  order  to  be  convinced  how  pecu- 
liarly the  Central  Committee  understood  its  own  "  profes- 
sionalism," it  is  sufficient  to  glance  at  a  few  numbers  of 
its  Messenger,  and  to  bear  in  mind  that  the  Central  Com- 


66  THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM 

mittee,  far  from  assuming  a  neutral  attitude,  would  often 
adopt  a  rather  "  intolerant "  one  towards  even  the  Pro- 
visional Government  itself. 

Better  than  any  one  else,  I,  as  Minister  of  War,  together 
with  my  close  collaborators,  knew  and  understood  all  the 
horror,  moral,  professional  and  political,  of  the  officers'  situ- 
ation; better  than  any  others  we  realized  that  the  officers 
of  the  Russian  army,  who,  after  the  Revolution,  were  be- 
coming the  **  scape-goats  "  for  the  sins  of  others,  could  not 
keep  outside  politics.  Less  than  anybody  else  could  we  be 
surprised  by,  let  alone  indignant  at,  the  opposition,  however 
sharp,  on  the  part  of  the  officers,  who,  not  knowing  all  the 
complexity  of  the  new  political  conditions  in  the  life  of  the 
country,  might  justifiably,  and  quite  naturally,  not  only  com- 
plain of,  but  be  indignant  at,  the  Government.  They  did 
not  know  that  strange,  powerful  pressure  of  elements  let 
loose  by  revolution  in  the  mass  of  the  people,  and  par- 
ticularly in  the  masses  of  soldiers  —  a  pressure  which 
strained  to  the  utmost  the  whole  organism  of  the  State. 
They  did  not  grasp  the  reasons  for  the  apparent  slowness 
with  which  Government  exercised  a  cooling  influence  on 
these  elements,  nor  realize  that  any  imprudent  measure  might 
only  enable  these  elements  to  break  out  afresh  and  sweep 
everybody  before  them,  and  first  of  all  the  officers  and,  with 
them,  the  entire  Russian  army. 

In  the  fiery  atmosphere  of  revolution,  as  in  the  torrid 
desert,  many  saw  mirages  before  them,  and  in  their  efforts 
to  reach  them,  they  unhappily  brought  disaster  —  not  only 
on  themselves.  That  the  Central  Committee  of  the  League 
of  Officers  should  run  after  a  mirage  was  dangerous,  be- 
cause the  Committee  spoke  in  the  name  of  the  whole  per- 
sonnel of  the  officers,  calling  itself  **  the  representative  "  of 
'*the  corps  of  officers,"  pretending  that  its  own  political 


THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM  57 

creed  was  the  cult  of  all  the  officers,  and  setting  its  seal 
upon  the  entire  corporation.  This  was  too  risky  a  game. 
It  was  like  playing  with  fire  on  the  edge  of  the  powder 
magazine.  And  if  we  take  into  consideration  that  the  Cen- 
tral Committee  of  the  League  was  located  at  Headquarters; 
relied  in  its  work  on  the  co-operation  of  officials  upon  the 
staff  at  the  fronts  and  in  the  various  armies ;  nominated  its 
own  confidential  representatives;  kept  a  black  list  of  offi- 
cers who  differed  from  its  political  views;  set  up  its  own 
commissions  of  inquiry;  expressed  its  approbation  or  dis- 
approval, etc. ;  if,  as  I  say,  we  take  all  these  facts  into  con- 
sideration, it  will,  on  the  one  hand,  be  evident  why  the 
proceedings  of  the  Central  Committee  of  the  League  as- 
sumed a  "  highly  officious  "  character,  and,  on  the  other 
hand,  why  the  responsibility  for  the  actions  not  even  of 
the  whole  League,  but  only  of  its  Central  Committee,  was 
attached  to  all  the  Russian  officers  jointly  and  individually. 
I  will  cite  a  clear  example  of  the  embarrassing  relations 
between  the  military  powers  and  the  Central  Committee 
which  prevailed  last  summer  and  required  the  intervention 
of  the  Ministry  of  War.  Savinkov  then  telegraphed  to 
Kornilov  as  follows :  "  Your  instructions  obliging  the  staffs 
to  provide  the  Central  Committee  of  the  League  with  lists 
of  Bolshevik  officers  may  lead  to  most  undesirable  misun- 
derstandings, because  these  orders  will  result  in  setting  up 
a  certain  control  by  the  Central  Committee  over  the  party 
organizations  and  activities  of  the  officers,  which  control 
certainly  is  not  a  function  of  the  Central  Committee;  and 
the  right  of  such  a  control  can  only  belong  to  the  Commis- 
saries and  to  competent  tribunals.  In  view  of  the  above 
considerations,  I  would  suggest  the  desirability  of  cancel- 
ling your  instructions."  Again,  the  staffs  used  to  circulate 
certain  militant  resolutions  of  the  Committee,  which  cir- 


58  THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM 

cumstance  was  understood  as  an  official  approval  of  the 
course  steered  by  the  Committee  and  served  to  increase  the 
tension  already  existing  in  the  relations  between  the  officers 
of  the  army  and  the  rank  and  file,  etc. 

I  considered  this  position  quite  abnormal,  unpermissible, 
pregnant  with  serious  consequences.  By  way  of  example 
I  will  point  to  the  alarm  aroused  by  the  activity  of  the 
League  among  the  naval  officers,  on  whom  the  least  fluctua- 
tion in  the  political  temperature  of  the  men  reacted  pain- 
fully. "  In  view  of  the  strong  agitation  in  both  fleets 
against  the  officers,  due  to  the  activities  of  the  League,  I 
beg  you  to  bring  to  the  knowledge  of  the  fleets  that  there 
is  information  to  the  effect  that  the  officers  of  the  Baltic 
Fleet  never  had  representatives  in  the  Central  Committee 
of  the  League  at  Headquarters,  and  that  the  Black  Sea 
Fleet  recalled  theirs."  Thus  the  Chief  of  the  Naval  Staff 
of  the  Commander-in-Chief  telegraphed  to  me  at  the  be- 
ginning of  August. 

Considering,  however,  that  the  root-idea  of  the  League 
was  healthy  and  useful,  I  and  my  collaborators,  especially 
General  Baranovsky,  desired  to  clear  up  the  general  posi- 
tion, by  an  exchange  of  views,  by  pointing  out  the  pos- 
sible results  of  such  a  course,  and  thereby  to  restrain  the 
Central  Committee  from  tendencies  which  were  psycho- 
logically intelligible,  but  dangerous  for  the  personnel  of 
the  officers  as  a  whole,  and,  what  was  even  more  important, 
fatal  to  the  ivhole  army.  I  remember  having  issued  in- 
structions that  Colonel  Pronin,  a  representative  of  the  Cen- 
tral Committee,  should  be  requested  to  come  to  me  per- 
sonally for  a  discussion  of  the  matter,  but,  unhappily,  for 
some  reason  the  discussion  never  took  place. 

At  the  end  of  July,  information  began  to  come  in  point- 
ing to  the  participation  of  an  influential  section  of  the  Cen- 


THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM  59 

tral  committee  (especially  of  the  staff  officers)  in  an  or- 
ganized conspiracy,  and  the  question  of  the  ultimate  fate  of 
the  Committee  became  still  more  acute.  It  was  urgently 
necessary  to  find  some  issue  before  it  was  too  late.  Un- 
fortunately, the  leaders  of  the  Committee,  and  among  them 
a  former  member  of  the  Fourth  Imperial  Duma  —  Colonel 
Novosiltsev  (Constitutional  Democrat) — persisted  in  their 
dangerous  game,  and  after  the  Moscow  Conference  I  re- 
solved to  have  the  Central  Committee  removed  from  Head- 
quarters. .  .  .  The  nightmare  through  which  we  are  living 
today  has  fully  confirmed  our  fears,  having  shown  how 
cruelly  the  whole  body  of  officers  suffered  for  the  proceed- 
ings of  a  separate  and  unimportant  group  of  fantastic  and 
insane  gamblers.  And  yet,  as  I  said  in  my  manifesto  of 
August  22nd,  "  the  flower  of  the  army  —  the  personnel  of  its 
officers  —  had  gone  through  a  great  bloodless  revolution  in 
brotherly  unity  with  their  men,  strengthening  the  work  of 
those  who  had  struck  oflf  the  shameful  fetters  of  slavery. 
The  officers  had  shown  that  they  were  of  one  flesh  with 
the  people.  The  first  days  of  joy  passed ;  a  hard  task  was 
keeping  every  man  at  his  post,  and  preventing  him  from 
throwing  down  his  arms,  so  that  the  foe  should  not  snatch 
away  his  newly  found  freedom.  The  officers  remained  at 
their  posts,  the  better  part  of  them,  in  spite  of  all  calumnies, 
having  faith  in  the  common  sense  of  the  people,  displaying 
the  loftiest  heroism;  in  some  units  the  casualties  included 
almost  all  the  officers.  The  officers,  as  a  body,  gave  their 
blood  on  the  battlefield,  and  proved  their  faith  in  their 
country  and  the  Revolution.  .  .  .  History  will  do  honour 
to  these  heroes."] 

Shdblovsky. —  What  was  the  particular  information  re- 
garding the  extent  of  this  plot,  the  individuals  —  or  per- 
haps the  organizations  —  which  might  be  implicated  in  it  ? 


60     THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM 

Perhaps  there  was  merely  general  information  that  some- 
thing was  being  hatched? 

Kerensky. —  There  was  not  merely  information  that 
something  was  being  hatched,  but  concrete  data.  You  are 
aware  of  our  position  at  present.  Without  actual  means 
of  investigation,  we  are  like  blind  puppies.  We  may  be 
tricked  on  all  sides  and  yet  notice  nothing.  Generally 
speaking,  a  whole  pile  of  information  was  amassed,  and 
even  before  the  Moscow  Conference  I  expected  that  some 
developments  were  inevitable.  This  information  came  in 
at  the  end  of  July  and  the  very  beginning  of  August. 

Shablovsky. —  Was  it  a  military  conspiracy? 

Kerensky. —  The  position  was,  that  the  people  about 
whom  we  received  information  were  all  in  the  army,  but 
they  had  relations  with  some  civil  elements ;  they  had  abun- 
dant resources.  Quite  a  series  of  newspapers  appeared  — 
some  of  them  are  flourishing  to  this  day  —  which  started 
to  attack  the  Provisional  Government,  and  myself  person- 
ally. They  were  all  organs  of  the  partisans  of  "  a  strong 
rule  " :  the  Jivoe  Slovo,  N.arodnaya  Gasetta,  Novaya  Rnss, 
Vechernee  Vremya,  etc.  I  cannot,  naturally,  furnish  at  this 
moment  proofs  satisfactory  for  inquiry  purposes,  but  to  me 
the  whole  plan  is  clear. 

Shavlovsky.—  Tht  creating  of  a  suitable  public  opinion 
in  certain  circles,  by  means  of  a  propaganda  in  the  Press? 

Kerensky. —  Yes. 

Shablovsky. —  But  were  there  any  indications  as  to  the 
immediate  object  in  view? 

Kerensky. —  To  seize  the  power  and  arrest  the  Provisional 
Government.  A  typical  counter-revolution  was  being  pre- 
pared; not  a  mass  movement,  but  a  coup  d'etat. 

Shablovsky. —  On  what  could  "they"  rely? 

Kerensky. — "They"  had  links  with  Headquarters.     At 


THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM  61 

that  time  no  special  indications  pointed  to  Kornilov,  but 
there  was  some  talk  of  the  part  played  by  the  staff  officers. 
The  first  source  of  information  was  perfectly  trustworthy. 
It  was  not  received  through  agents,  not  being  denunciatory 
information,  so  to  speak;  but  it  came  from  people  of  the 
highest  reliability,  who  were  honestly  and  seriously  anxious 
that  I  should  look  betimes  into  possible  occurrences.  Later 
on,  information  was  received  through  less  trustworthy 
sources,  but  it  completely  coincided  with  the  first  intima- 
tions. Then  we  began  to  take  our  own  observations  as  far 
as  lay  within  our  means.  Naturally  this  was  very  diffi- 
cult to  do,  for  the  general  feeling  at  Headquarters  was 
so  strained  that  every  person  who  came  there  from  the 
Centre  awakened  irritation  and  suspicion. 

[As  regards  the  plot,  it  is  necessary  to  make  a  few  gen- 
eral remarks.  Where  did  the  wave  of  conspiracy  origi- 
nate? There  can  be  but  one  reply:  it  originated  at  Tar- 
nopol,  and  on  July  3rd-4th  in  Petrograd.  The  debacle  at 
the  front  had  created  a  feeling  of  wounded  national  pride 
which  lent  itself  easily  to  methods  of  conspiracy,  and  the 
Bolshevik  insurrection  had  revealed  to  the  unenlightened 
how  far-reaching  was  the  inner  dissolution  of  the  democracy, 
the  impotence  of  the  Revolution  against  anarchy,  and  the 
power  of  the  minority  if  competently  organized  and  acting 
unexpectedly.  The  fact  that  only  a  handful  of  Cossacks 
and  a  few  soldiers  who  had  not  yet  lost  discipline  had  saved, 
the  Taurida  Palace  (that  is  to  say,  the  Soviet  itself)  from 
being  wrecked  was  duly  noted  by  those  who  were  interested 
in  such  things.  A  further  series  of  mistakes,  and  more 
particularly,  an  absurd  terror,  amounting  almost  to  panic, 
of  a  coming  counter-revolution,  which  after  the  3rd-5th 
of  July  positively  became  the  fashionable  disease  of  the 
democracy,  gave  the  circles  from  which  the  future  adven- 


62  THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM 

turers  originated  the  impression  that  the  democracy  was 
afraid  because  it  felt  its  weakness. 

Now  began  a  tragic  misunderstanding:  one  side  lost  faith 
in  its  strength,  which  was  real,  while  the  other,  hearing 
its  power  talked  about,  believed  in  this  myth.  The  former, 
panic-stricken  on  account  of  a  coming  counter-revolution, 
grew  demoralized  and  thereby  contributed  towards  re-estab- 
lishing in  the  masses  the  anarchical-Bolshevik  influences; 
the  other  side  became  bolder  and  bolder  in  its  attacks  on 
the  "  revolutionary  democracy,'^  and  so  irritated  the  people, 
to  the  great  joy  of  the  unruly  elements.  Besides,  among 
circles  adhering  to  the  "  Right "  it  was  supposed  that  popu- 
lar discontent  was  to  their  advantage,  consequently  they 
considered  it  a  good  thing  to  inflame  the  passions  of  the 
masses.  See,  for  example,  how  Souvorin's  Narodnaya 
Gazetta  sang  to  the  tune  of  Messrs.  Bronstein-Trotsky 
and  Co. :  "In  the  very  first  days  when  in  the  streets  of 
Petrograd  appeared  the  solemn  placard,  *Long  live  the 
Democratic  Republic!'  we  said  that  this  kind  of  political 
emasculation  will  not  succeed  in  Russia;  for  here  only  a 
great  People's  Republic  can  be  established  on  a  new  social 
order  —  a  great  Social  Republic."  And  here  is  an  echo 
of  the  Bolshevik  war-cry,  this  time  from  an  authentic  organ 
of  the  Black  Hundred  — the  Groza  ("The  Storm*'): 
"  On  June  i8th  [when  a  number  of  demonstrations  took 
place]  the  workers  of  the  capital  and  the  soldiers  had  a 
review  of  forces,  which  marched  against  the  capitalists  with 
a  view  to  shortening  the  war  and  exchanging  ministers 
taken  from  among  the  merchants  and  landowners  for  min- 
isters from  their  own  ranks.  Against  them  marched  the 
Jews,  supported  by  the  capitalists  who  are  for  the  continua- 
tion of  the  war.     The  workers  and  soldiers  threw  them- 


THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM     63 

selves  upon  the  Jews,  soundly  beat  them,  and  tore  up  their 
banners/* 

On  this  "  July  "  soil,  "  non-party  organizations  "  sprang 
up  like  mushrooms,  and  soon  began  to  form  themselves 
into  various  circles  and  groups,  which  proceeded  to  take 
practical    steps    towards   preparing    a    counter-revolution. 
From  among  various  similar  beginnings  finally  emerged 
a  serious  nucleus,  the  work  of  which  was  planned  on  a 
large  scale.     A  special  Press  made  its  appearance,  a  propa- 
ganda was  started  and  members  enrolled,  while  in  some 
places  agents  were  appointed  and  gathering-points  estab- 
lished.    Valuable  information  received  by  me  at  this  time 
made  it  possible  for  us  to  see  something  of  what  was  going 
on,  and  at  least  to  note  certain  individuals  and  partially 
to  reveal  their  object  and  task.     One  thing  stood  out  clearly : 
the  aim  of  the  counter-revolution  was  not  the  re-establish- 
ment of  the  fallen  dynasty;  consequently  some  successor 
of  the  Provisional  Government  was  being  prepared  some- 
where, and  in  any  case  this  question  must  have  been  very 
seriously  discussed.     Later  it  became  the  special  aim  of 
certain  groups  to  "  remove  "  me  by  some  means,  however 
drastic.     I  was  warned  of  an  occasion  when  the  lot  had 
been  already  drawn  to  decide  who  should  carry  out  the  sen- 
tence, and  only  an  accident  prevented  the  performance  of 
the  act  itself.  .  .  .  Upon  considering  every  aspect  of  this 
seditious  movement,  I  decided  that  the  extra-judicial  arrest 
and  exile  of  the  prominent  conspirators  would  be  an  entirely 
suitable  measure  of  precaution  in  this  case  (although  in  the 
case  of  a  mass  movement  such  procedure  is  useless  and 
even  harmful).     However,  our  means  of  investigation  were 
technically  so  imperfect  that  we  did  not  succeed  in  suppress- 
ing the  leading  centres  in  time. 


64  THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM 

The  whole  time  between  July  3rd  and  August  27th  may- 
be divided  into  three  periods :  first  comes  that  of  work  by 
primitive  methods  in  small  separate  Leagues,  and  the  proc- 
ess of  merging  the  more  important  of  them  into  one  body; 
in  the  second,  the  forces  were  organized  and  means  devised 
for  an  attempt  to  take  advantage  of  the  Moscow  Confer- 
ence ;  and  in  the  third  and  last  period  occurred  the  decisive 
effort  to  seize  the  governing  power  by  violence  under  the 
pretence  of  a  conflict  with  the  Bolsheviks.  The  aim  of 
the  movement  was  a  military  dictatorship.] 

§8 

Shablovsky. —  When  Kornilov  was  here  on  August  3rd, 
did  you  not  have  a  conversation  with  him  —  did  you  not 
simply  deliberate  on  the  subject  of  how  he  would  regard 
your  personal  departure  from  power?  Was  there  no  such 
conversation,  discussion  or  talk? 

Kerensky. —  I  read  about  this,  and  marvelled.  Some- 
where in  his  printed  depositions  he  says  that  "  Kerensky 
discussed  with  me  or  inquired  whether  it  was  not  time 
for  him  to  retire  " —  or  something  to  that  effect. 

Shablovsky. —  He  put  it  rather  differently. 

Kerensky. —  In  realty  (it  was  in  this  study  of  mine)  I 
assured  him  as  positively  as  I  could  that  the  existing  coali- 
tional  Governmenjt  was  the  only  possible  combination  of 
forces,  and  that  any  other  course  would  be  fatal.  I  said  to 
him :  "  Well,  suppose  I  retire,  what  would  be  the  out- 
come?"    That  was  what  I  said.  ... 

Shablovsky. —  So  there  was  a  discussion  ? 

Kerensky. —  There  was  no  deliberation  of  any  kind.  All 
that  Kornilov  and  others  said  to  the  effect  that  the  Provi- 
sional Government  attached  a  political  value  to  him  is  quite 


THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM      65 

absurd.  I  and  other  members  of  the  Government  did  all 
we  could  to  restrain  Kornilov  from  politics,  which  were 
not  within  the  range  of  his  intellect;  he  did  not  in  the  least 
understand  politics  nor  political  developments, 
i  Chairman. —  Therefore  this  conversation,  if  it  took  place, 
had  the  character  of  a  discussion,  but  not,  in  fact,  of  a 
consultation  ? 

Kerensky. —  I  said :  "  What  are  you  aiming  at  ?  You 
will  simply  find  yourself  choked  in  an  airless  space:  the 
railways  will  stop,  the  telegraph  will  not  work."  The 
conversation  was  in  that  kind  of  spirit. 

[I  remember  how,  following  my  question  about  the  Dic- 
tatorship, Kornilov  answered  thoughtfully :  "  Well,  maybe 
we  shall  have  to  make  up  our  minds  even  to  that."  .  .  . 
"  Well,"  I  remarked,  "  and  that  will  lead  inevitably  to  a 
fresh  massacre  of  the  officers."  "  I  foresee  that  possibility, 
but  at  least  those  who  are  left  alive  will  have  the  soldiers 
in  hand,"  Kornilov  replied  with  decision.] 

Really,  all  my  relations  with  Kornilov  and  my  attitude 
to  his  enterprises  are  very  well  known  to  the  Provisional 
Government,  and  ought  to  be  known  everywhere.  I  was 
obliged  to  carry  on  a  stiff  fight  all  the  time  for  the  main- 
tenance of  a  single  fount  of  authority  and  to  prevent  po- 
litical adventures.  I  believe  this  was  the  sole  method  I 
made  use  of  —  to  watch  and  be  ready.  I  am  sure  that 
this  was  my  only  way,  because  I  could  not  act  (that  is  to 
say,  bring  forward  accusations  officially  in  court)  on  the 
strength  of  secret  evidence  and  on  the  mere  friendly  in- 
formation which  I  possessed.  I  would  then  have  appeared 
in  the  opinion  of  the  public  like  a  man  suffering  from 
persecution-mania.  Nothing  would  have  come  of  this. 
But  all  the  while  I  w^as  on  my  guard  and  followed  the 
smallest  fluctuations  which  took  place  in  these  circles. 


66  THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM 

Chairman. —  Then,  as  to  this  incident  of  the  summoning 
of  Kornilov.  You  stated  in  your  deposition  that  the  Pro- 
visional Government  did  not  summon  Kornilov,  that  you 
found  yourself  faced  with  the  fact  of  his  intention  to  come, 
and  that,  having  learnt  it,  you  tried  to  prevent  him  by 
sending  him  a  telegram  which  crossed  him  on  the  way, 
and  that  afterwards  he  arrived  here  and  on  his  arrival 
presented  himself.  .  .  . 

Kerensky. —  He  arrived,  and  his  attitude  towards  me 
was  so  "  friendly  "  that  he  came  to  me  with  machine  guns. 

Ukrainzev. —  With  machine  guns  ?     What  do  you  mean  ? 

Kerensky. —  A  motor-car  with  machine  guns  went  in 
front,  and  another  motor  with  machine  guns  came  in  the 
rear.  The  Asiatic  soldiers  of  Kornilov  brought  in  two 
bags  with  the  machine  guns  and  laid  them  in  the  vestibule. 

Chairman. —  Really,  they  brought  in  machine  guns  ? 

Kerensky. —  Yes ! 

Chairman. —  And  left  them  there  ? 

Kerensky. —  No.  Afterwards  they  took  them  away, 
when  they  themselves  were  departing.  Again  one  motor- 
car with  machine  guns  led  the  way  and  another  followed 
behind.     This  was  their  manner  of  leaving. 

[On  his  previous  visit  to  Petrograd  on  August  3rd, 
Kornilov  came  in  without  machine  guns.  The  following 
quotation  from  the  Russkoe  Slovo  gives  some  idea  of 
the  sultry  atmosphere  which  prevailed  at  Headquarters 
before  the  Moscow  Conference  and  the  visit  to  Petrograd 
on  August  loth:  "The  feeling  at  Headquarters  in  con- 
nection with  General  Kornilov's  departure  was  very  strained, 
and  this  nervousness  increased,  particularly  on  account  of 
vague  rumours  which  came  from  Petrograd  of  a  plot  against 
the  Commander-in-Chief  which  was  said  to  be  in  prepara- 
tion. .  .  .  This  explains  why,  during  General  Komilov's 


THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM  67 

journey,  measures  of  precaution  were  taken.  .  .  .  Nearer 
to  Petrograd  the  feeling  of  apprehension  of  the  guard  in- 
creased, although  there  was  no  ostensible  reason  for  it/'] 

Oh  yes,  I  forgot  that  I  was  informed  of  the  existence 
of  a  certain  political  '*  salon,"  where  an  organized  campaign 
was  going  on  in  favour  of  Kornilov,  and  where  all  kinds 
of  agitation  took  place  and  attempts  were  made  to  form 
public  opinion.  But  as  this  was  a  lady's  salon  I  will  not 
mention  the  names;  this  is  of  no  importance. 

Chairman. —  Well,  then,  in  your  first  deposition  you  state 
that  on  August  3rd  Kornilov  withdrew  his  memorandum, 
and  that  later  he  presented  it  again,  personally  or  through 
Savinkov,  in  a  revised  form,  in  which  new  clauses  appeared 
respecting  the  output  of  work  in  the  factories. 

Kerensky —  No ;  he  brought  it  to  me  quite  ready  on 
August  loth.  As  far  as  I  remember  the  matter  stood  thus : 
Savinkov  and  Filonenko  met  Kornilov  at  the  station  and 
handed  him  the  report  there.  Personally,  I  believe  it  was 
so,  although  I  do  not  insist  upon  it.  I  believe  it  happened 
as  I  said.  Anyhow,  Kornilov  came  straight  to  me  with 
this  memorandum.  A  space  was  left  at  the  end  of  the 
document  for  his  signature,  and  Savinkov  signed  just  under 
this  space,  while  quite  at  the  bottom  of  the  document  Filo- 
nenko had  put  his  signature. 

Chairman, —  Now,  about  these  paragraphs  regarding  the 
railways  and  factories.  When  Kornilov  came  with  his 
fresh  report,  was  he  alone  or  accompanied  by  Savinkov  ? 

Kerensky. —  He  came  quite  alone.  Previously,  however, 
Savinkov  insisted  that  Kornilov  should,  without  fail,  make 
a  report  to  the  Provisional  Government. 

Chairman. —  On  August  loth,  when  he  was  summoned 
by  you? 

Kerensky. —  Previously.     I  said  at  a  sitting  of  the  Cab- 


68  THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM 

inet  that,  at  a  moment  when  we  were  wholly  occupied  in 
preparing  for  the  Moscow  Conference,  the  sittings  of  the 
Provisional  Government  did  not  provide  either  the  right 
time  or  the  right  place  for  a  report  that  required  to  be 
considered  in  detail.  Then  Savinkov  and  Filonenko  sum- 
moned him  notwithstanding;  still,  it  all  happened  as  I  pre- 
dicted: the  report  was  not  read  before  the  Provisional 
Government  on  August  loth.  It  was  read  here,  in  this 
study,  in  the  evening.  I  summoned  Terestchenko  and 
Nekrassov,  and  Kornilov  laid  the  document  before  us 
here. 

Chairman. —  You  have  expressed  your  views  during  the 
day.     Kornilov  did  not  show  you  the  report  earlier? 

Kerensky. —  No ;  I  had  run  through  the  report  during 
the  day  and  noticed  the  factories,  workshops  and  railway 
clauses,  which  opened  up  entirely  new  questions;  more- 
over, as  I  have  already  told  you,  it  contained  some  prepos- 
terous things. 

Chairman. —  And  then  you  expressed  your  objections 
to  it? 

Kerensky. —  I  said  that  from  the  formal  point  of  view 
it  was  quite  incorrect.  After  all,  said  I,  who  is  the  Deputy 
Minister  of  War?  He  is  an  official  attached  to  myself, 
the  Minister;  he  is  my  close  collaborator  and  my  repre- 
sentative. 

The  Deputy  Minister  of  War  had  no  right  to  go  against 
his  chief,  the  Minister,  and  still  less  to  sign  documents. 
Kornilov  agreed  that  this  could  not  be  done.  He  agreed 
that,  as  I  had  not  yet  seen  the  memorandum,  whereas  he 
had  brought  it  to  me  supposing  that  its  contents  were  known 
to  me,  it  was  impossible  to  insist  on  its  being  read  before 
the  Provisional  Government  immediately.  He  also  un- 
derstood  that    Savinkov   had    behaved   with   a   lack   of 


THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM      69 

discipline.  During  the  evening,  while  Kornilov  was  mak- 
ing his  report,  Savinkov  called.  I  was  informed  that  "  the 
Deputy  Minister  of  War  is  there."  I  did  not  receive  him. 
Savinkov  was  not  present  while  Kornilov  read  his  report, 
because  I  considered  that  he  had  already  retired  from  the 
Government.     This  was  obvious  to  me. 

[Savinkov's  effort  to  be  present  during  the  reading  of 
Komilov's  report  on  August  loth  was  evidently  made 
counting  on  my  "  soft-heartedness,*'  which  would  prevent 
me  from  refusing  before  strangers  to  receive  him.  The 
fact  is  that,  according  to  Savinkov  himself,  after  my  cate- 
gorical refusal  on  August  8th  to  sign  the  measures  pro- 
jected in  the  second  report,  he  gave  in  his  resignation,  de- 
claring that  "  in  that  case  the  report  would  be  presented 
to  the  Provisional  Government  by  General  Kornilov.  .  .  . 
My  resignation  (he  continues)  was  not  accepted.  I  carried 
on  the  current  work  as  usual,  but  I  did  not  report  any 
more  to  Kerensky."  (Which  was,  of  course,  quite  unwar- 
rantable, I  may  add.)  In  a  conversation  with  Kornilov 
on  August  loth,  Savinkov  acknowledged  that  his  conduct 
had  been  an  offence  against  discipline,  but  considered  that 
it  could  not  be  regarded  as  positively  harmful  to  the  State, 
for  during  that  time  there  were  no  urgent  reports.  "  On 
the  other  hand,  my  offence  against  discipline  was  the  only 
method  at  my  disposal  of  rousing  the  Prime  Minister  to 
give  his  serious  attention  to  the  report,  to  which  I  attached 
exceptional  importance.'* 

Is  not  the  whole  character  of  Savinkov  revealed  in  this 
incident  ? 

It  is  true  I  did  not  cause  official  action  to  be  taken  in 
regard  to  Savinkov's  letter  of  resignation  dated  August 
8th,  hoping  that  he  would  come  back  to  his  senses  and 
would  not  carry  his  **  threats "  about  General  Kornilov 


70  THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM 

into  execution.  When  General  Kornilov  actually  arrived 
and  began  to  carry  out  Savinkov's  ideas,  I  recognized  that 
it  was  not  permissible  that  the  latter  should  remain  any 
longer  in  the  service  of  the  Government,  and  I  signed  my 
acceptance  of  his  resignation.  Thereupon,  in  order  that 
I  might  not  put  Savinkov  into  an  awkv^ard  situation  on  that 
day,  1  sent  him  word  through  Terestchenko,  so  that  he 
should  not  call  on  me  that  day.  .  .  .  ("Terestchenko  in- 
formed me,"  says  Savinkov,  touching  on  this  subject,  "  that 
I  was  not  invited  to  attend  at  the  Palace  that  day.'')  How 
then,  under  such  circumstances,  could  Savinkov  have  re- 
solved to  call  on  me  that  evening,  and  how  could  he  count 
on  being  received?] 

Chairman. —  That  is  to  say,  it  has  been  assumed  then 
that  Kornilov's  lack  of  tact  was  due  to  Savinkov? 


§9 

Raupakh. —  And  Savinkov  did  not  make  any  verbal  re- 
port to  you  as  to  the  contents  of  the  document? 

Kerensky. —  It  was  in  this  way:  He  would  begin  to 
speak  of  the  introduction  of  the  death-penalty  at  the  rear; 
to  this  I  invariably  objected,  and  there  our  conversation 
would  usually  come  to  an  end.  "If  you  disagree  on  this 
fundamental  point,"  Savinkov  was  saying,  "  all  the  rest 
is  unessential."  Now,  all  the  other  measures,  with  the 
exception  of  the  clauses  relating  to  the  railways  and  fac- 
tories, had  been  projected  even  earlier  by  the  Ministry  of 
War.  The  complete  error  into  which  every  newly  ap- 
pointed administrator  fell,  and  which  he  would  innocently 
propagate,  was  that  nothing  had  been  done  before  he  came, 
as  though  he  were  the  first  to  start  upon  any  reforms: 
Savinkov  was  the  first,  Kornilov  was  the  first,  now  Verk- 


THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM     71 

hovsky  is  the  first  —  and  so  on.  In  reality,  all  the  matel'ial 
for  my  collaborators  had  long  been  collected  in  full,  and 
systematically  elaborated  into  a  series  of  measures  which 
all  tended  to  definite  aims  [to  re-establish  the  organization 
and  the  fighting  capacity  of  the  army]. 

[From  the  very  beginning,  when  I  became  Minister  of 
War,  it  was  evident,  without  expending  much  time  in  one's 
survey,  in  what  an  inextricable  confusion  Gutchkov,  with 
his  preposterous  reforms,  had  thrown  the  Ministry.  At 
a  glance  it  was  obvious  what  a  vast  work  was  required  in 
order  to  amend  this  muddle  and  carry  out  well-planned 
and  thorough  reforms.  Now,  Kornilov  wished  to  pro- 
ceed by  sweeping  reforms,  a  method  which  could  only  have 
shaken  the  whole  State. 

In  connection  with  this  point,  the  history  of  reforms 
made  by  the  Ministry  of  War,  I  recollect  the  words  I 
spoke  at  the  Moscow  Conference :  "  Gentlemen,  that  which 
many  now  set  down  to  the  account  of  the  Revolution  was 
wrought  by  the  force  of  elements,  not  by  a  conscious  action 
and  ill-will  on  the  part  of  malign  forces  of  revolution; 
this  is  evident  from  the  fact  that  all  which  arouses  the 
indignation  of  the  present  regenerators  of  the  army,  all 
that  was  done  before  me,  without  me,  and  by  their  own 
hands.'' 

In  fact,  the  statute  which  defined  the  nature  of  the  com- 
mittees and  organizations  elected  by  the  soldiers  was  sanc- 
tioned by  Gutchkov  and  appears  in  his  famous  order.  No. 
213.  The  much-discussed  Commission  of  General  Poli- 
vanov  (formerly  Minister  of  War)  which  worked  out  the 
declaration  of  the  rights  of  the  soldier,  and  generally  has 
cost  the  army  so  dear,  existed  during  Gutchkov's  term  of 
office,  but  was,  as  soon  as  my  authority  enabled  me  to  do  so, 
set  aside  by  me.     The  Admiralty  paid  also  dear  for  the 


72      THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM 

doings  of  the  Commission  of  Savitch  (member  of  the 
Octobrist  "  Right "  in  the  Fourth  Imperial  Duma)  ;  while 
V.  I.  Lebedev  ^  brought  it  back  to  some  extent  to  sanity 
and  activity.  The  Military  Council  even  found  means  to 
reduce  by  May  the  maintenance  of  the  officers.  Then,  that 
formation  of  detachments  of  homogenous  nationality,  in- 
troduced without  the  knowledge  of  the  Provisional  Gov- 
ernment—  how  many  difficulties  I  experienced  later  in 
struggling  with  the  inevitable  consequences  of  this  inno- 
vation! Then,  the  shuffling  of  the  commanders  at  the 
front  —  incomprehensible  to  any  one !     Etc.,  etc. ! 

I  signed  the  "  declaration  of  the  rights  of  the  soldiers," 
which  I  received  fully  prepared  as  a  legacy  from  my  pred- 
ecessors. To  refuse  to  sign  it  when  its  existence  was 
already  known  in  the  remotest  corners  of  the  front  and 
it  was  actually  in  practice,  would  have  been  to  act  upon 
an  "  ostrich-policy,"  to  believe  that  the  reality  disappears 
because  one  shuts  one's  eyes  to  it.  I  took  upon  myself 
the  formal  responsibility  for  it;  and  at  the  same  time  I 
demanded  categorically  that  it  should  include  not  an  im- 
plicit assumption  but  a  clear  and  open  statement  of  the 
rights  of  commanding  officers,  under  battle  conditions,  to 
act  by  force  of  arms  against  those  who  were  disobedient. 
Such  was  the  origin  of  the  final  text  of  the  famous  §  14, 
which  furnished  the  grounds  upon  which  the  Bolsheviks 
raised  a  hue-and-cry  about  me  in  the  army.  Now  is  the 
right  time  to  speak  of  it;  let  the  powers  that  be  reproach 
me  with  that  crime  against  the  people  —  they  who  so 
piously  bow  before  the  inviolability  of  human  life! 

Yes,  when  I  was  Minister  of  War  it  was  my  lot  to  be 
continually  cutting  down  and  curtailing  various  "  liberties  '* 
introduced  under  Gutchkov,  and  my  collaborators  will  cer- 

1  Socialist  Revolutionary,  and  for  a  short  time  the  Marine  Minister. 


THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM  73 

tainly  remember  that  I  sometimes  said  to  them :  "  How 
strange  that  a  '  violent '  revolutionist  should  have  to  oppose 
the  initiatives  of  the  Octobrist  '  upholders  of  the  State  ' ! '' 
They  will  remember,  too,  how,  when  signing  some  restric- 
tion or  prohibition,  I  laughingly  said :  "  Give  me  some- 
thing to  sign  which  would  be  pleasanter  for  *  comrades,* 
otherwise  they  will  be  down  on  me  " !  Ah,  least  of  all  do 
I  wish  in  any  way  to  do  Gutchkov  an  injustice,  and  still 
less  to  justify  myself!  History  will  have  its  word  to  say 
and  determine  the  place  of  each  one  of  us.  I  only  wish 
that  more  should  be  known  and  understood  at  this  present 
moment.  I  want  once  again,  as  at  the  Moscow  Confer- 
ence, to  make  this  statement :  from  the  time  of  my  coming 
to  the  Ministry  of  War,  not  one  measure  was  passed  which 
could  have  undermined  the  power  of  the  army  or  the  au- 
thority of  the  commanders.  From  the  outset  I  carried  on 
a  systematic  plan  of  work  for  the  revision,  codification, 
and  definition  of  the  limits  of  all  the  new  institutions  in 
the  army.  Above  all,  I  considered  it  necessary  to  pro- 
claim throughout  the  army,  from  top  to  bottom,  that  "  the 
entire  army,  without  regard  to  rank  or  position,  ought  to 
set  an  example  of  discipline,  of  obedience  of  every  one 
to  his  chief  and  of  all  to  the  supreme  command." 

In  less  than  a  month  the  very  Head  of  the  Army  had 
given  an  example  of  insubordination  towards  his  superior 
—  the  supreme  authority  of  the  Government.  Thus  was 
confirmed  the  right  of  every  one  who  carried  arms  to  get 
his  own  way.  Kornilov's  action  played  the  same  part  for 
the  army  that  the  counter-revolution  of  October  25th  ef- 
fected for  all  Russia  —  it  started  the  army  on  the  road  to 
ultimate  ruin.] 

Chairman. —  Who,  besides  yourself,  took  part  in  this 
Council  of  August  loth? 


74?  THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM 

Kerensky, —  Terestchenko,  Nekrassov  and  Kornilov  him- 
self. 

Chairman.—-  At  this  Council  did  you  express  your  opinion 
of  the  report,  or  have  you  had  no  opportunity  to  do  so? 

Kerensky. —  No ;  I  believe  only  two  people  spoke,  one 
of  them  being  Nekrassov ;  I  kept  silent. 

Chairman. —  You  had  said  v^hat  you  thought  of  it  during 
the  day? 

Kerensky. —  All  of  us  said  the  same  thing:  in  the  mili- 
tary section  most  of  the  projected  clauses  were  just  and 
acceptable,  but  the  form  was  impossible. 

Chairman. —  Another  question.  In  this  report  w^as  there 
any  mention  of  the  suppression  of  the  Soldiers'  Soviets  and 
Committees  in  the  army? 

Kerensky. —  Not  in  the  second  report.  The  situation 
had,  apparently,  altered  so  much  that  when  on  another  day, 
on  the  eve  of  the  Moscow  Conference,  the  military  section 
of  the  Government's  declaration  there  was  being  considered 
by  the  Provisional  Government,  it  was  found  possible  to 
put  the  question  as  to  the  measures  in  the  army  thus :  That 
the  Provisional  Government  accepted  the  substance  of  Kor- 
nilov's  first  report,  in  my  exposition  of  it.  At  the  Moscow 
Conference  it  fell  to  me  to  bring  forward  Kornilov's  report 
as  formulated  by  me. 

[I  remember  this  sitting  of  the  Provisional  Government 
on  the  eve  of  the  Moscow  Conference.  It  was  marked 
by  great  nervous  tension.  Only  that  morning  Kokoshkin 
had  sent  in  his  resignation,  and  the  sitting  was  tak- 
ing place  literally  just  a  few  hours  before  the  time 
of  departure  for  Moscow.  When  it  came  to  the  ques- 
tion of  what  should  be  said  about  the  army  in  the  name 
of  the  whole  Government,  it  was  proposed  that  we  should 
first  of  all  hear  the  report  of  the  Commander-in-Chief. 


THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM  75 

Following  the  reading  of  this  report  (the  first  one,  which 
was  more  militant,  but  more  acceptable  in  substance,  being 
without  the  two  nonsensical  clauses),  there  was  a  very  sharp 
discussion.  Then  I  brought  forward  my  version  of  the 
clauses  of  the  program,  which,  in  my  opinion,  might  have 
met  the  requirements  of  the  case,  the  real  intentions  of 
the  Government,  and  would  have  been  at  the  same  time 
acceptable  to  Headquarters  and  the  views  of  the  general 
public.  My  formula  secured  the  assent  of  the  Ministers 
(with  the  exception  of  the  clause  referring  to  the  death- 
penalty  at  the  rear). 

Here  is  the  substance  of  the  decisions  accepted  by  the 
Provisional  Government  on  August  nth  respecting  army 
reforms,  as  they  were  laid  before  the  Moscow  Conference : 
"The  experience  of  these  last  months  has  shown  that  all 
that  was  done  in  a  fortuitous,  sometimes  spasmodic  way, 
sometimes  without  sufficient  consideration,  has  now  to  be 
reconsidered.  It  is  necessary  to  regulate  both  the  rights 
and  the  duties  of  every  man  belonging  to  the  army.  .  .  . 
What  was  accomplished  first  was  a  hasty  and  fortuitous 
structure.  This  haste  was  unavoidable,  otherwise  all  this 
vast  mass  of  material  would  have  gone  to  pieces  after  the 
fall  of  the  despotic  military  power.  This  tendency  to 
'  disaggregate  '  has  been  checked.  Now  the  work  of  prep- 
aration for  building  gives  place  to  real  construction.  All 
will  be  allotted  their  right  places  and  each  6ne  will  know 
his  rights  and  obligations.  .  .  .  The  Comrrfissaries,  Com- 
mittees, and  disciplinary  tribunals  will  be  maintained;  but 
all  will  assume  the  forms  which  are  now  necessary  to  the 
army.  And  we  who  are,  or  have  been,  in  the  army  know 
where  it  is  possible  to  draw  the  line,  and  where  the  im- 
possible and  the  hazardous  begin.  When  it  comes  to  the 
limit,  the  Provisional  Government  will  say:     'Thus   far 


•re  THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM 

and  no  further.' "  Then  followed  the  passage  already 
quoted  about  discipline. 

In  order  that  it  may  be  understood  how  the  declarations 
of  the  Provisional  Government  differed  from  the  "  de- 
mands "  of  General  Kornilov,  I  vi^ll  quote  an  extract  from 
his  speech,  also  made  at  the  Moscow  Conference,  on  the 
Committees  and  Commissaries :  "  I  am  not  hostile  to  the 
Committees.  I  have  worked  with  them  as  Commander 
of  the  Eighth  Army  and  as  Commander  of  the  South- 
w^estern  front.  But  I  ask  that  their  activities  should  be  con- 
fined to  the  economic  interests  and  internal  life  of  the  army, 
within  limits  which  should  be  strictly  defined  by  the  law, 
without  in  any  way  interfering  in  the  sphere  of  military 
operations  and  the  selection  of  commanding  officers.  I 
recognize  the  Commissaries  as  being  a  necessity  at  the  actual 
moment,  but  this  institution  \n\\\  only  be  effective  if  the 
personnel  of  the  Commissaries  combines  democratic  views 
with  energy  and  fearlessness  of  responsibility.''  If  we 
take  into  consideration  that,  at  the  time  of  the  Moscow 
Conference,  the  Committees  had  no  legal  right  to  interfere 
in  the  question  of  operations  at  the  front,  etc.,  and  com- 
pare this  passage  of  Kornilov's  with  my  short  formulas 
about  the  Committees  and  Commissaries,  it  will  be  evident 
that  the  difference  between  us  was  only  in  tone,  and  in 
Kornilov's  putting  the  matter  in  a  very  personal  way. 

Here  is  what  was  published  on  the  subject  of  the  Moscow 
Conference  in  Savirikov's  name,  on  August  i8th,  in  the 
Isvestia,  the  organ  of  the  Central  Soviet:  "I  may  state 
that  I  remain  at  the  head  of  the  administration  of  the  War 
Office  .  .  .  and  according  to  the  statement  of  A.  F.  Keren- 
sky  I  may  again  work  in  complete  unity  with  him  to  bring 
into  being  that  program  to  which  he  refers  in  certain  pas- 
sages of  his  address  before  the  ^loscow  Conference,  and 


THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM     77 

in  which  I,  as  well  as  the  Commander-in-Chief,  Kornilov, 
fully  concur.  ...  It  would  be  a  mistake  to  think  (and  all 
information  which  appeared  in  the  Press  to  this  effect  is 
absolutely  false)  that  I  proposed  to  do  away  with  the  sol- 
diers' organizations.  Neither  I  nor  General  Kornilov  pro- 
posed to  do  anything  of  the  kind.  Both  Kerensky  and  we 
stood  for  the  preservation  and  strengthening  of  the  sol- 
diers' organizations,  with  the  proviso,  however,  that  they 
had  no  right  to  alter  the  battle-orders  or  interfere  in  the 
question  of  the  appointments  and  transferences  of  the  com- 
manding officers." 

How  vital  was  the  new  organization  of  the  army,  sys- 
tematically prepared  by  the  Ministry  of  War  and  energet- 
ically brought  into  existence,  will  be  evident  by  comparing 
the  following  facts.  On  July  28th  Savinkov,  in  the  name 
.of  the  Ministry  of  War,  formulated  the  new  situation  thus : 
"  With  the  establishment  of  the  institution  of  Commissaries, 
the  Supreme  Command  is  in  charge  of  military  operations, 
the  army  organizations  (Committees,  etc.)  are  entrusted 
with  the  army  administration  (economic  affairs  and  con- 
ditions of  life),  while  the  Commissaries  control  the  political 
life  of  the  army."  At  the  Moscow  Conference  a  declara- 
tion of  the  Army  Committees  was  read,  in  which  it  was 
stated  among  other  things  that :  "  The  commanding  body 
ought  to  be  left  quite  free  to  direct  military  operations 
and  activities,  and  to  have  the  decisive  voice  in  regard  to 
military  preparations  and  training.  .  .  .  The  Commissaries 
should  act  as  the  vehicles  of  the  revolutionary  policy  of 
the  Provisional  Government,  the  representatives  of  the  will 
of  the  revolutionary  majority  in  the  country.  .  .  .  The  sol- 
diers' organizations,  being  the  organs  of  the  soldiers'  self- 
administration,  ought  to  have  their  rights  and  obligations 
fully  fixed  in  and  confirmed  by  the  law."    Finally,  the 


78  THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM 

following  regulation  was  published  on  March  30,  191 8,  and 
accepted  by  the  supreme  Military  Council  of  the  "  People's 
Commissaries  "  :  "  The  soldiers'  committees  will  only  con- 
serve their  economic  functions;  they  are  deprived  of  the 
right  to  interfere  in  questions  of  service  or  of  military 
operations.  All  political  questions  will  be  decided  by  spe- 
cially nominated  Commissaries,  who  will  keep  in  touch 
with  the  Committees."  It  is  evident  that  matters  con- 
cerning operations  at  the  front  will  again  be  within  the 
jurisdiction  of  commanding  officers,  no  longer  appointed 
by  elections! 

Thus,  through  the  nightmare-like  experiment  of  Krilen- 
ko's  folly  the  miserable  remnants  of  the  army  returned  to 
the  "  counter-revolutionary  order  of  the  Kornilovite  Ker- 
ensky''!] 

Chairman. —  At  the  Moscow  Conference  you  set  forth 
in  your  version  the  whole  of  Kornilov's  report  except  the 
question  of  the  death-penalty  at  the  rear? 

Kerensky. —  Yes,  with  that  exception,  because  at  the  sit- 
ting of  the  Provisional  Government  on  August  nth  it  was 
decided  to  recognize  in  principle  the  possibility  of  applying 
these  or  any  other  measures,  including  even  the  death- 
penalty  at  the  rear,  but  to  bring  them  into  existence  only 
after  discussing  in  a  legislative  way  each  concrete  measure 
separately  [according  to  conditions  of  time  and  place]. 

["  Let  every  one  be  aware,"  I  said  at  the  Moscow  Con- 
ference, in  reference  to  the  death-penalty  at  the  rear,  "  that 
this  measure  is  a  very  trying  one,  and  let  no  one  venture 
to  inconvenience  us  in  that  matter  with  any  unconditional 
demands.  We  will  not  permit  this.  We  only  say:  *If 
the  wholesale  devastation  and  disaggregation,  pusillanimity 
and  cowardice,  treacherous  murder,  attacks  on  peaceful  in- 
habitants, arson,  pillage  —  if  all  these  continue  in  spite  of 


THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM  79 

our  warnings,  the  Government  will  combat  them  in  the 
way  now  proposed.'  "  I  spoke  thus  conditionally  of  the 
death-penalty  at  the  Moscow  Conference  because  on  this 
question  the  Provisional  Government  was  not  only  not 
unanimously  "  for "  it,  but  had  actually  had  a  majority 
"  against "  this  method  of  fighting  destructiveness  and  de- 
composition. On  the  other  hand,  the  whole  Government 
unanimously  acknowledged  that  the  question  of  the  death- 
penalty  should  not  be  the  subject  of  a  sharp  political  con- 
flict, especially  within  the  Government  itself;  the  more  so 
as,  after  the  partial  reintroduction  of  the  death-penalty  at 
the  front,  the  quarrel  was  no  longer  one  of  principle  but 
of  opportuneness.  Personally,  I  was  decidedly  opposed  to 
the  restoration  of  the  death-penalty  at  the  rear,  because  I 
considered  it  absolutely  impossible  to  carry  out  the  sentence 
of  death,  say  in  Moscow  or  Saratov,  under  the  conditions 
of  a  free  political  life. 

Homicide  by  sentence  of  a  court  of  law,  in  accordance 
with  all  the  rules  and  regulations  of  the  official  execution 
ritual,  is  a  great  "luxury ''  that  only  States  with  a  smoothly 
working  administrative  and  police  apparatus  can  afford. 
Setting  aside  all  humanitarian  considerations,  the  practical 
impossibility  of  carrying  out  a  judicial  death  sentence  in 
Russia  should  have  been  a  conclusive  reason  for  every 
practical  statesman.  The  short  but  sad  experience  of  the 
revolutionary  courts-martial  even  at  the  front  has  added 
very  weighty  evidence  in  support  of  this  view  of  mine. 

I  feel  that  readers  of  these  lines  in  the  Russia  of  the 
present  will  be  irritated  by  this  goody-goody  sentimentalism 
or  *'  Manilovism,"  ^  and  will  ask  me  indignantly :  "  What 
about  the  executions  by  order  of  the  Commissaries,  the 

1  After  "  Manilov,"  a  ridiculously  sentimental  hero  in  Gogol's  "  Dead 
Sauls." 


80  THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM 

Bolshevik  terrorism?"  .  .  .  Yes,  exactly;  there  is  terror- 
ism :  executions,  mass  executions ;  but  without  any  previous 
sentence  by  competent  judicial  authority;  assassinations  by 
the  police,  but  not  death  sentences  imposed  by  courts  of 
law;  and  that  is  the  whole  point.  It  is  the  Bolshevik  re- 
action which  has  proved  that  in  Russia  it  is  not  yet  possible 
to  take  human  life  by  judicial  sentence.  As  far  as  I  am 
able  to  judge  by  the  information  that  has  reached  me,  Mr. 
Bronstein  (Trotsky)  did  not  dare,  after  all,  to  introduce 
his  guillotine,  in  other  words  to  reintroduce  the  death- 
penalty,  to  be  executed  with  the  solemnity  of  a  sentence 
passed  by  a  court  of  law.  In  Russia  they  now  practise 
"  shooting  on  the  spot."  That,  however,  is  an  institution 
beyond  the  pale  of  any  State  Constitution,  or  of  any  cul- 
ture, however  barbaric.  To  transform  every  coward  who 
left  the  front  into  a  privileged  assassin  the  State  has  had 
first  to  be  thoroughly  destroyed.  .  .  .  But  even  irrespective 
of  these  considerations,  Kornilov  and  Filonenko's  idea  of 
employing  capital  punishment  as  a  specific  against  strikes, 
locks-out,  disorganization  of  transport  and  similar  occur- 
rences is  much  too  original  to  be  applicable  in  any  State 
which  is  at  all  civilized.] 

§io 

Chairman. —  Did  not  this  sitting  (of  the  Provisional 
Government  on  August  nth)  deal  with  the  question  of 
Kornilov's  taking  part  at  and  addressing  the  Moscow  Con- 
ference ? 

Kerensky. —  It  did. 

Chairman. —  What  attitude  did  the  Provisional  Govern- 
ment take  up? 

Kerensky. —  We  had  a  perfectly  definite  point  of  view. 


THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM  81 

Our  task  at  the  Moscow  Conference  was  clear  and  definite. 
Our  policy,  which  we  applied  everywhere  and  at  all  times, 
and  which,  however,  is  often  by  misunderstanding  consid- 
ered a  sign  of  weakness  in  the  Government,  consisted  in 
abstaining  from  forcing  events  or  provoking  any  explosions. 
In  this  particular  case  one  of  our  objects  was  to  create 
such  an  atmosphere  at  the  Moscow  Conference  that,  in 
the  event  of  Kornilov's  addressing  the  Conference,  he 
should  not  arouse  a  hostile  attitude  against  himself  among 
large  masses  of  people,  simply  because  it  appeared  to  us 
that  at  that  time  Kornilov  could  not  be  replaced  by  any- 
body. Being  guided,  then,  by  that  consideration,  the  Pro- 
visional Government  adopted  the  following  plan :  the  Com- 
mander-in-Chief will  deliver  an  address  or  report  of  con- 
tents similar  to  that  which  he  made  to  us  on  August  3rd, 
that  is  to  say,  he  w^ill  deal  with  the  position  at  the  front, 
with  the  state  of  the  armies,  the  strategic  situation  and 
so  on.  The  Provisional  Government  adopted  a  decision 
specifically  limiting  General  Kornilov's  address  in  that  sense, 
and  in  spite  of  that  .  .  . 

Chairman. —  And  in  spite  of  that,  in  spite  of  the  warning, 
he  acted  in  his  own  way.  Had  he  been  warned  already 
here  at  Petrograd  ? 

Kerensky. —  If  I  am  not  mistaken,  he  was  warned  here. 

[I  now  recollect  that  the  warning  could  not  have  been 
given  at  Petrograd,  as  General  Kornilov  left  Petrograd 
on  the  eve  of  the  meeting  of  the  Provisional  Government.] 

After  Kornilov's  arrival  at  Moscow,  the  Minister  of 
Ways  of  Communication  called  on  him  the  day  before  he 
spoke.  Then  I  spoke  to  him  on  the  telephone  and  at  the 
Theatre.^  I  again  sent  for  him,  and  told  him  for  the 
second  time  of  the  decision  of  the  Provisional  Government 

^The  Grand  Theatre,  where  the  Moscow  Conference  took  place. 


82  THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM 

and  insistently  asked  him  again  to  act  accordingly.  When 
in  reply  he  said  to  me  that  he  would  speak  in  his  own  way, 
I  warned  him  that  he  must  understand  that  he  would  thus 
be  infringing  discipline.  "  You  should  anyhow  show  an 
example  to  the  rest,  and  you  speak  of  breaking  discipline," 
said  L  At  that  time  General  Kornilov  was  in  such  a  mood 
that  he  was  firmly  convinced  that  the  Government  was 
absolutely  powerless;  he  looked  upon  the  Government  as, 
so  to  speak,  a  thing  in  the  past,  to  which  no  heed  need  be 
paid:  if  we,  i.e.  the  Provisional  Government,  said  that  a 
certain  thing  must  be  done  or  must  not  be  done,  our  reason 
for  it  was  solely  our  fear  of  him.  This,  I  believe,  was 
at  the  time  Kornilov's  state  of  mind  and  that  of  his  friends. 

Liber. —  Allow  me  to  ask  you  a  question.  Did  you  know 
that  the  address  which  Kornilov  delivered  at  the  Moscow 
Conference  was  written  by  Filonenko,  or  at  least  that  Filo- 
nenko  was  part-author  of  it? 

Kerensky. —  I  know  nothing  as  to  that. 

[Later  I  read  the  following  evidence  of  Filonenko,  the 
truth  of  which  is  of  course  a  matter  for  his  own  conscience : 
"  On  the  evening  of  August  13th  I  asked  General  Kornilov 
whether  he  had  prepared  the  speech  which  he  intended 
making  at  the  sitting  of  the  14th,  and  upon  being  told  that 
it  was  not  ready,  I  offered  him  my  help  in  sketching  out 
its  contents.  Apart  from  my  desire  to  be  of  assistance  to 
General  Kornilov,  I  thought  it  to  be  my  duty,  in  view  of 
the  responsibility  which  was  incumbent  upon  me  for  all 
acts  of  a  political  nature  by  the  Commander-in-Chief. 
Similar  help  was  also  offered  to  the  General  by  Zavoiko, 
who  met  General  Kornilov.  Zavoiko's  assistance  consisted 
in  his  writing  down  at  my  dictation  the  text  of  the  speech 
that  I  had  previously  discussed  in  a  general  way  with  Gen- 
eral Kornilov.     With  a  few  additions,  dealing  purely  with 


THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM     83 

some  facts,  the  text  as  dictated  by  me  was  read  by  General 
Kornilov  at  the  Conference."  In  drawing  up  the  speech 
Kilonenko  was  apparently  cognizant  of  the  instructions 
issued  by  the  Provisional  Government  to  the  Commander- 
in-Chief,  for  these  instructions  were  substantially  complied 
with  in  the  speech,  and  all  the  sharper  angles,  such  as  the 
question  of  capital  punishment  elsewhere  than  at  the  front, 
were  avoided.] 

I  forgot  to  mention  that  on  the  day,  I  think,  before  his 
arrival  at  Moscow,  Kofnilov,  knowing  already  of  ^Savin- 
kov's  resignation,  sent  me  a  telegram  while  on  his  journey 
insisting  on  Savinkov's  retention  in  the  service.  Then  I 
received  a  second  telegram,  in  which  Kornilov  stated  that 
Savinkov's  and  Filonenko's  presence  at  the  Moscow  Con- 
ference  was  of  the  utmost  importance  for  him  (Kornilov), 
as  they,  S.  and  F.,  would  support  him  either  in  his  demands 
or  in  his  speech  —  I  forget  the  exact  words.  That  was 
the  kind  of  telegram  I  received.  Let  us  assume  the  less 
offensive  wording  (since  I  am  not  sure  of  the  exact  words)  : 
"  in  his  speech."  The  telegram  further  contained  the  fol- 
lowing opinion  of  Savinkov:  a  well-known  man  wielding 
enormous  influence  with  democracy.  Something  to  that 
effect. 

[In  giving  my  evidence  I  was  mistaken  on  that  point: 
there  was  only  one  telegram  mentioning  Savinkov,  as  fol- 
lows :  "  Information  has  reached  me  that  .  .  .  Savinkov 
has  tendered  his  resignation.  I  deem  it  my  duty  to  express 
the  opinion  that  the  withdrawal  of  so  important  a  man 
as  Boris  Victorovitch  (Savinkov)  from  the  Government  is 
bound  to  affect  adversely  the  Government's  prestige  with  the 
country,  more  particularly  at  this  serious  juncture.  I  con- 
sider Savinkov's  presence  and  support  of  my  views  neces- 
sary on  the  occasion  of  my  speech  at  the  Moscow  Con- 


84  THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM 

ference  on  August  14th,  because  those  views  will  have 
more  chance  of  unanimous  adoption  if  they  have  the  ad- 
vantage of  the  prestige  attaching  to  Boris  Victorovitch's 
great  revolutionary  past  and  the  authority  he  enjoys  among 
the  large  democratic  masses.  .  .  /' 

Raupakh. —  Allow  me  to  return  to  the  question  of  the 
Memorandum.  Was  that  draft  of  Kornilov's  submitted  to 
the  Provisional  Government  on  your  behalf  in  your  capacity 
as  Minister  of  War,  or  was  it  submitted  by  the  Commander- 
in-Chief  on  his  own  behalf? 

Kerensky. —  The  Memorandum  was  submitted  by  Kor- 
nilov  on  his  own  behalf. 

Raupakh. —  The  new  draft  which  was  discussed  on 
August  loth? 

Kerensky. —  We  (Nekrassov,  Terestchenko  and  myself) 
asked  Kornilov  about  it  on  the  loth  of  August  in  the  eve- 
ning, and  he  left  the  Memorandum  for  the  Government 
in  its  first  draft  of  August  3rd. 

Raupakh. —  He  thought  it  necessary  to  bring  .  .  . 

Chairman. —  The  Prime  Minister  has  explained  to  us 
that  this  draft  was  a  new  one,  and  was  signed. 

Kerensky. —  The  signature  of  the  Deputy  Minister  of 
War  was  affixed  to  the  second  draft,  but  the  latter  had  not 
been  read  before  the  Provisional  Government. 

Chairman. —  That  second  draft  had  not  been  read  ? 

Kerensky. —  That  second  draft  had  not  been  brought  out 
at  the  time.     Later,  it  disappeared. 

[I  remember  my  surprise  when,  at  the  Moscow  Confer- 
ence, I  heard  Kornilov  talking  of  his  report  presented  to  the 
Provisional  Government,  which  had  been  signed  without 
reservation  by  both  Savinkov  and  Filonenko.  I  was  sur- 
prised to  hear  the  announcement  that  the  draft,  backed 
by    three    signatures,    had    been    "  presented "    to    the 


THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM  85 

Provisional  Government,  whereas  what  I  had  read,  with 
General  Kornilov's  consent,  at  the  meeting  of  the  Provi- 
sional Government  on  the  nth  of  August,  was  his  first 
memorandum.  Now,  only,  having  read  the  conversation  on 
the  Hughes  tape-machine  between  Filonenko  and  Go- 
betchia,  the  Assistant  Commissary  of  the  South- West- 
ern front,  I  learnt  that  **  General  Kornilov,  after  the 
discussion  upon  the  general  situation  (on  the  loth  of 
August),  drove  away  to  the  railway  station  carrying  the 
report  with  him;  but  there  B.  V.  Savinkov  and  myself, 
thinking  that  such  important  questions  could  not  be  de-'* 
/cided  by  private  conversations  between  persons  however 
/  highly  responsible,  persuaded  General  Kornilov  to  send  the 
/  report  in  an  envelope  to  the  Provisional  Government,  which 
he  did."  However,  that  "  envelope "  never  reached  me. 
This  case  provides  an  example  of  General  Kornilov's  lack 
of  independence  in  political  actions.] 

To  come  back  to  the  Moscow  Conference,  I  must  say 
that  the  only  trespass  beyond  the  limits  assigned  to  him 
made  by  Kornilov  in  his  speech  was  a  somewhat  general 
discussion  of  measures  to  be  adopted  in  the  rear,  containing 
the  remark  that  he  did  not,  at  present,  enter  into  an  examina- 
tion of  the  measures  necessary  for  the  reorganization  of 
railway  traffic  and  industry. 

Raiipakh. —  He  evaded  that  question? 

Kcrcnsky. —  We  had  stipulated  that  he  should  not  men- 
tion the  railways,  whereas  he  did  mention  them. 


CHAPTER  II 

§11 

Chairman. —  Did  information  concerning  the  conspiracy 
begin  to  reach  you  just  before  the  Moscow  Conference,  or 
even  at  an  eadier  date?  Did  not  the  evidence  grow  and 
strengthen  ? 

Kerensky. —  Yes,  all  the  time. 

Chairman. —  Was  not  Kornilov's  name  mentioned  in  con- 
nection with  the  conspiracy? 

Kerensky. —  Kornilov's  name  cropped  up  later,  not  long 
before  the  events  actually  took  place.  An  officer  used  to 
put  in  an  appearance  at  the  time,  whom  later  I  transferred 
to  the  Intelligence  Department.  He  w^as  a  bit  of  a  black- 
mailer, but  he  often  attended  the  Cossack  Council  and  was 
apparently  well-informed.  This  officer  would  come  to  warn 
me  just  as  Lvov  did,  that  I  was  threatened  with  inevitable 
ruin  in  connection  with  coming  events  due  in  a  few  days,  that 
is,  the  seizure  of  power  by  the  conspirators. 

Raupakh. —  From  the  parties  of  the  "  Right  "  or  .    .    . 

Kerensky. —  Yes,  from  the  "  Right."  There  is  no  doubt 
this  officer  was  well-informed,  but  I  never  clearly  could  make 
out  whether  he  came  to  me  as  a  scout  or  simply  to  betray 
others  and  earn  something  for  himself.  Only  one  thing 
is  perfectly  obvious  to  me  —  he  was  quite  au  coiirant. 

Chairman. —  He  did  not  name  Kornilov  or  any  one  else 
at  the  time? 

Kerensky. —  He  did  not  name  Kornilov,  but  he  named 
others  closely  associated  with  the  latter  —  Zavoiko,  and 
others  whose  names  I  forget,  who  were  intimate  with  Kor- 

86 


THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM      87 

nilov.  Then,  as  you  know,  a  Cossack  regiment  had  been 
summoned  to  Moscow  at  the  time  of  the  Moscow  Con- 
ference .    .    . 

Chairman. —  The  7th  Orenburg  Cossack  regiment  ? 

Kerensky, — .  .  .  without  knowledge  of  the  Commander 
of  the  Moscow  District.  At  this  same  time  the  corps  of 
Prince  Dolgoruky  was  advancing  to  Petrograd  from  Fin- 
land, but  was  stopped  by  the  Commander  of  the  troops 
there,  General  Vassilkovsky.  Various  rumours  were  spread 
in  the  officers'  training  school.  For  instance,  we  received 
a  communication  from  the  Moscow  cadets  to  the  effect  that 
an  officer  had  warned  them  that  during  the  Moscow  Confer- 
ence a  dictatorship  would  be  proclaimed.  I  do  not  know 
what  were  the  results  of  the  investigation  of  that  case.  I 
do  not  know  the  reason  of  the  Cossack  regiment's  move. 

Chairman. —  Kornilov  did  not  know.  It  was  probably 
done  to  support  some  kind  of  demand. 

Kerensky. —  Probably. 

Chairman. —  Is  it  not  now  definitely  known  who  sum- 
moned the  regiment? 

Kerensky. —  It  has  been  certified  that  the  regiment  was 
hastily  summoned  without  the  knowledge  either  of  the  Com- 
mander of  the  Moscow  military  district,  the  Provisional 
Government  or  the  Minister  of  War.  We  knew  nothing; 
and  only  were  in  time  to  stop  it  at  Mojaisk. 

Chairman. —  At  the  time  of  the  Conference,  did  not  Kor- 
nilov's  refusal  to  yield  to  the  Provisional  Government's 
directions  excite  the  Government's  suspicions  as  to  his 
loyalty ;  did  not  the  Government  suspect  him  in  connection 
with  the  rumours  of  the  conspiracy? 

Kerensky. —  You  see,  I  must  admit  that  part  of  the  Pro- 
visional Government  were  completely  hypnotized  by  Kor- 
nilov's  personality.     Of  course,  I  do  not  mean  that  these 


88  THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM 

members  of  the  Government  were  particularly  in  touch  with 
him  or  approved  of  his  bearing,  but  simply  that  some  of 
the  ministers  believed  that  here  was  a  man  outside  politics, 
an  honest,  daring  soldier,  who  can  and  should  organize 
the  army  [but  who  finds  it  difficult  to  strike  the  right  note  in 
complicated  "civilian"  affairs].  Therefore,  they  consid- 
ered this  move  as  a  hopeless  action  of  a  helpless  man :  cer- 
tainly (they  said)  the  man  is  completely  unversed  in  politics, 
unable  to  cope  with  them,  but,  then,  like  everybody,  he  has 
a  citizen's  feelings!  But  I  and  some  of  the  other  ministers 
did  take  into  account  Kornilov's  behaviour.  I  remember 
telling  my  intimate  friends  and  also  the  Provisional  Govern- 
ment, on  my  return,  that  I  was  extremely  satisfied  with  the 
Moscow  Conference,  as  I  had  been  able  to  learn  and  under- 
stand all  I  wanted,  and  know  the  "  how,  why  and  where '' 
of  everything.  Later,  when  the  Kornilov  rebellion  took 
place,  one  of  the  Constitutional  Democrats  said  to  me : 
"  Only  now  we  understand  your  attitude  at  the  Moscow 
Conference,  your  tone;  then  your  threats  addressed  to  the 
Right  wing  seemed  unintelligible  to  us." 

[Here  are  the  corresponding  parts  of  my  speech  at  the 
Moscow  Conference:  "...  Let  those  who  deem  the  time 
has  come  to  overthrow  the  revolutionary  power  by  bayonets 
beware  still  more.  (Loud  applause  from  the  Left.)  .  .  . 
Others  at  their  meetings  dare  to  utter  against  the  Supreme 
Authority  of  the  Russian  State  words-  for  which,  in  the  days 
of  the  old  regime,  they  would  soon  have  found  themselves 
removed  very  far,  as  insulters  of  Majesty.  ...  I  will 
now,  with  the  aid  of  the  entire  Provisional  Government, 
employ  the  same  energy  (as  was  exerted  upon  the  3rd,  4th 
and  5th  of  July)  to  set  a  limit  to  all  aspirations  tending  to 
use  Russia's  great  misfortune  .  .  .  for  injuring  the  com- 
mon national  interests;  .    .    .  and  whoever  dares  present 


THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM     89 

mc  with  an  ultimatum,  in  whatever  form,  will  be  subjected 
by  me  to  the  will  of  the  Supreme  Authority.  Once  more,  I 
repeat :  every  attempt  of  the  '  inside-out  Bolsheviks  '  ^  will 
find  a  barrier  in  me." 

In  general,  the  Moscow  Conference  presents  a  very  im- 
portant stage  in  the  development  of  the  movement  for  the 
establishment  of  a  military  dictatorship  in  Russia.  It  is 
but  a  prologue  to  the  27th  of  August.  Here  the  Russian 
republican  reaction  becomes  definitely  conscious  of  itself. 
Here  this  peculiar  Russian  "  Boulangisme  "  definitely  selects 
its  leader,  here  forces  are  reckoned  up,  here  is  the  rallying- 
point  of  the  social  circles  which  support  the  movement  both 
ideally  and  materially.  The  circle  of  active  conspirators  is 
here  greatly  widened;  here,  for  the  first  time,  Russia  makes 
acquaintance  with  her  future  dictator  —  Kornilov.  The 
circles  sympathizing  with  the  idea  of  a  military  dictatorship 
were  so  thoroughly  prepared  and  organized,  that  even  on 
the  30th  of  August  Kornilov  could  still  seriously  think  of 
getting  a  "  support,**  when  he  declared  to  the  Government 
that  only  on  condition  that  the  latter  agreed  to  certain  terms 
would  he  immediately  take  steps  to  tranquillize  those  who 
"  followed  him  " ;  the  organization  was  so  real  that,  after 
his  arrest,  General  Kornilov  complained  bitterly  of  being 
forsaken  by  every  one  at  the  crucial  moment,  while  General 
Alexeiev,  in  his  letter  of  the  12th  of  September  to  Miliukov, 
warned  him  "  that  General  Kornilov  would  be  obliged  to 
describe  in  detail  before  the  court  all  the  preparations,  all 
the  negotiations  with  various  persons  and  groups,  their  par- 
ticipation in  the  affair,  to  show  the  Russian  people  who  were 
his  adherents,  and  why  he,  abandoned  by  all  in  time  of  need, 
alone  with  a  few  officers,"  etc. 

1  Expression  used  (as  well  as  "Bolshevik  of  the  Right")  to  denote 
people  employing  Bolshevik  methods  for  conser\'ative  purposes. 


90  THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM 

Without  even  peeping  '*  behind  the  scenes  "  of  all  these 
"  preparations  "  and  negotiations,  the  mobilization  and  con- 
centration of  forces  could  be  observed  upon  the  open  stage 
itself  just  before  the  Moscow  Conference.  A  considerable 
number  of  meetings  took  place  of  various  organizations 
looked  upon  as  influential  by  some  sections,  and  one  after 
another,  as  if  obeying  a  word  of  command,  they  adopted 
resolutions  against  the  removal  of  Kornilov.  On  the  6th  of 
August,  the  Council  of  the  Cossack  Troops'  League  decided 
to  "  inform  the  Provisional  Government  and  the  Minister  of 
War,  and  to  publish  in  all  the  daily  papers,  that :  ( i )  .  .  . 
(2)  General  Kornilov  cannot  be  removed,  being  a  true  leader 
of  the  people  and  in  the  eyes  of  the  majority  of  the  popula- 
tion the  only  general  capable  of  regenerating  the  army's 
fighting  force  and  of  extricating  the  country  from  an  ex- 
tremely serious  situation;  (3)  the  Council  of  the  Cossack 
Troops'  League,  as  representative  of  all  Russian  Cossack- 
dom,  declare  that  the  removal  of  General  Kornilov  will 
inevitably  suggest  to  the  Cossacks  the  fatal  idea  of  the 
futility  of  all  further  Cossack  sacrifices,  in  view  of  the  Gov- 
ernment's not  desiring  to  adopt  effective  means  for  the  sal- 
vation of  the  Motherland;  (4)  the  Council  of  the  Cossacks' 
Union  think  it  their  moral  duty  to  state  to  the  Provisional 
Government  and  to  the  people  that  they  do  not  hold  them- 
selves responsible,  as  they  were  until  now,  for  the  be- 
haviour OF  THE  Cossacks'  army  at  the  front  and  in 
THE  rear  in  case  of  General  Kornilov's  discharge;  (5)  the 
Council  of  the  Cossacks*  Union  loudly  and  firmly  de- 
clare their  complete  and  absolute  devotion  to  their  heroic 
chief,  General  Lavr  Georgievitch  Kornilov." 

On  the  7th  of  August,  the  Central  Committee  of  the 
League  of  Army  and  Navy  Officers  telegraphed  to  the  Min- 
ister of  War,  to  the  Commanders  of  groups  of  armies  of 


THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM  91 

different  fronts  and  to  the  Commanders  of  armies,  their  de- 
cision about  General  Kornilov,  which  was  very  diplomati- 
cally drawn  up  and  concluded  thus :  "  We  summon  all  honest 
people  and  all  Russian  officers  to  declare  their  full  confidence 
in  him  without  delay.  We  do  not  admit  the  possibility  of 
interference  by  any  institutions  or  persons  whatever  in  his 
acts  sanctioned  by  the  Government,  and  are  ready  to  assist 
in  the  fulfilment  of  all  his  lawful  demands  to  the  last 

DROP  OF  OUR  BLOOD.'* 

Late  at  night,  on  the  same  day  and  at  the  same  place,  the 
Union  of  Knights  of  St.  George  carried  the  following  reso- 
lution :  — 

"(i)  The  Conference  of  the  Union  of  Knights  of  St. 
George,  having  deliberated  on  the  Cossacks'  Council's  reso- 
lution at  their  special  meeting  on  the  7th  of  August,  has 
unanimously  decided  to  support  this  resolution  and  firmly 
announce  to  the  Provisional  Government  that,  if  they  should 
allow  calumny  to  triumph  and  General  Kornilov  to  be  dis- 
charged, the  Union  of  the  Knights  of  St.  George  would  im- 
mediately call  to  arms  all  the  Knights  of  St.  George  for 
joint  action  with  the  Cossacks."  Similar  resolutions  were 
carried  by  the  Military  League  and  other  organizations. 

This  movement  to  maintain  General  Kornilov  in  his 
position  has  culminated  in  the  significant  decision  of  the 
"  Conference  of  public  workers,"  held  on  the  6th  to  the 
loth  of  August  before  the  All-Russian  Conference,  and  at 
which  were  gathered  all  the  best  men  of  the  Progressive 
Coalition  of  the  Fourth  Duma.  The  following  was  tele- 
graphed to  Kornilov  by  Rodzianko :  "  The  Conference  of 
Public  Workers,  welcoming  you,  the  Chief  Leader  of  the 
Russian  Army,  declare  that  they  consider  all  attempts  to 
prejudice  your  authority  in  the  army  and  in  Russia  to  be 
criminal  and  join  their  voice  to  the  voice  of  officers.  Knights 


92  THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM 

of  St.  George  and  Cossacks.  In  the  terrible  hour  of  heavy 
trial,  all  thoughtful  Russia  looks  to  you  with  hope  and 
faith."  All  this  campaign  was  said  to  be  provoked  by  the 
rumours  of  General  Kornilov's  **  possible  discharge  "  under 
the  pressure  of  the  Central  Soviet.  In  fact,  this  campaign 
was  the  call  to  arms  which  united  all  the  different  political 
parties  gravitating  towards  a  **  firm  government."  The 
Conference  of  PubHc  Workers,  under  the  leadership  of 
Rodzianko,  was  the  centre  which  has  reviewed  the  troops, 
defined  the  ideal  aims  of  the  growing  movement  and  made 
the  final  preparations  for  the  assault  on  the  Provisional 
Government  at  the  All-Russian  Conference  at  Moscow. 
The  leaders  of  the  movement  had  such  confidence  in  their 
success  that  some  most  practical  politicians  determined  to 
take  part  in  the  drafting  of  resolutions  on  behalf  of  Kor- 
nilov,  though  only  three  days  later  they  winced  at  being  re- 
minded of  the  fact. 

At  the  same  time,  many  journeys  of  representatives  of 
different  organizations  and  of  private  individuals  to  Gen- 
eral Headquarters  were  taking  place,  as  well  as  conferences 
at  some  houses  in  Moscow,  etc.  In  short,  something  sub- 
stantial was  being  prepared  for  the  justification  at  the  All- 
Russian  Conference  of  the  confidence  in  the  success  of  the 
movement  for  a  "  firm  government."  Should  the  circum- 
stances prove  favourable,  preparation  was  made  to  bring 
matters  to  an  end  at  the  Conference  itself.  Hence  the  at- 
tempt to  have  at  hand  some  real  help,  to  create  the  neces- 
sary atmosphere  amongst  the  cadets  of  the  Officers'  Training 
Schools.  Just  before  General  Kornilov's  arrival  in  Mos- 
cow, a  special  pamphlet  was  largely  circulated,  under  the 
title  "  Kornilov,  the  hero  of  the  people  "  (or  *'  Kornilov,  the 
leader  of  the  people"),  written,  in  a  suitable  style,  by  a 
prominent  member  of  one  of  the  military  associations. 


THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM      93 

Finally,  General  Kornilov's  solemnly  ceremonious  entry 
into  Moscow  took  place  in  conformity  with  a  previously  set- 
tled plan  (including  the  call  at  the  Iverskaya  Chapel). 
During  the  whole  time  of  his  stay  different  persons,  having 
nothing  to  do  with  the  army,  were  being  received  in  his 
saloon  carriage.  The  great  financial  experts  W.  and  P. 
"reported"  (as  stated  in  Moscow  papers)  on  Russia's 
financial  situation.  Aladin  **  presented  a  report "  on  the 
general  international  situation.  Purishkevitch  was  "  pre- 
sented," Miliukov  "  received  " ;  of  course  Kaledin  called,  etc. 

However,  the  Moscow  Conference  did  not  in  the  least 
justify  their  hopes.  Not  only  was  it  necessary  to  abandon 
the  hope  of  the  support  of  the  Conference  in  proclaiming  a 
Dictatorship,  but  the  very  clenched  fists  of  the  Preliminary 
Conference  of  Public  Workers  became  hands  extended  for 
a  friendly  shake.  From  the  start,  the  schemes  of  both  the 
extreme  parties  of  Right  and  Left  were  washed  away  by  the 
general  feeling  of  provincial  representatives  attending  at  the 
All-Russian  Conference,  and  the  general  strike  proclaimed 
by  the  Bolsheviks  had  no  more  success  than  the  call  at 
Iverskaya. 

The  overrating  of  his  forces  by  one  party  and  the  under- 
rating by  the  other  party  of  his  —  a  circumstance  already 
mentioned  by  me  —  became  strikingly  apparent  at  the  Mos- 
cow Conference.  Before  the  Moscow  days,  a  great  number 
of  people,  even  among  the  democratic  masses,  were  infected 
by  a  sickly  fear  of  a  counter-revolution  and  looked  forward 
to  the  Moscow  Conference  with  apprehension,  fearing  that 
the  voice  of  the  country  would  join  that  of  the  *'  Progressive 
Coalition  "  (regenerated  in  those  days  at  Moscow)  and  sus- 
pecting me  of  flirtation  with  the  reactionists.  (I  was  not 
at  that  time  acknowledged  to  be  counter-revolutionary.) 
On  the  other  hand,  the  leaders  of  the  coalition  of  "all 


94  THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM 

thoughtful  elements  in  Russia"  (to  quote  Rodzianko), 
which  prepared  themselves  for  an  assault  on  the  Govern- 
ment, were,  under  the  pressure  of  their  provincial  con- 
stituencies, also  obliged  to  alter  their  intended  resolutions. 
Summing  up  the  results  of  the  Moscow  Conference,  the 
Isvestia  of  the  Soviet  stated  with  some  astonishment  in 
their  issue  of  the  i6th  of  August  that  *'  all  men  of  the  3rd 
of  June,^  who  were  ready  to  kick  the  dying  lion,  expe- 
rienced, in  the  days  of  the  Moscow  Conference,  a  profound 
sense  of  disappointment."  Noting  the  unanimity  displayed 
at  the  Conference  by  the  representatives  of  workmen  and 
peasants,  the  masses  of  the  army  and  navy,  by  the  Zemstvos, 
the  towns,  the  co-operative  organizations,  by  railwaymen, 
teachers,  etc.,  the  Izvestia  rightly  remarked  that  **  the 
democracy  has  been  strengthened  by  the  Moscow  Confer- 
ence.'* Notwithstanding  this,  though  the  results  of  the 
Moscow  Conference  seem  to  have  destroyed  all  hopes  of  a 
coup  d'etat  from  the  Right,  the  active  adherents  of  a  Dic- 
tatorship were  not  persuaded  to  keep  quiet,  but  were  incited 
to  pursue  their  aims  by  other  more  peremptory  means.  An 
open  political  struggle  with  the  Provisional  Government 
being  found  to  be  not  within  their  power,  they  decided  to 
storm  it  unawares  by  a  "  sharp  stroke."] 

Chairman. —  Did  a  plan  arise  after  the  Moscow  Confer- 
ence for  some  changes  in  the  composition  of  the  Govern- 
ment, and  have  certain  names  been  mentioned  in  this  con- 
nection ? 

Kerensky. —  No,  there  was  only  talk  about  the  necessity 
of  making  use  of  the  change  of  mood  arising  from  the 
Bublikov-Tseretelli  incident  ^  and  of  starting  pourparlers 

^  Supporters  of  the  coup  d'etat  of  the  3rd  of  June,  1907,  when  Stoli- 
pin  disfranchised  the  great  majority  of  the  people. 
2  After   Bublikov's   speech   at   the   Moscow   Conference  urging  the 


THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM  95 

with  the  industrial  circles  with  regard  to  their  being  repre- 
sented in  the  Provisional  Government.  The  question  was 
then  simply  that  of  recalling  to  the  administration  of  the 
State  representatives  of  the  propertied  classes  —  not  Cadets 
(Constitutional  Democrats),  but  Konovalov  and  other 
genuine  representatives  of  these  classes. 

§12 

Chairman. —  What  intelligence  have  you  had  about  the 
Bolsheviks'  actions,  whence  did  you  get  it,  and  was  it  not 
of  a  designedly  provocative  character  ? 

Kerensky. —  We  used  to  receive  information  of  Bolshevik 
actions  nearly  every  week  or  fortnight.  For  instance,  not 
long  before  the  27th  of  August,  at  a  Government  meeting, 
one  of  the  Ministers  asked  me  whether  I,  or  the  Minister  of 
the  Interior,  was  aware  of  the  rumours  about  an  impending 
Bolshevik  rising,  and  whether  these  rumours  had  serious 
grounds.  Then  I  answered  (and  so,  I  believe,  did  Skobelev) 
that  these  rumours  were  of  no  importance. 

Chairman. —  What  measures  did  the  Government  under- 
take in  case  the  expected  Bolshevik  rising  in  Petrograd  and 
Kronstadt  took  place  ? 

Kerensky. —  In  Kronstadt,  nothing  was  proposed  to  be 
done.  I  must  state  that  a  Bolshevik  action  then  had  no  im- 
portance at  all.  In  my  deposition  at  the  preliminary  exami- 
nation, I  mentioned  my  talk  with  Mr.  V.  Lvov.  It  is  stated 
there  that  Lvov  was  assuring  me  that  a  Bolshevik  rising  was 
inevitable,  and  I  replied  that,  as  far  as  we  know,  no  Bolshe- 
vik action  was  expected  to  take  place.     I  even  told  him: 

necessity  of  the  loyal  co-operation  of  the  bourgeoisie  with  the  demo- 
cratic elements,  Tseretelli  demonstratively  shook  hands  with  him. 


96     THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM 

"  You  speak  with  as  much  certainty  as  if  you  were  going 
yourself  to  take  part  in  this  rising/' 

[Now,  after  the  Bolshevik  counter-revolution,  or  (to  use 
a  better  term)  after  the  All-Russian  new  "  Pugatchevst- 
china,''  which  has  destroyed  the  Russian  State,  and  taking 
into  account  our  remarkable  ability  to  forget  altogether  yes- 
terday's events,  very  many  of  my  readers  will  think  at  this 
part  of  my  statement  that,  whilst  firing  at  sparrows  (the 
Komilovites),  the  Provisional  Government  ignored  the  real 
game,  and  many  others  will  say  that  Kornilov  had  foreseen 
the  possibility  of  a  Bolshevik  rising,  whereas  the  Provisional 
Government  was  fatally  blind,  or  at  least  had  their  left  eye 
blindfolded.  These  criticisms  are  thoroughly  wrong,  be- 
cause (i)  before  and  at  the  time  of  Kornilov's  rebellion, 
there  was  no  real  danger  or  even  any  symptom  of  a  Bolshe- 
vik rising,  and  (2)  before  Kornilov's  rebellion,  the  Bolshe- 
vik menace  was  confronted  by  the  whole  enormous  force  of 
democracy  organized  in  the  new  local  self-government  — 
the  Soviets  and  army  organizations,  the  force  which  was 
defending  the  country  and  Government  from  the  chaos  of 
the  extreme  Left. 

Kornilov's  movement  was  being  prepared,  just  at  the  time 
of  the  most  intensive  struggle  of  the  statesmanlike  and  patri- 
otically minded  democracy  with  her  anarchist  and  Bolshevik 
elements.  On  the  8th  of  July  a  resolution  of  the  Central 
Executive  Committee  of  the  Soviet  insisted  on  ''  the  sharp 
change  in  the  minds  of  the  masses,  which  was  created  by. 
the  adventurous  political  attempt  (of  July  3rd-5th)  at  an 
armed  rising  against  the  Provisional  Government,"  prepared 
by  anarchist-Bolshevik  elements  and  by  some  dark  forces 
acting  under  their  colours. 

On  the  1 8th  of  July,  the  same  Central  Soviet  unanimously 
stated  that  "  the  restoration  of  the  fighting  capacity  of  the 


THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM  97 

army  is  the  most  serious  problem  of  the  moment."  I  have 
already  quoted  many  other  proclamations  and  resolutions  of 
the  Central  Executive  Committee  full  of  the  same  healthy 
feelings.  It  is  enough  to  run  over  the  leaves  of  the 
Isvestia  of  the  Central  Executive  Committee  for  July- 
August,  to  be  convinced  of  the  intensity  of  this  struggle  be- 
tween the  statesmanlike  and  the  anarchist  parties,  to  see  how 
the  class  feelings  were  more  and  more  subdued  in  the  minds 
of  the  democracy  to  the  needs  of  the  State,  how  the  longing 
for  work  and  order  was  reviving,  and  how  the  conscious- 
ness of  the  necessity  of  sacrifices  for  the  country's  sake  was 
penetrating  deeper  and  deeper  into  the  minds  of  the  people. 
One  should  remember  how  unselfishly  the  army  organiza- 
tions and  commissaries  struggled  on  the  front  with  the  Bol- 
shevik propaganda  of  "  my  precious  life  first,"  how  many  of 
them  redeemed  their  unwitting  errors  of  the  first  days  of 
Revolution,  and  sanctified  their  struggle  with  cowards  and 
traitors  by  their  blood.  One  has  only  to  look  through  the 
many  hundreds  of  resolutions  drafted  by  battalions,  regi- 
ments and  divisions  at  that  time,  to  be  convinced  that  a 
process  of  purification  was  rapidly  going  on  in  the  minds  of 
the  soldiers  themselves,  and  that  the  position  of  the  com- 
manding officers  was  steadily  getting  better.  At  the  same 
time,  the  activity  of  newly  formed  local  government  bodies 
was  developing  in  the  country  at  the  expense  of  the  Soviets 
and  various  self-appointed  Committees.  The  leading 
Soviets'  papers  acknowledged  this  fact  and  thought  it  to  be 
a  symptom  of  the  healthy  development  of  revolutionary 
statesmanship.  But,  first  and  foremost,  we  must  not  forget 
that  everywhere  the  Bolsheviks  were  then  a  small  minority 
and  were  playing  the  part  of  an  irresponsible  opposition. 
Their  piteous  attempt  at  organizing  a  general  strike  at  the 
time  of  the  Moscow  Conference,  their  forfeiture  of  their 


98  THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM 

right  of  independent  action  at  its  meetings,  decreed  by  the 
Bureau  of  the  Central  Soviet,  and,  on  the  other  hand,  the 
boldness  of  the  democracy  in  extending  a  friendly  hand  to 
the  bourgeoisie  —  all  this  is  no  dream,  but  the  actual  reality 
in  which  we  lived  before  the  27th  of  August  and  which  en- 
abled me  to  answer,  to  the  proposal  to  postpone  the  procla- 
mation of  martial  law  until  the  arrival  of  the  3rd  Corps  of 
Cavalry,  that  I  did  not  need  it  for  that  purpose  at  all. 

On  the  whole,  a  comparison  of  forces  showed  that  all 
attempts  to  repeat  the  3rd-5th  of  July  were  sure  to  be  a 
COMPLETE  FAILURE.  Still  less  was  there  any  real  danger  to 
the  regime  then  existing  to  be  anticipated  from  the  attempts 
of  the  extreme  Right.  The  "  Bolshevism  of  the  Right  " 
BY  itself  was  never*  to  BE  FEARED.  It  was  not  a  pow- 
der store  which  on  explosion  destroys  the  foundation  of 
everything,  but  a  match  that  could  fall  in  a  store  of  ex- 
plosives and  then  .  .  .  The  results  of  the  27th  of  August 
have  shown  what  would  follow. 

One  of  the  most  prominent  leaders  of  the  S.R.  party, 
notorious  for  his  irremediable  propensity  towards  the  Left 
extremists,  speaking  of  Kornilov's  rebellion  at  the  last  Con- 
gress of  his  party  in  November,  1917,  said:  "The  sudden 
increase  of  energy  in  the  struggle  against  the  threatening 
military  plot  and  counter-revolution  for  one  moment  suc- 
ceeded in  reuniting  the  forces  of  the  revolutionary  democ- 
racy against  the  only  great  party  of  Russian  propertied 
classes  which  still  held  an  ambiguous  position,  the  *  party  of 
the  People's  Freedom'  (Constitutional-Democrats):  the 
position  of  socialist  democracy  and  the  rather  shaken  influ- 
ence of  the  Soviets  was  much  strengthened  by  this  rising  of 
enthusiasm  and  energy.  This  had  enabled  the  Soviets,  who 
had,  after  the  events  of  the  3rd-5th  of  July  and  the  disloca- 
tion of  the  democratic  front,  become  more  moderate,  again 


THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM  99 

to  join  the  line  and  provoked  a  new  move  to  the  Left. 
That  is  why  it  is  no  wonder,  comrades,  that  many,  and  I 
amongst  them,  were  welcoming  Kornilov's  action  as  a  step 
which  would  bring  this  moderation  of  the  country  to  its 
logical  end,  to  absurdity,  to  a  military  plot,  and  would  enable 
us  to  profit  by  the  mistakes  and  folly  of  the  Right  in  order 
to  smooth  over  and  rectify  all  the  harm  that  was  done  by 
the  mistakes  and  folly  of  the  Left." 

I  was  not  among  those  many  who  were  "  welcoming  ** 
the  possibility  of  bringing  Soviets  under  the  Bolshevik  in- 
fluence, but  I  must  state  that,  in  fact,  it  was  only  the  27th  of 
August  that  made  the  27th  of  October  possible.  And  that 
is  really  the  great  crime,  the  unredeemable  sin  against  our 
native  country  of  those  naive  dreamers,  skilful  politicians 
and  bold  adventurers  who  undertook  to  save  Russia  by 
means  of  a  "  White  General."  ^  In  his  proclamation  **  to 
the  Russian  people,"  General  Kornilov,  in  spite  of  all  evi- 
dence to  the  contrary,  states  that  the  Provisional  Govern- 
ment acts  under  the  pressure  of  the  Bolshevik  majority  of 
the  Soviets,  etc.  Whether  Kornilov  himself  laboured  under 
a  delusion,  or  lied  deliberately,  is  of  no  importance,  but 
there  was  nothing,  nothing  whatever,  of  the  kind  at  the 
time  in  the  Soviets  clearly  leaning  to  the  Right.  But  Kor- 
nilov himself  proved  a  remarkable  prophet.  Almost  imme- 
diately following  his  declaration,  the  Soviets  were  every- 
where actually  seized  by  the  Bolsheviks. 

On  the  27th  of  August,  the  lighted  match  actually  fell  into 
a  powder-store.  On  September  ist  the  Bolsheviks'  resolu- 
tion, containing  the  program  of  the  coup  d'etat  of  the  25th 
of  October,  was  introduced  into  the  Central  Executive  Com- 
mittee of  the  Soviet.  Here  are  some  of  its  most  prominent 
points.     "  All  wavering  policy  as  to  the  organization  of  the 

1  General  on  a  white  horse. 


100  THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM 

authority  must  be  decisively  set  aside;  the  policy  of  com- 
promise  must  be  struck  at  the  root.  .  .  .  The  extraor- 
dinary powers  and  irresponsibility  of  the  Provisional  Gov- 
ernment can  no  longer  be  tolerated.  The  only  remedy  lies 
in  the  creation  of  an  authority  composed  of  representatives 
of  the  revolutionary  proletariat  and  peasants,  whose  policy 
would  be  based  upon  the  following  principles:  immediate 
abolition  of  all  private  land  property,  that  of  the  landowners 
to  be  abolished  without  compensation,  etc. ;  labour  control  of 
all  production  and  distribution  upon  a  scale  embracing  the 
entire  State ;  nationalization  of  the  most  important  branches 
of  industry  .  .  .  ruthless  taxation  of  large  investments 
and  property  and  confiscation  of  war-profits;  annullation  of 
all  secret  treaties  and  the  immediate  proposal  of  a  demo- 
cratic peace  to  all  nations.  The  following  immediate  meas- 
ures must  be  decreed:  revocation  of  all  repressions  directed 
against  the  labour  classes  (read  *  Bolsheviks ')  and  their 
organizations;  abolition  of  the  death-penalty  at  the  front 
and  restoration  of  complete  liberty  of  propaganda  and  of  all 
democratic  army  organizations   ..."  etc. 

At  this  same  meeting  of  the  Central  Executive  Commit- 
tee, even  Dan  protested  already  against  the  "  irresponsi- 
bility" of  the  Provisional  Government,  and  declared  that 
*'  the  authorities  have  no  right  to  take  any  repressive  meas- 
ures (against  workmen)  without  a  previous  discussion  with 
our  Commission  for  the  struggle  against  the  counter-revolu- 
tion." The  same  meeting  of  the  Central  Executive  Commit- 
tee of  the  Soviet  adopted  a  resolution  of  protest  against  the 
suppression  of  two  Bolshevik  papers  which  were  carrying  on 
an  injurious  campaign  against  the  officers. 

The  Red  Guard  was  created,  and  developed  so  rapidly 
that  its  statute  was  worked  out  in  Moscow  by  the  5th  of 
September.     On  the  6th  of  September  the  Menshevik  and 


THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM  lOl 

Social-Revolutionary  presidium  of  the  Petrograd  Soviet 
gave  up  its  powers,  and  a  few  days  later,  in  place  of  Gotz, 
Skobelev  and  Tseretelli,  appeared  Bronstein  (Trotsky), 
Rosenfeldt  (Kamenev)  and  Co.   .    .    . 

A  regular  mania  for  arbitrary  arrests  was  exhibited 
everywhere :  self-appointed  "  Committees  for  the  suppression 
of  the  counter-revolution  "  sprang  up  in  all  quarters,  openly 
refusing  to  obey  my  orders  to  stop  their  activity  after  the 
suppression  of  the  Kornilov  revolt.  The  so-called  "  Inter- 
regional Conference  ' '  at  Petrograd  on  the  6th  of  September 
declared  that,  "  having  discussed  Kerensky's  order,  we  de- 
cide not  to  dissolve  the  revolutionary  organizations  for  the 
suppression  of  the  counter-revolution  and  to  inform  the 
Central  Executive  Committee  of  the  Soviet  of  the  above 
decision."  The  Central  Executive  Committee  agreed  to  the 
Inter-regional  Conference's  point  of  view. 

On  September  7th  the  Moscow  Soviet  for  the  first  time 
rejected  a  Menshevik  resolution  expressing  confidence  in  and 
promising  to  support  the  Provisional  Government  on  condi- 
tion of  the  exclusion  from  its  membership  of  Cadets  (Con- 
stitutional Democratic  Party),  and  adopted  the  Bolshevik 
resolution,  which  on  the  ist  of  September  was  not  passed  in 
Petrograd. 

Abominable  massacres  of  officers  occurred  again  in  the 
army  and  navy  on  the  30th  of  August,  and  I  was  obliged  to 
send  the  following  telegram  to  the  fleet :  "  I  demand  that  all 
atrocious  acts  of  violence  shall  cease  immediately.  Crews 
committing  these  crimes,  under  pretext  of  saving  the  country 
and  the  Revolution,  when  in  reality  ruining  the  fleet's  mili- 
tary efficiency  in  the  face  of  the  enemy,  have  forgotten  their 
duty,  their  moral  sense,  and  are  traitors  to  their  country. 
These  counter-revolutionary  acts  of  murderers  and  brutes 
will  forever  brand  all  the  Baltic  crews  with  shame.    Am 


lOSf         THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM 

expecting  immediate  report  that  order  is  fully  restored." 
The  position  of  the  officers  became  indeed  desperate.  Army 
organizations,  under  pressure  of  the  soldiery  maddened  by 
agitators,  arbitrarily  assumed  new  powers;  much  of  what 
had  been  re-established  with  such  enormous  difficulty  had  to 
be  thrown  overboard  for  the  sake  of  saving,  at  least,  some 
remnants. 

Handled  by  clever  demagogues  scenting  booty,  the  ab- 
surd adventure  of  a  group  of  persons  becomes  a  ''  counter- 
revolutionary Government  plot  against  the  labouring 
masses."  The  worse  than  imprudent  behaviour  of  a  few 
prominent  members  of  the  Cadet  Party  in  having  been  in 
touch  with  Kornilov*s  movement,  offered  the  opportunity 
for  proclaiming  the  most  influential  Liberal  Party  a  criminal 
and  counter-revolutionary  organization,  and  that  oppor- 
tunity was  seized  by  the  very  men  who,  in  July,  were  indig- 
nant at  the  attempt  of  the  Right  to  lay  the  blame  for  the 
rising  of  the  3rd-5th  of  July  upon  the  entire  Bolshevik 
Party.  A  death-blow  was  being  consciously  dealt  to  the 
idea  of  an  all-national  authority  at  a  moment  when  nothing 
but  anarchy  could  replace  it. 

At  the  same  time,  maddened  by  their  failure,  the  avowed 
and  secret  Kornilov  faction  started  a  shameless  slandering 
campaign  against  me,  creating  the  legend  of  a  '*  great  provo- 
cation," which,  cleverly  managed  by  the  writers  of  the 
Pravda  (the  leading  Bolshevik  organ),  became  the  fairy- 
tale of  my  complicity,  of  my  being  a  Kornilovite.  It  was 
the  beginning  of  a  chaos.  September  and  October  witnessed 
the  torturing  agony  of  the  Revolution,  which  was  destined 
to  become  the  agony  of  Russia.  .  .  .  We  are  quickly  apt 
to  forget  what  happened  but  yesterday.  I  say  to  those  who 
have  genuinely  forgotten :  curse  not  democracy  alone  for  the 


THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM  103 

Motherland's  ruin ;  remember  that  the  25th  of  October  could 
not  have  been  without  the  2/th  of  August.] 

§13 

Chairman. —  Was  the  intended  proclamation  of  martial 
law  in  Petrograd  called  for  by  strategical  considerations, 
without  any  connection  with  the  Bolshevik  movement  and 
with  the  question  of  the  organization  of  a  strong  authority? 

Kerensky. —  Had  I  sufficient  time  at  my  disposal,  I  would, 
according  to  my  habit  in  dealing  with  big  legal  investiga- 
tions into  political  cases,  have  reconstructed  the  whole  story 
properly.  There  certainly  existed  a  certain  group  of  per- 
sons at  the  Stavka  (Headquarters)  who  always  en- 
deavoured, whatever  events  took  place  in  the  country,  to 
make  use  of  them  according  to  their  own  definite  tendency. 
For  instance,  immediately  after  the  break  through  at  Riga, 
I  began  to  receive  demands  for  the  establishment  of  martial 
law,  for  the  transference  of  all  the  troops  of  the  Petrograd 
district  to  the  command  of  the  Generalissimo. 

Krokhmal. —  Demands  from  whom? 

Kerensky. —  From  the  Stavka,  from  Kornilov.  My  task 
then  was  rather  hard,  because  again  part  of  the  Provisional 
Government  were  ready  to  accept  anything  coming  from 
the  Stavka.  As  for  myself,  taking  into  consideration  the 
political  situation  on  the  one  hand,  and  on  the  other  con- 
sidering that  the  front  w^as  drawing  near  to  Petrograd  and 
that  all  the  region  close  to  Petrograd  might  gradually  be- 
come the  army's  rear  line;  that  before  Protopopov  intro- 
duced the  separate  command  for  Petrograd  (which  took 
place  on  the  loth  of  February,  191 7,  i.e.,  only  a  few  days 
before  the  Revolution),  the  Petrograd  district  was  under 


104j  the  prelude  TO  BOLSHEVISM 

orders  of  the  Generalissimo;  that  therefore  this  state  of 
things  had  been  changed  only  seven  months  ago  and  that  I 
had  no  reason  for  adhering  to  such  a  separation  of  the 
Petrograd  district  —  considering  all  that,  I  decided  to  pursue 
but  one  aim  —  to  safeguard  the  independence  of  the  Gov- 
ernment. I  explained  this  to  the  Provisional  Government 
by  pointing  out  that,  owing  to  the  critical  political  situation, 
it  was  impossible  for  the  Government  to  be  entirely  depend- 
ent upon  the  Stavka  for  military  command.  I  proposed  the 
following :  that  at  any  rate  Petrograd  and  its  nearest  neigh- 
bourhood should  be  detached  and  constitute  a  separate  dis- 
trict military  subordinated  to  the  Government.  I  firmly 
insisted  upon  this.  Thus  the  Provisional  Government  would 
give  over  to  the  Stavka  all  that  was  needed  for  strategical 
purposes,  while  Petrograd,  as  the  political  centre  and  the 
residence  of  the  Provisional  Government,  must  remain 
extra-territorial,  i.e.  militarily  independent  of  the  Stavka. 
This  plan  cost  me  a  week's  struggle,  but  at  last  I  succeeded 
in  bringing  the  members  of  the  Provisional  Government  to 
unanimity  and  in  receiving  General  Kornilov's  formal 
assent.  It  became  known  later  that  Kornilov  thought  there 
would  only  be  a  delay  of  from  four  to  five  days,  the  condi- 
tion "  While  the  Provisional  Government  remains  in  Petro- 
grad "  having  been  interpreted  by  him  as  meaning  that  the 
Provisional  Government  would  leave  Petrograd  almost  on 
the  day  immediately  following  the  declaration  of  the  new 
military  order ;  although  there  was,  of  course,  not  the  slight- 
est intention  of  doing  so,  as  practically  no  measures  have  yet 
been  undertaken  to  prepare  a  possible  evacuation.  Later, 
General  Krimov  told  me,  before  committing  suicide,  that  he 
came  to  Petrograd  in  the  capacity  of  an  Army  Commander 
w^ith  the  order  to  proclaim  a  state  of  siege  and  divide  Petro- 
grad into  military  sections.     So  that  we  should  have  been 


THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM  106 

bagged  at  any  moment.  Therefore,  in  view  of  the  Stavka's 
state  of  mind  and  of  possible  compHcations  arising  from  the 
sending  of  troops  to  the  front  (which  was  not  proceeding 
quite  smoothly),  in  view  also  of  possible  excesses  during  the 
transfer  of  the  Government  Offices  to  Moscow,  we  intended 
to  keep  a  certain  number  of  armed  troops  at  the  special 
disposal  of  the  Provisional  Government,  but  in  no  way 
subordinated  to  the  Generalissimo  (i.e.  neither  to  the  Com- 
mander-in-Chief of  the  Northern  front  nor  to  the  Generalis- 
simo). 

Chairman. —  Therefore,  martial  law  was  not  to  be  estab- 
lished in  consequence  of  Petrograd's  being  formed  into  a 
separate  unit  ? 

Kerensky. —  No.  Martial  law  was  to  be  established,  but 
on  a  special  principle,  under  direct  control  not  of  the  Gen- 
eralissimo but  of  the  Provisional  Government. 

Shahlovsky. —  Was  there  any  intention  of  dismantling 
Kronstadt,  and  what  were  the  reasons  for  doing  so  ?  Were 
they  strategical  reasons? 

Kerensky. —  That  was  not  mentioned  in  connection  with 
the  establishing  of  martial  law  in  Petrograd.  That  is  an 
old  business  —  as  old  as  last  summer. 

Liher. —  The  official  document  was  signed  on  August 
8th,  therefore  there  was  some  connection. 

Kerensky. —  No,  that  is  an  old  story.  There  are  very 
good  guns  at  Kronstadt  which  we  needed  for  other  posi- 
tions, but  the  Kronstadt  garrison  would  not  give  them  up. 
I  think  that  this  was  due  not  merely  to  revolutionary  zeal, 
but  to  deliberate  German  propaganda,  because  Kronstadt 
is  full  of  German  agents.  From  the  very  beginning  of  the 
Revolution,  especially  during  the  summer,  the  Stavka  had 
given  repeated  orders  for  the  guns  to  be  delivered  to  the 
command  of  the  Northern  front  for  some  new  positions,  but 


106     THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM 

these  orders  always  met  with  a  decided  opposition  from  the 
Kronstadt  garrison,  on  the  alleged  plea  of  the  Stavka's 
treacherous  intention  of  disarming  Kronstadt. 

Krokhmal. —  For  political  reasons? 

Kerensky. —  Not  only  for  political,  but  for  treasonable 
purposes.  The  result  of  the  Kronstadt  people's  behaviour 
is  that  the  before-mentioned  positions  are  insufficiently  forti- 
fied even  now,  and  they  cannot  be  fortified  in  the  near  fu- 
ture. It  was  decided  to  dismantle  the  Kronstadt  fortress 
in  June,  or  July  at  latest,  and  to  transform  Kronstadt  into 
a  base  for  supplies,  stores,  etc. 

Shahlovsky. —  Was  not  the  fortress  considered  of  no 
value  for  military  purposes,  and  was  not  the  coast  considered 
to  be  of  more  importance? 

Kerensky. —  Yes,  this  is  why  all  that  was  suggested  — 
the  removal  of  the  guns  and  the  dismantling  of  the  fortress. 
All  this  was  intended  for  purely  military  and  strategical 
reasons. 

Liber. —  And  the  removal  of  the  Kronstadt  garrison? 

Kerensky. —  This  was  but  the  natural  consequence  of  the 
dismantling  of  the  Kronstadt  fortress.  Had  the  fortress 
been  needed  and  had  it  possessed  any  importance  as  a  point 
of  defence,  then,  whatever  the  spirit  of  its  garrison,  the  Gov- 
ernment would  never  have  ordered  its  disarmament  and 
abolition  for  political  reasons  —  to  suppose  so  is  absurd ;  but 
had  the  heavy  artillery  been  removed  there  would  be  sense 
in  such  a  dismantling.  In  general,  Kronstadt  has  no  mili- 
tary or  strategical  importance  w^hatever. 

[The  Kronstadt  question  had  apparently  been  raised 
owing  to  the  following  statement  by  General  Kornilov. 
Referring  to  the  two  tasks  to  be  accomplished  by  General 
Krimov  upon  arriving  with  his  troops  at  Petrograd,  Gen- 
eral Kornilov  writes  that,  "after  accomplishing  his  first 


THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM  107 

task,  General  Krimov  would  have  to  send  a  brigade  with 
artillery  to  Oranienbaum  and,  once  there,  order  the  Kron- 
stadt  garrison  to  dismantle  the  fortress  and  cross  over  to 
the  continent.  The  consent  of  the  Prime  Minister  for  the 
dismantling  of  the  fortress  had  been  obtained  on  the  8th  of 
August."  It  was  not  I  who  "  gave  consent "  for  the  dis- 
armament of  the  fortress,  but  I  as  the  Minister  of  Marine 
had  raised  that  question  and  obtained  the  consent  of  the 
Provisional  Government,  and  I  never  consented  to  the 
method  of  disposing  of  the  fortress  proposed  by  General 
Kornilov;  besides  which,  he  could  allot  no  tasks  to  a  de- 
tachment sent  to  be  at  the  disposal  of  the  Provisional  Gov- 
ernment. ...  I  must  say  that  the  fall  of  Riga  had  slightly 
sobered  the  Kronstadt  garrison,  and,  when  Kornilov  was 
entrusting  Krimov  with  his  "  task,"  they  were  already  "  sur- 
rendering "  the  guns.  By  a  terrible  irony  of  fate,  in  Febru- 
ary last,  the  Kronstadt  garrison's  suspicion  of  treason  in  the 
Stavka's  order  for  the  removal  of  heavy  artillery  was  based 
upon  the  Stavka's  order  being  signed  by  the  German  name 
of  Captain  Altvater,  who  is  now,  apparently,  playing  an  im- 
portant part  with  Messrs.  "  The  People's  Commissaries  " 
and  has  been  delegated  by  them  as  an  "  expert "  to  Brest. 
The  legend  of  treason  at  the  Stavka  was  so  deeply  rooted 
in  Kronstadt,  that  every  attempt  to  remove  the  artillery 
drove  the  crowd  to  absolute  fury,  intensified  by  clever 
agitators. 

I  must  point  out,  however  strange  it  may  seem,  judging 
by  the  terrible  results  of  the  six  months'  activity  of  the 
revolutionary  masses,  that  they  were  ready  to  credit  the 
most  absurd  stories  and  rumours  of  treason,  and  searched 
for  it  with  exceptional  ardour.  For  instance,  in  the  Baltic 
provinces,  the  sailors  in  their  ardent  search  for  traitors 
among  the  local  German  Barons  surpassed  all  examples 


108     THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM 

of  the  kind  recorded  from  the  practice  of  the  agents  of  the 
old  regime.] 

Liber. —  Had  the  fortification  works  in  Finland  been 
reduced  with  Kornilov's  knowledge  and  had  this  been  de- 
cided upon  at  the  Moscow  Conference? 

Kerensky. —  No,  it  had  been  decided  upon  much  earlier. 

Liber. —  But  with  Kornilov's  knowledge?  Was  he  ac- 
quainted with  it  ? 

Kerensky. —  No.  It  had  been  decided  before  Kornilov's 
appointment  to  the  post  of  Generalissimo.  It  can  be  veri- 
fied by  the  agenda  of  the  Provisional  Government's  meet- 
ings. It  was  decided  to  limit  measures  for  the  fortification 
of  Finland  because  they  proved  to  be  utterly  useless  and  ab- 
surd. They  were  no  good.  Why  do  you  attach  any  sig- 
nificance to  the  matter? 

Liber. —  Because,  in  his  statement,  Kornilov  declares  that 
the  cessation  of  work  in  Finland  was  a  deliberate  act  of  the 
Government  which  has  now  resulted  in  disastrous  conse- 
quences. 

Kerensky. —  Nonsense ! 

["  A  deliberate  act '' —  the  member  of  the  Commission  of 
Inquiry  has  greatly  softened  General  Kornilov's  meaning. 
"  The  limitation  of  fortification  work  in  Finland  "  is  con- 
sidered by  General  Kornilov  as  a  proof  of  the  Provisional 
Government's  acting  in  full  accord  with  the  plans  of  the 
German  General  Staff.  The  story  of  the  "  note  "  transmit- 
ted at  the  meeting  of  the  3rd  of  August  was,  so  to  speak,  a 
preparation  for  attack.  The  Finland  story  is  a  bombard- 
ment from  a  48-inch  gun.  I  am  not  revolted,  nor  indignant : 
a  year  of  revolution  has  too  deeply  revealed  the  secret  na- 
ture of  men.  I  only  want  to  tell  all  past,  present  and 
future  slanderers  that  he  who  wishes  to  calumniate  success- 
fully must  know  well  of  what  he  is  speaking. 


THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM  109 

So  far  as  I  can  remember,  the  limitation  of  work  in  Fin- 
land took  place  in  early  spring,  and  in  any  case  the  ques- 
tion arose  in  A.  T.  Gutchkov's  time.  The  fact  is  that, 
besides  important  military  defensive  constructions,  a  great 
amount  of  work  went  on  in  Finland  under  cover  of  needs 
of  defence,  and  this  work,  very  advantageous  for  those 
who  directed  it,  was  unnecessary  for  the  country's  defence, 
ruinous  for  the  exchequer,  and  extremely  harmful  politi- 
cally, since  rapine,  plunder  and  violence  towards  the  popula- 
tion acted  more  potently  than  any  pro-German  propaganda. 
Dozens  of  square  kilometres  of  timber  were  cut  down  around 
Helsingfors  and  other  places.  Priceless  forests  were  de- 
stroyed aimlessly  and  needlessly,  and  national  wealth  ruth- 
lessly plundered.  It  was  the  Government's  duty  to  arrest 
this  carnival  of  mischief  and  put  a  stop  to  the  activity 
of  such  marauders  of  the  rear.  Needless  to  say,  all  the 
really  defensive  works  never  ceased  in  Finland  for  a  mo- 
ment. 

Speaking  generally,  it  is  possible  to  point  to  a  whole 
series  of  enterprises  and  works  run  under  the  old  regime  as 
defence- work,  often  for  no  other  reason  than  to  escape  the 
necessity  of  asking  the  State  Duma  for  a  vote  of  credit. 
This  limitation  of  work  in  Finland  formed  but  a  small  part 
of  the  milliards  saved  from  "  military  expenses ''  by  the 
Provisional  Government  in  an  urgent  way,  mainly  owing  to 
the  insistence  of  all  four  Ministers  of  Finance  (Terest- 
chenko,  Shingarev,  Nekrassov  and  Bernadsky) ,  without  dis- 
tinction of  party.  Yet,  what  do  demagogues  from  Right  or 
Left  care  for  dull  reality,  w^hen  so  many  simpletons  are 
always  ready  to  believe  any  kind  of  nonsense?] 

Chairman. —  In  view  of  the  coming  establishment  of 
martial  law,  was  any  opposition  to  this  measure  expected 
from  the  Soviet,  and  did  the  Government  enter  into  negotia- 


110  THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM 

tions  or  confer  with  the  Central  Executive  Committee  con- 
cerning the  prevention  of  a  possible  conflict? 

Kerensky, —  No,  there  were  no  negotiations.  Probably, 
Liber  also  knows  that  I  had  no  negotiations  concerning  the 
establishment  of  martial  law,  nor  did  any  one  else  negotiate 
in  my  name.  We  had  plenty  of  Soviet  representatives : 
Avksentiev,  Tchernov,  Skobelev.  There  was  no  opposition 
from  any  quarter.  The  Provisional  Government  only 
wished  to  guarantee  the  capital  and  country  from  surprises 
and  experiments. 

Shahlovsky. —  Then  the  3rd  Corps,  which  was  marching 
here,  was  to  represent  a  military  force  placed  at  the  dis- 
posal, not  of  the  Generalissimo,  but  of  the  Provisional  Gov- 
ernment in  case  of  emergency? 

Kerensky. —  Yes. 

Shahlovsky. —  Was  there  any  intention  of  using  these 
troops  for  the  suppression  of  possible  disorders,  or  was 
not  the  question  discussed  by  the  Provisional  Govern- 
ment? 

Kerensky. —  It  had  never  been  definitely  laid  down  for 
what  purpose  these  troops  might  be  needed.  Generally,  in 
case  of  any  emergency.  Because  the  Government  needed 
support.  It  was  not  even  known  against  which  side  they 
would  have  to  be  used.  I  did  not  even  think  there  would 
arise  a  necessity  for  using  them.  In  any  case,  they  were  not 
to  have  any  relation  whatever  either  with  the  Commander 
of  the  front  or  with  the  Generalissimo. 

Shahlovsky. —  Were  not  these  troops  intended  to  form  a 
nucleus  for  the  formation  of  a  new  army  on  the  coast  in 
connection  with  the  break-through  at  the  Riga  front  ? 

Kerensky. —  Hardly  that.  There  existed  an  old  dispute 
about  the  formation  of  an  army  for  the  coast.  That  is  a 
special  military  question.     It  had  been  raised  in  Gutchkov's 


THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM  111 

time,  between  the  Stavka  on  one  side  and  Gutchkov  and 
Kornilov  on  the  other.  There  were  many  plans  as  to  the 
organization  of  the  Petrograd  troops  in  case  they  found 
themselves  obliged  to  defend  not  only  the  "  Revolution," 
but  the  approaches  to  Petrograd.     It  is  an  old  question. 

§14 

Krokhmal. —  Did  the  intention  of  summoning  the  3rd 
Corps  originate  only  after  Riga  fell  ? 

Kerensky. —  Yes. 

Krokhmal. —  Was  not  there  some  kind  of  talk  between 
you  and  Savinkov  to  the  effect  that  this  corps  was  meant  for 
a  possible  suppression  of  a  Bolshevik  revolt;  and  is  anything 
known  as  to  how  Savinkov  put  it  in  his  conversation  with 
Kornilov  about  the  summoning  of  this  corps? 

Kerensky. —  I  do  not  know  the  wording  of  Savinkov's 
conversation  with  Kornilov,  because  I  learn  from  the  papers 
that  much  has  been  said  at  the  Stavka  which  has  never  been 
mentioned  here;  for  instance,  I  read  that  discussions  took 
place  there  concerning  possible  changes  in  the  Provisional 
Government;  absolutely  fantastic  names  were  proposed, 
while  we  here  had  no  idea  of  what  was  going  on.  But  here, 
the  question  of  calling  up  troops  against  the  Bolsheviks  had 
never  been  so  concretely  formulated  by  the  Provisional  Gov- 
ernment. No  such  great  importance  was  attached  here  to 
the  Bolsheviks  as  was  at  the  Stavka;  they  were  a  mere 
incident.  At  that  time,  there  were  generally  no  particular 
discussions.  For  instance,  when  we  thought  at  one  time  of 
moving  to  Moscow,  it  was  intended  to  call  up  a  railway 
battalion  to  raise  the  efficiency  of  the  Nicholas  railway  (  from 
Petrograd  to  Moscow) .  All  these  episodes  are  of  no  conse- 
quence.    I  recollect  that  only  after  Savinkov's  return  from 


112  THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM 

the  Stavka,  presumably  on  the  25th  of  August,  I  received 
the  first  information  that  a  corps  was  on  the  march,  and 
that  it  was  actually  the  3rd  Corps.  I  mention  all  this  be- 
cause at  the  beginning  of  the  episode  I  was  questioned  by 
many  persons  who  were  more  intimate  with  me,  whether  I 
could  remember  how  it  all  originated  —  why  the  3rd  Corps 
had  been  sent;  and  we  could  not  recollect  how  it  all  hap- 
pened, why  and  what  —  everything  had  been  so  little  re- 
corded here. 

[In  his  statement  of  the  13th  of  September,  Savinkov 
gives  the  following  explanation  of  the  causes  which  led  to 
the  summons  of  the  3rd  Cavalry  Corps :  "  By  order  of  the 
i  Prime  Minister  I  asked  the  Generalissimo  to  dispatch  a  cav- 
I  airy  corps  for  the  purpose  of  establishing,  in  reality,  martial 
(  law  at  Petrograd.  The  establishment  of  martial  law  at 
Petrograd  originated  from  the  necessity  of  subordinating 
the  Petrograd  military  district  to  the  Generalissimo,  in  con- 
sequence of  recent  events  at  the  front.  The  draft  of  the 
declaration  of  martial  law  at  Petrograd  was  approved,  to 
the  best  of  my  belief,  by  the  Provisional  Government,  of 
which  Tchernov  was  also  a  member.  It  goes  without  saying 
that  this  cavalry  corps,  being  at  the  disposal  of  the  Pro- 
visional Government,  was  obliged  to  defend  it  from  all  an- 
tagonistic attempts  independently  of  their  origin,  just  as 
the  joint  detachment  defended  the  Government  against  the 
Bolsheviks  at  the  beginning  of  July "  ( Volia  Naroda, 
September  12th).  This  formula  is  perfectly  correct.  It 
is  highly  probably  that  Savinkov,  when  asking  Kornilov  in 
my  name  to  send  troops  to  the  Provisional  Government, 
founded  this  demand  upon  a  possible  danger  from  the  Left. 
.  .  .  What  else  could  he  tell  Kornilov?  ...  As  to 
Savinkov  himself  being  perfectly  alive  to  the  danger  from 
the  Right,  this  is  plain  from  his  following  statement :  "  I 


THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM  113 

was  satisfied  (on  August  24th)  by  Kornilov's  statement  of 
his  readiness  fully  to  support  A.  F.  Kerensky.     However, 
the  general  state  of  mind  at  the  Stavka  appeared  to  me  as 
being  highly  strained,  and  I  was  not  at  all  surprised  when, 
on  my  return  journey  in  the  train,  the  Commissary  of  the 
8th  Army  spoke  to  me  of  possible  attempts  at  a  conspiracy 
of  the  Stavka  Staff,  and  offered  to  put  at  once  the  entire 
8th  Army  (of  which  he  was  sure)  at  the  disposal  of  the 
Provisional  Government;  an  offer  w^hich  I  gratefully  ac- 
cepted, promising  to  send  him  a  telegram  in  case  of  neces- 
sity.    I  did  send  that  telegram  on  the  27th  of  August, 
)  having  previously  reported  my  conversation  to  A.  F.  Ker- 
[ensky."     On  his  return  from  the  Stavka  on  the  25th  of 
August,  Savinkov  told  me  that,  during  the  first  day  of  his 
.  stay,  Kornilov's  attitude  had  been  quite  "  irreconcilable," 
j  but  by  the  end  of  the  second  day  he,  Savinkov,  succeeded  in 
'  making  him  change  his  mind.     I  must  say  that  Savinkov 
,  himself  always  suspected  the  Stavka  Staff  of  plotting,  but 
'exempted  Kornilov  himself.] 

Kerensky. —  Concerning  the  3rd  Corps,  I  recollect  Savin- 
kov telling  me,  after  his  return  from  the  Stavka,  that  he 
had  succeeded  in  dissuading  Kornilov  from  sending  here  the 
"  Savage  Division  "  and  appointing  Krimov.  I  do  not  know 
whether  you  are  aware  that  I  had,  just  at  that  time,  signed 
the  order  appointing  Krimov  to  the  command  of  the  nth 
Army.  This  was  done  for  greater  reassurance. 
Krokhmal. —  For  whose  reassurance? 
Kerensky. —  For  mine.  Once  General  Krimov  was  in 
command  of  the  nth  Army,  there  was  nothing  more  to  be 
said.  But,  it  seems,  he  remained  all  the  while  at  the  Stavka, 
working  out  the  disposition  of  the  troops  "  in  case  of  a 
Bolshevik  revolt,"  and  then  suddenly  made  his  appearance 
here.     I  was  extremely  surprised  to  hear  of  his  arrival. 


114     THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM 

I  asked  him :  "  Who  are  you?  "  *'  I  am  the  Commander  of 
the  Special,  Army.''  ''Which?"  ** The  one  appointed  to 
Petrograd." 

Krokhmal. —  And  yet  there  had  been  no  order  appointing 
him  to  the  command  of  this  very  army? 

Kerensky. —  No.  My  assistant,  General  lakubovitch, 
was  present  at  our  interview.  I  asked  him :  "  Do  you  know 
anything  about  it?  "  "  No,  I  know  nothing;  neither  does 
the  Ministry  of  War." 

Chairman, —  We  have  a  lacuna  concerning  General 
Krimov,  as  we  had  not  examined  him;  therefore,  the  Com- 
mission begs  you  to  state  whether  you  have  had  any  ex- 
planations with  him. 

Kerensky. —  I  have  a  vivid  recollection  of  the  whole 
scene,  and  I  can  describe  it  to  you. 

Chairman. —  What  information  had  you  as  to  the  move- 
ments of  his  corps  before  he  put  in  an  appearance? 

Kerensky. —  You  see,  we  dispatched  an  officer,  who  had 
formerly  served  with  him,  to  meet  him  at  Luga  and  explain 
the  situation.  We  did  this  after  our  telegrams  ordering 
him  to  stay  his  march  remained  unacknowledged.  This 
mission  succeeded.  General  Krimov  arrived  here  accom- 
panied by  this  officer  (General  Samarin).  When  General 
Krimov  was  announced,  I  went  to  meet  him,  invited  him  to 
my  study,  and  then  we  had  a  talk.  As  far  as  I  can  remem- 
ber. General  lakubovitch,  Assistant  Minister  of  War,  was 
also  present.  General  Krimov  began  by  saying  that  they 
had  no  special  aims  in  marching  here;  that  they  had  been 
sent  at  the  disposal  of  the  Provisional  Government;  that 
they  had  received  orders  to  aid  the  Provisional  Government ; 
that  no  one  ever  dreamed  of  acting  against  the  Government ; 
that,  as  soon  as  the  misunderstanding  had  been  cleared,  he 
had  given  orders  to  halt.     Then  he  added  that  he  was  in 


THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM  115 

possession  of  a  written  order  to  that  effect.  At  first  he 
would  not  produce  the  order,  and  I  had  no  reason  to  doubt 
that  he  had  been  deceived  by  it.  He  apparently  hesitated 
to  deliver  it,  but  did  so  at  last.  The  order  was  absolutely 
clear  and  precise. 

Chairman. —  You  were  good  enough  to  give  it  me. 

Kerensky. —  You  know  it.  .  .  .  It  is  very  cleverly  writ- 
ten. I  read  the  order.  I  knew  Krimov  and  always  greatly 
respected  him,  as  a  man  of  decidedly  very  moderate  views, 
but  highly  honest  and  decent.  I  rose  and  slowly  approached 
him.  He  also  rose.  He  saw  that  I  was  greatly  impressed 
by  the  order.  He  approached  this  table;  I  came  up  quite 
close  to  him  and  said,  in  a  low  voice :  "  Yes,  General,  I  see. 
You  are  undoubtedly  a  very  clever  man.  Thank  you." 
Krimov  saw  that  the  part  he  played  was  perfectly  clear  to 
me. 

(To  the  Qiairman)  I  sent  for  you  at  once  and  passed  it 
to  you. 

Chairman. —  You  gave  me  the  order. 

Kerensky. —  After  this.  General  Krimov  told  me  that  he 
had  been  at  the  Stavka,  where  they  had  drafted  the  disposi- 
tion and  the  statute  for  proclaiming  a  state  of  siege  at 
Petrograd ;  he  added  that,  according  to  this  plan,  Petrograd 
w^as  to  be  divided  into  military  sections.  I  am  sure  he 
found  the  situation  unbearable,  because  he,  Krimov,  had 
swerved  from  the  truth ;  first  of  all,  he  did  not  openly  con- 
fess his  own  part  in  the  affair,  and  secondly,  clause  4  of  the 
order  begins  with  the  Avords :  "  From  communications  of  the 
Stavka  and  information  received  by  me,  I  learn  that  riots  are 
taking  place  in  Petrograd  ..."  etc.  I  asked  him  what  were 
his  grounds  for  making  this  declaration  in  his  own  name 
about  riots.  He  was  driven  to  refer  to  some  "  officer," 
travelling  he  did  not  know  whence  or  whither.     In  short, 


116  THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM 

he  could  not  explain  it.  Then  we  parted,  i.e.  I  dismissed 
him,  refusing  to  shake  hands  with  him. 

[It  appears  that  in  about  an  hour  or  two  after  Krimov  left 
my  study  he  committed  suicide.  It  should  not  be  thought 
that  I  ceased  to  respect  him  when  I  refused  to  shake  hands 
with  him.  Not  at  all.  The  whole  of  Krimov's  behaviour 
during  his  interview  with  me,  his  calm  resolve  —  after 
momentary  hesitation  —  to  hand  over  to  me  immediately 
the  convicting  document  (the  order  to  his  corps),  his  noble 
silence  as  regards  General  Kornilov's  telegrams  of  August 
27th-29th,  his  manly  confession  of  his  belief  in  a  dictator- 
ship, all  give  him  an  undeniable  right  to  the  highest  esteem 
of  his  political  enemies.  All  these  facts  clearly  illustrate  the 
honest,  courageous,  vigorous  nature  of  the  man.  But  I,  as 
the  most  official  person  in  the  most  official  surroundings,  as 
Premier  and  War  Minister  —  I  could  not  and  had  no  right 
to  treat  this  general  guilty  of  a  crime  against  the  State  in 
any  other  way. 

By  the  way,  General  Krimov  was  one  of  those  higher 
officers  of  the  Russian  army  who,  in  the  winter  preceding 
the  Revolution  of  February  27th,  together  with  a  part  of 
the  "  propertied  classes,"  planned,  and  were  preparing,  the 
deposition  of  Nicholas  II. 

The  story  of  the  3rd  Corps'  march  on  Petrograd,  led  by 
General  Krimov,  throws  important  light  on  the  question 
whether  General  Kornilov's  rebellion  was  a  **  misunder- 
standing "  caused  by  my  "  provocation,''  as  it  is  termed  in 
Kornilov's  address  to  the  **  Russian  People,"  or  whether  it 
was  a  premeditated  crime.  I  shall  record  a  few  facts  which 
will  solve  this  question,  without  as  yet  drawing  any  con- 
clusions therefrom. 

On  August  2 1  St  Savinkov,  the  Deputy  War  Minister,  ar- 
rived at  Headquarters,  and  reported  to  the  Generalissimo 


THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM  117 

the  Premier's  suggestion  to  place  a  detachment  of  troops 
at  the  disposal  of  the  Provisional  Government,  under  the 
strict  condition  that  Krimov  should  not  be  at  the  head  of 
the  detachment,  and  that  the  native  Caucasian  division 
should  not  be  sent  with  it. 

On  August  24th  Savinkov  left  Headquarters,  having  se- 
cured (according  to  his  statement)  General  Kornilov's  con- 
sent "  to  send  a  cavalry  corps,  not  to  appoint  General  Krimov 
as  its  commander,  and  to  replace  the  native  division  by  a 
regular  cavalry  division." 

But,  first,  General  Krimov,  just  appointed  Commander 
of  the  nth  Army  by  the  Provisional  Government  in  the 
usual  v^ay,  i.e.  on  the  recommendation  of  the  Generalissimo, 
turns  out  to  be  at  Headquarters  as  "  selected  "  to  command 
the  Petrograd  army,  and  precisely  at  that  time  is  completing 
the  study  of  the  plans  not  only  "  of  the  defence  "  of  Petro- 
grad against  the  Germans,  but  also  of  its  occupation.  Sec- 
ondly, not  only  does  the  cavalry  corps  remain  under  General 
Krimov,  but,  as  far  as  I  remember,  precisely  on  August 
24th,  by  special  orders  from  the  Generalissimo,  Krimov  was 
also  placed  in  command  of  the  native  division.  Thirdly, 
not  only  does  the  native  division  remain  unreplaced  by 
regular  cavalry,  but  it  heads  the  advance  on  Petrograd. 
Fourthly  and  finally,  the  detachment,  far  from  being  sent 
to  be  at  the  disposal  of  the  Provisional  Government,  is  ad- 
vancing for  the  accomplishment  of  "  two  tasks  "  expressly 
entrusted  to  General  Krimov  by  General  Kornilov. 

On  August  25th  Savinkov  returned  to  Petrograd  and  in- 
formed me  of  General  Kornilov's  "  consent "  to  accept  my 
conditions;  and  at  the  same  time  troops  were  already  ap- 
proaching Petrograd,  but  they  were  not  those  troops  which 
would  have  had  the  right  to  do  so.  On  August  26th  Kor- 
nilov signed  an  order  for  the  formation  of  the  Petrograd 


118  THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM 

army,  an  order  which  —  under  the  pretence  of  its  being 
premature  —  was  not  transmitted  to  the  troops,  nor  was  the 
Government  informed  of  it.  Why  was  it  just  on  August 
26th?  There  certainly  must  be  some  reason  for  the  fact 
that  on  the  very  day  of  his  departure  to  join  his  troops  Gen- 
eral Krimov  was  entrusted  with  the  following  task :  "  On 
hearing  from  me  (General  Kornilov)  or  from  local  sources 
of  the  commencement  of  a  Bolshevik  rising,  advance  on 
Petrograd  immediately,  occupy  the  city,  disarm  those  di- 
visions of  the  Petrograd  garrison  which  join  the  rising,  dis- 
arm the  population,  and  disperse  the  Soviets''  All  this 
happened  before  the  evening  of  August  26th,  i.e.  before  my 
conversation  with  V.  N.  Lvov  and  with  General  Kornilov 
on  the  direct  wire,  when  the  "  great  provocation  "  is  alleged 
to  have  taken  place.  On  August  27th  at  2  40  a.  m.  General 
Kornilov,  as  yet  ignorant  of  his  dismissal,  sent  a  telegram 
to  the  Deputy  War  Minister  beginning  with  the  following 
words :  "  The  concentration  of  the  corps  in  the  environs  of 
Petrograd  will  be  completed  by  the  evening  of  August  2^^ 
...  He  thus  made  the  Government  believe  that  it  was 
the  detachment  which  was  to  be  placed  at  the  disposal  of  the 
Government  without  Kximow  or  the  native  division.  At  the 
same  time  I  and  Savinkov  were  eagerly  "  awaited  at  Head- 
quarters "  on  August  28th,  certainly  not  later.  It  was  not 
in  vain  that  V.  N.  Lvov  implored  me  not  to  go  there.  And 
what  would  have  been  the  position  of  the  Provisional  Gov- 
ernment if  it  had,  following  on  the  same  telegram,  pro- 
claimed martial  law  in  Petrograd  on  August  29th  and  had 
then  to  face  Krimov's  troops,  who  had  a  task  of  their  own 
to  perform?  Would  not  the  Government  itself  be  then  de- 
clared to  be  acting  under  the  influence  of  the  ''  Bolshevik 
majority  of  the  Soviets,'*  as  it  soon  happened  (August 
27th)  ?     This  being  so,  did  a  change  occur  in  the  conduct  of 


THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM  119 

Headquarters  after  the  evening  of  August  26th,  after  my 
conversation  with  Komilov  over  the  direct  wire? —  No 
change  whatsoever. 

"  That  General  Krimov  did  not  carry  out  the  task  en-^ 
trusted  to  him,"  Kornilov  explained  by  the  fact  that  *'  com- 
munications with  him  were  severed,  and  he  could  not  receive 
my  (Kornilov's)  instructions.  No  special  measures  to  main- 
tain my  connection  with  him  were  taken,  because  the  corps' 
was  advancing  on  Petrograd  at  the  demand  of  the  Pro- 
visional Government,  and  I  could  not  foresee  that  the  Gov- 
ernment itself  would  order  connections  to  be  severed 
between  the  corps  and  Headquarters."  In  other  words, 
General  Kornilov  assumed  that,  in  face  of  the  demands  put 
forward  through  V.  N.  Lvov,  and  after  our  "  conversation  '* 
on  the  direct  wire,  I  would  still  feel  happily  confident  that 
there  was  no  connection  between  Headquarters'  "  offers  " 
and  the  advance  of  the  3rd  Corps. 

On  August  29th  General  Kornilov  gave  orders  to  General 
Krimov  to  continue  the  movement  on  Petrograd,  and  "  in 
case  of  communications  being  severed  again,  to  act  accord- 
ing to  the  circumstances  and  to  my  original  instructions/' 

But  this  was  not  the  first  order  since  August  27th.  On 
the  morning  of  August  29th  General  Krimov  already  issued 
his  own  order  No.  128,  which  he  afterwards  handed  over  to 
me  personally.     These  are  its  most  characteristic  points :  — 

'*  I.  I  received  the  following  telegrams  from  the  Prime 
Minister  and  the  Generalissimo :  — 

(Here  he  quotes  the  text  of  my  announcement  of  the  dis- 
missal of  General  Kornilov  and  the  reasons  thereof,  as  well 
as  the  text  of  General  Kornilov's  declaration  of  his  open 
move  against  the  Provisional  Government. ) 

"  3.  .  .  .  Having  received  M.  Kerensky's  telegram,  I 
sent  to  the  Commander-in-Chief  of  the  Northern  Front  for 


120     THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM 

orders.     General  K sky  stated  in  reply  .    ,    .  that  in 

these  hard  times  all  Commanders-in-Chief  recognized  Gen- 
eral Kornilov  to  be  the  sole  Generalissimo,  whose  every 
order  was  valid.  Moreover,  the  Cossacks  (it  should  be  re- 
membered that  the  3rd  Army  Corps  was  a  Cossack  one) 
long  ago  decided  that  General  Kornilov  could  not  be  re- 
moved, which  I  hereby  proclaim  for  general  guidance. 

"  4.  Tonight  I  heard  from  Generalissimo's  Headquarters 
and  from  Petrograd  that  riots  have  broken  out  in  that 
city.  Famine  is  increased  by  the  insane  actions  of  the  peo- 
ple, who,  panic-stricken  at  the  sight  of  their  own  troops 
marching  on  Petrograd,  destroyed  the  railw^ay  and  thus 
stopped  the  supply  of  food  to  the  metropolis.  And  who 
were  those  troops  they  were  so  afraid  of?  They  were 
those  who  had  sworn  on  oath  to  be  loyal  to  the  new  regime, 
those  who  at  the  Moscow  State  Conference  had  declared 
their  belief  in  the  republican  order  as  the  best  suited  for 
Russia,"  etc. 

This  order  scarcely  requires  explanation.  I  think  every 
one  will  now  understand  why  General  Krimov  did  not  hand 
over  to  me  his  order  at  once.  And  does  not  this  order  re- 
mind one  of  Kaledin's  conduct  at  the  Moscow  State  Confer- 
ence and  the  noisy  campaign  in  favour  of  Kornilov's 
**  irremovability,"  which  I  have  already  mentioned  above, 
as  well  as  many  other  things  ? 

To  what  extent  General  Krimov's  march  on  Petrograd 
was  anticipated  and  how  serious  were  the  hopes  centred  in  it 
can  be  seen  from  the  fact  that  Headquarters  could  not  to  the 
very  end  reconcile  themselves  with  what  had  actually  hap- 
pened. On  September  ist  General  Lukomsky  spoke  over 
the  Hughes  tape  machine  to  General  Alexeiev,  who  was  then 
at  Vitebsk,  already  on  his  way  to  Mohilev : — 

"  For  me  to  receive  a  definite  reply  from  General  Kor- 


THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM  121 

nilov,  it  is  highly  desirable  that  you  should  explain  what  is 
happening  to  Krimov." 

Even  Kornilov  himself  admits  that  only  at  the  moment 
"  when  I  learned  from  a  conversation  over  the  direct  wire 
of  General  Krimov's  death  did  I  take  measures  to  settle  my 
conflict  with  the  Prime  Minister  Kerensky  in  a  bloodless 
and  painless  way  as  far  as  the  country  and  the  army  were 
concerned.'* 

These  are  the  facts.  There  is  one  which  I  wish  to  em- 
phasize. As  Prime  Minister  I  suggested  that  a  detachment 
of  troops  should  be  sent  and  placed  at  the  disposal  of  the 
Provisional  Government  on  certain  terms.  This  suggestion 
was  not  carried  out  by  the  Generalissimo,  so  that  the  march 
of  Krimov's  detachment  cannot  be  explained  as  being  the 
result  of  an  "  agreement  "  with  the  Government. 

And  then  arises  the  pertinent  question,  why  these  troops 
were  marching  on  Petrograd  even  before  the  evening  of 
August  26th.] 

§15 

Krokhmal, —  Was  the  question  of  bringing  up  additional 
troops  considered  by  the  Provisional  Government,  or  at  a 
private  conference  of  some  of  its  members? 

Kerensky.—  I  think  the  matter  was  settled  by  conversa- 
tions. Usually,  at  meetings  of  the  Provisional  Government 
questions  are  put  to  me  by  individual  ministers,  e.g.,  about 
the  general  situation,  or  whether  the  Provisional  Govern- 
ment has  at  its  disposal  sufficient  forces  on  which  it  can  rely, 
or  what  are  the  relations  between,  and  the  state  of,  this  and 
that  body  of  troops,  etc. 

Krokhmal. —  Not  at  official  meetings  ? 

Kerensky. —  We  hold  various  kinds  of  meetings  —  busi- 
ness, political  and  private.     I  always  try  to  report  to  the 


122  THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM 

Provisional  Government  about  the  general  political  situa- 
tion, so  as  to  keep  it  always  well  informed.  At  that  time 
the  question  arose  of  the  necessity  of  securing  a  sufficient 
force  at  the  command  of  the  Government  to  maintain  order 
under  such  difficult  circumstances.  I  remember  that  in 
addition  we  also  had  to  deal  with  the  grave  question  of  the 
influx  of  refugees  from  the  Baltic  provinces.  I  remember, 
M.  Shablovsky,  your  report  on  this  question  in  connection 
with  the  state  of  affairs  on  the  Baltic  railway  lines,  which  I 
then  submitted  to  the  Provisional  Government.  An  active 
propaganda  was  being  carried  on  among  the  troops  on  the 
lines  of  retreat  towards  Petrograd.  On  the  whole  there 
was  much  tension  in  the  atmosphere.  Add  to  this  the  in- 
evitable conflict  between  myself  and  Headquarters  which 
sooner  or  later  was  sure  to  arise,  and  I  believe  you  will 
admit  there  was  sufficient  cause  for  alarm  concerning  the 
position  of  Petrograd. 

Krokhmal — Do  you  remember  when  the  question  of 
bringing  up  troops  was  considered  by  the  Provisional  Gov- 
ernment, and  which  of  its  members  were  present? 

Kerensky. —  No,  I  don't.  I  even  think  I  can  state  with 
certainty  that  we  did  not  discuss  at  all  which  corps  to  bring 
up,  the  3rd,  5th,  or  12th.  It  was  merely  asked,  "  Are  you 
sufficiently  secure?"  and  the  Minister  of  War  (or  the 
Minister  of  the  Interior)  answered,  "  The  necessary  steps 
are  taken,"  or  "  everything  will  be  arranged." 

Krokhmal. —  Do  you  remember  whether  the  question  of 
:  the  necessity  of  bringing  up  troops  in  connection  with  the 
\  then  possible  or  expected  Bolshevik  rising  was  put  before  the 
Provisional  Government? 

Kerensky. —  No,  I  don't. 

Krokhmal. —  Did  not  Savinkov  speak  to  you  about  it? 

Kerensky. —  PossiWy.    The  subject  was  discussed. 


THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM  128 

Krokhtnal. —  But  it  was  not  definitely  referred  to  when 
it  was  decided  to  bring  up  troops? 

Kerensky. —  It  would  be  wrong  to  assume  that  our  at- 
tention was  mainly  directed  that  way,  that  we  were  expect- 
ing a  Bolshevik  coup.  Our  attention  —  my  personal  atten- 
tion —  was  directed  elsewhere.  You  remember,  just  at  that 
time  some  of  the  Grand  Dukes  were  arrested,  and  various 
searches  were  made.  After  the  Moscow  State  Conference 
it  became  quite  clear  to  me  that  the  next  blow  would  come 
from  the  Right,  not  from  the  Left. 

Chairman. —  Did  Savinkov  go  to  Headquarters  with  the 
knowledge  and  according  to  the  instructions  of  the  Govern- 
ment, or  on  his  own  initiative? 

Kerensky. —  Both.  You  see,  he  arranged  a  conference  ^ 
of  all  Commissaries  at  Headquarters  for  August  24th 
(which  I  either  did  not  know  or  had  forgotten),  to  discuss 
various  proposals  of  reforms ;  at  the  same  time  it  was  nec- 
essary to  arrive  at  a  decision  on  many  urgent  questions, 
e.g.  about  the  Officers'  Union,  about  sending  troops,  etc. 
And  as  the  question  of  proclaiming  martial  law,  with  the 
exclusion  of  the  Petrograd  area,  was  also  to  be  considered, 
I  asked  Baranovsky  to  go  with  Savinkov  in  order  that  the 
military  business  should  receive  better  attention.  [I  re- 
member that  in  this  very  room  I  met  Savinkov,  two  of  my 
colleagues  (lakubovitch  and  Tumanov)  and  Baranovsky. 
We  were  busy  in  defining  the  area  which  was  to  be  excluded 
from  the  jurisdiction  of  the  Generalissimo  after  the  Petro- 
grad district  had  been  transferred  to  that  of  Headquarters. 
Then  it  was  decided  that  Baranovsky  should  also  go  to 
Headquarters.] 

Chairman. —  Was  it  reported  to  you  and  did  you  know 
that  Savinkov  was  taking  Mironov  with  him,  and  what  was 
the  object  of  it? 


124j  the  prelude  TO  BOLSHEVISM 

Kerensky. —  No,  I  don't  know  about  Mironov.  I  re- 
member that  the  day  after  their  departure  I  wanted  Mi- 
ronov to  arrange  that  the  movements  of  a  certain  person 
should  be  watched.  I  sent  for  Mironov.  I  was  told  that 
he  had  gone  to  Headquarters  with  Savinkov. 

[At  that  time  N.  D.  Mironov  was  the  Head  of  the 
Counter-intelligence  Department  at  the  General  Staff  of  the 
Petrograd  Military  District.  His  arrival  at  Headquarters 
with  Savinkov  caused  considerable  alarm  and  enormous  ir- 
ritation. 

"  I  know,"  said  Kornilov  to  Savinkov  excitedly,  "  Ker- 
ensky wants  to  arrest  a  valuable  officer.  .  .  .  He  sent  Mi- 
ronov, this  Professor  of  Sanskirt,  with  you.  I  know  that 
Mironov  is  engaged  in  political  espionage.  He  has  come 
here  to  watch  us.  .  .  ." 

"  Mironov  has  come  with  my  permission,"  retorted  Savin- 
kov. "  Kerensky  did  not  even  know  that  he  was  going  with 
me.  .  .  . 

"  All  the  same,  I  warn  you,  if  Mironov  dares  to  arrest 
any  one  here,  I'll  have  him  shot  by  my  Tekintzy  (Asiatic 
soldiers)." 

**  He  cannot  arrest  any  one  without  my  orders,"  remarked 
Savinkov. 

This  is  a  picturesque  fragment  from  Savinkov's  conver- 
sation with  Kornilov  on  August  24th.  The  alarm  caused  at 
Headquarters  by  Mironov's  arrival  will  be  perhaps  better 
understood  in  the  light  of  the  fact  that  it  was  Savinkov's 
intention  to  take  serious  measures  against  the  Main  Com- 
mittee of  the  Officers'  League  and  the  Headquarters'  Polit- 
ical Department  in  connection  with  information  received 
concerning  the  plot.] 

Chairman. —  What  report  did  Savinkov  give  of  his  visit 
to  Headquarters? 


THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM  125 

Kerensky. —  Not  a  very  detailed  one.  He  told  me  be- 
sides that  on  the  first  day  (August  23rd)  Kornilov  adopted 
an  extremely  excited  and  irreconcilable  attitude  towards 
me.  Only  after  long  negotiations  did  Savinkov  succeed  in 
alleviating  this  animosity,  and  at  his  departure  Kornilov 
himself,  or  a  representative  of  his  —  I  don't  remember  who 
—  called  on  Savinkov  in  order  to  ask  him  to  tell  me  that 
Kornilov  desired  to  co-operate  with  me  and  was  devoted 
to  me. 

At  the  same  time  Baranovsky,  who  also  returned,  told 
me,  as  I  have  already  mentioned,  that  the  whole  atmosphere 
at  Headquarters  was  unbearable,  that  "  it  is  even  impos- 
sible to  mention  your  name  there,'*  that  "practically  no 
work  is  being  done"  because  at  all  desks  one  heard  noth- 
ing but  political  discussions. 

[I  must  here  mention  that  one  of  the  most  unexpected 
aspects  of  Komilov's  policy  was  that  from  the  moment  of 
his  appointment  as  Generalissimo  all  questions,  military, 
strategic,  or  concerning  the  front,  completely  ceased  to 
interest  Headquarters.  What  used  to  be  the  chief  subject  of 
my  discussions  with  Alexeiev  and  Brussilov  now  fell  into 
the  background.  I  remember  that  on  several  occasions  I 
expressed  surprise  at  such  a  hypertrophy  of  politics  where 
such  questions  should  not  have  existed  at  all.] 

Chairman. —  Did  Savinkov  tell  you  about  his  proposal 
not  to  proclaim  martial  law  in  Petrograd  until  the  3rd 
Corps  approached  the  city? 

Kerensky. —  Yes,  he  did.  But  I  pointed  out  that  /  did 
not  attach  any  importance  to  the  advance  of  the  corps, 
that  I  considered  the  delay  quite  superfluous,  that  the 
measure  was  necessary  in  view  of  altered  circumstances, 
and  that  martial  law  could  be  proclaimed  without  waiting 
for  new  troops.     So  you  see,  I  disagreed  with  Savinkov, 


Ue  THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM 

The  Government  did  not  discuss  this  particular  question. 

Chairman. —  Did  he  report  only  to  you  personally  ? 

Kerensky. —  As  far  as  I  remember,  no  report  was  made 
to  the  Government  on  the  subject,  apart  from  a  statement 
of  the  general  results  of  his  journey  to  Headquarters. 

Chairman. —  Was  it  not  then  intended  to  send  Terest- 
chenko  on  a  mission  to  Headquarters,  and  for  what  reason  ? 

Kerensky. —  To  which  mission  do  you  refer? 

Chairman. —  To  the  one  immediately  following  on  Savin- 
kov's  return.     What  was  the  reason  of  it? 

Kerensky. —  He  visited  Headquarters  in  July,  and  brought 
back  the  news  that  Filonenko  was  intriguing  against  Lukom- 
sky. 

Liber. —  And  what  about  his  visit  before  Lvov  ? 

Kerensky. —  Oh,  yes.  He  went  to  Headquarters  on  his 
own  business,  and  possibly  might  have  wished  to  discuss  the 
general  situation  personally.  I  believe  at  that  time  Makla- 
kov  had  to  go  there,  whose  ambassadorial  appointment  to 
Paris  was  then  under  consideration. 

Chairman. —  So  there  was  no  connection  between  Terest- 
chenko's  visit  and  Savinkov's  mission? 

Kerensky. —  That,  I  think,  is  very  unimportant.  It  did 
not  occupy  my  attention  at  the  time.  [But  now  I  can  say 
^  definitely  that  it  had  nothing  to  do  with  Savinkov's  Mis- 
I  sion.] 

Raupakh. —  May  I  ask  whether  Baranovsky  had  any  ob- 
ject of  his  own  in  accompanying  Savinkov  to  Headquarters  ? 

Kerensky. —  He  went  as  Chief  of  the  Military  Cabinet, 
mainly  to  investigate  the  question  (of  the  exclusion  of 
Petrograd)  from  a  military  point  of  view,  and  was  only 
present  at  the  meeting  at  which  this  question  was  discussed. 

Raupakh. —  Does  that  mean  that  he  was  instructed  to 
insist  on  the  exclusion  of  Petrograd? 


THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM  187 

Kerensky, —  The  military  authorities  were  always  against 
the  exclusion  of  Petrograd,  as  were  also  lakubovitch  and 
Prince  Tumanov  at  the  meeting  in  my  room  mentioned 
above.  But  for  considerations  of  my  own,  I  desired  to 
make  the  military  aspect  of  the  question  clear  to  Kornilov, 
and  as  all  here  were  more  or  less  unanimous,  Baranovsky 
was  sent  to  Headquarters  to  defend  my  point  of  view. 

§i6 

Shablovsky. —  When  you  first  discussed  with  Lvov  thifc 
question  of  reorganizing  and  strengthening  the  Government, 
who  initiated  the  discussion,  and  what  were  the  concrete 
suggestions  made  by  Lvov? 

Kerensky. —  I  had  no  such  discussion  with  him. 

Shdblovsky. —  What  were  the  concrete  suggestions  he 
made? 

Kerensky. —  Among  the  infinite  number  of  people  who 
come  to  me  with  all  sorts  of  serious  propositions  and 
"  schemes,"  useful  advice  and  idle  talk  (everybody  being 
convinced  that  the  real  cause  of  all  the  disasters  is  that  I 
did  not  give  him  a  hearing),  came  Lvov.  He  did  not  talk 
much  about  his  "  schemes  '*  or  the  changes  in  the  Provisional 
Government,  but  tried  to  persuade  me  that  my  "  song  was 
sung,"  that  I  had  no  support  anywhere,  because  I  was  now 
"  hated  by  the  Right,"  and  that  I  had  "  lost  my  influence  ** 
with  the  democracy  owing  to  my  resolute  repressive  meas- 
ures against  and  persecutions  of  the  Bolsheviks,  that  I  and 
my  Provisional  Government  had  *'  lost  our  footing,"  that 
support  must  be  found,  that  he  could  help,  that  Cabinet 
changes  were  necessary,  and  that  elements  even  more  mod- 
erate than  the  Cadets  ought  to  be  included.  As  this  hap- 
pened soon  after  the  Moscow  Conference,  I  considered  it 


1«8  THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM 

natural  for  a  man  to  come  and  express  such  opinions.  I 
answered  in  general  terms  that  I  was  a  convinced  ad- 
herent of  Coalition  Government,  etc.  I  do  not  now  re- 
member the  details  of  the  conversation,  but  the  gist  of  it 
was  that  V.  Lvov  tried  to  show  that  I  "  had  no  support," 
whereas  he  had  something  or  somebody  behind  his  back. 
He  kept  on  repeating:  *' We  can  do  this.  We  can  do 
that."  I  asked  him  who  "  w^e  "  were,  what  he  could  do, 
in  whose  name  he  was  speaking.  To  these  questions  he 
replied :  "I  have  no  right  to  tell  you.  I  am  only  author- 
ized to  ask  you  whether  you  are  willing  to  enter  into  dis- 
cussion." I  could  see  from  what  he  said  that  he  came  on 
behalf  of  a  distinct  group.  There  was  no  doubt  about  it. 
More  than  once  he  hinted  that  he  had  just  come  from 
somewhere,  and  that  he  must  return  the  same  day,  but 
"  before  leaving  I  must  have  your  answer."  He  emphasized 
the  following:  "  I  am  instructed  to  ask  you  whether  you 
are  willing  or  not  to  include  new  elements  in  the  Provisional 
Government,  and  to  discuss  the  question  with  you."  I 
replied :  "  Before  I  give  you  an  answer,  I  must  know  with 
whom  I  am  dealing,  who  are  those  you  represent,  and  what 
they  want."  "  They  are  public  men."  "  There  are  various 
kinds  of  pubHc  men,"  said  I.  At  last  I  said:  '*  Well, 
supposing  I  have  no  support,  what  can  you  offer,  what  are 
the  actual  forces  you  rely  upon?  I  can  imagine  of  whom 
your  group  consists,  and  who  those  public  men  are."  He 
then  hinted  that  I  was  mistaken,  that  "  they  "  were  backed 
by  a  considerable  force  which  nobody  could  afford  to 
ignore. 

Such  was  my  conversation  with  Lvov.  Of  course  I  gave 
him  no  instructions,  no  powers.  I  believe  he  had  admitted 
that  in  speaking  as  he  did  at  Headquarters  on  my  behalf 
he  "  exceeded  "  his  warrant.     Of  course  he  did,  because  I 


THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM  129 

told  him  nothing  of  the  sort.  I  plainly  told  him :  "  Before 
I  can  give  you  any  answer,  you  must  tell  me  whom  I  am 
dealing  with." 

Shahlovsky. —  And  he  said  he  was  not  entitled  to  tell  you? 

Kerensky, —  Yes,  that  was  what  puzzled  me  most.  In 
the  tangled  mass  of  information  I  had  about  the  intended 
lines  of  action  of  various  groups,  this  secrecy  attracted  my 
attention.  I  have  known  Lvov  for  a  long  time:  I  saw 
that  he  did  not  merely  drop  in  to  have  a  chat.  He  said 
he  wished  me  well,  that  my  personality  interested  him,  and 
he  did  not  desire  my  ruin,  etc. 

Shahlovsky. —  As  he  did  not  say  from  whom  he  came, 
because  he  was  not  authorized  to  do  so,  did  you  not  suggest 
that  he  should  obtain  such  authority? 

Kerensky. —  I  did  not  say  "  authority."  I  said,  "  Before 
I  express  my  opinion,  I  must  know  whom  I  am  dealing 
with  and  in  whose  name  you  are  speaking." 

Shahlovsky. —  How  did  he  end  the  conversation  ? 

Kerensky. —  He  did  not.  He  asked :  "  Will  you  nego- 
tiate if  I  tell  you  ?"  I  replied :  "  Tell  me  more  definitely 
what  you  want  to  learn  from  me  and  why."  He  said 
"  Good-bye  "  and  departed.  That  was  the  end  of  it.  Head- 
quarters were  not  even  mentioned. 

Shahlovsky. —  Did  you  expect  him  to  come  again  after 
this  conversation  with  clearer  and  more  definite  proposals, 
or  did  you  consider  the  matter  finished? 

Kerensky. —  I  thought  the  matter  would  end  at  that. 
Generally  speaking,  I  did  not  attach  any  importance  to  it, 
but  some  of  the  details,  and  more  particularly  Lvov's  man- 
ner, attracted  my  attention.  I  suspected  that  V.  Lvov  was 
referring  to  that  Rodzianko  group,  the  group  of  *'  men  who 
have  been,"  which  then  had  its  Headquarters  in  Moscow. 
It  must  not  be  forgotten  that  it  was  a  time  of  all  sorts 


130  THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM 

of  talk  and  idle  scheming.  Even  in  June-July  people 
sometimes  came  to  me  with  various  suggestions  as  to  the 
proper  organization  of  the  Government.  Direct  offers  of 
dictatorship  were  even  made  to  me.  Such  offers  made 
it  easier  for  me  to  keep  an  eye  on  those  round  Kornilov, 
because  they  were  the  same  men  who  had  previously  tried 
to  gain  my  ear. 

Shahlovsky. —  Did  Lvov  suggest  inclusion  in  the  Gov- 
ernment of  only  those  elements  of  the  Right  whose  support 
could  be  relied  upon,  or  did  he  suggest  strengthening  the 
Government  by  gaining  the  support  of  wider  masses?  Or 
did  he  suggest  any  real  force,  aiming  at  strengthening  the 
Government  ? 

Kerensky. —  When  he  first  came  we  talked  about  the 
inclusion  of  new  elements  to  widen  the  range  of  influence 
of  the  Provisional  Government,  and  when  I  asked :  "  Who 
can  raise  the  authority  of  the  Government;  what  is  the  use 
of  appointing  two  or  three  more  Ministers?  '*  he  answered 
with  a  smile,  "  Oh  well,  you  may  be  mistaken ;  there  are 
forces  behind  us."  "  What  forces  ?  '*  "  You  don't  know, 
but  there  are."  This  was  what  particularly  impressed  me. 
Lvov  seemed  to  know  something;  he  was  not  talking  for 
himself. 

Shahlovsky. —  Did  you  speak  to  your  colleagues  Zarudny 
or  Nekrassov  or  to  somebody  else  about  Lvov's  suggestions 
to  the  effect  that  here  was  an  attractive  offer,  and  did  you 
instruct  any  one  to  find  out  who  was  behind  his  back  and 
who  was  responsible  for  the  offer? 

Kerensky. —  I  don't  remember.  .  .  .  No,  indeed,  I  gave 
no  such  instructions. 

Shahlovsky. —  Did  you  mention  the  matter  at  all  ? 


THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM  131 

§17 

Kerensky. —  I  could  not  tell  you.  I  believe  I  merely 
mentioned  casually  to  one  of  my  colleagues  that  Lvov  had 
been  talking  with  me,  but  I  cannot  speak  v^ith  certainty 
for  the  moment,  because  I  did  not  attach  much  importance 
to  his  visit.  I  must  say  that  on  his  second  visit  on  August 
26th  he  completely  changed  his  manner.  He  tried  hard 
to  arrange  an  interview  with  me.  I  remember ;  I  had  neither 
time  nor  desire  to  see  him,  particularly  as  he  was  incensed 
when  he  left  the  Provisional  Government.  I  believe  he 
then  said  to  Terestchenko,  "  Kerensky  —  c'est  mon  ennemi 
mortel."  The  second  time  he  came,  I  met  him  with  the 
following  words:  "You  have  come  again  to  talk  about 
the  inclusion  of  new  elements  in  the  Provisional  Govern- 
ment." (I  am  not  certain  about  the  actual  words,  but 
such  was  the  meaning. )  He  answered :  "  No,  I  have  come 
to  discuss  a  totally  different  subject;  the  situation  has  com- 
pletely changed."  This  time  he  made  no  mention  what- 
soever of  the  necessity  to  include  new  elements  in  the  Pro- 
visional Government  or  of  extending  its  range  of  support. 
He  told  me  bluntly  that  he  had  come  to  warn  me  that  my 
position  was  extremely  precarious,  that  I  was  doomed; 
in  the  very  near  future  there  would  be  a  Bolshevik  rising, 
when  the  Government  would  receive  no  support;  that  no 
one  would  guarantee  my  life,  etc.  When  he  saw  that 
all  this  made  no  impression  upon  me  and  that  I  took  it  in 
a  jocular  way :  '*  It  can't  be  helped,  such  is  fate,"  and 
so  on,  he  abruptly  broke  off  the  conversation.  Then,  ap- 
parently much  excited,  he  added :  **  I  must  make  you  a 
formal  offer."  "From  whom?"  "From  Kornilov." 
When  I  listened  to  all  this  nonsense,  it  seemed  to  me  that 
either  he  was  insane  or  something  very  serious  had  hap- 


132     THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM 

pened.  Those  who  were  about  me  can  testify  how  much 
I  was  upset.  When  Lvov  left  my  study,  V.  V.  Virubov 
was  shown  in.  I  showed  him  the  document  just  drawn 
up,  and  said :  "  This  is  what  we  have  come  to,  such  is  the 
state  of  affairs." 

[I  must  apologize  for  inevitable  repetitions,  but  I  deem  it 
necessary  to  reproduce  the  events  of  the  evening  of  August 
26th  as  precisely  as  I  can.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  I  was  cross- 
examined  on  certain  particular  episodes  of  the  affair  of 
which  the  nature  was  sufficiently  familiar  to  the  Commission 
of  Inquiry,  but  which  may  not  be  grasped  by  the  reader. 

The  evening  of  August  26th  was  of  exceptional  impor- 
tance. Thanks  to  the  coming  of  Lvov,  it  was  possible  — 
quoting  Nekrassov's  vivid  expression  — "  to  explode  the  al- 
ready prepared  mine,  two  days  before  the  time  fixed  for 
\  it"  (August  28th),  and  it  was  just  because  of  the  events 
\  of  that  evening  that  General  Kornilov  talked  of  "  great 
I  provocation,"  and  all  his  followers  conducted  against  me 
^  and  a  certain  part  of  the  Provisional  Government  a  most 
obdurate  campaign. 

So  about  six  o'clock  on  August  26th  V.  N.  Lvov  came 
to  me  in  my  official  study,  and  after  a  long  conversation 
about  my  *'  doom  "  and  about  his  anxiety  to  **  save  "  me 
and  so  forth,  said  in  so  many  words  that  — 

General  Kornilov  declared  to  me  (Kerensky)  through 
him  (Lvov)  that  no  assistance  whatever  would  be  given 
to  the  Provisional  Government  in  its  struggle  with  the 

I  Bolsheviks,  and  that  in  particular  Kornilov  would  not  an- 
swer for  my  life  anywhere  but  at  Headquarters;  that  the 
continuance  of  the  Provisional  Government  in  power  could 
no  longer  be  permitted;  that  General  Kornilov  invited  me 
to  urge  the  Provisional  Government  to  transfer  its  powers 
that  very  day  to  the  Generalissimo,  and,  pending  the  for- 


THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM  133 

mation  by  him  of  its  new  Cabinet,  to  hand  over  the  direction 
of  current  affairs  to  the  Assistant  Ministers  and  to  proclaim 
martial  law  throughout  Russia.  As  to  myself  and  Savin- 
kov,  we  were  urged  to  go  away  that  night  to  Headquarters, 
where  Ministerial  portfolios  awaited  us  —  for  Savinkov  the 
position  of  War  Minister,  for  me  that  of  Minister  of  Jus- 
tice. 

To  this  V.  N.  Lvov  added  that  this  last  condition  — 
that  is  to  say,  our  going  to  Headquarters  and  the  rest  — 
was  put  to  me  privately,  and  was  not  to  be  disclosed  at 
the  session  of  the  Provisional  Government. 

This  communication  was  an  absolute  surprise  to  me,  and 
especially  the  fact  that  it  came  from  the  lips  of  V.  N. 
Lvov,  because  his  name  had  never  before  been  mentioned 
in  any  of  the  reports  or  statements  concerning  the  plot 
which  I  had  in  my  possession. 

At  first  I  burst  out  laughing.  "  Don  t  joke,  V.  N.,''  I 
said. 

"  There  is  no  time  to  joke ;  the  situation  is  very  serious," 
Lvov  answered;  and  with  extreme  excitement  and  evident 
sincerity,  he  began  to  urge  me  to  save  my  life.  For  that 
there  was  "  only  one  way,  to  yield  to  Kornilov's  demands.** 
He  was  beside  himself. 

I  walked  hastily  up  and  down  my  large  room,  trying 
to  understand,  to  feel,  what  was  the  real  meaning  of  all 
this  —  Lvov's  coming,  and  the  rest  of  it.  I  remembered 
what  he  had  said  at  his  first  visit  about  "  real  force,'*  and 
compared  it  with  the  feeling  that  existed  against  me  at 
Headquarters,  and  with  all  the  reports  about  the  ripening 
•conspiracy  which  was  without  a  doubt  connected  with 
Headquarters ;  and  as  soon  as  I  had  got  over  my  first  sur- 
prise, or  rather  shock,  I  decided  to  test  Lvov  once  more, 
to  verify  his  statement  and  then  to  act.     And  to  act  in- 


1S4     THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM 

stantly  and  resolutely  My  mind  was  at  work.  I  did  not 
hesitate  for  an  instant  in  my  acting.  I  rather  felt  than 
understood  all  the  extraordinary  seriousness  of  the  situa- 
tion, if  ...  if  only  Lvov's  words  were  even  remotely  in 
accord  with  reality ! 

Calming  myself  a  little,  I  deliberately  pretended  that  I 
had  no  longer  any  doubt  or  hesitation,  and  that  personally 
I  had  decided  to  agree. 

I  began  to  explain  to  Lvov  that  I  could  not  convey  such 
a  communication  to  the  Provisional  Government  without 
proofs.  He  reassured  me,  saying  that  every  word  he  had 
uttered  was  true.  At  last  I  asked  him  to  put  into  writing 
all  Kornilov's  points.  The  readiness,  the  assurance,  the 
quickness  with  which  Lvov  agreed  and  wrote  down  Korni- 
lov's proposals  gave  me  full  confidence  that  Lvov  was  not 
only  fully  informed,  but  that  he  had  no  doubt  as  to  the 
realization  of  the  plan. 

Here  is  the  text  of  the  note  Lvov  wrote: — 

General  Kornilov  proposes  — 

(i)  That  martial  law  shall  be  proclaimed  in  Petrograd. 

X2)  That  all  military  and  civil  authority  shall  be  placed 
in  the  hands  of  the  Generalissimo. 

(3)  That  all  Ministers,  not  excluding  the  Premier,  shall 
resign,  and  that  the  temporary  executive  power  shall  be 
transferred  to  the  Assistant  Ministers  till  the  formation 
of  a  Cabinet  by  the  Generalissimo. 

V.  Lvov. 
Petrograd,  August  26,  19 17. 

As  soon  as  he  began  to  write,  my  last  doubt  disappeared. 
I  had  only  one  desire,  one  overmastering  impulse :  to  check 
the  madness  at  the  outset,  not  giving  it  time  to  blaze  up, 


THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM  135 

and  preventing  the  possible  breaking-out  of  its  partisans 
in  Petrograd  itself.  All  that  had  previously  occurred  — 
the  activity  of  various  organizations,  the  commotion  around 
the  Conference  in  Moscow,  the  campaign  in  the  Press,  re- 
ports concerning  conspiracies,  the  behaviour  of  individual 
politicians,  the  series  of  ultimatums  sent  to  me  by  Staff 
Headquarters,  Aladin's  visit  to  Prince  G.  E.  Lvov,  Korni- 
lov's  recent  telegram  supporting  the  railwaymen  in  their 
impossible  demands,  the  insistence  that  the  Petrograd  army 
should  be  handed  over  to  Staff  Headquarters  —  all,  all 
instantly  shone  clear  in  a  very  brilliant  light  and  merged 
into  one  clear  picture.     The  double  game  was  manifest. 

Certainly  I  could  not  then  prove  every  point,  but  I  saw 
everything  with  extraordinary  clarity. 

In  those  instants  while  Lvov  was  writing,  my  brain 
worked  intensely.  It  was  necessary  to  prove  at  once  the 
formal  connection  between  Lvov  and  Kornilov  so  clearly 
that  the  Provisional  Government  would  be  able  to  take 
resolute  measures  that  very  evening.  It  was  essential  to 
make  Lvov  commit  himself,  by  making  him  repeat  in  the 
presence  of  a  third  person  all  his  conversation  with  me. 
I  felt  I  must  act  thus,  and  in  no  other  way.  .  .  .  Mean- 
time, Lvov  finished  writing,  and  giving  me  the  document, 
said,  "  That  is  very  good ;  now  everything  will  end  peace- 
fully. People  there  think  it  very  important  that  the  powers 
of  the  Provisional  Government  should  be  transferred  legally. 
Well,  and  as  for  you,"  he  concluded,  "  will  you  go  to  Staff 
Headquarters  ?  '* 

I  do  not  know  why,  but  this  question  stabbed  me,  put 
me  on  my  guard,  and  almost  involuntarily  I  replied,  "  Cer- 
tainly not.  Do  you  really  think  that  I  can  be  Minister  of 
Justice  under  Kornilov  ?  " 

Here  something  strange  happened. 


186  THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM 

Lvov  sprang  up;  his  face  brightened  as  he  exclaimed: 
'*  You  are  right !  You  are  right !  Don't  go  there.  A  trap 
is  set  for  you ;  he  will  arrest  you.  Go  away  —  some- 
where far  away;  but  get  out  of  Petrograd  you  must.  They 
hate  you."     Lvov  said  this  excitedly. 

We  then  "  decided  "  that  Kornilov  should  learn  by  tele- 
graph of  my  resignation,  and  that  I  should  not  go  to  Staff 
Headquarters. 

"  And  what  will  happen,  V.  N.,'*  I  said,  "  if  you  are  mis- 
taken, or  if  they  have  played  a  practical  joke  on  you? 
What  position  will  you  be  in  then?  You  know,  what  you 
have  written  is  very  serious.*' 

Lvov  began  energetically  to  prove  that  it  was  not  a  mis- 
take, that  it  could  not  be  a  joke,  that  it  was  indeed  a  very 
serious  matter,  and  that  "  General  Kornilov  would  never 
take  back  his  words." 

At  that  moment  the  idea  came  into  my  head  that  I  would 
get  direct  confirmation  from  Kornilov  himself  on  the  direct 
telegraphic  line.  Lvov  jumped  at  the  suggestion,  and  we 
arranged  that  we  should  meet  at  eight  o'clock  at  the  house  of 
the  War  Minister  to  speak  together  to  Kornilov  on  the 
I  direct  telegraph. 

Lvov  had  come  to  me  a  few  minutes  after  five  o'clock, 
and  he  left,  as  far  as  I  remember,  after  seven.  Nearly 
an  hour  was  left  before  we  were  to  meet  at  the  War  Min- 
ister's house.  As  he  went  out,  at  the  door  of  my  room 
Lvov  met  Virubov,  who  was  coming  to  me.  After  I  had 
acquainted  him  with  what  had  happened,  and  asked  him  to 
stay  with  me,  I  sent  my  aide-de-camp  to  arrange  for  a 
direct  line,  and  to  summon  to  me  at  my  Palace  at  nine 
o'clock  in  the  evening  the  Chief  Assistant  of  the  Military 
Staff,  Balavinsky,  and  the  Assistant  to  the  Commander 
of  the  Military  District,  Captain  Kosmin. 


THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM  137 

At  eight  o'clock  in  the  evening  I  went  with  Virubov 
to  the  telegraph.  Everything  was  ready.  Kornilov  was 
waiting  at  the  other  end  of  the  line.  Lvov  was  not  yet 
there.  We  tried  to  ring  him  up  at  his  house,  but  there 
was  no  reply.  Kornilov  waited  at  the  telegraph  for  twenty 
to  twenty-five  minutes.  I  decided  to  speak  alone,  as  the 
character  of  the  conversation  made  it  indifferent  whether 
only  one  or  both  of  us  were  there;  the  subject  had  been 
agreed  upon  beforehand.  I  must  confess  that  apparently 
both  Virubov  and  I  were  still  hoping  that  General  Kornilov 
would  ask  in  utter  bewilderment :  "  What  is  there  for  me 
to  corroborate?  Which  Lvov?"  But  the  hope  was  not 
realized.  Here  is  the  full  conversation  as  recorded  by  the 
Hughes  tape  machine. 

The  Conversation  by  the  Hughes  Tape  Machine  of 
THE  Prime  Minister  (Kerensky)  with  the  Com- 
mander-in-Chief (General  Kornilov).  Italics  and 
figures  are  partly  mine. 

( 1 )  ''  Good  day,  General.  V.  N.  Lvov  and  Kerensky  at 
the  apparatus.  We  beg  you  to  confirm  the  statement  that 
Kerensky  is  to  act  according  to  the  communication  made 
to  hint  by  V.  N/' 

"  Good  day,  Alexander  Feodorovitch ;  good  day,  V.  N. 
Confirming  again  the  description  I  gave  V.  N.  of  the  present 
situation  of  the  country  and  the  army  as  it  appears  to  me, 
I  declare  again  that  the  events  of  the  past  days  and  of 
those  that  I  can  see  coming  imperatively  demand  a  definite 
decision  in  the  shortest  possible  time." 

(2)  ''  I,  V.  N.,  ask  you  whether  it  is  necessary  to  act  on 
that  definite  decision  which  you  asked  me  to  communicate 
privately  to  Kerensky,  as  he  is  hesitating  to  give  his  full 
confidence  without  your  personal  confirmation." 


138  THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM 

"  Yes,  I  confirm  that  I  asked  you  to  convey  to  Alexander 
Feodorovitch  my  urgent  demand  that  he  should  come  to 
Mohilev." 

(3)  "I,  Alexander  Feodorovitch,  understand  your  an- 
swer as  confirmation  of  the  words  conveyed  to  me  by  V.  N. 
To  do  that  today  and  start  from  here  is  impossible.  I 
hope  to  start  tomorrow.  Is  it  necessary  for  Savinkov  to 
go?'' 

"  I  beg  urgently  that  Boris  Victorovitch  shall  come  with 
you.  Everything  I  said  to  V.  N.  refers  in  equal  degree 
to  Savinkov.  I  beg  you  earnestly  not  to  put  off  your  de- 
parture later  than  tomorrow.  Believe  me,  only  my  recog- 
nition of  the  responsibility  of  the  moment  urges  me  to  per- 
sist in  my  request." 

(4)  "  Shall  we  come  only  in  case  of  an  outbreak,  of 
which  there  are  rumours,  or  in  any  case?  '* 

"  In  any  case." 

"  Good  day.     Soon  we  shall  see  each  other." 

"  Good  day." 

The  above  is  a  classical  specimen  of  a  '*  code  "  conversa- 
tion in  which  the  one  who  answers  understands  from  half 
a  word  the  one  who  questions,  because  the  subject  of  the 
conversation  is  known  to  them  both.  For  instance,  take 
the  first  and  second  answers,  "  Confirming  again,"  etc., 
where  everything  is  puzzling  to  the  outsider  and  clear  only 
to  the  initiated,  who  knows  the  real  point  of  the  dialogue. 
There  is  not  a  single  leading  question,  not  a  single  question 
whence  one  could  gather  what  is  already  known  by  the 
questioner  about  the  subject  of  his  interrogation.  Never- 
theless the  answers  were  precisely  what  were  expected. 
They  were  in  exact  accordance  with  V.  Lvov*s  communi- 
cation to  me,  especially  the  second  and  third. 


THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM  139 

This  conversation  yielded  more  than  could  have  been 
expected ;  it  not  only  confirmed  V.  Lvov's  authority  to  speak 
directly  on  behalf  of  Kornilov,  but  also  verified  the  ac- 
curacy which  Lvov  had  passed  on  to  me  Korniloi/s 
words.  ... 

It  was  now  necessary  to  strengthen  this  evidence  by  the 
repetition  in  the  presence  of  a  third  person  of  my  "  private  " 
conversation  with  Lvov. 

We  went  back  to  the  Winter  Palace.  On  our  way  a 
scene  occurred  which  is  mentioned  later  in  the  evidence. 
On  my  return  to  my  study,  the  conversation  with  Lvov 
was  repeated.  S.  A.  Balavinsky,  at  that  time  present  in 
my  room,  gave  the  following  account  of  it  next  day,  August 
27th,  to  the  examining  magistrate,  among  other  evidence. 

"  I  was  in  M.  Kerensky's  cabinet  and  wanted  to  leave 
in  view  of  his  approaching  interview  with  Lvov,  but  Ker- 
ensky  asked  me  to  remain,  and  I  stayed  in  the  room  all 
through  the  conversation.  Kerensky  had  brought  with 
him  two  documents.  At  the  very  beginning  Kerensky 
read  to  Lvov  the  tape  from  the  telegraph  to  Staff  Head- 
quarters containing  the  Kerensky-Kornilov  conversation, 
the  same  tape  that  you  now  produce  before  me  "  (they 
showed  the  witness  the  tape  produced  by  Kerensky  at  the 
examination),  "and  Lvov  confirmed  the  accuracy  of  the 
conversation  recorded  on  the  tape. 

"  Then  A.  F.  Kerensky  read  aloud  to  Lvov  those  notes 
in  Lvov's  own  handwriting  which  you  show  me  now,  and 
he  confirmed  the  accuracy  of  those  notes,  certifying  that 
every  proposal  in  those  notes  had  been  made  by  Kornilov 
himself.  Further,  V.  N.  Lvov  said  that  the  general  opinion 
of  the  people  and  of  everybody  at  Staff  Headquarters 
was  so  strongly  against  Kerensky  and  the  Provisional  Gov- 
ernment, that  General  Kornilov  could  not  answer  for  A.  F. 


140     THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM 

Kerensky^s  personal  safety  in  any  place  in  Russia,  and 
that  was  why  it  was  necessary  that  A.  F.  Kerensky  and 
Savinkov  should  go  to  Staff  Headquarters,  and  Lvov 
privately  gave  Kerensky  friendly  advice  to  accept  and  carry 
out  General  Kornilov's  conditions.  Advising  Kerensky  to 
fulfil  Kornilov's  demands,  V.  N.  Lvov  said  that  General 
Kornilov  offered  in  the  Cabinet  he  was  forming  the  port- 
folio of  Minister  of  Justice  to  Kerensky,  while  Savinkov 
was  to  have  the  Ministry  of  War  and,  as  it  seemed  to  me, 
the  Ministry  of  Marine. 

"  In  his  conversation  with  Lvov,  Kerensky  several  times 
returned  to  the  same  question:  according  to  the  accurate 
information  he  had  received,  there  would  not  be  a  Bolshe- 
vik outbreak  on  August  27th;  what  then  were  the  reason 
and  motive  that  made  General  Kornilov  say  it  was  impera- 
tive for  Kerensky  and  Savinkov  to  go  to  Staff  Headquar- 
ters? But  to  this  question  Lvov  made  no  answer.  In  his 
conversation  Lvov  mentioned  that  he  had  not  slept  for 
four  nights,  and  that  he  felt  very  tired,  and  he  asked  Ker- 
ensky to  come  to  a  decision  quickly. 

"  I  did  not  know  previously  with  whom  Kerensky,  who 
had  just  returned,  was  going  to  talk,  and  while  witnessing 
the  conversation  between  Kerensky  and  Lvov,  I  was  not 
seen  by  the  latter."  ^ 

After  this  conversation,  which  took  place  about  ten  o'clock 
in  the  evening,  V.  Lvov  was  put  under  arrest.  .  .  .  The 
reckoning  began. 

1  This  was  one  of  the  most  important  testimonies  in  the  Kornilov 
affair,  and  although  almost  the  first,  it  was  not  printed  in  a  single  one 
of  the  hosts  of  newspapers  which  filled  their  columns  with  "truth" 
about  this  matter. 


THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM  141 

§i8 

Now  comes  the  question:  had  I  not  the  right,  after 
all  that  had  happened  on  August  26th  between  five 
and  ten  o'clock  in  the  evening,  to  declare  to  the  popula- 
tion :  — 

"  On  August  26th  General  Kornilov  sent  V.  Lvov,  mem- 
ber of  the  Duma,  with  a  demand  for  the  handing  over 
of  the  whole  civil  and  military  power  of  the  Provisional 
Government,  so  that  he  might  at  his  own  discretion  form 
a  new  Government  to  rule  the  country.  That  Lvov,  mem- 
ber of  the  Duma,  possessed  full  authority  to  make  this 
proposition  was  afterwards  confirmed  by  General  Korni- 
lov in  his  conversation  with  me  on  the  direct  line.'* 

Or  was  the  "  telegram  of  the  Prime  Minister  in  the 
whole  of  the  first  part  a  lie"  as  Kornilov  dared  to  declare 
to  -the  Russian  people  ?  Or,  lastly,  was  the  whole  thing 
a  "mutual  misunderstanding,"  to  quote  the  timorous  ex- 
pression of  Kornilov's  cautious  partisans? 

Kornilov  himself  does  not  deny  that  he  sent  V.  Lvov, 
member  of  the  Duma,  to  tell  me  something,  and  conversing 
on  August  27th  about  fivt.  o'clock  on  the  direct  line  with 
Savinkov,  Kornilov,  among  other  things,  said :  "  Yester- 
day evening,  when  I  was  talking  with  the  Premier  on  the 
telegraph,  I  confirmed  to  him  what  I  had  asked  Lvov  to 
communicate  to  him,  and  I  was  quite  satisfied  that  the 
Premier,  convinced  of  the  serious  condition  of  the  coun- 
try and  willing  to  work  in  full  agreement  with  me,  had 
decided  to  leave  for  Staff  Headquarters  today,  to  come 
to  some  definite  decision  here." 

It  is  true  that,  giving  later  his  evidence  before  the  Com- 
mission of  Inquiry,  General  Kornilov  stated  that  he  "  had 


143  THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM 

only  confirmed  his  request  to  Kerensky  to  come  to  Staff 
Headquarters."  But  it  is  enough  to  glance  at  the  text  of 
the  communication  on  the  tape  to  see  that,  before  confirm- 
ing the  necessity  of  my  going  to  Mohilev,  General  Korni- 
lov  (point  i)  had  already  answered  in  the  categorical  affir- 
mative the  general  question  whether  I  was  to  act  on  Lvov's 
statement. 

Besides  that,  the  whole  character  of  the  second  question 
and  General  Kornilov's  answer  to  it,  in  relation  to  his  fur- 
ther words  **  everything  Lvov  said  applies  in  equal  degree  to 
B.  V.  Savinkov,"  undoubtedly  showed  that  Kornilov  under- 
stood quite  well  why  "  A.  F.  is  hesitating  to  give  his  full 
confidence,"  understood  what  was  meant  by,  not  only  to 
"  start,"  but  "  to  do  that "  today  was  impossible,  etc. 

In  one  word,  all  the  text  on  the  tape  left  no  doubt  what- 
ever that  General  Kornilov  did  not  dare  to  tell  the  Com- 
mission of  Inquiry  the  truth,  and  if  General  Kornilov  only 
confirmed  his  invitation  to  me  to  come  to  Staff  Headquar- 
ters, why  was  it  that  "  after  this  conversation,*'  Prince 
Trubetzkoy  tells  us,  "  a  sigh  of  relief  came  from  Korni- 
lov's  breast,  and  on  my  question :  *  Then  the  Provisional 
Government  will  meet  you  in  everything?'  he  said: 
*Yes.'*'^     Why? 

So  it  was  not  a  'lie "  when  I  declared  that  General 
Kornilov  had  sent  Lvov  to  me  with  something. 

Also  it  was  not  a  "  lie  "  w'hen  I  declared  that  this  some- 
thing was  the  "  demand  "  for  my  transference  of  the*  full 
power  of  the  Provisional  Government  to  General  Kornilov, 
and  that  Lvov  came  to  me  on  this  mission.  **  Events  de- 
mand quite  definite  decision  in  the  shortest  possible  time," 
said  Kornilov  on  the  direct  line.  jMoreover,  next  day, 
in  conversation  with  Savinkov  on  the  same  subject,  Kor- 

^The  italics  everywhere  are  mine. 


THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM  143 

nilov  said :  "  After  your  departure  ^  I  received  two  alarm- 
ing communications  about  the  state  of  affairs  at  the  front 
and  at  the  rear"  (and  I  may  add  that  Krimov  was  then 
already  moving  on  Petrograd).  "I  told  Lvov  it  was  my 
profound  conviction  that  the  only  solution  was  to  be  found 
in  the  establishment  of  a  Dictatorship  and  the  proclamation 
of  martial  law  throughout  the  country.  I  asked  V.  Lvov 
to  tell  Kerensky  and  you  that  I  considered  it  absolutely 
imperative  that  you  and  Kerensky  should  take  a  share 
in  the  Government.  I  asked  him  to  convey  my  insistent 
appeal  that  you  should  come  to  Staff  Headquarters  to 
take  some  definite  decision,  and  I  added  to  that,  that  in 
view  of  the  accurate  information  in  my  possession  con- 
cerning a  Bolshevik  rising  in  Petrograd,  I  considered  the 
position  extremely  serious,  and  in  particular  I  believed  that 
your  and  Kerensky' s  presence  in  Petrograd  was  very  dan- 
gerous for  both  of  you,  and  for  that  reason  I  offered  you 
to  come  to  Headquarters,  guaranteeing  by  my  word  of 
honour  your  absolute  safety."  Is  it  not  more  than  obvious 
that  Lvov's  rendering  entirely  coincides  with  the  actual 
thoughts  of  General  Kornilov?  Whilst  the  "apprehen- 
sion "  of  Lvov  for  my  life  so  strangely  coincides  wdth  the 
promises  of  "  safety "  of  the  General.  Why,  however, 
should  the  Commander-in-Chief  have  to  pledge  his  "  word 
of  honour  "  that  the  Prime  Minister,  the  Supreme  Chief 
of  the  State,  will  remain  alive  if  he  comes  to  the  Com- 
mander-in-Chief's Headquarters  at  his  own  invitation? 

That  which  had  taken  place  at  Headquarters  after  the 
conversation  carried  on  by  means  of  the  Hughes  tape  ma- 
chine and  "the  sigh  of  relief '*  confirms  once  more  that 
Lvov  was  not  indulging  in  any  fancy  of  his  imagination 

1  Between  Savinkov's  departure  from  the  G.H.Q.  and  .Lvov's  visit 
to  Kornilov  five  or  six  hours  passed. 


144.  THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM 

when  he  made  his  demands  to  me,  to  be  immediately  ful- 
filled ("within  the  shortest  possible  time,"  according  to 
General  Kornilov*s  Hughes'  communication). 

"  The  Commander-in-Chief  "  (so  Prince  Trubetzkoy  con- 
tinues his  narration),  "assuming  that  he  had  come  to  a 
complete  understanding  in  principle  with  the  Prime  Min- 
ister, gave  orders  confirming  orders  previously  given  by  him 
for  the  dispatch  to  Petrograd  of  the  necessary  troops.  At 
the  same  time  he  sent  telegrams  to  certain  prominent  po- 
litical men  inviting  them  to  come  to  his  Headquarters  to 
discuss  the  situation  that  had  arisen,  with  a  view  to  induce 
them,  together  with  some  members  of  the  Provisional  Gov- 
ernment (Kerensky  and  Savinkov),  to  form  a  new  Cab- 
inet, which,  in  General  Kornilov's  opinion,  was  to  have 
carried  out  a  strictly  democratic  program,  consolidating 
the  people's  liberty  and  having  for  its  main  feature  the 
solution  of  the  agrarian  question."  I  have  to  add  that 
already,  about  a  fortnight  previous  to  August  26th,  a  cer- 
tain professor  arrived  from  Moscow  at  Headquarters  for 
"  conversations "  upon  the  agrarian  question,  and  by 
August  26th  a  full  agrarian  law  or  manifesto  was  already 
drafted. 

It  appears  therefore  that  at  the  time  of  the  Moscow  Con- 
ference General  Kornilov  was  already  taking  an  interest 
not  only  in  discussions  of  financial  and  international  ques- 
tions and  had  conversations  not  only  with  railway  men. 

The  picture  therefore  is  perfectly  clear.  On  August  2Sth 
there  would  have  been  assembled  in  Headquarters,  with 
the  Commander-in-Chief,  "  the  elders  of  the  nation  "  and 
the  Prime  Minister,  with  the  War  Minister,  who  have 
''agreed"  to  hand  over  the  power  to  General  Kornilov, 
whilst  at  Petrograd  there  would  have  been  the  troops  of 
Krimov,   the  *' beheaded"  Provisional   Government,   the 


THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM  145 

"Bolshevik  majority"  of  the  Soviets  exercising  pressure 
on  that  Government  J  and  .  .  . 

The  Provisional  Government  would  thus  "  loyally  "  have 
ceased  to  exist. 

General  Alexeiev,  perfectly  well  informed  of  the  inten- 
tions of  the  conspirators,  asserts  in  the  same  confidential 
letter  to  Miliukov  that  Kornilov's  movement  '*  was  directed 
solely  against  the  persons  who  one  after  the  other  joined 
the  Ministry  and  quickly  left  it,"  that  is  to  say,  against  the 
Provisional  Government  of  that  time,  and  acknowledges 
that  it  was  precisely  for  that  purpose  that  the  srd  Cavalry 
Corps  was  moving  on  Petrograd. 

To  what  extent  by  the  eve  of  August  26th  everything  had 
been  prepared  and  arranged  at  Headquarters  is  borne  out 
by  the  following  characteristic  conversation  of  Kornilov 
with  the  same  Prince  Trubetzkoy :  "  To  my  question  why 
Kornilov  insists  on  the  participation  of  Kerensky  and  Savin- 
kov  in  the  Cabinet  (consequently  there  were  some  who  did 
not  insist!)  I  received  the  reply:  *  The  new  Government 
will  be  compelled  by  the  force  of  circumstances  to  take 
some  very  stringent  measures,  and  I  desire  that  these  meas- 
ures should  not  be  more  stringent  than  are  required.  More- 
over, democracy  should  see  and  know  that  it  is  not  being 
deprived  of  its  favourite  leaders  and  most  precious  con- 
quests/ "  This  statement  of  motives  does  not  err  on  the 
side  of  bash  fulness,  and  is  quite  sufficiently  frank. 

I  think  that  no  one  who  knows  and  has  thought  over 
the  Kornilov  affair  can  deny  that  the  intentions  of  the 
Kornilov  group  towards  the  Provisional  Government  as 
such  were  perfectly  definite;  that  the  Provisional  Govern- 
ment was  to  yield  to  the  will  of  the  Dictator ;  that  no  kind 
of  "  misunderstanding "  as  regards  the  Provisional  Gov- 
ernment as  a  whole  existed  at   Headquarters;   that  on 


14^6  THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM 

August  28th  the  fatal  question  would  have  been  settled  as 
to  the  purpose  for  which  Headquarters  troops  were  being 
moved  on  Petrograd;  that  Lvov  indeed  caused,  whether 
wishing  it  or  not,  the  mine  that  had  been  prepared  for  the 
Provisional  Government  to  explode  two  days  before  the 
appointed  time. 

§19 

The  participators  in  the  rebellion  themselves  did  not  deny, 
and  do  not  deny,  their  intentions  towards  the  Provisional 
Government ;  they  did  not  deny  it  even  when  they  declared 
the  words  of  the  Prime  Minister  to  be  "  an  absolute  lie.'* 
It  is  necessary  to  read  very  carefully  the  first  lines  of 
the  appeal  or  manifesto  of  the  Commander-in-Chief  to  the 
"  people  of  Russia  "  in  order  to  understand  their  true  mean- 
ing and  to  appreciate  the  skill  of  the  author  of  the  appeal 
—  Zavoiko.  Here  are  these  lines:  "Telegram  No.  4163 
I  of  the  Prime  Minister  is  absolute  lie  in  the  whole  of  its 
}  first  part;  it  was  not  I  who  sent  the  member  of  the  Duma, 
'  V.  Lvov,  to  the  Provisional  Government,  but  Lvov  came 
to  me  as  an  envoy  of  the  Prime  Minister,  as  Aladin,  an- 
other member  of  the  Duma,  can  witness.  And  so  a  great 
act  of  provocation  was  committed,  which  placed  at  stake 
the  fate  of  the  country."  How  can  the  direct  meaning  of 
these  lines  be  understood  on  comparing  them  with  my  tele- 
gram No.  4163?  There  the  Prime  Minister  states  (i) 
"Lvov  came  to  me  on  behalf  of  General  Kornilov.  (2) 
He  called  upon  the  Provisional  Government  to  hand  over 
the  power  to  Kornilov.  (3)  Kornilov  confirmed  that  he 
had  given  Lvov  the  necessary  authorization."  "  All  that 
is  an  absolute  lie,"  replies  the  Kornilov  manifesto,  whence 
the  simple-minded  reader  will  conclude  (i)  that  Lvov  did 
not  come  at  all  to  Kerensky;  (2)  that  he  did  not  communi- 


THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM  147 

cate  any  demands  to  the  Provisional  Government;  (3)  that 
accordingly  Kornilov  was  not  in  a  position  to  confirm  that 
Lvov  was  acting  with  due  authority.  More  than  that,  the 
simple-minded  reader  will  infer  that  not  only  did  nothing 
of  the  kind  take  place,  but  that  it  was  all  the  other  way 
about:  Lvov  was  Kerensky's  envoy  who  came  to  Kornilov. 
That  undoubtedly  is  the  direct  meaning  of  that  part  of 
Kornilov's  appeal  or  statement  which  was  communicated 
in  the  night  of  August  27th-28th  on  all  railway  lines  to 
"  all  persons  in  authority  "  and  to  the  *'  railway  commit- 
tees." These  are  words  which  clearly  reveal  the  distinct 
intention,  that,  to  put  it  vulgarly,  all  those  should  be  "  taken 
in  "  by  surprise  in  whose  chest,  in  the  words  of  the  same 
statement,  "  a  Russian  heart  is  beating,  and  who  believe 
in  God  and  in  the  temples.''  The  people  had  to  be  taken 
in  and  to  respond  before  they  would  have  had  time  to  un- 
derstand and  to  learn  the  truth. 

But  this  bold  demogogic  text  adapted  for  circulation  in 
the  masses  has  a  different,  real  meaning,  which  can  be 
understood  only  by  a  very  thoughtful  or  well  informed 
reader :  Yes,  I  did  make  demands  on  the  Provisional  Gov- 
ernment, I  don't  deny  it,  but  I  made  those  demands  with 
the  knowledge  of  the  Prime  Minister.  It  was  he  who  first 
sent  Lvov  to  me  for  negotiations;  it  was  Kerensky  who 
was  "  provoking  "  me.     That  is  the  real  meaning. 

It  was  then  that  the  carnival  of  lies  was  started.  Kerensky 
was  insincere  and  betrayed  Kornilov  —  that  is  the  calumny 
of  the  Right.  Kerensky  is  a  "  Kornilovite,"  a  counter- 
revolutionary, he  meant  to  betray  democracy;  that  was  the 
shameful  lie,  one  regrets  to  say,  not  of  the  Bolshevik  dema- 
gogues alone.  "  Kerensky's  participation  is  beyond  every 
doubt " ;  thus  General  Alexeiev,  as  if  summing  up  the  vari- 
ous legends.     Even  if  that  had  been  so,  nevertheless  that 


148  THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM 

in  which  I  participated  would  remain  a  crime;  there  would 
only  have  been  one  criminal  more.  But  what  evidence  is 
there  of  my  participation?  There  is  the  circumstantial 
evidence  —  the  calling  out  of  the  3rd  Cavalry  Corps  (which 
already  has  been  referred  to)  in  connection  with  certain 
actions  and  statements  of  Savinkov,  the  behaviour  at  Head- 
quarters of  Filonenko  (to  him  I  will  refer  later),  and  finally 
the  mission  of  Lvov. 

It  seems  to  me  that  the  above  sufficiently  demonstrates 
the  absurdity  of  this  last  proof  of  the  clumsy  invention  of 
the  conspirators.  In  their  hurry  they  overlooked  even 
this  simplest  consideration.  Supposing,  indeed,  that 
through  Savinkov  and  Filonenko  I  was  in  agreement  with 
Kornilov,  why  should  I  at  the  last  moment  "  introduce  into 
the  business  "  an  outsider  who,  moreover,  since  he  ceased 
to  be  a  member  of  the  Provisional  Government,  was  no 
friend  of  mine? 

How,  then,  stood  matters  in  reality,  and  how  did  it  come 
about  that  on  the  evening  of  August  26th  V.  N.  Lvov 
was  in  my  room  ?  This  is  how  it  happened :  V.  N.  Lvov, 
having  come  to  take  part  at  the  Moscow  Conference,  met 
at  the  National  Hotel  (the  Moscow  headquarters  of  Zavoiko 
and  Aladin)  an  old  friend,  a  certain  Dobrynski,  a  member 
of  the  Executive  Committee  of  the  Union  of  Knights  of 
St.  George,  a  fellow-officer  of  Krimov,  and  at  that  time  a 
frequent  visitor  at  Headquarters.  Dobrynski  introduced 
Lvov  to  Aladin,  and  they  both  to  some  extent  initiated 
Lvov  into  their  plans.  At  that  time  (immediately  after 
the  Moscow  Conference),  feverish  preparations  went  on, 
and  a  man  was  urgently  required  for  a  special  task :  to  con- 
trive to  see  me  otherwise  than  through  the  usual  channels 
of  our  communications  with  Headquarters  (through  Savin- 
kov or  Baranovsky).     Aladin  knew  by  his  own  experience 


THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM  149 

that  men  of  his  kind  have  no  chance  of  being  admitted  to 
me  personally.  An  attempt  of  the  same  Aladin  to  obtain 
an  interview  with  me  through  an  intermediary  fell  through : 
Prince  G.  E.  Lvov,  to  whom  Aladin  applied  a  short  time 
before  V.  N.  Lvov's  arrival,  asking  the  Prince  to  obtain 
my  consent  to  see  him  (Aladin)  on  a  matter  of  exceptional 
importance,  refused  Aladin's  request.  When  leaving  Prince 
Lvov,  Aladin  nevertheless  took  the  precaution  to  mention 
that  for  so  many  (I  do  not  remember  how  many)  days 
he  would  wait  for  a  decision  at  the  National  Hotel,  and  in 
the  course  of  his  conversation  with  Prince  Lvov,  Aladin  em- 
phasized the  fact  that  he  came  from  Headquarters.  Aladin 
did  not,  however,  receive  any  message,  and  thereupon 
V.  N.  Lvov  was  sent,  who  as  a  member  of  the  Duma  and 
former  member  of  the  Provisional  Government  had  natu- 
rally a  right  to  be  received  by  me. 

The  following  particulars  are  relevant  and  very  inter- 
esting. Between  August  i6th  and  21st  Aladin  had  been 
to  Prince  Lvov.  On  August  1 7th  Dobrynski  returned  from 
Mohilev  with  the  news  that  "  Headquarters  have  decided  to 
insist  on  reforms  "  and  told  it  to  V.  N.  Lvov.  On  August 
2 1  St,  Dobrynski,  as  Aladin  put  it,  "  introduces "  Lvov 
to  Aladin,  and  Lvov  there  and  then  informs  Aladin  that 
he  will  go  to  Petrograd  to  Kerensky  and  as  his  '*  personal 
friend  "  will  insist  on  the  necessity  of  forming  a  Ministry 
that  will  enjoy  general  confidence.  On  August  21st  Lvov 
leaves  Moscow  to  see  me;  on  August  23rd  he  returns  to 
Moscow.  At  the  same  National  Hotel,  in  Dobrynski's  pres- 
ence, Lvov  informs  Aladin  that  Kerensky  has  agreed  to 
enter  into  negotiations  with  Headquarters.  It  is  true  that 
Lvov's  statement  before  his  departure  for  Petrograd  to  see 
me  (as  the  same  Aladin  had  put  it)  hardly  agrees  with 
what  he  said  about  Headquarters  after  he  saw  me.     But 


160     THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM 

that  does  not  make  any  difference  to  Mr.  Aladin.  On 
the  same  day,  August  23rd,  Lvov  and  Dobrynski  both 
hurry  back  to  Headquarters  with  a  letter  from  Aladin  to 
Zavoiko. 

On  August  24th  Aladin  goes  to  Headquarters.  On  the 
evening  of  that  day  General  Kornilov  receives  Lvov.  They 
speak  at  first  without  anybody  else  being  present,  but  after- 
wards, in  the  presence  of  "  the  orderly  officer,  Zavoiko,  I 
(General  Kornilov)  confirmed  to  Lvov  the  essential  points 
of  my  statements."  After  his  interview  with  Kornilov, 
Lvov  spends  most  of  the  night  with  Zavoiko,  Aladin,  Radio- 
nov  (if  I  remember  rightly,  the  author  of  "Our  Crime") 
and  Company. 

On  August  26th  Lvov  hurries  to  Petrograd,  and  almost 
straight  from  the  train  goes  to  my  waiting-room.  A  tele- 
gram from  Headquarters  follows,  addressed  "  Winter  Pal- 
ace, Kerensky  for  Lvov.  On  your  return,  find  and  bring 
Rodzianko. —  Dobrynski."  Alas !  that  wire  arrived  when 
Lvov  was  already  under  arrest. 

Thus  since  August  21st  (the  day  when  he  was  "intro- 
duced" to  Aladin)  Lvov  did  not  spare  himself  and  had  no 
rest.  It  was  not  without  reason  that  in  speaking  to  me 
he  complained  that  he  had  not  slept  for  four  nights.  Was 
he  not  peculiar,  my  "envoy"?  He  made  journeys  not 
going  from  me,  but  coming  to  me  —  once  from  Moscow, 
sent  by  Aladin  and  Dobrynski,  another  time  from  Mohilev, 
where  he  was  spending  his  time  in  the  company  of  Kornilov, 
Zavoiko,  and  again  with  Dobrynski  and  Aladin. 

After  that,  who  could  testify  better  than  Aladin  to  all  those 
"  who  believe  in  God  and  the  temples  "  that  Lvov  was 
"  my  envoy  "  and  that  everything  else  is  "  complete  lie  "? 

I  have  taken  the  trouble  to  give  the  details  of  Lvov's 
movements  during  the  relevant  days,  together  with  some 


THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM  151 

explanatory  extracts  by  the  persons  themselves  concerned, 
so  that  the  clumsy  efforts  of  the  conspirators  to  prevent  the 
truth  coming  out  should  be  perfectly  clear  to  every  reader. 
What  was  Lvov's  position  in  that  crowd,  and  to  what 
extent  he  was  initiated  into  their  plans,  I  have  not  yet  suc- 
ceeded in  ascertaining.  It  seems,  however,  fairly  certain 
that  he  was  not  one  of  the  chief  conspirators,  but  was 
one  of  the  men  whom  the  principals  used  for  such  services 
as  they  were  supposed  to  be  fit  for. 

The  statement  of  the  outside  observer,  Prince  Trubetz- 
koy,  well  illustrates  my  surmise.  "  When  I  heard  that  V. 
Lvov  had  visited  Kornilov,  I  asked  one  of  the  aides-de- 
camp :  *  Is  Kornilov  aware  that  Lvov  is  not  a  very  bright 
intellect?  '  The  aide-de-camp  smiled  and  said,  'Everybody 
knows  that,  but  General  Kornilov  said  that  anyhow  he  is 
capable  of  delivering  a  message  given  to  him,  and  more- 
over, until  quite  recently  he  was  a  member  of  Kerensky's 
Cabinet.*  "  *'  He  is  capable  of  delivering  a  message  given 
to  him  " —  that  is  the  Worth  of  Lvov  as  weighed  at  Head- 
quarters. He  was  treated  accordingly.  First  he  was  sent 
to  me  with  demands,  and  when  the  game  failed,  an  offer 
"  from  me  to  Kornilov  "  was  put  into  his  (Lvov's)  mouth 
— "  that  Kornilov  should  accept  the  dictatorship  which 
should  be  proclaimed  by  the  present  Provisional  Govern- 
ment'' (General  Kornilov's  words  to  Savinkov  on  August 
27th,  communicated  by  the  Hughes  apparatus).  Here  we 
see  once  more  a  complete  agreement  of  Lvov's  version  with 
what  General  Kornilov  actually  did  say:  on  the  26th  of 
August  in  the  evening  Lvov  was  insisting  to  me  on  the 
importance  of  the  "  lawful  '*  transfer  of  power.  And  what 
is  of  especial  importance,  these  words  of  Kornilov  through 
the  Hughes  apparatus  completely  bear  out  the  fundamental 
point  2  of  Lvov's  written  ultimatum. 


152  THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM 

V.  Lvov  himself,  after  a  series  of  his  muddled  semi- 
truthful  or  not  entirely  mendacious  statements,  although 
he  affirmed  in  his  last  deposition  (which  was  entirely  di- 
rected against  myself)  that  I  gave  him  a  commission,  ad- 
mitted, however,  that  it  was  not  to  make  any  offers  or  pro- 
posals on  my  behalf,  but  to  find  out  the  desires  of  others 
—  the  desires  of  certain  political  groups,  including  that  of 
Headquarters. 

It  must  be  said  that  later,  when  giving  evidence  before 
the  Commission  of  Inquiry,  General  Kornilov,  who  knew 
by  that  time  that  a  third  person  heard  my  apparently  private 
conversation  with  Lvov,  has  transformed  Lvov  from  a 
"  proposer "  into  an  *'  inquirer,"  and  takes  the  initiative 
as  to  the  dictatorship  upon  himself. 

"  V.  Lvov  told  me  on  behalf  of  Kerensky  that  if  in  my 
opinion  Kerensky's  continuation  in  office  deprives  the  Gov- 
ernment of  the  necessary  strength  and  firmness,  Kerensky 
is  prepared  to  leave  the  Provisional  Government.  If  Ker- 
ensky can  count  on  support  he  is  willing  to  remain.  To 
that,  I,  having  stated  briefly  the  general  position  of  affairs 
in  the  country  and  in  the  army,  declared  that  the  only  way 
of  helping  the  grave  state  of  affairs,  as  I  am  profoundly 
convinced,  is  a  dictatorship  and  the  immediate  proclamation 
of  martial  law  throughout  Russia.''  (Compare  point  i  of 
Kornilov's  reply  through  the  Hughes  apparatus  on  August 
26th).  "  I  stated  that  personally  I  am  not  after  power  and 
am  prepared  to  obey  immediately  the  man  who  will  be 
made  dictator.  Lvov  stated  that  such  a  decision  is  not  im- 
possible; that,  in  view  of  the  difficult  general  situation  of 
the  country,  the  Provisional  Government,  as  at  present  con- 
stituted, will  of  itself  come  to  the  decision  of  the  necessity 
for  the  appointment  of  a  dictator,  and  it  is  quite  possible 


/ 


THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM  153 

that  I  will  be  chosen  to  accept  that  appointment."     What  a 
change,  thank  God ! 

The  story  of  my  sending  an  envoy  to  Headquarters  with 
a  most  humble  request,  **  come  and  lord  over  us,"  is  simply 
a  desperate  attempt  of  men  who  have  lost  their  heads  after 
having  been  caught  red-handed,  and  now  try  to  hide  behind 
other  people's  backs  and  to  obliterate  all  their  own  traces 
—  and  who  are  not  very  particular  as  to  their  methods. 
Unfortunately,  this  was  not  by  any  means  the  only  attempt 
of  the  kind.  On  the  same  day  when  the  proclamation  was 
sent  out  containing  the  absolute  lie  about  the  "  great  provo- 
cation," General  Lukomsky  sent  me  a  telegram  (No.  6406) 
in  which  he  wrote,  inter  alia,  that  General  Kornilov  had 
taken  his  "  final  decision  "  after  the  "  arrival  of  Savinkov 
,  and  Lvov,  who  made  General  Kornilov  a  proposal  on  your 

(behalf  to  the  same  effect  .  .  .  and  in  accordance  with  your 
proposal,  has  given  final  orders  which  it  is  now  too  late 
^  to   countermand."     Having  read   the  telegram,    Savinkov 
\  :  immediately   handed   me   a    statement   in   writing.     That 
^1  statement  was  immediately   handed   by  me  to  the   Pro- 
f  visional    Government,    from    whom    it    was    sent    to    the 
Chairman  of  the  Commission  of  Inquiry,  for  which  reason 
I    can   only   quote    it    from    memory.     "  Having   become 
acquainted  with  the  reference  to  myself  contained  in  the 
telegram  of  General  Lukomsky,  No.  6406,  dated  August 
27th,  I  state  that  it  is  a  libel.     No  political  statements  what- 
soever were  made  or  could  have  been  made  by  me  on  your 
behalf  to  General  Kornilov. — (Signed)  Savinkov,  August 
I  27,  191 7."     Savinkov  was  indignant  over  that  libel,  and 
expressed  his  anger  by  the  direct  wire  to  General  Kornilov, 
repeating  that  the  words  of  General  Lukomsky  concerning 
/   him,  Savinkov,  were  a  libel.     To  which  immediately  the 
only  possible  reply  was  made  —  that  Lukomsky's  telegram 


154     THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM 

referred  only  to  what  Savinkov  had  said  in  the  presence 
of  General  Lukomsky,  General  Romanovsky  and  Colonel 
Baranovsky  on  sending  troops  at  the  disposal  of  the  Pro- 
visional Government  and  the  proclamation  of  martial  law. 

This  time  the  attempt  failed  at  once.  It  is  to  be  re- 
gretted that  the  conversation  with  Lvov  took  place  either 
without  the  presence  of  anybody  else  or  in  the  presence  of 
such  a  "  witness  "  as  Zavoiko.  It  is  accordingly  extraor- 
dinarily difficult  to  establish  the  truth  here.  Nor  was  it 
by  accident  or  chance  that  General  Lukomsky  mentioned 
Lvov  and  Savinkov  together.  They  both  saw  me  on  August 
22nd  at  Petrograd.  Both  left  the  capital  the  same  evening 
—  Lvov  for  Moscow  and  Savinkov  for  Mohilev ;  they  were 
both  at  Mohilev  on  August  24th  —  Savinkov  was  leaving 
and  Lvov  had  just  arrived.  It  may  be  asked  —  why  should 
I  have  chosen  for  a  "  conspiracy  "  the  roundabout  way  via 
Moscow-Lvov  and  ignored  the  more  direct  and  convenient 
means  of  communication  —  Savinkov,  who,  moreover,  could 
have  much  more  easily  and  without  being  observed  by  any 
outsiders  or  third  parties  have  had  a  strictly  private 
tete-a-tete  conversation  with  Kornilov.] 

§  20 

Chairman. —  On  August  26th,  when  Lvov  appeared  here, 
did  he  first  report  himself  through  somebody,  or  did  he 
suddenly  appear?  Further,  did  any  information  reach  you 
that  day  as  to  Lvov  spreading  some  extraordinary  rumours 
over  the  city? 

Kerensky. —  To  my  regret  I  learnt  of  this  only  later, 
after  Lvov  had  already  left  me.  Before  Lvov  came  I 
had  with  me  the  Supreme  Commissary  of  Turkestan  with 
a  most  important  report.     As  soon  as  he  left  me,  Lvov 


THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM  155 

came  in.  .  .  .  Who  told  me?  .  .  .  One  of  my  men  told 
me  that  Lvov  was  seen  in  a  fairly  excited  state.  .  .  .  Oh, 
yes,  another  man,  who  had  spoken  to  Lvov  just  prior  to 
my  seeing  him,  afterwards  told  me  that,  not  only  in  the 
street  but  even  here  at  the  Winter  Palace,  Lvov  was  speak- 
ing in  very  strong  terms.  I  do  not  recollect  who  it  was  who 
told  me. 

Chairman. —  Then,  Lvov's  report.  How  did  he  intro- 
duce it?  What  motive  did  he  disclose?  Did  he  connect 
it  with  any  previous  visit  to  you,  or  did  he  speak  as  if  it 
were  an  entirely  new,  different  matter? 

Kerensky. —  That's  it.  He  was  quite  a  different  man. 
All  the  past  had  been  wiped  out,  as  it  were. 

Chairman. —  So  this  occasion  was  entirely  unconnected 
with  what  preceded  it  .  .  . 

Kerensky. —  Yes.  I  have  already  stated  that  I  met  him 
with  the  words,  "  Here  you  are  again  with  your  affair,*' 
and  he  replied,  "  No,  circumstances  have  changed,"  or  some- 
thing to  that  effect.  This  time  there  was  only  one  topic 
of  conversation.  I  must  hand  over  my  office  and  quit. 
There  was  no  mention  of  any  "  introduction  of  new  blood  " 
into  the  Provisional  Government  or  of  any  "  extension  "  of 
its  basis.  ...  I  remain  firmly  convinced,  and  I  expressed 
this  conviction  at  the  time,  that  this  was  perhaps  the  only 
evening  when  Lvov  was  sincere,  and  being  aware  of  what 
was  to  come,  was  genuinely  desirous  of  saving  me  from 
something.  Whether  his  conscience  raised  its  voice,  or 
whether  he  became  frightened,  makes  no  difference.  I 
was  particularly  confirmed  in  that  conviction  by  our  conver- 
sation in  the  motor-car  (on  the  way  from  the  direct  wire 
station  to  the  Winter  Palace),  when,  in  V.  V.  Virubov's 
presence,  I  purposely  told  V.  N.  Lvov  that  "  I  have  changed 
my  mind  and  will  go  to  Headquarters."     I  said  that  to  test 


166  THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM 

him.  Thereupon  he  became  greatly  excited,  and  with  his 
hand  on  his  heart  implored  me :  *'  May  God  prevent  you 
from  doing  that.  For  God's  sake  don't  go  to  Headquar- 
ters; you'd  be  lost  there." 

[When  on  August  30th,  being  under  arrest,  Lvov  learnt 
of  the  complete  failure  of  the  Kornilov  attempt,  he  sent  me 
a  note:  "  I  congratulate  you  from  the  bottom  of  my  heart. 
I  am  glad  that  I  saved  you  out  of  Kornilov's  hands.  Yours, 
V.  Lvov,  joth  of  August/'  I  handed  that  note  too  to 
the  Chairman  of  the  Commission  of  Inquiry  and  am  writ- 
ing from  memory,  but  I  am  quite  certain  of  its  general 
tenor.] 

Chairman. —  Did  he  tell  you  any  details,  why  and  how 
—  or  did  he  merely  put  an  ultimatum  before  you? 

Kerensky. —  An  ultimatum.  He  said,  "  I  am  instructed 
by  General  Kornilov." 

Chairman. —  Did  he  tell  you  in  detail,  did  he  have  some 
information? 

Kerensky. —  No,  he  only  stated  the  points.  He  obviously 
knew  them  very  well  indeed,  for  he  stated  them  correctly 
both  verbally  and  in  writing:  the  proclamation  of  martial 
law,  the  handing  over  of  the  power  and  the  resignation, 
and  point  4  (for  myself  and  Savinkov  only):  immediate 
departure  for  Headquarters.  That  is  why  I  wished  to  fix 
point  4,  which  did  not  appear  on  paper,  by  the  Hughes  tape 
machine.  From  my  point  of  view,  the  almost  decisive 
words  of  our  conversation  by  the  Hughes  tape  machine  were 
in  my  question:  "Is  Savinkov  wanted?"  Lvov  told  me 
that  Kornilov  insisted  equally  on  the  immediate  arrival  both 
of  myself  and  of  Savinkov.  That  is  why  I  put  the  ques- 
tion whether  the  suggestion  as  to  the  immediate  journey 
to  Headquarters  concerned  myself  only  or  both  myself  and 
Savinkov.     A  categoric  confirmation  — "  Savinkov  also  " 


THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM  157 

—  and  then  the  statement  that  only  the  "  sense  of  respon- 
sibility "  compelled  him  "  so  insistently  to  demand,"  made 
it  perfectly  clear  to  me  that  Lvov  was  au  c  our  ant  of  the 
whole  affair. 

Chairman. —  Did  Virubov  see  that  note? 

Kerensky. —  I  handed  it  to  him  and  said :     "  Read." 

Chairman. —  What  impression  did  it  make  on  Virubov  ? 

Kerensky. —  He  said,  "What  is  to  be  done?"  I  told 
him  what  steps  I  was  taking.  Later  in  the  evening  Lvov 
was  arrested. 

Chairman. —  So  Lvov  was  not  there  at  the  time  ? 

Kerensky. —  Lvov  went  out,  Virubov  came  in.  I  had 
asked  Virubov  to  be  in  good  time  for  eight  o'clock  p.  M. 
at  the  direct  wire  in  the  house  of  the  War  Minister.  After- 
wards Balavinsky  and  Kosmin,  the  Deputy  Commander 
of  the  Petrograd  Military  District,  were  asked  to  attend. 
In  a  word,  I  made  all  the  preparation  necessary  duly  to 
estabHsh  "  the  fact." 

Raupakh. —  So  Lvov  set  out  those  points  not  as  an 
opinion  of  Kornilov,  not  as  an  advice,  but  as  a  demand, 
an  ultimatum? 

Kerensky. —  There  was  no  question  of  any  opinions;  it 
was  a  demand,  an  ultimatum.  A  further  point  of  the  com- 
munication over  the  Hughes  tape  to  which  I  attached  the 
greatest  importance  was  the  reply  to  my  question  whether 
our  arrival  was  desirable  only  in  case  the  Bolsheviks  moved. 
When  I  was  speaking  to  Lvov  I  was  trying  to  find  out 
whether  the  journey  was  thought  desirable  only  in  case  of 
danger  from  the  Bolsheviks  or  in  any  case.  I  wished  to 
find  out  whether  they  really  apprehended  the  Bolsheviks, 
or  if  that  was  merely  a  pretext.  I  put  the  question  to  Lvov 
several  times :  "  Is  all  that  required  if  the  Bolsheviks 
really  will  act,  or  am  I  to  go  in  any  case,  Bolsheviks  or  no 


158     THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM 

Bolsheviks?  "  The  reply  was,  "  Just  the  same."  I  put  the 
same  question  to  Kornilov.  I  do  not  remember  how  it  was 
on  the  tape. 

Raupakh. — "  Is  it  necessary  for  me  to  come  .  .  .'' 

Kerensky. — "  Only  in  the  event  of  the  Bolshevik  action 
or  in  any  event?'*  Reply:  "In  any  event."  Thus  the 
two  men  Kornilov  and  Lvov,  hundreds  of  miles  away  from 
one  another  and  not  being  aware  what  the  other  was  saying, 
gave  the  same  replies  to  the  same  questions.  And  then  a 
third  time,  when  I  and  Lvov  were  returning  from  the  direct 
wire,  I  put  the  same  question  in  Balavinsky's  presence. 

Chairman. —  To  Lvov? 

Kerensky. — Yes.  Whether  I  was  to  leave  in  any  event 
or  only  in  case  the  Bolsheviks  acted.  I  myself  knew  for 
certain  that  on  August  27th  there  would  not  be  any  move 
by  the  Bolsheviks. 

Chairman. —  So  that  you  decided  to  have  Lvov  arrested 
after  your  conversation  with  Kornilov  and  in  connection 
with  that  imminent  journey? 

Kerensky. —  No,  it  was  in  connection  with  my  growing 
conviction  that  this  man  was  a  party  to  something  or  knew 
something,  and  that  he  was  speaking  the  truth.  He  several 
times,  especially  during  the  first  conversation  with  me,  used 
the  plural  "  we.'* 

Chairman. —  To  whom  then,  and  in  what  order  of  se- 
quence, did  you  tell  of  that  episode  with  Lvov  and  of  your 
conversation  with  Kornilov? 

Krokhmal. —  I  wish  to  ask  how  that  document  was  ob- 
tained. 

Kerensky. — Oh,  it  was  obtained  perfectly  simply.  I  have 
already  referred  to  it  at  the  first  interrogation.  Lvov  had 
stated  it  all  verbally  and  demanded  of  me  categorical  com- 
pliance.    I  finally  told  him :     "  You  understand  yourself, 


THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM  159 

Vladimir  Nikolayevitch,  that  if  I  go  before  the  Provisional 
Government  and  make  that  sort  of  statement,  still  no  one 
will  believe  me,  but  will  think  I  am  mad,  or  they  will  first 
send  to  find  out  and  verify  whether  Kornilov  did  make  such 
a  proposal  to  me,  and  I  shall  find  myself  in  the  position  of 
a  fool.  What  right  have  I  to  place  such  proposals  before 
the  Provisional  Government?  I  know  you  and  trust  you, 
but  I  cannot  speak  without  evidence/*  "  No,  I  will  guaran- 
tee it."  "  If  you  will  guarantee  it,  please  write  it  down." 
"  With  pleasure,  because,  as  you  know,  I  never  say  any- 
thing that  is  not  true."     So  he  wrote  it  down. 

Raupakh. —  Was  this  before  the  conversation  over  the 
tape? 

Kerensky. —  It  was.  I  showed  these  points  to  Virubov, 
and  thereupon  I  left,  to  communicate  with  Kornilov  over 
the  direct  wire. 

Raupakh. — Lvov  was  not  with  you? 

Kerensky. —  He  w^as  late,  but  he  came.  As  we  were 
going  down  the  staircase  he  was  coming  up.  It  was  because 
of  that  that  I  afterwards  read  to  him  the  whole  conver- 
sation on  the  tape,  so  that  he  should  confirm  it. 

Raupakh. —  Was  the  conversation  carried  on  in  your  own 
name,  or  in  Lvov's  name? 

Kerensky. —  He  told  me  that  perhaps  he  would  be  a  little 
late,  but  as  Kornilov  had  already  been  some  twenty  minutes 
at  the  telegraphic  apparatus,  I  did  not  wish  to  wait  any 
longer  and  put  the  questions  as  coming  from  us  both. 

Raupakh. —  Why  did  you  consider  it  necessary  to  speak 
in  the  names  of  both?  What  cause  was  there  for  this? 
Was  it  more  convenient  to  carry  on  the  conversation  with 
Kornilov  that  way? 

Kerensky. —  Because  Lvov  came  to  me  on  behalf  of  Kor- 
nilov*    He  said  that  he  was  acting  under  the  instructions 


160     THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM 

of  Kornilov.  So  it  was  arranged  that  we  should  carry 
on  the  conversation  jointly.  As  we  were  going  down  and 
Lvov  came  up,  he  asked  me,  "  Well,  Alexander  Feodoro- 
vitch,  have  I  proved  a  true  friend?  I  have  not  deceived 
you.'*     I  said,  "  You  have  not." 

Raupakh. —  That  was  after  the  conversation  (with  Kor- 
nilov) ? 

Kerensky. —  Yes.     And  after  that  we  came  together  here. 

Raupakh. —  Here,  in  Balavinsky's  presence  .  .  . 

Kerensky. —  Here,  in  Balavinsky's  presence,  Lvov  re- 
peated all  the  essential  points  of  our  conversation  during 
the  day.  And  above  all  I  attached  importance  not  so  much 
to  particular  words  of  Lvov,  as  to  the  fact  that  I  should 
be  able  to  have  some  one  else  to  witness  the  excited  state  of 
Lvov  and  to  confirm  that  he  considered  all  that  business 
exceptionally  important. 

Kojokolov. —  And  did  Lvov  know  that  Balavinsky  was 
there  ? 

Kerensky. —  He  did  not. 

[Only  now  when  I  can  pass  in  review  the  whole  of  the 
campaign  which  is  carried  on  against  me  by  both  the  extreme 
wings  who  are  making  capital  out  of  the  Kornilov  affair, 
only  now  do  I  appreciate  the  great  importance  of  the  fact 
that  on  the  26th,  in  the  whirl  of  events,  I  was  able  to  see 
the  necessity  of  making  some  sort  of  safeguard  for  myself. 
I  can  imagine  what  would  have  happened  if  my  conversation 
with  Lvov,  which  he  thought  was  quite  *'  private,"  had  not 
been  heard  by  a  livimg  though  involuntary  witness,  a  well- 
known  public  man.] 


CHAPTER  III 

§  21 

Chairman. —  To  whom  and  in  what  order  of  sequence  did 
you  communicate  Lvov^s  proposal  and  the  conversation  with 
Kornilov  over  the  tape ;  and  after  you  had  read  the  tape  and 
the  note,  were  any  objections  made  by  any  of  your  col- 
leagues ? 

Kerensky. —  It  was  like  this.  We  returned  from  the  ap- 
paratus. The  second  conversation  with  Lvov  took  place. 
Then  I  ordered  his  arrest.  By  that  time  we  were  joined, 
as  far  as  I  remember,  by  Nekrassov,  Virubov,  Balavinsky; 
I  am  not  sure  whether  Terestchenko  was  there  or  not. 
There  were  a  fair  number  of  seats  occupied  at  the  table, 
but  I  am  not  quite  sure  who  was  there.  Savinkov  came 
later. 

Chairman. —  No  one  of  those  gentlemen,  having  taken 
cognizance  of  the  tape,  had  any  objections  to  make  to  you 
on  the  subject? 

Kerensky. —  I  recollect  that  Savinkov  suggested  an  imme- 
diate conversation  with  Kornilov  over  the  direct  wire. 

[I  also  remember  very  well  that  I  refused  that  request  of 
Savinkov.  I  refused  it  because  Savinkov  was  of  opinion 
that  it  was  the  duty  of  the  Provisional  Government  to  use 
every  means  for  a  peaceful  settlement  of  the  "  conflict," 
which  should  remain  unknown.  I  myself  was  of  opinion 
that  it  was  not  a  **  conflict  "  between  two  equal  parties,  but  a 
crime;  it  ought  emphatically  to  be  settled  by  peaceful  means; 
not,^  however,  by  negotiations  with  the  guilty  General,  but 
by  the  will  of  the  Provisional  Government,  to  which  the 

161 


162  THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM 

Commander-in-Chief,  who  had  failed  in  his  trust,  should 
submit  immediately.  From  the  moment  when  my  con- 
versation with  Kornilov  satisfied  me  as  to  his  plan,  nobody 
and  nothing  could  make  me  abandon  this  point  of  view. 

The  idea  that  Lvov  "  made  a  mess  of  it "  and  that  the 
whole  thing  was  a  "  misunderstanding "  became  popular 
only  the  next  day  —  August  27th.     Savinkov  himself  was 
saying  to  Filonenko  over  the  direct  wire  on  the  morning  of 
the  27th:  "  I  regret  to  say  that  you  are  not  well  informed: 
General  Kornilov  confirmed  the  statements  of  his  envoy  in 
speaking  to  A.  F.  by  the  Hughes  apparatus.     The  decision 
has  now  been  taken."     And  in  the  evening  of  the  26th 
Savinkov  suggested  sending  a  telegram  to  the  front  to  send 
a  certain  unit  which  he  knew  as  being  "  reliable  "  to  march 
on    Headquarters.     The   information   that   arrived    from 
Headquarters  in  the  night  of  August  26th-2yth.  could  only 
increase  our  anxiety.     About  one  o'clock  in  the  morning 
Filonenko  made  the  following  fairly  obscure  communica- 
tion over  the  Hughes  apparatus  in  his  "  code  "  language : 
that  the  heights  (Kornilov)  were  changing  hands;  that  gal- 
lant generals  were  going  to  attack ;  that  a  dance  was  to  take 
place  between  the  Herculean  Pillars  (Kerensky  and  Kor- 
nilov) ;  that  some  great  men  were  expected  to  meet  at  Head- 
quarters, and  so  on ;  the  one  definite  conclusion  that  could  be 
made    from    those    communications    was   that    something 
extraordinary  was  going  on  at  Headquarters.     What  was 
going  on  can  be  now  put  thus :  Pending  the  result  of  Lvov's 
mission,  Kornilov  was  discussing  in  his  study  the  final  de- 
cision  as   to   the    form  of   the    dictatorship.     Two   main 
schemes  were  examined;  in  one  Kornilov  was  to  be  sole 
dictator,  with  the  Council  of  Ministers  subordinate  to  him ; 
in  the  other  a  "  Council  of  National  Defence  "  was  to  be 
created,  with  Kornilov  at  the  head,  whilst  the  Council  of 


THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM  163 

Ministers  were  to  take  their  instructions  from  that  "  Coun- 
cil of  National  Defence."  The  second  scheme  was  ap- 
proved, and  the  One  Man  Dictatorship  was  rejected.  By 
whom  ?  By  Messrs.  Zavoiko,  Aladin,  and  Filonenko.  The 
honour  of  bringing  about  the  rejection  of  the  One  Man 
Dictatorship  was  claimed  by  Filonenko ! 

Having  settled,  with  those  highly  qualified  advisers,  the 
form  of  the  Government,  Kornilov  in  the  same  company 
makes  a  list  of  his  Cabinet,  discusses  details  of  the  pro- 
gram, etc.  Finally,  having  received  the  communication  of 
my  "  consent "  to  surrender  the  Provisional  Government 
without  a  struggle,  Kornilov  with  a  sigh  of  relief  hastily 
sends  telegrams  to  some  favourites  —  Miliukov,  Rodzianko, 
Maklakov,  and  so  on  —  to  come  immediately  to  Headquar- 
ters in  view  of  the  perilous  state  of  affairs.  That  was  the 
kind  of  "  misunderstanding  "  that  was  going  on  at  Head- 
quarters. 

Nevertheless,  next  day,  August  27th,  after  Savinkov^s 
conversation  with  Kornilov  about  6  p.  m.,  the  version  is 
being  spread  in  Petrograd  that  Lvov  simply  "  made  a  mess 
of  it,"  that  a  "  misunderstanding "  arose.  That  version 
finds  many  energetic  supporters.  The  same  Savinkov,  in- 
sisting on  Filonenko's  leaving  Headquarters,  was  telling  him 
in  the  morning :  "  Believe  me  that  I  am  better  informed  than 
you  are,  and  that  you  have  been  unaware  of  many  things, 
just  as  I  was  when  I  was  last  time  at  Headquarters."  But 
after  his  conversation  with  Kornilov,  Savinkov  proceeds 
about  8  p.  M.  to  the  Winter  Palace  and  insists  on  the  neces- 
sity "  of  attempting  to  clear  up  the  misunderstanding  and 
of  entering  into  negotiations  with  General  Kornilov."  This 
in  spite  of  the  fact  that,  in  the  course  of  that  conversation, 
Kornilov  not  only  stated  that  he  refused  to  give  up  the 
command,  but  acknowledged  that  he  had  sent  Lvov  to  make 


164  THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM 

a  statement  as  to  the  dictatorship.  He  only  explained  that 
that  statement  was  a  reply  to  my  proposal.  What,  then, 
was  the  misunderstanding  that  made  negotiations  desirable  ? 
The  Commander-in-Chief  of  all  the  active  armies  in  the  field, 
who  informs  the  Government  of  an  immediate  proclama- 
tion of  his  dictatorship,  cannot  be  left  at  the  head  of  the 
armies  by  any  Government  for  one  minute,  whilst  a  general 
who,  in  these  circumstances,  refuses  to  hand  over  his  com- 
mand is  clearly  committing  the  weightiest  of  crimes  against 
the  State.  The  only  "  misunderstanding,"  if  Kornilov  were 
to  be  believed,  that  in  the  circumstances  could  have  happened, 
would  be  either  that  I  really  made  such  a  proposal  to  him 
and  afterwards  repudiated  it  or  that  some  one  had  caused 
General  Kornilov  to  form  a  mistaken  idea  of  my  proposal. 
To  those  now  who  literally  accepted  Kornilov's  words  and 
accordingly  considered  me  an  accomplice,  I  say  that  any 
negotiations  should  have  been  conducted  not  with  myself, 
but  with  the  Provisional  Government,  who  should  have  been 
asked  to  order  my  arrest. 

Those  who  supposed  that  a  bona  fide  error  was  made  by 
General  Kornilov  could  have  held  to  that  supposition  until 
the  moment  when  it  was  made  clear  to  Kornilov  that  Lvov 
did  not  have  and  could  not  have  any  instructions  from  me 
for  General  Kornilov. 

In  any  case,  if  until  August  27th  it  was  possible  to  be- 
lieve that  General  Kornilov  was  making  a  bona  fide  mistake, 
it  was  impossible  to  deny  that  his  action  was  criminal. 
Consequently  any  negotiations  of  the  Provisional  Govern- 
ment with  a  man  acting  criminally  were  out  of  the  question. 
It  could  be  submitted  that  there  was  reason  to  treat  him 
mildly  on  the  ground  that  his  error  was  a  mitigating  cir- 
cumstance. This  was  the  sole  reason  for  which  I  could  see 
my  way  to  listen  at  all  to  Savinkov  and  others  in  favour  of 


THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM  165 

negotiating  on  August  27th,  for  I  took  it  that  they  were 
assuming  a  bona  fide  error  of  Kornilov.  I  suggested  that 
they  should  themselves  **  negotiate  "  with  General  Kornilov, 
that  is  to  say,  I  asked  them  to  use  all  their  influence  with 
him  to  induce  him  to  submit  to  the  Provisional  Government 
before  it  was  too  late,  before  his  action  had  led  to  serious 
consequences  for  himself  personally  and  above  all  for  the 
State.  But  it  was  impossible  for  me  to  allow  any  pourparlers 
between  Kornilov  and  the  Provisional  Government.  I  could 
not  allow  even  any  delay  in  the  taking  of  the  necessary 
measures  against  General  Kornilov.  In  my  opinion,  imme- 
diate and  resolute  action  alone  could  prevent  further  de- 
velopment and  save  Russia  from  further  bloodshed. 

Obviously,  those  who  genuinely  believed  the  assumption 
that  the  whole  trouble  was  caused  by  Lvov  misleading  Kor- 
nilov could  be  in  favour  of  pourparlers  only  up  to  the  morn- 
ing of  August  28th,  that  is  to  say,  up  to  the  day  when  Kor- 
nilov's  proclamation  was  published  concerning  the  **  great 
provocation  *'  and  "  Lvov's  mission."  From  that  moment 
any  possibility  of  doubt  had  ceased :  the  malicious  intention 
was  evident.  It  should  have  been  obvious  for  them  that  any 
possibility  of  pourparlers  had  disappeared.  When  Savin- 
kov,  towards  the  morning  of  August  28th,  learnt  not  onTy" 
that  Kornilov  had  refused  to  hand  over  his  command,  but 
that  he  had  detained  Filonenko  and  sent  the  "  Savage  Di- 
vision "  in  the  van  of  the  cavalry  corps  and  had  appointed 
Krimov  commander  of  the  corps  —  that  is  to  say,  that  Kor- 
nilov had  broken  his  promise  —  even  Savinkov  understood 
that  "  in  the  circumstances  "  it  was  no  longer  possible  to 
enter  into  pourparlers  with  General  Kornilov.  Next  day 
(August  29th),  Savinkov,  as  Military  Governor  of  Petro- 
grad,  issued  an  appeal  to  the  inhabitants  of  the  capital  which 
began  as  foll-^ws :  **  In  the  perilous  hour  when  the  enemy 


166     THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM 

has  broken  through  our  front  and  when  Riga  has  fallen, 
General  Kornilov  has  attempted  to  discredit  the  Provisional 
Government  and  the  Revolution  and  has  joined  the  ranks  of 
their  enemies."] 

Kcrensky. —  In  the  night,  when  I  read  to  the  Provisional 
Government  both  documents  (the  tape  of  the  conversation 
with  Kornilov  and  Lvov's  "  points  ")  one  after  the  other,  no 
objections  were  raised  at  all,  as  far  as  I  can  remember. 

Chairman. —  So  that  thereupon  the  meeting  was  called  for 
the  night  of  August  26th.-2yth,  when   .    .    . 

Kerensky. —  The  meeting  of  the  Provisional  Government 
had  already  previously  been  appointed  to  take  place  that 
night.  At  the  meeting  I  reported  all  the  circumstances  very 
fully  —  Lvov's  visit  and  all  subsequent  events.  Then  I 
made  a  proposal.  .  .  .  My  proposal  amounted  to  order- 
ing General  Kornilov  to  hand  over  his  command,  and  noth- 
ing more. 

§22 

Chairman. —  Was  it  not  suggested  by  you  to  the  other 
Ministers  or  by  the  Ministers  to  you  that,  in  view  of  the 
circumstances,  in  view  of  the  revolt  which  was  evident,  you 
should  be  given  special  powers  —  unlimited  powers  to  fight 
the  counter-revolution  ? 

Kerensky. —  Yes.  I  do  not  remember  the  exact  wording. 
I  do  not  think  that  I  put  it  quite  that  way,  but  I  pointed 
out  that  it  was  necessary  that  I  should  have  a  certain  free- 
dom of  action.     I  was  of  opinion  that  this  was  indispensable. 

Chairman. —  Therefore  the  Provisional  Government  was 
dealing  already  on  the  night  of  August  26th-2yth.  with  the 
question  of  the  rebellion  of  which  we  are  speaking  now? 

Kerensky. —  I  do  not  remember  whether  the  word  "  re- 
bellion "  had  been  mentioned.    We  spoke  generally  of  the 


THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM  167 

extremely  serious  situation,  of  the  obvious  act  of  insubor- 
dination by  Kornilov,  of  the  attempt  to  overthrow  the  Pro- 
visional Government. 

I  forgot  to  say  why  "  they ''  wished  me  to  go  to  Head- 
quarters. Lvov  said  several  times  that  they  thought  it  of 
the  utmost  importance  that  a  lawful  transfer  of  power 
should  take  place,  that  there  should  be  no  seizure  of 
power,  but  that  there  should  be  a  formal  decision  by 
the  Provisional  Government  to  transfer  it.  "They" 
seemed  to  lay  particular  emphasis  on  that.  Lvov  at  least 
three  times  resumed  that  point,  and  insisted  that  they  con- 
sidered it  of  the  utmost  importance  that  the  Provisional 
Government  should  decide  the  transfer  of  power,  so  that 
everything  should  be  done  in  a  perfectly  legal  form. 

Raupakh. —  Tell  us,  please,  was  not  the  surrender  of 
their  portfolios  by  the  Ministers  at  that  night  sitting  occa- 
sioned by  an  endeavour  to  leave  you  wider  powers  for  com- 
bating the  rebellion? 

Kerensky. —  Yes.  The  position  was  so  complicated! 
The  mutual  relations  within  the  Provisional  Government  had 
already  been  rather  difficult,  while  now,  under  the  newly 
created  circumstances,  the  necessary  steps  could  hardly  be 
taken  rapidly.  The  Government  lacked  cohesion  and 
solidarity.  The  "  polarity  "  between  Kokoshkin  and  Tcher- 
nov  was  found  to  be  particularly  embarrassing.  They  were 
elements  that  could  hardly  act  jointly,  or  even  stay  together, 
at  such  a  moment. 

[The  powers  obtained  by  me  from  the  Provisional  Gov- 
ernment on  the  eve  of  August  27th  for  the  suppression  of 
General  Kornilov*s  rebellion  were  thus  formulated  in  my 
Message  to  the  population,  issued  on  the  same  date,  August 
27th :  "  The  Provisional  Government  has  found  it  neces- 
sary, for  saving  the  country  and  the  Republican  order,  to 


168     THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM 

empower  me  to  take  prompt  and  resolute  measures  for  nip- 
ping in  the  bud  any  attempts  to  encroach  upon  the  supreme 
authority  in  the  State  and  upon  the  rights  conquered  by  the 
Revolution  for  its  citizens.  I  am  taking  all  the  measures 
required  for  the  preservation  of  order  and  liberty  in  the 
country."  This  text  confirms  that  on  the  night  preceding 
August  27th  I  did  not  receive  "  entire  plenitude  of  author- 
ity," but  only  defined  powers  for  the  solution  of  a  definite 
problem,  viz.  the  quickest  and  least  painful  "  liquidation  " 
of  the  Kornilov  move.  If  then,  after  the  almost 
instantaneous  quelling  of  the  rebellion,  there  came  a 
"  quinquevirate  "  period  (the  so-called  Directorate),  such  a 
form  of  government  accorded  least  with  my  own  desires, 
whereas  such  a  concentration  of  power  as  took  place  on 
August  27th  seems  to  me  to  have  been  a  clear  necessity. 
While  entering  upon  a  struggle  with  a  conspiracy  directed 
by  the  will  of  a  single  person,  the  State  must  oppose  that 
will  by  a  power  capable  of  prompt  and  decisive  acts.  No 
collegiate  body  can  act  as  such  a  power,  least  of  all  one  that 
is  composed  of  a  coalition. 

The  blow  struck  by  Kornilov  was  aimed  at  the  very  junc- 
tion of  the  coalition  forces  that  governed  the  country,  the 
Provisional  Government,  and  could  not  but  strengthen  the 
centrifugal  forces  within  the  same.  The  Provisional  Gov- 
ernment was  living  through  a  crisis  like  the  one  it  had 
experienced  between  the  3rd  and  the  5th  of  July;  the  only 
difference  was  in  the  parts  played  by  the  political  wings  (the 
Right  and  the  Left) —  parts  which  were  now  the  reverse  of 
what  they  had  been  before.  The  struggle  with  Kornilov 
had  to  be  carried  on  in  the  name  and  with  the  participation 
of  the  whole  people,  and  the  Government  had  to  act  only 
as  the  people's  common  authority,  without  inclining  to- 
wards the  Right  wing  for  an  agreement  with  the  rebels,  or 


THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM  169 

towards  the  Left  wing  for  combating  whole  groups  and 
classes  of  the  population  under  the  pretence  of  suppressing 
the  counter-revolution.  As  far  as  we  can  judge  ourselves, 
the  Provisional  Government  has  fulfilled  this  task  of  a  con- 
centration of  authority.  At  any  rate,  it  did  not  shed  a  single 
drop  of  blood;  and  it  did  not  permit  a  single  superfluous 
victim  to  be  made,  nor  has  it  deviated  a  single  step  from  its 
sworn  promise  to  govern  in  the  name  of  the  general  in- 
terests of  the  whole  State. 

That  is  precisely  my  reply  to  the  rhetorical  question  put  to 
me  on  September  5th  at  the  Democratic  Conference  by  J.  G. 
Tseretelli :  "  When,  at  the  moment  of  Kornilov's  rush,  in 
order  to  have  a  free  hand  against  Kornilov,  who  was  march- 
ing upon  revolutionary  Petrograd  with  a  dictatorship,  the 
head  of  the  Government  felt  it  necessary  (but  only  on  that 
particular  occasion)  to  confront  Kornilov  with  the  revolu- 
tionary power  of  a  single  person,  was  he  right  or  was  he 
wrong?"  To  which  Tseretelli  himself  immediately  an- 
swers that,  in  his  opinion,  "he  was  wrong/'  He  thinks 
that,  "  as  a  matter  of  fact,  only  the  union  of  the  entire 
democracy  at  that  moment,  the  indissoluble  union  of  the 
Government  and  of  all  its  representatives  with  the  democ- 
racy, could  and  actually  did  save  the  Revolution." 

If  they  did  save  it,  what  was  wrong  then?  Why  then 
did  Tseretelli  not  only  say  of  me  that  "  at  this  time  of  his 
administration  he  committed  blunders,"  but  also  think  fit  to 
declare:  "Let  democracy  blame  itself  if  at  that  height  its 
representative's  head  shall  turn."  (Cheers.)  In  what  way 
was  the  turning  of  my  head  made  manifest?  Was  it  in  my 
declining  to  throw  myself,  between  the  27th  and  the  30th 
of  August,  into  the  arms  of  the  elements  and  to  proclaim, 
with  the  support  of  the  Soviets,  a  campaign  against  the 
whole  of  the  Russia  that  exists  outside  the  Soviets,  thus 


170     THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM 

affirming  my  fulness  of  power  by  the  horrors  of  civil  war? 
Or  was  it  in  that,  while  remaining  the  representative  of  the 
whole  democracy,  of  the  whole  of  Russia  that  w^as  free  and 
devoted  to  freedom,  I  did  not,  in  the  night  preceding  Aug- 
ust 28th,  appear  before  the  Central  Executive  Committee 
of  the  Councils  of  Workmen's  and  Soldiers'  Deputies  in  or- 
der to  "  unite  myself  indissolubly  '*  only  with  one  portion 
of  the  democracy,  though  a  very  influential  one?  Was  it 
not  clear  to  every  one  that,  if  my  head  had  really  turned,  I 
could  have  restored  tyranny  in  Russia  two  months  earlier 
(than  it  actually  came),  at  this  very  Central  Executive  Com- 
mittee on  the  night  preceding  August  28th,  under  the  cover 
of  the  watchword :  "  All  the  power  to  the  Soviets  "  ?  Or 
was,  perhaps,  the  turning  of  my  head  shown  in  the  fact  that, 
on  the  very  next  day  after  the  bloodless  conclusion  of  the 
Kornilov  rebellion,  I  insisted  in  reinstating  the  work  of  the 
Provisional  Government  as  a  whole,  and  was  only  prevented 
from  carrying  my  wish  into  effect  by  impediments  from  out- 
side, which  compelled  me  to  behold  for  three  weeks,  with 
set  teeth,  how^  the  State  was  being  ruined  and  the  Revolu- 
tion was  perishing,  merely  because  the  victory  of  the  whole 
of  Russia,  that  had  been  of  one  mind,  was  entirely  and  ex- 
clusively attributed  to  the  Council  of  Workmen's  and  Sol- 
diers* Deputies,  who  (the  imaginary  victors!)  were  pre- 
paring all  the  time  to  dictate  their  terms  to  Russia  and  to 
the  Government !  No,  the  wine  of  victory  did  not  go  to  my 
head;  although,  if  you  like,  my  head  was  really  turning, 
but  only  from  my  consciousness  that,  in  spite  of  all  tempta- 
tions, I  remained  sober  to  the  last,  though  once  more 
solitary.  I  had  been  solitary  at  the  very  outset  of  the  re- 
bellion, when,  because  of  the  conduct  of  Miliukov  and  the 
newspaper  Retch  the  Left  started  to  hunt  down  the  whole 
party  of  the  Constitutional  Democrats,  and  the  "  Izvestia  " 


THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM  ITl 

of  the  Central  Executive  Committee  demanded  the  elimina- 
tion of  the  representatives  of  that  party  from  the  Govern- 
ment. Then  I  was  the  only  one  who  said  what  J.  G.  Tsere- 
telli  vainly  urged  later  at  the  Democratic  Conference:  "  One 
must  not  approach  political  currents  with  a  Penal  Code 
criterion,"  and,  "  When  they  tell  you  that  you  must  deter- 
mine the  degree  of  participation  of  individual  persons  or 
organizations,  and  that  that  participation  obliges  you  to 
sweep  away  from  political  work  an  entire  political  party 
containing  heterogeneous  elements,  then  the  problem  has 
not,  politically  speaking,  been  stated  properly."] 

Raupakh. —  From  the  moment,  then,  when  the  portfolios 
were  handed  over  to  you,  you  considered  that  the  plenitude 
of  power  belonged  to  you  ? 

Kerensky. —  No,  I  did  not  consider  it  so,  and  that  is  why 
I  declined  to  accept  the  resignations.  The  problem  merely 
consisted  in  creating  such  conditions  as  would  render  it  pos- 
sible to  act  promptly  and  resolutely,  and  to  effect,  in  case  of 
need,  a  re-grouping  within  the  Provisional  Government. 
This  led  to  the  relations  with  some  of  the  Cadets  among  the 
Ministers  becoming  somewhat  strained,  as  a  certain  differ- 
ence in  our  and  their  respective  attitudes  towards  events 
manifested  itself.  The  majority  of  the  Ministers  continued 
to  exercise  their  functions,  and  actually  contributed  in  every 
way  towards  ending  the  rebellion.  Only  a  very  small  group 
of  Ministers,  not  more  than  two,  raised  the  question  of  resig- 
nation quite  formally,  and  abstained  decidedly  from  every 
contact  with  the  Provisional  Government.  They  laid  stress 
on  their  being  no  longer  Ministers.  I  impressed  upon  them 
there  and  then  that  this  meant  that  they  had  resigned  them- 
selves, since  I  had  not  accepted  the  resignation  of  the  mem- 
bers of  the  Provisional  Government. 

[Tchernov  then  also  retired  immediately  from  the  Pro- 


172     THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM 

visional  Government,  but  was  energetic  in  repressing  the 
rebellion;  he  made  a  tour  of  all  the  positions  round  Petro- 
grad,  and  issued  his  appeal  by  the  Rural  Minister  which 
became  famous  for  a  time.  At  present,  when  in  Russia, 
or  rather  in  Muscovy,  the  "  knights  of  denunciation  and 
execution  "  are  raging  as  of  old,  I  consider  it  a  duty  to  em- 
phasize the  fact  that  the  behaviour  of  those  two  Cadet 
Ministers  w^as  by  no  means  typical.  The  other  Constitu- 
tional Democratic  Ministers  remained  with  the  majority 
of  the  Provisional  Government.  Still  less  could  conclusions 
be  drawn  from  the  conduct  of  those  two  members  of  the 
Government  as  to  the  mood  of  the  whole  Cadet  Party  at  the 
time.  One  ought  to  look  at  the  facts,  and  remember  what 
had  happened  from  the  3rd  to  the  5th  of  July.  Then  it  was 
the  same  thing,  only  vice  versa.  The  attempted  rebellion, 
then,  too,  originated  with  elements  hostile  to  the  coalition, 
only  then  they  were  the  Left  elements.  Then  too,  it  was 
necessary  to  take  prompt  and  resolute  measures,  while  there 
were  also  hesitations,  but  on  the  opposite  wing  of  the  Pro- 
visional Government.  Those  hesitations  lasted  until  the 
peals  of  thunder  from  before  Kalustch  and  Tarnopol 
reached  Petrograd.  Now,  as  then,  nobody  approved  the 
"  way  of  acting  " :  on  both  occasions  there  was  complete 
soHdarity  on  that  question  between  the  two  wings  of  the  Pro- 
visional Government.  On  both  occasions  the  question  was 
only  as  to  the  manner  of  combating  the  rebels,  whether 
resolutely,  or  by  seeking  a  way  to  reconciliation.  Just  as 
on  the  3rd-5th  of  July,  to  people  who  were  utter  strangers 
to  Social-Maximalist  mentality,  mere  hesitation  on  the  ques- 
tion as  to  the  necessity  of  resolute  measures  seemed  to  be  a 
crime,  so  after  the  26th-30th  August  all  those  were  classed 
among  "  traitors  to  the  Revolution  "  who  offended  in  the 
same  way,  i.e.  by  too  closely  approximating  to  the  sentiment 


THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM  173 

of  the  Kornilovites,  or  by  too  intimate  an  understanding  of 
the  motives  of  their  activity.  Both  these  parties  in  turn 
failed  to  "  see  the  wood  for  the  trees  ";  through  their  per- 
sonal sentiment  they  overlooked  the  State  and  that  terrible 
danger  which  lurked  equally  in  Bolshevism  and  Kornilovism. 
On  both  occasions  the  position  of  the  members  of  the  Pro- 
visional Government  who  understood  too  well  the  motives 
of  the  criminal  moves  was  all  the  more  difficult  because, 
within  their  own  parties,  now  the  Left,  now  the  Right, 
Maximalism  already  found  an  active  echo.  Let  us  remem- 
ber Kamkov  or  Martov,  in  the  days  of  the  3rd-5th  July, 
and  Miliukov  or  Struve,  in  the  days  of  the  Kornilov 
movement. 

Lack  of  sharpness  to  its  edges  constituted  both  the  strength 
and  the  weakness  of  the  Coalitional  Government;  it  consti- 
tuted strength  so  long  as  State-consciousness  prevailed  over 
class  and  group  interests,  but  became  a  weakness  when  that 
consciousness  was  extinguished. 

To  return  to  the  Cadet  Ministers  who  were  in  the  Pro- 
visional Government  before,  during,  and  after  Kornilovism, 
I  feel  bound  to  testify  to  the  intentional  maliciousness  of 
accusing  such  clean  men  as  Kartashev,  Oldenburg,  Kishkin 
and  others  of  any  intrigues  and  conspiracies  against  democ- 
racy. If  these  Radicals  by  conviction  represented  the  Rus- 
sian bourgeoisie  as  members  of  the  Cadet  Party,  it  was  that 
wise  portion  of  the  same  which,  according  to  the  words  of 
Tseretelli  himself,  "  had  understood  that  at  this  moment  the 
Kornilov  adventure  did  not  mean  the  affirmation  of  the 
principles  put  forward  by  Kornilov,  but  the  complete  de- 
struction of  the  country,''  The  Cadet  Party  also  perceived 
the  error  of  some  of  its  members :  after  August  2yth-2gth.f 
Miliukov  soon  left  for  a  "  rest "  in  the  Crimea,  while  I,  as 
Prime  Minister,  up  to  the  very  opening  of  the  Provisional 


17*  THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM 

Council  of  the  Republic,  in  my  negotiations  with  the  Cadet 
Party,  had  to  deal  chiefly  with  that  very  sagacious,  far-see- 
ing, and  real  statesman,  V.  D.  Nabokov.] 

Raupakh. —  I  am  putting  this  question  as  to  your  powers 
because  the  dismissal  of  the  Supreme  Commander-in-Chief 
would  only  be  possible  by  an  order  of  the  Government. 

Kerensky. —  This  was  done  before  the  resignation  of  the 
Ministers. 

Raupakh. —  There  was  then  a  ukase,  a  decision  of  the 
Government  as  to  the  discharge  of  Kornilov? 

Kerensky. —  That  was  resolved  immediately. 

Chairman, —  And  does  it  exist  in  writing? 

Kerensky. —  I  don't  know  whether  it  exists  in  writing,  as 
the  sitting  was  a  rather  stormy  one. 

Raupakh. —  The  dismissal,  then,  was  not  your  personal 
act,  but  a  decision  of  the  Government? 

Kerensky. —  Certainly.  Only  I  can't  say  whether  the 
decision  was  put  into  writing  there  and  then.  At  the  sit- 
tings are  present  the  Chief  Clerk  of  the  Provisional  Govern- 
ment and  the  Bureau  officials,  who  afterwards  enter  all  the 
resolutions  in  the  journal.  I  only  remember  that  my  motion 
was  to  the  effect  that  it  was  necessary  immediately  to  request 
Kornilov  to  resign  his  post.     Such  was  my  declaration. 

Raupakh. —  Do  you  recollect  how  the  telegram  was 
drafted?  In  your  own  name,  or  in  that  of  the  Provisional 
Government  ? 

Kerensky. — The  telegram  was  composed  in  a  hurry. 

Raupakh. —  Was  it  not  entered  in  the  journal  of  papers 
going  out  ? 

Kerensky. —  It  was  drafted  in  a  very  great  hurry.  One 
must  remember  the  circumstances  of  that  night. 

Raupakh. —  But  it  must  be  in  existence.     It  was  trans- 


THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHE\T[SM  175 

mitted  by  the  direct  line.  It  must  be  here ;  we  couldn't  find 
it  there. 

Kcrensky. —  Where  do  you  mean  by  "  there  '*  ? 

Raupakh. —  At  Headquarters.  It  was  not  to  be  found 
there. 

Kerensky. —  What  do  you  mean  by  "  it  was  not  to  be 
found ''? 

Shablovsky. —  It  proved  to  have  been  lost.  It  was  taken 
by  Kornilov ;  it  was  brought  to  the  Staff ;  it  was  used  as  evi- 
dence, but  it  was  not  to  be  found  there.  We  did  not  get  it 
in  the  original. 

Raupakh. —  The  dismissal  of  Kornilov  was  not,  then,  a 
personal  act  of  your  own,  but  a  decision  of  the  Govern- 
ment ?     This  is  very  important. 

Kerensky. —  It  was  moved  and  adopted  by  the  Provisional 
Government  before  the  resignations  had  been  handed  to 
me.  There  is  no  doubt  whatever  about  that.  I  made  a 
detailed  report,  together  with  the  conclusion  arising  there- 
from. 

[The  Commission  of  Inquiry  went  so  minutely  into  the 
question  of  the  moment  of  General  Kornilov's  dismissal  and 
the  circumstances  in  which  the  telegram  about  it  was  dis- 
patched to  him  because,  in  the  course  of  the  inquiry,  formal 
defects  of  the  telegram  mentioned  at  that  point  of  my  inter- 
rogatory were  advanced  as  one  of  the  serious  motives  of 
Kornilov's  refusal  to  lay  down  the  command.  The  defects 
\^  were  the  following:  (i)  the  absence  of  a  serial  number; 
\  (2)  the  mere  signature  "  Kerensky  "  without  the  addition 
of  my  status;  (3)  the  absence  of  any  reference  to  the  de- 
cision of  the  Provisional  Government.  But  if  General 
Kornilov  had  really  entertained  any  serious  doubt  as  to  the 
authenticity  of  that  telegram,  or  as  to  my  authority  to  send 


176     THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM 

it,  he  could  and  should  first  of  all  have  immediately  ad- 
dressed an  inquiry  for  verification ;  and  secondly,  his  scepti- 
cism would  have  been  somehow  reflected  in  conversation  with 
Savinkov  on  the  Hughes  tape  machine  on  August  27th ;  but, 
of  course,  he  made  no  such  indications  of  uncertainty. 
Among  motives  for  refusing  to  surrender  his  office  set  out 
on  the  Hughes  tape  machine  is  no  mention  of  the  formal 
defects  of  this  telegram.  Only  in  one  of  Kornilov's  deposi- 
tions known  to  me  he  says,  by  the  way :  "  On  the  morning 
of  August  27th,  I  received  a  telegram  signed  '  Kerensky,' 
but  without  any  number,  instructing  me  to  hand  over  my 
post  to  Lukomsky.'*     That  is  all ! 

Filonenko,  if  credence  may  be  given  to  his  deposition  in 
this  case,  establishes  that  it  was  he  who  raised  the  doubt  in 
General  Kornilov's  mind  as  to  the  authenticity  of  the  tele- 
gram, and  that  it  was  he  who  ascertained  the  genuineness  of 
the  same  on  August  27th,  in  his  conversation  with  Savinkov. 
In  other  words,  it  follows  from  Filonenko's  version  that  the 
clearing-up  of  any  doubt  as  to  the  genuineness  of  the  telegram 
did  not  in  the  least  influence  Kornilov's  further  conduct. 
Nor  did  General  Lukomsky  doubt  for  a  moment  the  genuine- 
ness of  my  telegram,  since  without  any  inquiries  he  sent 
me  a  telegram  in  reply  with  a  reasoned  refusal  to  undertake 
the  command  instead  of  General  Komilov. 

I  explained  intentionally  this  insignificant  episode  of  the 
telegram  with  greater  detail  in  order  to  show  with  what  care 
and  attention  the  Commission  of  Inquiry  was  verifying 
every  indication  in  favour  of  General  Kornilov,  and  was 
eager  to  ascertain  the  slightest  fact  that  might  provide  a 
motive  justifying  General  Kornilov's  conduct.  How  very 
different  was  the  activity  of  the  Commission  of  Inquiry, 
formed  by  me  personally,  from  any  attempt  "  to  hide  in  snap 
judgments  in  Court  and  in  graves  the  truth,  the  aims  of  the 


THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM  177 

movement,  and  the  participation  of  members  of  the  Govern- 
ment in  the  affair  " !  But  it  is  exactly  such  a  purpose  that 
General  Alexeiev  attributes  to  the  "  invisible  participators 
(in  the  Kornilov  revolt)  who  came  as  the  masters  of  destiny 
and  the  managers  of  the  inquiry." 

Does  not  the  whole  tenor  of  the  minutes  of  my  examina- 
tion prove  the  real  independence  of  the  Commission  of 
Inquiry,  which  enabled  it  to  investigate  so  closely,  and  some- 
times even  captiously,  the  acts  of  the  "  master  of  destiny  "? 
Alexeiev's  insinuation  only  proves  one  thing:  that  the  so- 
ciety educated  by  the  justice  of  a  Stsheglovitov  only  deserves 
a  tribunal  a  la  Stutchka !  *] 

§23 

Shahlovsky. —  What  happened,  in  chronological  order, 
after  you  sent  off  the  first  telegram ;  what  objections  arose 
in  view  of  the  communication  to  the  population  of  the  Prime 
Minister  of  August  27th  which  was  then  being  worked  out? 

Kerensky. —  I  think  there  arose  a  question  as  to  the  de- 
sirability of  delaying  this  telegram,  and,  I  think,  it  was 
delayed.     But  which  telegram  are  you  speaking  of  ? 

Shahlovsky. —  Of  the  communication  in  your  name  of 
August  27th.  (One  of  the  members  of  the  Commission 
hands  to  Kerensky  the  telegram  in  question.) 

[I  remember  that  the  dispatch  by  wireless  of  this  tele- 
gram which  I  addressed  to  the  population  was  delayed,  but 
not  on  account  of  the  motives  insisted  upon  by  those  persons 
who  proposed  its  delay.  These  persons  were  anxious  to 
put  off  altogether  the  publication  of  the  "  conflict  "  between 
the  Provisional  Government  and  General  Kornilov,  in  order 
not  to  lose  the  possibility  of  finding  a  "  compromise  "  and 

*  Minister  of  Justice  under  the  Bolsheviks. 


178     THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM 

to  settle  the  misunderstanding  by  peaceful  means,  on  the 
basis  of  **  mutual  concessions."  As  I  explained  before,  I 
could  not  agree  to  that,  and  my  agreement  was  the  less  pos- 
sible as  towards  the  evening  of  the  27th,  especially  during 
the  night,  most  of  the  conciliators  insisted  on  a  compromise, 
no  longer  on  the  supposition  of  Kornilov's  bona  fide  mis- 
take (which  by  that  time  was  already  disproved  by  the 
facts),  but  on  the  ground  of  "  sober  calculation  of  the  real 
forces."  By  that  time  General  Kornilov  was  already  a 
fighting  party,  which  had  mobilized  its  forces. 

Among  the  public  at  large  there  is  a  conviction  that  Gen- 
eral Kornilov's  active  move  against  the  Provisional  Govern- 
ment began  after  he  became  acquainted  with  my  appeal  to 
the  population  of  August  28th,  circulated  by  wire,  and  after 
the  telegraphic  prohibition  to  the  railways  from  carrying  out 
any  orders  of  the  "  late  "  Supreme  Commander-in-Chief, 
that  is  to  say  of  Kornilov.  This  conviction  is  quite 
erroneous.  It  is  an  error  which  is  strongly  supported  by 
the  Kornilovites.  Indeed,  Kornilov  himself,  when  he  says 
that  it  w^as  only  on  August  28th  that  "  he  resolved  to  move 
openly  and  to  force  the  Provisional  Government  by  pres- 
sure," is  trying  to  represent  his  move  as  a  consequence  of 
**  my  having  been  declared  by  the  Provisional  Government 
on  August  28th  to  be  a  traitor  to  the  country." 

As  a  matter  of  fact,  my  appeal  did  not  play  any  part  in 
Kornilov's  resolve  to  make  his  move.  This  is  clear 
even  from  the  remark  written  down  by  General  Korni- 
lov on  the  very  date  of  August  28th  with  regard  to 
the  copy  of  my  telegram  addressed  to  General  Klembovsky, 
which  had  been  reported  to  Kornilov.  General  Kornilov 
wrote  on  the  copy  of  that  telegram  as  follows :  "  I  request 
General  Klembovsky  to  let  me  know  immediately  his  de- 
cision, since  on  the  ground  of  his  yesterday's  telegram  [that 


THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM  179 

is  to  say  of  August  27th]  I  have  already  taken  a  definite 
decision,  the  rescinding  of  which  would  be  the  cause  of  great 
convulsions  in  the  army  and  in  the  country."  On  the  same 
day  (August  27th)  Krimov's  echelons  began  to  force  their 
way  by  violence,  so  that  it  proved  necessary  to  remove  the 
rails  in  order  to  keep  them  back.  On  August  27th,  General 
Kornilov's  communications  with  the  fronts  were  concluded, 
and  an  order  was  sent  to  the  Commanders  of  the  rear  dis- 
tricts to  obey  Kornilov  henceforward.  At  least  I  know  one 
such  telegram  that  had  been  sent  to  the  Commander  of  the 
Moscow  Military  District.  General  Denikin  had  already 
sent  on  that  day  to  the  Provisional  Government  his 
laconic  but  clear  telegram  No.  145,  which  began  with  the 
words :  "  I  am  a  soldier  and  cannot  play  at  hide-and-seek'' 
and  as  well  had  undertaken  on  the  spot  a  number  of  un- 
equivocal measures.  In  short,  on  August  27th  the  mobiliza- 
tion of  troops  for  operations  on  a  wide  front  was  proceeding 
most  intensely  at  Headquarters.  So  that  on  the  night  of 
August  27th,  while  the  conciliators  were  besieging  me  in  the 
Winter  Palace,  at  Headquarters  the  irretrievable  decision 
had  already  been  taken  "  to  compel  the  Provisional  Govern- 
ment to  remove  from  its  midst  those  Ministers  who,  accord- 
ing to  my  [Kornilov's]  information,  are  traitors  to  the 
country,  and,  secondly,  to  reorganize  itself  in  such  a  way  as 
to  secure  for  the  country  a  strong  and  firm  authority.  In 
order  to  exercise  pressure  on  the  Provisional  Government,  I 
resolved  to  utilize  General  Krimov's  3rd  Cavalry  Corps,  or- 
dering it  to  continue  its  concentration  towards  Petrograd/' 
This  forms  a  most  valuable  confession  by  Gen^l  Kornilov. 
He  thinks,  however,  that  his  soldier's  word  of  honour 
will  be  believed  by  everybody  and  that  nobody  will  ever 
doubt  that  it  was  only  after  his  being  insulted  by  the  Govern- 
ment that  Kornilov  suddenly  resolved  to  make  an  open 


180 


THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM 


move;  whereas,  in  fact,  the  draft  of  his  famous  Declara- 
tion to  the  People  of  Russia  was  already  prepared  on  August 
27th,  while  my  Appeal  has  perhaps  only  accelerated  its  publi- 
cation with  a  suitable  alteration  at  the  beginning  of  its 
text.i 


1  The  following  is  the  text  of  these  two  documents,  to  which  I  have 
to  refer  so  often. 


A  MESSAGE  TO  THE 
POPULATION 

I  hereby  announce: 

On  August  26th  General  Korni- 
lov  sent  to  me  the  member  of  the 
State  Duma  V.  N.  Lvov  with  a 
demand  for  the  surrender  by  the 
Provisional  Government  of  the 
whole  plenitude  of  Civil  and 
Military  authority,  with  a  view  to 
his  forming,  at  his  personal  dis- 
cretion, a  NEW  GOVERNMENT  for 
administering  the  country.  The 
authenticity  of  Deputy  Lvov's  au- 
thorization to  make  such  a  pro- 
posal to  me  was  subsequently 
confirmed  by  General  Kornilov  in 
his  conversation  with  me  by  direct 
wire.  Perceiving  in  the  presenta- 
tion of  such  demands,  addressed 
to  the  Provisional  Government  in 
my  person,  a  desire  of  some  cir- 
cles of  Russian  society  to  take 
advantage  of  the  grave  condition 
of  the  State  for  the  purpose  of 
establishing  in  the  country  a  state 
of  authority  in  contradiction  to 
the  conquests  of  the  Revolution, 
the  Provisional  Government  has 
found  it  indispensable: 

To  authorize  me,  for  the  salva- 
tion of  OUR  country,  of  liberty, 


PROCLAMATION  BY  THE 
SUPREME  COMMANDER. 
IN-CHIEF 

The  Premier's  telegram  No. 
4163  is  in  its  first  portion  a  lie 
throughout :  it  was  not  I  who  sent 
Deputy  Vladimir  Lvov  to  the  Pro- 
visional Government,  but  he  came 
to  me  as  the  Premier's  envoy. 
Deputy  Alexis  Aladin  is  a  witness 
to  this. 

A  great  provocation  has  thus 
taken  place,  which  jeopardizes  the 
fate  of  the  FATHERLAND. 

People  of  Russia! 

Our  great  country  is  dying. 
The  hour  of  its  end  is  near.  Be- 
ing compelled  to  come  forward  in 
the  open,  I,  General  Kornilov,  de- 
clare that,  under  the  pressure  of 
the  Bolshevik  majority  of  the 
Soviets,  the  Provisional  Govern- 
ment is  acting  in  complete  accord 
with  the  plans  of  the  German 
General  Staff,  at  the  time  when 
enemy  troops  are  landing  on  the 
Riga  coast;  it  is  kilHng  the  army 
and  shaking  the  foundations  of 
the  country. 

A  grave  sense  of  the  inevitable 
ruin  of  the  country  commands  me 
at  this  threatening  moment  to  call 


THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM 


181 


My  telegram  which  the  conciliators  wanted  to  stop,  far 
from  *'  provoking  "  anything,  even  rendered  essential  as- 
sistance to  Headquarters  by  providing  them  with  an  oppor- 
tunity   for   still    further   covering   up   their   traces.     The 


and  of  Republican  order,  to  take 
prompt  and  resolute  measures  for 
the  purpose  of  uprooting  any  at- 
tempt to  encroach  upon  the  Su- 
preme Authority  in  the  State  and 
upon  the  rights  which  the  citizens 
have  conquered  by  the  Revolution. 

I  am  taking  all  necessary  meas- 
ures to  protect  the  liberty  and 
order  of  the  country,  and  the 
population  will  be  informed  in 
due  course  with  regard  to  such 
measures. 

At  the  same  time  I  order  here- 
with: 

I.  General  Kornilov  to  surren- 
der the  post  of  Supreme  Com- 
mander-in-Chief to  General  Klem- 
t)ovsky,  the  Commander-in-Chief 
over  the  armies  of  the  Northern 
front  which  bar  the  way  to  Petro- 
grad ;  and  General  Klembovsky  to 
enter  temporarily  upon  the  post 
of  Supreme  Commander-in-Chief, 
while  remaining  at  Pskov. 

II.  To  declare  the  city  and  dis- 
trict of  Petrograd  under  Martial 
Law,  extending  to  it  the  regula- 
tions for  the  localities  declared 
under  Martial  Law. 

(See  Code  of  Law,  vol.  ii.,  on 
Provincial  Public  Institutions, 
Art.  23,  with  its  supplement  of 
1892  and  its  continuation  of  1912.) 

I  call  upon  all  the  citizens  to 
preserve  complete  tranquillity  and 
to  maintain  order,  which  is  so  in- 


upon  all  Russian  people  to  save 
the  dying  country. 

All  you  in  whose  breast  a  Rus- 
sian heart  is  beating ;  all  you  who 
believe  in  God  and  in  the  temples, 
pray  to  the  Lord  to  manifest  the 
greatest  miracle  of  saving  our 
native  land.  I,  General  Kornilov, 
the  son  of  a  Cossack  peasant,  de- 
clare to  all  and  sundry  that  I  want 
nothing  for  mj'  own  person,  ex- 
cept the  preservation  of  a  Great 
Russia,  and  I  swear  to  carry  over 
the  people,  by  means  of  a  victory 
over  the  enemy,  to  the  Constitu- 
ent Assembly  at  which  it  will 
decide  its  own  fate  and  choose 
the  order  of  its  new  State  life. 

I  cannot  bring  it  upon  myself 
to  hand  over  Russia  to  its  heredi- 
tary enemy,  the  German  race,  and 
to  turn  the  Russian  people  into 
slaves  of  the  Germans,  but  prefer 
to  die  on  the  field  of  honour  and 
battle,  so  as  not  to  see  the  shame 
and  infamy  of  the  Russian  Land. 

Russian  people,  the  life  of  your 
country  is  in  your  hands ! 

General  Kornilov. 

The  27th  day  of  August  1917, 


182  THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM 

definite  decision,  the  rescinding  of  which  "  would  be  the 
cause  of  convulsion  in  the  army  and  in  the  country,"  was 
taken  first,  while  the  refusal  to  surrender  the  command  fol- 
lowed only  afterwards.  This  was  the  real  sequence  of 
events. 

Only  prompt  and  resolute  measures  could  save  the  coun- 
try, and  did  save  it  then,  from  great  and  sanguinary  convul- 
sions. I  was  all  the  more  unable  to  admit  any  delay  as, 
since  the  evening  of  August  26th,  it  had  become  clear  to  me 
that  we  had  to  deal  with  events  which  were  unfolding  them- 
selves according  to  a  previously  thought-out  plan,  and  that, 
while  calculating  upon  taking  the  Provisional  Government 
by  surprise,  the  conspirators  had  also  provided  for  the  possi- 
biHty  of  another  turn  of  events.  It  was  also  necessary  to 
take  into  account  the  possibility  of  surprise  on  the  part  of 
those  elements  who  had  been  got  ready  in  various  localities, 
including  Petrograd,  with  the  intention  of  forming  fighting 
bodies  from  them;  about  these  we  had  information.  It 
may  be  added  that  by  the  trains  going  from  Mohilev  towards 
Petrograd,  which  were  stopped  on  the  way  on  the  27th  and 
the  28th  of  August,  there  travelled  groups  of  persons  who 
were  intended  to  distinguish  themselves  at  Petrograd  by 
their  active  support  of  Headquarters.] 

dispensable  for  the  salvation  of 
the  country.  I  call  upon  all  the 
ranks  of  the  army  and  navy  to 
carry  on  with  calmness  and  self- 
abnegation  their  duty  of  defend- 
ing the  country  against  the  ex- 
ternal enemy. 

A.  F.  Keren  SKY, 
Prime-Minister,   Minister  of 

War  and  of  Marine. 
The  2/th  day  of  August  1917. 


THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM  183 

§24 

Chairman. —  Were  no  objections  raised  against  sending 
off  that  telegram  of  August  27th? 

Kerensky. —  Objections  were  made.  It  was  urged  that 
the  affair  would  perhaps  end  in  a  compromise.  That 
was  said  by  those  who  held  the  point  of  view  which  was 
most  clearly  expressed  afterwards  by  Miliukov,  who  called 
upon  me  to  offer  his  mediation,  declaring  that  I  ought  to 
understand  that  the  real  strength  lay  on  the  side  of  Kornilov. 

Until  it  became  finally  clear  that  my  predictions  were 
correct,  and  that  Kornilov  found  himself  in  a  complete 
"  vacuum,"  there  remained  up  to  the  last  moment  a  large 
number  of  adherents  to  a  policy  of  compromise,  or,  to  speak 
more  correctly,  of  surrendering  the  positions  to  Kornilov. 

[Miliukov's  visit  to  my  study  took  place  during  the  day 
of  x\ugust  28th. 

In  this  connection  General  Alexeiev  says  in  his  deposition 
as  follows :  "  As  it  seemed  very  likely  that  in  this  affair 
General  Kornilov  was  acting  in  agreement  with  several 
members  of  the  Provisional  Government,  and  that  only 
during  the  last  days  of  August  —  the  26th  to  the  28th  — 
this  agreement  was  infringed  or  some  misunderstanding  had 
occurred  in  the  interval,  Miliukov  and  myself  called  once 
more  on  the  Premier  on  August  28th  at  3  p.  m.,  to  make  an 
attempt  to  induce  him  to  send  to  Mohilev  several  members 
of  the  Government  together  with  Miliukov  to  clear  up  mat- 
ters so  as  to  reach  an  agreement;  or,  at  least,  to  continue 
negotiations  by  the  Hughes  apparatus.  But  in  this  we  met 
with  a  resolute  refusal."  I  ought  to  mention  that  while  he 
was  in  my  study.  General  Alexeiev  kept  silent  the  whole 
time,  except  for  a  few  words  on  the  position  at  the  front  in 
the  absence  of  command  which  had  occurred,  so  that  I  was 


184     THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM 

rather  in  the  dark  as  to  the  reason  for  his  presence  at  my 
interview  with  MiHukov.  At  any  rate,  it  never  occurred  to 
me  then,  on  August  28th  at  3  p.  m.,  that  there  was  sitting 
before  me  not  only  partisans,  but  such  partisans  as  had 
come  to  me  from  a  certain  meeting,  as  I  learnt  afterwards. 
I  need  hardly  say  that  the  motives  for  the  necessity  of  con- 
tinuing negotiations,  which  are  set  out  in  the  above  deposi- 
tion of  General  Alexeiev,  were  not  even  hinted  at  by 
Miliukov  in  our  conversation:  for,  if  he  had  done  so,  he 
would  not  have  had  the  opportunity  of  carrying  on  his  con- 
versation with  me  to  the  end. 

Miliukov  reasoned  on  the  ground  of  the  interests  of  the 
State,  of  the  patriotic  motives  of  the  move  of  General 
Kornilov,  who  was  only  mistaken  in  his  methods,  and,  lastly, 
as  an  ultima  ratio,  he  brought  forward  the  reason  which 
seemed  to  him  the  most  conclusive  and  effective,  namely, 
that  the  real  strength  lay  on  the  side  of  Kornilov.^ 

iQn  what  real  forces  they  were  counting  at  Headquarters  and  on 
what  they  founded  their  assurance  of  the  wide  support  and  success  of 
"the  open  move  against  the  Provisional  Government,"  may  be  seen 
from  the  following  "  diplomatic  "  telegram,  No.  262,  from  Prince  Tru- 
betzkoy,  authorized  by  General  Kornilov,  which  was  sent  on  the  morn- 
ing of  August  28th  to  the  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs.  I  describe  this 
telegram  as  authorized  by  General  Kornilov  because,  before  dispatching 
it  to  Petrograd,  Prince  Trubetzkoy  had  shown  it  to  General  Kornilov, 
who,  "  after  acquainting  himself  with  the  text  of  the  same,  said,  *  Send 
it  on.'  '*  Here  is  the  text  of  this  telegram,  which  has  become  known  to 
me  only  now :  — 

"  On  a  sober  estimate  of  the  position,  one  has  to  admit  that  the  whole 
personnel  in  command,  the  overwhelming  majority  of  the  officers,  and 
the  best  part  of  the  army  at  the  front  will  follow  Kornilov.  In  the 
rear  there  will  stand  on  his  side  the  whole  of  Cossackdom,  the  majority 
of  the  military  schools,  as  well  as  the  best  elements  of  the  troops.  To 
their  physical  power  must  be  added  the  superiority  of  a  military  or- 
ganization over  the  weakness  of  the  Government  organs,  the  moral 
sympathy  of  all  non-Socialist  elements  of  the  population,  the  ever- 
growing discontent  with  the  existing  order  among  the  lowest  classes. 


THE  PRELUDE  TO  B0LSHEVIS:M  185 

As  far  as  I  remember,  I  replied  that  I  would  rather  die 
than  subordinate  Right  to  the  argument  of  Force.  I  added 
that  I  was  astonished  at  the  suggestion  made  to  me,  the 
Premier,  to  continue  negotiations  after  General  Kornilov 
had  dared  to  declare  the  members  of  the  Provisional  Gov- 
ernment to  be  agents  of  the  German  General  Staff.  Yes,  I 
was  very  angry.  I  felt  extremely  indignant  at  Miliukov's 
complete  indifference  to  this,  to  say  the  least,  quite  inadmis- 
sible sally  of  Kornilov,  though  among  the  members  of  the 
Provisional  Government  there  were  some  of  Miliukov's 
closest  political  friends.  Even  Prince  Trubetzkoy,  who  ex- 
perienced the  strong  pressure  of  the  atmosphere  at  Head- 
quarters, relates  that  when  on  August  28th  he  became 
acquainted  with  the  contents  of  the  Proclamation  to  the 

and,  among  the  majority  of  the  popular  and  urban  masses,  who  have 
become  blunted  in  regard  to  everything,  the  indifference  which  obeys 
the  stroke  of  the  whip.  An  enormous  number  of  those  who  were  So- 
cialists in  March  will  doubtless  pass  over  immediately  to  their  side. 
On  the  other  hand,  the  latest  events  at  the  front  and  in  the  rear,  espe- 
cially at  Kazan,  have  demonstrated  with  unmistakable  clearness  the 
picture  of  the  complete  bankruptcy  of  the  present  order  of  things  and 
the  inevitability  of  a  catastrophe  unless  a  crisis  takes  place  at  once. 

"  This  consideration  seems  to  be  decisive  for  General  Kornilov,  who 
is  aware  that  only  by  resoluteness  is  it  possible  to  stop  Russia  at  the  edge 
of  the  abyss  into  which  it  will  otherwise  roll.  It  is  neither  here  nor 
there  to  say  that  Kornilov  is  preparing  the  triumph  of  the  Kaiser,  when 
there  will  soon  remain  nothing  for  the  German  troops  to  overcome 
except  our  wide  expanses.  It  depends  on  the  men  now  in  power 
whether  they  will  meet  the  inevitable  crisis  half-way,  thus  rendering 
it  painless  and  preserving  the  real  guarantees  of  popular  freedom,  or 
if  they  will  take  upon  themselves,  by  their  opposition,  the  responsibility 
for  innumerable  new  calamities.  I  am  convinced  that  only  the  imme- 
diate arrival  here  of  the  Premier,  of  the  Deputy  Minister  of  War,  and 
of  yourself,  in  order  to  establish  jointly  with  the  Supreme  Commander- 
in-Chief  the  foundations  of  a  strong  authority,  can  avert  the  threaten- 
ing danger  of  civil  war." 

Does  not  this  telegram  once  more  confirm  that  my  urgent  measures 
against  General  Kornilov's  move  had  a  sufficient  foundation? 


186     THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM 

■Russian  People  ( Kornilov's  Order  No.  i ) ,  he  was  ''  so 
astonished  at  it  that  he  doubted  its  genuineness/*  and  it  be- 
came clear  to  him  that  "  adventurers  had  passed  off  on 
General  Kornilov  a  document  which  he  signed  without 
proper  consideration."  The  text  of  that  document  made  it 
clear  to  Trubetzkoy  that  reconciliation  was  impossible. 

I  also  remember  that  in  the  course  of  that  conversation  I 
pointed  out  to  Miliukov  that  my  attitude  towards  the  move 
of  Kornilov  could  not  be  any  different  from  my  attitude  to- 
wards the  Bolsheviks  in  July ;  that  from  the  point  of  view  of 
the  authority  of  the  State  the  position  was  in  both  cases 
exactly  the  same,  and  that  the  Government  was  faced  by  a 
similar  attempt  to  snatch  power  by  violence,  etc.  I  remem- 
ber how  Miliukov  argued,  from  the  difference  in  the  motives 
of  the  crime  (which  difference  as  to  motives,  I  did  not  deny 
myself,  nor  do  I  deny  it  now),  the  necessity  for  a  different 
attitude  on  the  part  of  the  Government  towards  the  crime 
itself.  I  thus  had  before  me  an  inversion  of  Martov  in  July. 
Indeed  the  leading  articles  in  the  Retch  (the  leading 
organ  of  the  CD.)  at  this  time  corresponded  to  the  leading 
articles  in  the  Novaya  Ji/^n  (the  organ  of  Internationalist 
Mensheviks)  during  the  period  of  the  Bolshevik  revolt. 

I  have  already  mentioned  that  prominent  individual  Lib- 
erals were  giving  by  their  conduct  in  the  Kornilov  days 
fruitful  material  to  Bolshevik  and  semi-Bolshevik  dema- 
gogues. In  the  ranks  of  the  democracy  there  began  a  final 
assault  upon  the  sole  State  idea  which  had  been  saving  the 
State  from  political  death  —  upon  the  idea  of  a  single  uni- 
versally national  authority.  Some  started  the  attack  openly 
and  others  in  a  cowardly  way,  hiding  themselves  behind  the 
watchword  of  "  a  coalition  without  the  Cadets,"  though  they 
knew  full  well  that  this  watchword  practically  signified  the 
negation  of  a  coalition,  since  all  that  was  progressive,  but 


THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM  187 

not  democratic,  including  the  industrial  aristocracy  of  Mos- 
cow, had  then  united  round  the  Constitutional  Democratic 
Party. 

After  Kornilov's  move  the  Government  remained  solitary 
in  its  endeavour  again  to  unite  "the  representatives  of  all 
those  elements  which  placed  the  eternal  and  general  interests 
of  the  country  above  the  temporary  and  private  interests  of 
single  parties  or  classes."  The  Government  declared  this 
aspiration  to  be  its  immediate  task  in  its  Message  to  the 
population  of  September  ist,  in  which  it  declared  Russia  to 
be  a  Republic.  The  "  eternal  and  universal  "  was  forgotten 
by  all  parties  and  classes  in  the  name  of  the  "  temporary 
and  private  " ;  both  among  the  democracy  and  the  bourgeoisie 
the  irreconcilable  but  active  minority  was  rapidly  capturing 
influence  and  power.  If,  however,  one  can  understand  Bol- 
sheviks who,  by  letting  loose  all  the  dark  animal  instincts  of 
the  masses  of  the  people,  wished  to  capture  and  to  utilize  for 
their  own  purposes  the  really  gigantic  force  of  these  masses, 
one  must  stand  quite  puzzled  at  the  "  Realist "  policy  of  the 
irreconcilable  wing  of  the  bourgeois  intellectuals,  who  made 
it  their  aim  to  free  the  State  from  the  pressure  of  the  whole 
"  revolutionary  democracy,"  without  possessing  at  that  time 
any  real  force  at  their  disposal.  Truly,  God  deprives  of 
their  reason  those  whom  He  wishes  to  chastise.  But,  while 
punishing  themselves,  these  "  sober  "  elements  of  the  country 
have  greatly  helped  the  Anarchist-Bolsheviks  to  precipitate 
Russia  into  the  abyss.] 

Kerensky. —  Apart  from  the  attempts  at  compromise, 
there  went  on  at  this  time  a  wholesale  exodus  from  this 
place,  known  to  be  doomed  to  ruin.  Indeed,  on  a  certain 
night  I  walked  about  here,  in  the  Winter  Palace,  almost 
alone,  not  because  I  did  not  wish  to  act  together  with  any- 
body else,  but  simply  because  such  an  atmosphere  had  been 


188     THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM 

created  all  round  that  it  was  considered  to  be  more  prudent 
to  keep  away  from  such  marshy  ground. 

[I  must  admit  that  in  appearance  Miliukov  had  selected  a 
very  convenient  moment  for  proving  to  me  that  the  real 
strength  was  on  the  side  of  Kornilov.  The  day  of  the  28th 
of  August  was  precisely  the  time  of  the  greatest  hesitations 
and  of  the  greatest  doubts  as  to  the  strength  of  Kornilov's 
opponents,  as  well  as  of  the  greatest  nervousness  in  the 
midst  of  the  democracy  itself.  The  lingering  self-suggestion 
of  a  "  counter-revolution  "  had  induced  a  good  many  to  ex- 
aggerate the  strength  of  the  adherents  of  the  "  Republican 
reaction  "  in  the  country.  Bewildered  by  the  noisy  con- 
fusion of  the  "  Kornilovist  revolution,"  a  good  many  people 
were  as  crudely  mistaken  as  Miliukov  himself.  I  shall  never 
forget  the  painful  long  hours  of  that  Monday,  and  especially 
of  that  Monday  night.  What  pressure  was  I  subjected  to 
all  that  time,  resisting  while  seeing  the  growing  perplexity  all 
round  me !  This  Petrograd  atmosphere  of  utter  mental  de- 
pression was  rendering  still  more  unbearable  one's  conscious- 
ness that  the  absence  of  a  Chief  at  the  front,  the  excesses 
within  the  country,  and  the  dislocation  of  transport  might 
cause  at  any  moment  irretrievable  consequences  to  the  as  yet 
hardly  recuperated  mechanism  of  the  State.  During  those 
painfully  lingering  days  I  was  weighed  down  by  a  truly 
superhuman  responsibility!  I  remember  with  a  feeling  of 
satisfaction  that  I  did  not  then  bend  down  under  its  weight. 
I  also  remember  with  gratitude  those  persons  who  supported 
me  then  simply  as  human  beings.  It  was  only  on  the  next 
day,  August  29th,  that  a  mighty  reaction  against  the  mad 
attempt  of  the  conspirators  manifested  itself  throughout  the 
whole  of  the  country.  I  have  already  said,  and  I  must  point 
out  once  more,  that  the  credit  for  the  victory  over  Kor- 
nilov  could   not   under  any   circumstances   be   especially 


THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM  189 

ascribed  to  the  Soviets.  The  Kornilov  movement  was 
bloodlessly  crushed  at  the  very  first  moment  only  thanks  to 
the  enthusiasm  and  the  unity  of  the  whole  country,  which  had 
rallied  to  the  national  democratic  authority.  This  unity 
embraced  immeasurably  wider  strata  of  the  population  than 
the  Soviets  circles  at  that  time.  The  new  municipal  and 
Zemstvo  local  government  bodies  then  played  an  enormous 
part  in  the  popular  movement.  Hundreds  and  hundreds  of 
telegrams  from  all  comers  of  Russia  were  speaking  out 
clearly  that  at  this  time  the  "unification  of  all  the  living 
forces  of  the  country  "  was  not  yet  an  empty  sound.  It 
should  not  be  forgotten  that  precisely  at  this  time  there  was 
going  on  a  healthy  process  of  decrease  in  the  political  im- 
portance of  the  Soviets  in  the  State.  That  process  was 
interrupted  by  Kornilovism,  which  turned  the  Soviets  into 
Bolshevik  citadels.  Nor  should  it  be  forgotten  that  the 
Government  had  taken  all  its  decisions  and  issued  its  orders 
before  any  outsider  was  aware  of  the  very  fact  of  Kornilov's 
move.  The  legend  of  the  Government's  having  taken  its 
measures  against  Kornilov  only  under  pressure  from  the 
Central  Executive  Committee  of  the  Soviets  of  the  Work- 
men's and  Soldiers'  Deputies  is  absolutely  contrary  to  the 
facts.  In  looking  through  the  newspapers  of  that  period  I 
came  across,  in  the  issue  of  the  Izvestia  of  the  Central  Exec- 
utive Committee  of  the  Soviets  of  the  Workmen's  and  Sol- 
diers' Deputies  of  August  27th,  a  characteristic  little  article 
entitled  "  A  Night  of  Alarm,"  which  shows  strikingly  how 
far  even  the  most  informed  inhabitants  of  Petrograd  were 
from  the  reality  on  the  morning  of  August  27th.  That 
paragraph  relates  the  uninterrupted  and  alarming  sittings  of 
the  Ministers  and  the  Premier's-consultations  with  the  mili- 
tary authorities,  explaining  it  all  by  the  expectation  of  street 
demonstrations  on  the  six  months'  celebration  of  the  out- 


190     THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM 

break  of  the  Revolution.  The  newspaper  in  question  con- 
cludes its  description  of  the  night  of  alarm  with  a 
communication  that,  "  on  inquiries  being  made,  the  Bol- 
sheviks and  other  organizations  have  made  categorical 
statements  that  they  had  neither  prepared  nor  were  con- 
templating any  movements.  Similar  declarations  were  made 
by  all  the  democratic  organizations."  Indeed,  the  day  of 
August  27th  passed  off  at  Petrograd  most  quietly,  without 
there  being  seen  any  hint  of  the  Bolshevik  rebellion  which 
V.  Lvov  had  prophesied  with  such  assurance.  The  author 
of  that  little  article  had  not  even  the  slightest  idea  as  to  how 
near  he  was  to  the  truth  when  he  reported  ''  some  conjectures 
as  to  the  possibility  of  such  movements  being  provoked  by 
the  organizations  of  the  Right."  The  28th  of  August  was 
the  hardest  day,  owing  to  its  uncertainty,  while  on  the  eve- 
ning of  the  29th  it  has  already  become  possible  to  issue  the 
following  Government  communique :  "  The  rebellious  at- 
tempt of  General  Kornilov  and  of  the  handful  of  ad- 
venturers who  had  gathered  round  him  remains  quite 
isolated  from  the  active  army  and  navy.  Only  small  de- 
tachments which  had  been  moved  by  General  Kornilov 
towards  Petrograd  still  remain  in  error,  but  the  further 
movement  of  these  echelons  has  been  stopped  and  communi- 
cations between  them  interrupted.  From  everywhere  in  the 
provinces  reports  arrive  affirming  the  complete  loyalty  of  the 
troops  and  of  the  population  to  the  Provisional  Government, 
while  all  the  public  organizations  send  in  declarations  of 
their  resolve  to  support  the  Government."  On  August 
30th  the  Winter  Palace  was  again  full  of  people  and  anima- 
tion, the  calculators  of  the  balance  of  forces  having  forgotten 
their  hesitations.  General  Alexeiev  left  in  the  evening  for 
Headquarters,  but  already  on  September  ist  the  Provisional 
Government  had  to  write :  "  The  insurrection  of  General 


THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM  191 

Kornilov  is  suppressed,  but  the  trouble  carried  by  him  into 
the  ranks  of  the  army  and  into  the  country  is  great.  There 
is  once  more  a  great  danger  threatening  the  fate  of  the 
country  and  its  Hberty.  The  Provisional  Government  con- 
siders it  to  be  its  main  task  to  restore  the  order  of  the  State 
and  the  fighting  capacity  of  the  army."  In  its  issue  of 
September  3rd  the  Isvestia  of  the  Central  Executive  Com- 
mittee of  the  Soviets  of  the  Workmen's  and  Soldiers' 
Deputies,  in  an  article  headed  "  Do  not  Destroy  the  Army," 
had  to  put  the  terrible  question :  "  Was  it  the  unruly  acts 
and  the  assassinations  which  are  disgracing  the  name  of  the 
Russian  soldier  that  have  saved  Russia  from  Kornilov's 
conspiracy?  No;  Russia  was  saved  by  something  quite 
different."  If  a  certain  newspaper  in  a  neutral  State  has 
recently  put  to  the  German  Government  the  tragic  inquiry 
as  to  whether  it  was  going  to  erect  in  the  Siegesallee  at  Ber- 
lin a  monument  to  the  conqueror  of  Russia  —  Lenin,  I 
maintain  very  seriously  that  the  Bolsheviks  ought  to  erect 
on  one  of  the  squares  of  the  former  Russia  an  obelisk  to 
Kornilov,  with  the  inscription  "  In  hoc  signo  vinces."] 

Chairman. —  Had  you  had  no  conversation,  with  regard 
to  the  position  that  had  been  created,  with  Terestchenko, 
Dutov,  Karaulov,  and  Savinkov  ? 

Kerensky. —  These  conversations  had  nothing  to  do  with 
my  telegram  of  August  27th.  As  far  as  I  remember,  Dutov 
and  the  Cossacks  came  on  the  night  of  that  day. 

Chairman. —  That  is  so. 

Kerensky. —  They  came  with  an  intimation  that  they 
should  like  to  go  to  Headquarters  with  a  view  to  mediation, 
in  order  to  try  and  arrange  the  relations  with  Kornilov.  I 
repeated  that  I  would  grant  the  permission  required.  But 
when  on  the  next  day,  August  28th,  there  followed  on  the 
part  of  Kornilov  not  only  an  open  act  of  disobedience,  but 


192  THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM 

also  a  declaration  to  the  effect  that  we,  the  Provisional  Gov- 
ernment, were  German  agents,  I  refused  pemiission  for  the 
Cossacks  to  start  for  Headquarters,  saying  that  after  the 
conditions  now  created  any  mediations  or  journey ings  for 
arranging  the  affair  had  become  impossible,  since  the  mat- 
ter had  now  passed  into  quite  a  different  stage.  The  Cos- 
sacks were  greatly  excited  and  made  a  grievance  of  my 
having  first  promised  to  let  them  start  and  then  withdrawing 
the  permission.  My  answer  was  all  the  time  to  the  effect 
that  the  position  had  changed  in  the  interval  in  a  radical 
manner. 

[Altogether,  in  August  the  conduct  of  the  Soviet  of  the 
Cossack  armies  was  rather  provoking,  while  in  those  days 
its  members,  and  especially  its  President,  only  managed  with 
difficulty  to  abstain  from  giving  utterance  to  their  real  opin- 
ions and  intentions.  I  had  to  speak  to  them  very  sharply, 
all  the  more  so  as  I  could  oppose  to  their  political  declara- 
tions the  temper  of  Cossackdom  at  the  front,  which,  since 
the  resolution  passed  by  the  Council  of  the  Cossack  armies 
as  to  the  irremovability  of  Kornilov,  had  been  protesting 
to  me  against  the  policy  of  the  Council.  When  later,  on 
the  29th  and  30th  of  August,  one  deputation  after  another 
kept  on  arriving  from  the  units  of  the  third  Cossack  Corps, 
I  had  for  the  first  time  occasion  to  convince  myself  of  the 
extraordinary  exaggeration  of  the  idea  as  to  any  special 
unity  between  the  high  and  the  low  ranks  in  Cossackdom. 
I  was  able  to  convince  myself  of  it  once  more  through  my 
personal  experience  at  Gatchina.  When  a  delegation  from 
the  Council  of  the  Cossack  armies  arrived  there  and  began, 
among  other  things,  to  work  against  me  as  the  "  betrayer  " 
of  Kornilov,  they  met  with  no  success  among  the  rank  and 
file  of  the  corps,  where,  on  the  contrary,  there  was  found 
favourable  soil  for  the  Bolshevik  propagandists  who  were 


THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM  193 

also  agitating  against  me,  but  who  concentrated  their  atten- 
tion on  quite  different  matters.  In  the  end,  after  their 
having  decided  to  "  deliver  me  "  to  Dibenko,  they  nearly 
resolved  to  arrest  their  own  officers  as  well.  I  was  not, 
therefore,  astonished  in  the  least  when  news  reached  me  of 
the  sad  issue  of  the  fighting  on  the  Don  against  Moscow 
Bolshevism.] 

Raupakh. —  What  about  the  proposal  of  lakubovitch, 
Tumanov,  Savinkov,  and  Lebedev  to  enter  upon  a  com- 
promise ? 

Kerensky. —  I  do  not  remember  any  conversation  with 
lakubovitch  and  Tumanov.  As  for  Savinkov,  there  had 
been  a  conversation  with  him  about  giving  him  an  oppor- 
tunity of  talking  the  matter  over  with  Headquarters  by  the 
direct  line,  already  on  the  evening  of  the  26th  of  August. 

Raupakh. —  But  after  that,  did  he  not  say  that  it  was 
still  possible? 

Kerensky. —  He  was  given  the  opportunity  of  speaking 
by  direct  line,  and  he  did  so  throughout  the  whole  day.  But 
when  Lukomsky's  telegram,  which  you  probably  remember, 
arrived  and  Savinkov  read  it,  he  handed  me  a  declaration  to 
the  effect  that  the  reference  made  to  him  was  a  calumny,  and 
that  he  never  did,  nor  could,  carry  on  negotiations  in  my 
name.  He  made  a  similar  declaration  to  Kornilov  by  the 
direct  line. 

Raupakh. —  Did  not  that  conversation  serve  as  a  reason 
for  Savinkov  to  point  out  that  there  was  some  possi- 
bility .    .    .  ? 

Kerensky. —  That  was  during  the  night. 

Raupakh. —  After  the  conversation  by  the  direct  line, 

Kerensky. —  Possibly.     I  don't  remember. 

Raupakh. —  I  am  anxious  to  clear  the  matter  up  with  re- 
gard to  all  the  persons  who  have  been  mentioned. 


194     THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM 

Kerensky. —  There  were  all  sorts  of  persons ;  they  should 
be  divided  into  groups.  As  for  the  visit  of  the  Cossacks, 
they  were  simply  anxious  to  reach  Headquarters  in  time. 
I  have  no  doubt  whatever  that  they  were  among  those  per- 
sons who,  like  Miliukov,  for  instance,  were  convinced  that 
a  victory  would  fall  to  the  side  of  Kornilov,  and  not  to  that 
of  the  Revolution. 

Raupakh. —  To  the  side  of  the  "  real  forces  "? 

Kerensky. —  As  I  said  before,  all  these  persons  must  not 
be  thrown  into  one  heap.  As  for  lakubovitch  and  Tuma- 
nov,  I  do  not  remember  having  had  any  conversation  with 
them.  They  spoke  perhaps  with  me  too,  but  such  conversa- 
tion must  have  been  so  insignificant  th^  I  remember  nothing 
about  it.  I  know  only  one  thing :  when  I  asked  how  it  was 
that  I  did  not  see  either  Tumanov  or  Taubovitch,  I  was  told 
by  somebody  —  by  Savinkov,  if  I  remember  rightly  —  that 
the  whole  thing  had  had  such  an  effect  on  Tumanov  that 
he  was  in  a  most  depressed  condition.  I  think  that  lakubo- 
vitch came  later,  and,  if  I  am  not  mistaken,  I  requested  him 
to  invite  several  people  to  assist  in  organizing  the  defence. 
I  remember,  however,  with  certainty  Savinkov's  offer  to 
speak  by  direct  wire  on  August  27th,  and  then  Miliukov's 
call  on  the  29th.  Subsequently,  at  the  meeting  of  the  Pro- 
visional Government,  when  we  discussed  the  question,  I 
think,  already  on  the  eve  of  the  solution  of  the  crisis,  part 
of  the  Government  expressed  itself  for  the  necessity  of  a 
solution  by  compromise,  in  view  of  the  *'  correlation  of 
forces  "  and  of  the  necessity  to  avoid  commotions.  Some 
argued  that  it  would  inevitably  strengthen  the  Bolshevik 
current.  There  were  various  conversations,  but  they  were 
in  another  connection  —  in  connection  with  estimating  the 
correlation  of  forces.     /  stood  on  the  definite  position  that 


THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM  195 

there  were  no  two  parties,  but  only  the  Provisional  Govern- 
ment and  a  general  who  had  transgressed  his  duties. 

There  was  a  group  of  persons  and  a  portion  of  public 
opinion  who  considered  that  there  were  two  parties  with 
equal  rights  to  fight  for  power;  to  carry  on  with  one  an- 
other, so  to  say,  peace  negotiations,  and  to  appeal  for  media- 
tion. I  was  of  opinion  that  such  a  course  would  inilict  a 
decisive  blow  to  the  idea  of  revolutionary  authority  and  to 
the  unity  it  had  maintained  since  the  outset  of  the  Revolu- 
tion. I  therefore  could  not  accept  the  view  of  two  camps 
negotiating  through  mediators,  considering  that  I  should 
break  my  oath  by  taking  such  a  course. 

Raupakh. —  Was  there  no  offer  of  negotiations  in  view  of 
the  possibility  of  misunderstandings? 

Kerensky. —  Savinkov  made  an  offer  on  the  evening  of 
the  26th. 

Raupakh. —  After  the  conversation  by  tape.  What  about 
Terestchenko  and  Lebedev? 

Kerensky. —  I  don't  remember  such  a  thing  with  regard 
to  Lebedev,  rather  the  opposite.  .  .  .  Lebedev  was  very 
suspicious  of  Filonenko's  part  in  this  affair,  and  Filonenko^s 
exit  was  due,  properly  speaking,  to  Lebedev's  communica- 
tion of  a  certain  conversation  which  had  taken  place  at  the 
Staff  on  the  night  of  Filonenko's  arrival  from  Head- 
quarters. As  for  Terestchenko,  he  was  at  one  time 
really  in  favour  of  an  agreement.  Indeed,  he  even  said  at 
one  of  the  meetings  of  the  Provisional  Government  that  the 
business  ought  to  be  settled  in  such  a  way  that  both  Keren- 
sky and  Kornilov  should  be  set  aside,  thus  satisfying  both 
parties  by  a  mutual  sacrifice. 

Shablovsky. —  Who  drafted  the  appeal  to  the  Regional 
Commissaries  of  the  provinces :  did  it  bear  your  signature  ? 


196  THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM 

Krokhmal. —  Excuse  me,  who  drafted  the  communication 
of  August  27th? 

Kerensky. —  I  don't  remember. 

Shahlovsky. —  And  the  one  to  the  provincial  commis- 
saries ? 

Kerensky. —  I  am  unable  to  state  that  either. 

Shahlovsky. —  We  are  interested  in  the  part  of  Nekrassov ; 
was  it  not  drafted  by  him  ? 

Kerensky. —  What  do  you  mean  by  the  "  part  of  Nekras- 
sov "  ?     He  had  no  particular  part  whatever. 

Shahlovsky. —  We  ask  it  on  account  of  a  newspaper  para- 
graph which  states  that  the  Provisional  Government  was 
prepared  to  refrain  from  sending  out  the  telegram  announc- 
ing the  conspiracy,  but  that  Nekrassov  made  haste  and  dis- 
patched it  against  the  opinion  of  the  Government,  thus 
placing  the  latter  before  an  accomplished  fact. 

Kerensky. —  I  don't  remember.  I  do  remember  that  the 
telegram  which  was  to  have  been  sent  by  wireless  was  kept 
back  merely  because  we  thought  that  we  ought  not  to  over- 
excite  public  opinion  and  sentiment. 

[Nekrassov's  part!  That  is  one  of  the  malicious  in- 
ventions in  the  Kornilov  affair.  One  finds  in  the  deposition 
of  nearly  every  witness  favourable  to  Kornilov  some  refer- 
ence to  the  part  of  Nekrassov  —  to  the  part  of  the  evil 
genius  of  the  Premier,  "  who  easily  yields  to  outside  influ- 
ences." Here,  Nekrassov  is  circulating,  without  the  Gov- 
ernment's knowledge,  a  telegram  which  "  renders  any  fur- 
ther negotiations  impossible  " ;  there,  he  orders  on  his  own 
initiative  the  rails  on  the  road  to  Komilov's  detachments  to 
be  removed ;  then  again,  he  comes  forward  in  the  capacity  of 
an  irresponsible  adviser,  and  so  on.  I  read  myself  in  one  of 
the  pro-Kornilov  newspapers  how  Nekrassov  "has  de- 
stroyed the  possibility  of  an  agreement  between  Kerensky 


THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM  197 

and  Kornilov."  Paragraphs  in  this  style  were  appearing 
continually.  Of  course,  all  that  was  pure  invention,  and 
Nekrassov  himself  was  quite  right  when  he  proved  that  all 
the  leading  instructions  emanated  from  me,  and  that  nothing 
of  importance  had  been  undertaken  without  me.  Still,  there 
is  no  smoke  without  a  fire :  Nekrassov  has  really  done  very 
much  towards  putting  an  end  to  Kornilov^s  move  as 
promptly  as  possible.  This  was  his  crime  for  which  the 
Kornilovists  could  not  forgive  him !  They  were  taking  re- 
venge on  Nekrassov  because,  as  Deputy  Prime  Minister  — 
that  is  to  say,  as  my  nearest  assistant  in  the  supreme  ad- 
ministration—  he  carried  out,  in  those  alarming  days  of 
general  uncertainty,  the  duties  of  his  office  most  con- 
scientiously and  with  rare  energy.  They  took  revenge  upon 
him  for  having  assisted  me.  I  leave  alone  the  considera- 
tion that,  even  as  a  simple  citizen,  Nekrassov  would  have 
been  fully  entitled  to  contribute  towards  the  prompt  sup- 
pression of  the  rebellion,  even  apart  from  any  of  his  par- 
ticular duties.  The  Kornilovists  would  perhaps  somewhat 
have  softened  their  attitude  towards  him  if  they  had  been 
aware  that  there  was  an  hour  when  I  did  not  see  even 
Nekrassov  near  me ! 

But  why  the  part  of  Nekrassov,  who  had  accelerated  the 
suppression  of  the  insurrection,  should  have  interested  so 
much  the  Commission  of  Inquiry  is  not  quite  clear  to  me.  I 
am  reluctant  to  admit  that  any  energetic  activity  in  the  sup- 
pression of  the  revolt  should  have  interested  some  members 
of  the  Commission  of  Inquiry  more  than  the  revolt  itself. 

The  unscrupulous  baiting  started  in  various  Kornilovist 
publications  against  all  those  who  had  brought  about  Kor- 
nilov's  collapse  may  be  seen  even  from  the  way  in  which  the 
Novoye  Vremya  of  October  loth,  reported  my  examina- 
tion by  the  Commission  of  Inquiry,  of  which  the  original 


198     THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM 

minutes  are  now  placed  before  the  reader^s  eyes.  I  shall 
quote  a  few  characteristic  extracts  from  the  Novoye 
Vremya  version.  After  an  introductory  remark  to  the  ef- 
fect that  "  A.  F.  Kerensky  frequently  took  part  himself  in 
the  examination  of  witnesses  "  (which  is  a  downright  lie), 
that  paper  begins  to  report  my  deposition  thus :  — 

"  He  first  gave  some  brief  explanations,  setting  out  in  a 
compressed  form  the  whole  course  of  his  negotiations  with 
General  Kornilov.  These  explanations  called  forth,  how- 
ever, a  number  of  supplementary  questions.  One  of  the 
members  of  the  Commission  of  Inquiry  evinced  an  interest 
in  the  question  as  to  whether  the  Prime  Minister  had  charged 
V.  N.  Lvov  to  carry  on  negotiations  with  Headquarters. 
A.  F.  Kerensky  replied  in  the  aiHrmative  (?  !).  The 
Premier  likewise  confirmed  (  ?  !)  that  Lvov  was  not  present 
at  the  conversation  by  the  Hughes  apparatus  on  August 
26th,  and  declared  that  in  view  of  the  alarming  moment 
and  of  the  importance  of  the  question  to  the  State,  he  had 
taken  recourse  to  such  a  trick  (?).  A  series  of  questions 
were  then  put  to  Kerensky  as  to  the  reason  for  the  retire- 
ment of  several  Ministers  and  as  to  the  pressure  (?)  exer- 
cised in  that  matter  on  the  Premier  by  his  former  Deputy, 
Nekrassov.  Altogether,  the  Extraordinary  Commission  of 
Inquiry  concentrated  its  attention  greatly  on  the  part  of 
Nekrassov.  The  Premier  was  asked  about  the  author  of  A. 
F.  Kerensky's  well-known  "  Appeal  "  to  the  people  with  re- 
gard to  the  move  of  General  Kornilov,  who  was  described 
there  as  a  rogue  (?),  a  betrayer  (?),  and  a  traitor 
(?).  A.  F.  Kerensky  stated  that  the  author  of  that  tele- 
gram was  N.  V.  Nekrassov  (?  !).  One  member  of  the 
Commission  of  Inquiry  questioned  in  detail  (?)  on  Nekras- 
sov's  interference  with  purely  military  questions  and  on  the 
pressure  exercised  by  him  in  deciding  questions  on  the  re- 


THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM  199 

calling  of  members  of  the  High  Command  of  the  army.'* 

Such  a  mixture  of  perversions  of  the  truth  and  down- 
right Hes  was  offered  to  the  reader  as  a  report  of  my  exami- 
nation. For  the  thorough  appreciation  of  the  editorial  work 
of  the  Novoye  Vremya  and  similar  papers,  one  has  to  keep 
in  mind  that,  possessing  the  advantage  of  a  very  good  source, 
the  Kornilovist  papers  had  at  their  disposal  all  the  original 
minutes  and  documents  of  the  Commission  of  Inquiry 
almost  on  the  very  day  of  their  production.  Unfortunately 
I  only  learnt  too  late  who  had  provided  that  source.] 

Chairman. — What  about  Krimov  and  the  third  corps  de- 
tachment ?  Were  any  orders  given  to  stop  it,  to  damage  the 
road,  etc.  ?  Was  it  called  forth  by  some  document,  or  only 
by  an  apprehension  that  had  but  little  foundation?  Did 
Krimov  commit  any  act  of  open  disobedience  to  Staff  orders? 

Kerensky. —  As  I  said  before,  Krimov  participated  in  the 
revolt,  which  he  joined,  together  with  a  small  number  of 
officers,  with  quite  definite  intentions.  I  remember  one  little 
incident :  when  Krimov  shot  himself,  an  officer,  whose  name 
I  don't  quite  remember  —  I  think  it  was  Bagratuni  —  re- 
marked :  "  Now  all  traces  have  disappeared."  Krimov  did 
not  carry  out  the  order  to  stop  the  movement  and  continued 
to  go  forward. 

Shablovsky. —  If  such  orders  were  given,  they  were,  then, 
called  forth  by  some  documents  ? 

Kerensky. —  Yes,  by  communications  as  to  the  location  of 
the  units  in  question.  The  chief  part  was  played  in  this 
case  by  the  railwaymen,  who  reported  even  the  slightest 
movements. 

§25 

Shablovsky. —  What  did  Filonenko  actually  report  on  his 
arrival  from  Headquarters  ? 


/ 


200     THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM 

Kerensky. —  Filonenko's  arrival  at  Petrograd  was  not 
quite  intelligible  to  me.  I  don't  know  the  actual  reason  for 
his  arrival.  He  reported  nothing  to  me  until  I  summoned 
him  myself  to  the  Palace.  I  had  seen  him  at  night  at  the 
District  Staff.  As  soon  as  Filonenko  made  his  appearance 
there,  Savinkov  intimated  to  me  that  he  would  like  to  have 
him  as  his  nearest  assistant  in  the  defence  of  Petrograd.  I 
objected,  but  ultimately  agreed  to  this,  as  I  considered  the 
chief  director  of  operations  could  select  whomsoever  he 
chose  as  his  assistant,  on  his  own  responsibility.  But  the 
next  day  it  transpired  that  Filonenko  had  been  carrying  on  a 
most  unsuitable  conversation  with  General  Kornilov.  I 
then  summoned  him  here,  and  he  confessed  the  nature  of  the 
conversation,  which  he  related.  But  Savinkov  began  to  put 
forward  a  whole  series  of  attenuating  comments.  I  ought 
to  say  that  Savinkov  is  a  very  trustful  man,  and  when  he 
once  has  faith  in  anybody,  he  does  not  notice  any  defects  in 
him  for  a  long  time.  This  is  what  Filonenko  related  to  me : 
Kornilov  had  asked  him  whether  it  would  not  be  opportune 
for  him  to  proclaim  himself  dictator.  Filonenko  replied 
that  he  was  against  a  personal  dictatorship,  and  refused  to 
support  Kornilov.  The  latter  then  suggested  to  him  a 
"  collective"  dictatorship,  to  be  composed  of  Kornilov,  Ker- 
ensky, Filonenko,  and  Savinkov,  to  which  Filonenko  re- 
plied that  he  was  ready  to  join  such  a  combination. 

I  considered  that  this  conversation  was  inadmissible  in 
itself,  apart  from  the  fact  that  any  one  might  conjecture 
that  Filonenko  had  some  reasons  for  speaking  in  that  way, 
since  he  was  the  representative  of  the  Central  Government 
with  the  Supreme  Commander-in-Chief.  I  therefore  found 
that  it  was  impossible  to  retain  him  in  service  any  longer. 
At  first  I  even  wanted  to  arrest  Filonenko,  but  afterwards 
I  withdrew  that  order  in  view  of  the  position  which  Savin- 


THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM  201 

*_kov  had  taken  up  on  that  question.  I  decided  that  this 
could  be  done  later  on  just  as  well,  and  confined  myself 
for  the  present  to  ordering  him  to  vacate  his  post  imme- 
diately. 

[Filonenko  arrived  at  Petrograd  from  Headquarters  on 
the  night  of  August  28th.  Early  in  the  morning  of  the 
29th  there  called  on  me  V.  T.  Lebedev  (the  former  Deputy 
Minister  of  Marine,  whom  I  had  appointed  on  August  28th 
to  be  Assistant  to  the  Governor-General  of  Petrograd). 
He  appeared  quite  alarmed,  and  told  me  that,  together  with 
Colonel  Bagratuni  (the  Chief  of  Staff  of  Petrograd  Mili- 
tary District),  he  had  heard  Filonenko  using  quite  an  in- 
admissible phrase  in  his  conversation  with  Savinkov.  I  or- 
dered Filonenko  to  be  arrested.  Shortly  afterwards  Savin- 
kov called  on  me,  requesting  me  either  to  arrest  him  together 
with  Filonenko  or  to  examine  Filonenko's  accusers  in  the 
presence  of  both  of  us.  I  thereupon  ordered  Lebedev,  Bag- 
ratuni, and  Filonenko  to  be  summoned  to  my  study,  where 
all  of  them  appeared  about  11  a.  m.  The  sequel  I  shall 
quote  from  the  very  exact  report  made  by  V.  T.  Lebedev 
in  No.  145  of  the  Volia  Naroda:  — 

"  A.  F.  Kerensky  addressed  us  thus :  *  I  call  you  to- 
gether, gentlemen,  for  the  following  reason:  V.  T.  Lebe- 
dev told  me  that  in  his  report  to  B.  V.  Savinkov,  M.  M. 
Filonenko  had  made  use  of  the  following  phrase :  "  But 
I  kept  on  defending  our  scheme:  Kornilov  and  Kerensky 
as  the  two  pillars  of  the  dictatorship.*'  Do  you  confirm 
it,  Colonel  Bagratuni  ?  ' 

"  *  Yes,  I  confirm  it,'  replied  Colonel  Bagratuni. 

"  *  And  you,  M.  M.  Filonenko?  ' 

"  *  Yes,  I  made  that  remark.' 

"  M.  Filonenko  then  related  that,  after  the  arrival  of 
V.  N.  Lvov,  he  had  discussed  together  with  Kornilov  a 


202  THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM 

plan  of  a  dictatorship  in  the  form  of  a  *  Council  of  Defence/ 
composed  of  the  following  persons:  General  Kornilov,  A. 
F.  Kerensky,  Savinkov,  and  himself.  He  had  been  dis- 
cussing that  plan  in  order  to  counteract  the  contingency  of 
the  sole  dictatorship  of  Kornilov,  which  would  otherwise 
become  inevitable.  The  Premier  was  quite  astounded  at 
this  confession. 

"  *  How  could  you,  the  Supreme  Commissary  of  the  Pro- 
visional Government,  carry  on  such  a  conversation  with 
Kornilov!  Who  authorized  you  to  do  so?  General  Kor- 
nilov might  now  indeed  say  that  he  had  been  led  indirectly 
into  error.' 

"  Filonenko  endeavoured  to  prove  that  he  had  put  for- 
ward this  plan  as  a  counterpoise  to  the  schemes  of  the  con- 
spirators ;  that  there  was  no  time  to  be  lost,  and  lastly,  that 
this  conversation  had  been  carried  on  in  the  spirit  of  private 
relations  and  personal  friendship. 

"  *  For  General  Kornilov  you  were  the  Supreme  Commis- 
sary, and  this  conversation  of  yours  was  a  conversation 
between  the  Supreme  Commissary  and  the  Supreme  Com- 
mander-in-Chief. You  appeared  to  General  Kornilov  as 
representative  of  the  Provisional  Government,  which,  how- 
ever, had  never  authorized  you  to  make  any  such  declara- 
tions.' 

"  When  Savinkov  and  Filonenko  pointed  out  that  an 
essentially  similar  plan  of  a  Council  of  Defence  had  been 
brought  forward  by  the  Provisional  Government,  A.  F. 
Kerensky  replied : — 

"*  Never,  never!  A  question  was  raised  and  passed  as 
to  the  formation  of  a  "  Council  of  Defence ''  [rather  a 
War  Cabinet  than  a  Council  of  Defence]  from  the  niidst 
of  the  Provisional  Government  itself,  for  concentrating 
in  its  hands  the  defence  of  the  whole  country,  after  the 


THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM  203 

example  of  England.  But  it  never  occurred  to  any  one  that 
General  Kornilov,  a  subordinate  of  the  Provisional  Gov- 
ernment, could  ever  enter  such  a  Council.  You,  however, 
who  are  a  Commissary  of  the  Provisional  Government,  dis- 
cussed with  General  Kornilov,  without  the  Government's 
knowledge,  plans  for  a  Directorate  into  which  there  should 
enter  three  persons  who  are  not  members  of  the  Provisional 
Government  —  yourself,  B.  V.  Savinkov,  and  General  Kor- 
nilov—  and  one  person  who  does  form  part  of  the  Gov- 
ernment, namely  myself,  who  knew  nothing  about  it! ' 

"As  a  result  of  the  conversation,  A.  F.  Kerensky  said 
that  he  looked  upon  M.  M.  Filonenko's  action  as  tactless, 
to  say  the  least,  and  that  he  considered  it  impossible  for  the 
latter  to  continue  any  political  work. 

"  I,  for  my  own  part,  declared  that  I  considered  M.  M. 
Filonenko's  behaviour  at  Headquarters  had  been  criminal. 

"  Filonenko  consented  to  submit  to  A.  F.  Kerensky's  de- 
cision and  to  retire  from  any  participation  in  the  political 
life  of  the  country,  whereat  Savinkov  came  out  with  a  pro- 
test, defending  the  correctness  of  Filonenko's  conduct  and 
explaining  away  Filonenko's  confession  in  such  a  manner 
that  A.  F.  Kerensky  corrected  him  several  times  by  say- 
ing:— 

**  *  All  three  of  us  —  myself,  V.  T.  Lebedev,  and  Colonel 
Bagratuni  —  have  heard  what  M.  M.  Filonenko  has  said. 
He  said  something  different.' 

*'  As  Savinkov  w^ent  on  insisting  on  the  correctness  of 
Filonenko's  actions  and  expressing  solidarity  with  him,  the 
Premier  offered  to  refer  the  whole  business  to  the  Pro- 
visional Government,  which,  however,  Filonenko  declined, 
declaring  that  he  preferred  to  submit  to  A.  F.  Kerensky's 
decision.'* 

Towards  the  evening  of  that  day  Filonenko  was  officially 


204  THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM 

\^''  dismissed.  As  I  pointed  out  before,  Filonenko*s  behaviour 
at  Headquarters  is  being  used  as  one  of  the  three  proofs 
of  my  collusion  with  Kornilov.  General  Alexeiev  said, 
indeed,  straight  out  that  the  question  of  Komilov's  move 
had  been  discussed  with  Kerensky  through  Savinkov  and 
Filonenko.  I  have  already  spoken  of  Savinkov,  to  whom 
I  shall  still  have  to  revert;  but  as  far  as  Filonenko  is  con- 
cerned, I  think  that  the  scene  in  my  study  is  sufficiently 
convincing  proof  that  no  discussion  whatever  had  taken 
place  with  me  through  Filonenko,  and  I  shall  not  touch  upon 
that  question  again. 

This  confession  of  Filonenko,  however,  is  most  impor- 
tant in  itself,  since  it  coincides  with  a  corresponding  depo- 
sition of  General  Kornilov  and  with  his  Hughesogram  of 
August  27th.  By  adding  to  it  the  evidence  of  Trubetzkoy, 
Lukomsky,  and  several  others,  one  gets  an  exact  picture  of 
the  alterations  that  the  scheme  of  dictatorship  had  under- 
gone at  Headquarters,  as  well  as  on  whose  initiative  the 
whole  question  had  arisen  altogether.  Kornilov's  conversa- 
tion with  Filonenko  about  a  dictatorship  took  place  in  the 
evening  of  the  26th.  The  declaration  concerning  a  dictator- 
ship, however,  was  made  by  Kornilov  to  V.  N.  Lvov  on 
the  24th.  On  that  day  a  fictitious  consent  was  given  to 
Savinkov  not  to  send  Krimov  with  the  "  Savage  Division  " 
to  Petrograd,  and  on  the  same  day  this  division  was  placed 
by  special  order  under  General  Krimov  and  started  for 
Petrograd.  According  to  the  admission  of  General  Korni- 
lov himself  in  his  conversation  with  Lvov,  he  had  declared 
the  necessity  of  introducing  a  dictatorship  on  his  own  ini- 
tiative. Lvov's  arrival  at  and  departure  from  Headquarters 
became  known  to  Filonenko  afterwards  from  Za^'oiko  and 
Aladin,  who  called  on  him  on  a  visit.  From  the  telegraphic 
negotiations  of  August  27th  by  the  Hughes  apparatus  and 


THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM  g05 

the  corresponding  depositions  of  Kornilov  and  Filonenko, 
it  can  be  ascertained  that  up  to  the  very  evening  of  August 
26th  the  introduction  of  Kornilov's  sole  dictatorship  was 
contemplated.  The  depositions  contain  no  data  for  either 
affirming  or  denying  Filonenko's  participation  in  any  con- 
sultations on  the  question  of  a  dictatorship  previous  to  the 
evening  of  the  26th.  Nor  are  there  any  indications  as  to 
Filonenko  having  suddenly  changed  his  point  of  view  on 
this  question  when  he  supported  a  collective  dictatorship 
on  August  26th.  Filonenko  cannot  therefore  be  recognized 
as  the  initiator  of  the  introduction  of  an  individual  dictator- 
ship, no  matter  what  his  part  at  Headquarters  may  have 
been.  I  think  that  one  may  assert  in  complete  conformity 
with  the  facts  that  the  very  question  of  a  dictatorship  had 
arisen  independently  of  Filonenko,  and  that  the  position 
of  that  question  at  Headquarters  was  not  known  to  him 
in  its  fuU  extent.  Unfortunately,  General  Kornilov's  con- 
sultation with  Krimov  and  the  other  military  participators 
in  the  conspiracy  does  not  seem  to  have  been  cleared  up  at 
all  by  the  Inquiry.  I  am  convinced,  however,  that  the 
practical  part  of  the  venture  was  precisely  discussed  with 
such  clever  men  as  Krimov,  and  that  among  them  there 
could  perhaps  have  been  found  the  real  initiator  of  the  whole 
affair.  On  the  strength  of  the  materials  known  to  me,  the 
most  active  adherent  at  Headquarters,  if  not  the  initiator, 
of  the  idea  of  individual  dictatorship  must  he  recognised 
to  be  Kornilov  himself. 

All  the  circumstances  of  the  final  consultation  about  a 
dictatorship  held  on  August  26th  seemed  to  point  to  the 
probability  of  Filonenko  having  said  perhaps  the  truth,  when 
he  affirmed  in  my  study  that  only  after  being  confronted 
by  the  fact  of  the  inevitable  declaration  of  Kornilov's  sole 
dictatorship  he  had  put  forward  the  counter-proposal  of  a 


206     THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM 

collective  dictatorship  as  the  lesser  evil.  At  any  rate,  the 
Inquiry  has  firmly  established  that  this  scheme  had  only 
arisen  on  the  26th  of  August  at  the  consultation  between 
Kornilov,  Zavoiko,  Aladin,  and  Filonenko;  and  of  all  the 
data  of  the  Kornilov  affair,  Filonenko's  version  is  the  only 
one  I  could  find  which  provides  an  explanation  of  this 
sudden  alteration  of  the  plan  of  action.  But  even  Filo- 
nenko's story  does  not  reveal  those  motives  which  had  com- 
pelled General  Kornilov  to  agree  to  such  an  alteration  in 
the  form  of  a  dictatorship.  It  is  not  clear  whether  Filo- 
nenko had  really  convinced  Kornilov  that  his  scheme  was 
more  to  the  purpose,  or  whether,  standing  in  need  for  some 
reason  or  another  of  Filonenko's  consent  on  that  evening. 
General  Kornilov  only  pretended  for  a  time  to  have  been 
convinced  by  Filonenko.  I  would  rather  suppose  the  latter, 
because  it  is  hardly  possible  to  assume  that  General  Korni- 
lov did  not  perceive  the  whole  absurdity  of  such  a  dictatorial 
quartet,  composed  of  Kornilov,  Kerensky,  Savinkov,  and 
Filonenko!  I  am  simply  of  opinion  that  on  that  evening 
Kornilov  did  not  take  any  particular  interest  in  the  forms 
of  a  dictatorship,  since  he  understood,  or  at  least  felt,  that 
on  the  day  following  the  coup  d'etat  the  final  decision  would 
belong  to  him  who  would  remain  in  power. 

As  for  the  degree  of  the  participation  of  Filonenko  him- 
self in  the  conspiracy,  I  am  rather  inclined  to  think  that 
he,  as  well  as  Lukomsky,  for  instance,  was  dragged  into  the 
affair  at  the  last  moment,  being  placed  before  the  fact  and 
bound  by  his  boastful  loquacity.  It  is  not  impossible,  how- 
ever, that  a  careful  judicial  inquiry  would  have  revealed 
that  Filonenko  had  been  more  deeply  concerned  in  the  con- 
spiracy. At  any  rate,  it  is  very  difficult  to  clear  up  Filo- 
nenko's part  at  Headquarters,  because  on  the  one  hand  his 
conduct  was  very  slippery,  while  on  the  other  hand  the 


THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM  ^07 

attitude  of  Headquarters  towards  him  was  rather  change- 
able. Now  he  was  persona  grata  with  Kornilov ;  now  they 
could  hardly  put  up  with  him;  now  he  was  ordered  to  be 
arrested,  and  now  he  was  given  a  special  train  to  start  for 
Petrograd.  According  to  the  witnesses,  he  was  now  attack- 
ing me,  now  insisting  that  no  Government  was  possible 
without  me;  now  he  demanded  the  removal  of  Lukomsky, 
and  now  he  would  discuss  together  with  him  and  Kornilov 
the  composition  of  the  future  Cabinet  in  which  he  claimed 
the  post  of  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs,  and  would  only 
at  worst  "  agree "  to  act  as  Minister  of  the  Interior. 
Lukomsky  writes,  as  far  as  I  remember,  that  in  all  his  re- 
lations with  Kornilov,  Filonenko  manifested  complete  agree- 
ment with  all  his  schemes  and  used  to  say  that  he  was 
going  hand  in  hand  with  him,  while  at  the  same  time  "  they 
did  not  trust "  Filonenko  at  Headquarters. 

Even  about  the  arrest  of  Filonenko  two  versions  are  in 
existence.  According  to  one,  he  himself  asked  to  be  ar- 
rested, since  "as  a  representative  of  the  Provisional  Gov- 
ernment he  ought  to  be  on  its  side,  whereas  he  sympathized 
with  his  whole  heart  with  Kornjlov."  According  to  the 
other  version,  "  on  noticing  a  complete  change  in  Filonenko 
and  taking  account  of  the  circumstances.  General  Kornilov 
announced  that  he  detained  him  at  Headquarters."  What 
was  happening?  On  the  morning  of  the  27th,  on  receipt 
of  my  telegram  dismissing  Kornilov,  there  gathered  in  his 
study  Lukomsky,  Zavoiko,  Aladin,  and  Filonenko.  They 
discussed  the  position  that  had  been  created,  when  Filo- 
nenko stated  in  the  course  of  the  conversation  that  he  had 
to  start  for  Petrograd,  whither  he  had  been  summoned. 
After  the  conclusion  of  the  conversation,  Kornilov  and 
Lukomsky  left  the  study  and  went  away  together.  Imme- 
diately afterwards  Zavoiko  came  out  of  the  study  into  j^e 


208     THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM 

hall,  telling  those  present  that  "  Filonenko  had  just  asked 
to  be  arrested."  On  the  other  hand,  Lukomsky,  on  meet- 
ing Trubetzkoy,  told  him  that  "  Filonenko  had  been  put  on 
parole  not  to  leave  the  place."  Filonenko  himself  posi- 
tively asserts  that  it  was  not  he  who  asked  to  be  arrested, 
but  that  he  was  detained  by  Kornilov,  and  that  this  happened 
during  that  morning  conversation  in  Kornilov's  study.  Lu- 
komsky's  confirmation  of  the  words  of  Filonenko  renders 
the  latter's  story  more  credible. 

Now,  what  made  Zavoiko  represent  Filonenko  in  the 
character  of  the  wife  of  the  non-commissioned  officer  in 
Gogol's  "  Re  visor,"  who,  according  to  the  excuse  of  the 
local  Governor,  had  inflicted  a  flogging  upon  herself? 
Why  does  Filonenko's  role  appear  so  slippery  and  change- 
able at  Headquarters  ?  Why,  after  sending  on  August  27th 
from  Headquarters  a  telegram  to  Petrograd  upon  the  neces- 
sity of  retaining  Kornilov  in  the  post  of  Supreme  Com- 
mander-in-Chief and  of  arriving  at  an  agreement  with  him, 
did  Filonenko,  when  he  succeeded  in  getting  to  Petrograd, 
issue  there  a  fighting  proclamation  against  Kornilov  ?  For 
want  of  sufficient  evidence  I  am  unable  to  give  a  definite 
reply.  At  any  rate,  Filonenko's  behaviour  at  Headquarters, 
as  Commissary  of  the  Provisional  Government  with  the 
Supreme  Commander-in-Chief,  urgently  needed  a  judicial 
investigation,  and  I  feel  no  compunction  for  having  wished 
to  arrest  him.] 

Shahlovsky. —  Was  the  advancement  in  Filonenko's  serv- 
ice career  occasioned  by  his  personal  qualities  as  well,  or 
was  he  merely  a  protege  of  Savinkov? 

Kerensky. —  Before  meeting  him  during  the  retreat  and 
the  operations  on  the  South-western  front,  Savinkov  knew 
him  very  little.     I  remember,  at  least,  that  before  being 


THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM  209 

appointed  to  the  army  Filonenko  referred  me  to  Savinkov, 
whereas  Savinkov  afterwards  told  me  that  he  knew  very 
little  of  him.  Filonenko  was  one  of  those  young  military 
men  who  had  done  much  for  the  organization  of  the  army 
Commissariats  and  for  dispatching  to  the  front  Commis- 
saries who  undertook  to  act  there  not  only  by  persuasion, 
but  also  by  personal  participation  in  the  battles.  These 
were  the  **  Commissaries  of  personal  example."  He  per- 
sonally displayed  great  courage  in  the  8th  Army  during 
the  offensive  and  the  retirements.  There  at  the  front  Savin- 
kov and  Filonenko  evidently  became  intimate.  Later  on, 
when  Kornilov's  appointment  became  inevitable,  in  view  of 
his  **  peculiarities  "  I  wanted  to  appoint  Savinkov  as  Su- 
preme Commissary  with  him.  I  did  not  go  any  further 
than  that.  Savinkov,  however,  pointed  out  that  it  would 
be  more  correct  to  have  Filonenko  as  Commissary,  since 
the  latter  had  got  accustomed  to  the  ways  of  Kornilov, 
with  whom  he  had  been  working.  I  saw  Filonenko  once 
or  twice  at  Petrograd  in  the  spring,  and  also  when  I  spent 
a  day^  in  the  sector  of  the  8th  Army,  but  hardly  ever  had 
a  talk  with  him.  I  also  saw  him  at  Headquarters  and  in 
the  train,  after  the  conference  of  the  i6th  of  July.  Then 
it  was  that  a  commissary  had  for  the  first  time  to  be  ap- 
pointed with  the  Supreme  Commander-in-Chief,  for  the  pur- 
pose, among  other  things,  of  being  always  sure  as  to  the 
correctness  of  the  political  course  at  Headquarters,  in  view 
of  the  peculiarities  in  the  character  of  General  Kornilov. 
I  had  wished  that  Savinkov,  who  had  originally  been  in- 
tended to  act  as  Supreme  Commissary,  should  control  and 
direct  this  political  and  public  work.  When  Savinkov  was 
appointed  Deputy  Minister  of  War,  the  question  as  to  the 
personality  of  the  Commissary  with  the  Supreme  Com- 


^10  THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM 

mander-in-Chief  became  a  matter  of  indifference  to  me, 
since  the  direction  of  the  political  work  at  Headquarters 
remained  in  the  hands  of  SavinkoV. 


§26 

Shdblovsky, —  We  were  impressed  in  Savinkov's  depo- 
sition by  his  support  of  Filonenko.  He  even  identified 
himself  with  him.  When  you  wished  to  set  Filonenko  aside, 
Savinkov  almost  coupled  it  with  his  own  retirement. 

Kerensky. —  Yes,  I  told  Savinkov :  "  I  trust  you  com- 
pletely; I  think  that  you  might  commit  errors,  but  I  do 
not  doubt  in  the  least  your  devotion  to  the  Revolution, 
whereas  Filonenko  I  do  not  know  at  all."  In  this  case,  too, 
Savinkov's  special  feature  of  standing  up  to  the  very  end 
for  men  "  devoted  "  to  him  manifested  itself.  Every  time 
he  put  the  question  about  Filonenko  as  if  it  concerned  his 
own  person.  When  I  suggested  to  Filonenko  to  cease  im- 
mediately the  execution  of  his  service  duties,  Savinkov 
brought  up  the  question  of  his  own  retirement,  so  that  I 
had  to  postpone  for  a  while  Filonenko's  official  retirement 
[as  I  did  not  want  to  lose  Savinkov].  I  considered  it, 
however,  impossible  to  retain  Filonenko  in  office,  and  Savin- 
kov retired  almost  immediately.  He  declared  to  me  cate- 
gorically that  he  did  not  wish  to  serve  with  me  any  longer, 
as  he  did  not  approve  of  the  new  appointments  of  Verk- 
hovsky  and  Verderevsky,  and  absolutely  insisted  on  re- 
signing. 

[With  regard  to  Filonenko's  confession,  there  might  arise 
the  puzzling  question  as  to  why,  when  Filonenko  spoke  of 
"  our  scheme,"  that  is  to  say,  not  only  of  his  own  scheme 
but  also  that  of  Savinkov,  I  wanted  to  arrest  Filonenko 
alone  and  told  only  him  to  resign  ?     I  must  answer  straight 


THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM  211 

out:  because  I  was  perfectly  sure  that  Savinkov  had  no 
part  whatever  in  the  conspiracy,  and  I  interpreted  these 
words  of  Filonenko  as  a  mere  attempt  to  justify  before 
Savinkov  his  participation  in  an  inadmissible  and  criminal 
conversation.  At  the  same  time,  I  only  saw  in  Savinkov's 
persistent  and  hopeless  attempt  in  my  study  to  put  in  the 
mouth  of  Filonenko  such  words  as  the  latter  had  never 
uttered,  a  passionate  desire  to  save  Filonenko. 

That  gavinkov  was  by  no  means  initiated  into  that 
conversation  at  Headquarters  may  be  gathered,  first,  from 
the  fact  that  even  on  the  23rd  and  the  24th  of  August  he 
was  carrying  on  at  Headquarters  a  struggle  with  the  Main 
Committee  of  the  Officers'  League  and  with  the  political 
section  of  Headquarters  (at  the  head  of  which  was  a  mem- 
ber of  the  same  Main  Committee  of  the  Officers'  League, 
Captain  S.) — that  is  to  say,  with  the  two  organizations, 
numerous  members  of  which  were  active  participators  in 
the  events;  secondly,  from  the  fact  that  General  Kornilov 
personally  deceived  Savinkov  on  the  question  of  Krimov 
and  of  the  Native  Caucasian  Division  (as  far  as  I  remem- 
ber, even  the  very  presence  of  Krimov  at  Headquarters 
remained  unknown  to  Savinkov)  ;  thirdly,  from  the  fact 
that  even  at  the  most  critical  moment,  after  Lukomsky's 
telegram  on  Lvov's  and  Savinkov's  proposals,  at  the  latter's 
direct  declaration  that  the  reference  made  to  him  was  a 
calumny,  Kornilov  was  not  only  unable  to  make  any  re- 
joinder, but  was  compelled  silently  to  admit  it;  fourthly, 
from  the  circumstance  that  Savinkov  had  never  been  in 
close  intercourse  with  Zavoiko  and  Aladin,  and  could  not 
endure  the  former  at  all,  looking  upon  him  with  great 
suspicion  and  avoiding  him,  while  on  the  one  occasion  he  had 
even  obtained  his  temporary  relegation;  fifthly,  from  the 
fact  that  Savinkov  was  himself  suspecting  and  trying  to  dis- 


218     THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM 

cover  the  conspiracy  at  Headquarters,  though  making  a 
reservation  about  Kornilov  himself,  whom  he  considered  to 
be  a  patriot  and  "  a  stranger  to  poHtics  " ;  and  sixthly,  from 
the  fact  that  from  the  27th  to  the  30th  of  August  Savinkov 
did  not  hesitate  for  a  single  moment  on  whose  side  he 
ought  to  stand. 

In  order  to  illustrate  the  character  of  the  mutual  relations 
of  Kornilov  and  Savinkov  and  of  my  own  part  in  their 
relationship,  I  shall  quote  a  few  extracts  from  Savinkov's 
conversations  with  Kornilov,  as  written  down  by  Savinkov 
himself : — 

**  Lavr  Georgievitch,''  Savinkov  said  to  Kornilov  on 
August  23rd,  "  I  should  like  to  speak  with  you  in  private." 
(At  these  words,  Lukomsky  and  Filonenko  got  up  and  left 
the  room. )  "  The  matter  is  this :  the  telegrams  lately  re- 
ceived by  the  Ministry  and  signed  by  various  persons  be- 
longing to  the  Headquarters  Staff,  I  must  tell  you  frankly, 
inspire  me  with  alarm.  These  telegrams  frequently  treat 
of  questions  of  a  political  character,  and  that  in  an  inadmis- 
sible tone.  I  have  stated  to  you  already  that  I  am  convinced 
that  you  will  loyally  support  the  Provisional  Government, 
and  will  not  go  against  it.  But  I  cannot  say  the  same  about 
your  Staff." 

Kornilov. — ''I  must  tell  you  that  I  do  not  trust  any 
longer  Kerensky  and  the  Provisional  Government.  The 
latter  has  not  the  strength  to  stand  on  the  ground  of  firm 
authority  which  alone  can  save  the  country.  As  for  Ker- 
ensky, he  is  not  only  weak  and  vacillating,  but  even  insincere. 
He  insulted  me  undeservedly  [at  the  Moscow  Conference]. 
Moreover,  he  carried  on  conversations  behind  my  back  with 
Tcheremissov,  and  wanted  to  appoint  him  Supreme  Com- 
mander-in-Chief." [Nothing  of  the  kind  ever  happened. 
—A.  K.] 


THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM  gl3 

Savinkov. — "  It  seems  to  me  that  in  questions  of  State 
there  is  no  room  for  personal  grievances.  As  for  Ker- 
ensky,  I  can't  share  your  opinion  about  him.  I  know 
Kerensky." 

Kornilov. — "The  composition  of  the  Government  ought 
to  be  altered." 

Savinkov. — "  As  far  as  I  know,  Kerensky  is  of  the  same 
opinion.*' 

Kornilov, — "It  is  necessary  that  Kerensky  should  not 
meddle  with  affairs." 

Savinkov. — "  This  is  impossible  at  present,  even  if  it  were 
necessary." 

Kornilov. — '*  It  is  necessary  that  Alexeiev,  Plekhanov 
and  Argunov  should  be  in  the  Government." 

Savinkov. — "  It  is  necessary  rather  that  the  Soviet  So- 
cialists should  be  replaced  by  non-Soviet  Socialists.  Is  that 
what  you  mean  ?  " 

Kornilov. — "  Yes ;  the  Soviets  have  proved  their  imprac- 
ticability and  their  inability  to  defend  the  country." 

Savinkov. — "  All  that  is  a  matter  for  the  future.  You 
are  dissatisfied  with  the  Government;  talk  it  over  with 
Kerensky.  At  any  rate,  you  must  admit  that  without  Ker- 
ensky at  its  head  no  Government  is  conceivable." 

Kornilov. — "  I  shall  not  enter  the  Government.  You  are 
right,  of  course,  that  without  Kerensky  at  its  head  no  Gov- 
ernment is  conceivable.  But  Kerensky  is  vacillating;  he 
hesitates:  he  promises  and  does  not  fulfil  his  promises." 

Savinkov. — "  This  is  not  correct.  Allow  me  to  inform 
you  that  during  the  six  days  that  elapsed  since  the  Moscow 
Conference,  at  which  Kerensky  declared  that  he  was  adopt- 
ing methods  of  firm  authority,  the  Ministry  of  War  did 
much,  namely  ..." 

This  conversation  took  place  on  the  23rd  of  August. 


214     THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM 

Here  are  some  extracts  from  a  conversation  on  the  follow- 
ing day: — 

Kornilov. — "Very  well,  I  shall  not  appoint  Krimov." 

Savinkov, — "  Alexander  Feodorovitch  [Kerensky]  would 
like  you  to  appoint  General  D." 

Kornilov. — *'  Alexander  Feodorovitch  has  the  right  of 
objecting  to  an  appointment,  but  he  cannot  instruct  me 
whom  to  appoint." 

Savinkov. — "  Alexander  Feodorovitch  does  not  instruct 
you,  he  only  requests." 

Kornilov. — **  I  shall  appoint  D.  Chief  of  the  Staff." 

Savinkov. — "  And  what  about  the  Native  Division  ?  ** 

Kornilov. — "  I  shall  replace  it  by  the  regular  cavalry." 

Savinkov. — **  Many  thanks.  Alexander  Feodorovitch 
also  charged  me  to  request  you  to  detach  for  his  disposal 
Colonel  Pronin  [Assistant  President  of  the  Main  Commit- 
tee of  the  Officers'  League]." 

Kornilov. — "Pronin!  What  for?  I  understand.  It  is 
a  concealed  arrest!  I  shall  not  let  Pronin  go.  Give  me 
proofs,  and  I  will  arrest  Pronin  myself." 

Savinkov. — "  Very  well.  I  shall  report  it  in  that  way 
to  Alexander  Feodorovitch." 

Kornilov. — "  Certainly." 

(Follows  the  conversation  about  Mironov,  which  I  have 
already  quoted.) 

Savinkov. — "  Will  you  allow  me,  Lavr  Georgievitch,  to 
come  back  to  yesterday's  conversation  ?  What  is  your  atti- 
tude towards  the  Provisional  Government  ?  " 

Kornilov. — "  Tell  Alexander  Feodorovitch  that  I  shall 
support  him  in  every  way,  for  the  welfare  of  the  Father- 
land requires  it." 

Savinkov. — "Lavr  Georgievitch!     I  am  happy  to  hear 


THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM  215 

these  words.     I  never  doubted  you.     I  shall  tell  Alexander 
Feodorovitch  what  you  have  just  said.'* 

After  this  conversation,  Savinkov,  reassured  and  confi- 
dent with  regard  to  Kornilov,  leaves  at  3  p.  m.  for  Petro- 
grad.  But  a  few  hours  after  his  departure  there  takes  place 
the  reception  of  V.  N,  Lvov,  to  whom  is  made  the  famous  > 
declaration  for  communication  to  me.  .  .  .  Such  was  the 
sincerity  and  truthfulness  of  Kornilov,  even  in  his  relations 
with  Savinkov!  Trying  to  explain  somehow  to  Savinkov 
the  duplicity  of  his  conduct,  Kornilov,  when  conversing ' 
with  him  by  direct  line  on  the  27th  of  August,  says: 
"  After  your  departure  I  received  alarming  news  on  the 
position  of  affairs  at  the  front  and  at  the  rear.*'  And  this 
within  the  three  or  four  hours  which  had  elapsed  between 
Kornilov's  taking  leave  of  Savinkov  at  the  station  and  Lvov's 
call  at  his  study!  Let  us  suppose  it  was  so.  But  when 
General  Kornilov  enumerates  the  new  alarming  news 
(which,  by  the  by,  contained  nothing  that  was  new),  he 
does  not  mention  any  particular  news  he  had  received  dur- 
ing those  hours  from  Petrograd.  Why  then  did  he  not 
at  least  warn  Savinkov  personally,  at  the  station,  that  on 
the  strength  of  "  exact  information  "  from  Petrograd  he 
considered  the  position  to  be  "  extremely  threatening  "  and 
the  presence  of  myself  and  of  Savinkov  at  Petrograd  to  be 
**  very  dangerous  "  for  both  of  us? 

Why  then,  after  his  most  friendly  last  interview  with 
Savinkov,  did  Kornilov  think  it  necessary,  not  only  to  com- 
municate such  alarming  news  through  a  man  who  called 
by  chance,  but  even  to  *'  guarantee  "  through  him  the  com- 
plete "  safety  "  of  our  stay  at  Headquarters?  The  wisest 
man  will  fail  to  solve  this  enigmatical  conduct  of  Kornilov, 
so  long  as  he  assumes  that  he  has  to  deal  with  a  sincere  and 


216     THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM 

truthful  soldier  who  is  a  "  stranger  to  politics."  But  to 
any  one  who  seeks  the  truth  impartially,  this  day  of  August 
24th  throws  a  deeper  light  on  the  events  than  a  whole 
bundle  of  documents.  He  would  perceive  how,  while  he 
was  conversing  *'  sincerely  "  with  Savinkov,  matters  were 
—  not  being  talked  about  but  being  done  with  Krimov, 
Zavoiko,  and  other  initiated  persons. 

Savinkov  is  guilty  indeed,  but  not  of  any  conspiracy  with 
Kornilov,  nor,  as  Alexeiev  imagines,  of  my  having  been 
previously  "informed"  through  him  of  Kornilov's  move; 
his  guilt  was  that  while  being  utterly  unconscious  of  the 
character  and  the  real  intentions  of  Kornilov,  he  unwittingly 
assisted  him  in  his  struggle  for  power  by  putting  forward 
Kornilov  as  a  political  force  with  rights  equal  to  those  of 
the  Government.  He  is  also  guilty  of  having,  while  at 
Headquarters,  exceeded  the  powers  granted  to  him,  and  of 
having,  besides  acting  in  the  capacity  of  my  nearest  assist- 
ant, also  undertaken  special  political  tasks  on  his  own 
account.  He  is  guilty  in  that,  being  insufficiently  informed 
with  regard  to  the  general  condition  of  the  State,  and 
being  unable  after  a  long  exile  abroad  to  find  his  way  as 
yet  in  the  complicated  political  relations  and  the  real  dis- 
positions of  the  masses,  he  self-confidently  began  to  carry 
on  a  personal  policy,  without  taking  into  account  the  experi- 
ence and  the  plans  even  of  those  who,  by  advancing  him 
to  an  exceptionally  responsible  post,  had  taken  upon  them- 
selves formal  responsibility  for  his  entire  activity  as  a  states- 
man. 

But,  whatever  my  personal  estimate  of  such  conduct  on 
the  part  of  Savinkov,  I  must  decidedly  protest  against  the 
declaration  made  with  reference  to  him  at  the  fourth  Con- 
ference of  the  Social  Revolutionary  Party  by  V.  M.  Tcher- 
nov  on  November  28th  of  last  year,  to  the  effect  that  in 


THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM  ^17 

the  Kdftiilov  affair  "a  more  than  equivocal,  one  may  say 
a  treacherous,  part  had  fallen  to  the  share  of  a  man  who 
had  been  once  a  member  of  the  Social  Revolutionary  Party." 
The  Kornilov  case  affords  no  data  whatever  for  such  a 
declaration.  To  hurl  a  similar,  more  than  careless,  accusa- 
tion was  especially  unpardonable  at  a  time  when  Russia,  in 
November  last,  was  living  through  an  orgy  of  bloodthirsty 
instincts ! 

Just  because  I  knew  that  Savinkov  was  not  concerned 
in  the  conspiracy,  it  never  occurred  to  me  to  dismiss  Savin- 
kov along  with  Filonenko.  Savinkov  himself,  however, 
continued  with  particular  insistence  to  take  Filonenko's 
part,  and  after  the  morning  of  the  29th  of  August  I  sav/ 
that  he  was  only  looking  out  for  a  pretext  for  retiring. 
Such  a  pretext  was  found  by  him  in  my  "  lack  of  correct- 
ness towards  him"  (which  I  shall  not  touch  upon  here, 
as  it  is  a  purely  personal  question),  and  in  the  appoint- 
ment of  Verkhovsky  and  Verderevsky  as  Ministers  of  War 
and  of  Marine  respectively. 

Against  the  latter  reason  for  his  resignation  on  principle 
I  could  not  raise  any  objection,  whereas  now  I  must  admi 
that  Savinkov's  negative  attitude  towards  those  appoint- 
ments has  been  justified  by  the  facts,  since  the  results  that 
were  expected  from  appointing  in  my  place  "  real  "  military 
men  have  in  no  way  been  obtained.  It  ought  to  be  recog- 
nized, however,  that  between  Verkhovsky  and  Verderevsky 
there  existed  an  essential  difference.  The  clever  and  most 
diplomatic  Verderevsky  perfectly  understood  the  position 
created  by  Kornilovism,  and  wanted  to  save  whatever  could 
still  be  saved.  He  considered  it  to  be  his  chief  task  to  pro- 
tect the  still  uninjured  naval  officers  from  any  further 
lynchings  and  final  extermination.  This  explains  his  exces- 
sive opportunism  in  his  relations  with  the  sailors'  organiza- 


218     THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM 

tions.  But  vAiile  "kicking  off*'  somehow  the  inrush  of 
the  rank  and  file,  Verderevsky  devoted  himself  entirely 
to  the  task  of  working  out  and  preparing  a  number  of 
important  measures  intended  to  attempt  during  the  winter 
the  restoration  of  the  fighting  capacity  of  the  navy.  Gen- 
eral Verkhovsky,  on  the  other  hand,  was  not  only  quite 
unable  to  master  the  situation,  but  could  not  even  grasp 
it.  He  was  caught  up  by  the  political  gamblers  of  the 
Left,  and  he  rapidly  floated  without  sail  and  rudder  straight 
towards  catastrophe!  There  may  be  imputed  to  me  with 
much  reason  the  guilt  of  having  appointed  Verkhovsky  to 
the  post  of  Minister  of  War,  and  I  accept  that  reproach. 
This  was  the  most  unlucky  of  all  the  appointments :  Verk- 
hovsky introduced  into  his  activity  a  vague  element  of 
comedy.  Nevertheless,  not  by  way  of  justifying  myself, 
but  merely  as  a  matter  of  fact,  I  ought  to  say  that,  previous 
to  his  being  appointed  Minister  of  War,  Verkhovsky  had 
appeared  a  somewhat  different  personality.  I  shall  not 
speak  of  his  activity  at  Sebastopol  and  before,  but  even  on 
August  27th,  in  a  telegram  to  Kornilov,  he  expressed  his 
solidarity  with  the  substance  of  Kornilov's  measures, 
only  protesting  against  Kornilov's  method  of  acting: 
"  One  may  and  ought  to  have  changed  the  policy,  but 
not  to  undermine  the  last  strength  of  the  people  at  a 
time  when  the  front  was  broken  through."  On  arriving 
at  Petrograd  after  his  appointment,  Verkhovsky  was  intro- 
ducing himself  to  everybody  as  a  "  Kornilovist."  Besides, 
owing  to  some  vagueness  in  the  conduct  at  the  time  of  the 
Kornilov  movement  of  other  desirable  candidates,  I  literally 
had  no  one  to  choose  from,  while  both  from  the  Right 
and  from  the  Left  there  was  a  sudden  desire  to  see  a  mili- 
tary man  at  the  post  of  Minister  of  War.] 


THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM  ^19 

§27 

Shablovsky. —  Did  the  Government  possess  any  data 
when  committing  Kornilov,  Lukomsky,  KisHakov,  Denikin, 
and  Markov  for  trial :  something  that  v^e  have  not  got,  any 
information  that  we  have  overlooked?  We  have  just  made 
an  inquiry  at  Petrograd,  interrogating  individual  persons, 
but  the  Government  has  perhaps  something  we  are  not  aware 
of? 

Kerensky. —  As  far  as  I  know,  all  who  had  manifested 
their  activity  after  the  formal  removal  of  Kornilov  from 
office  were  committed  for  trial.  General  Kisliakov  con- 
tinued to  give  orders.  Lukomsky  —  well,  I  think  his  posi- 
tion is  clear,  while  the  story  of  Denikin  and  Markov  is 
known  to  you. 

Shablovsky. —  Were  there  no  special  reports? 

Kerensky. —  On  the  contrary,  the  telegram  and  the  be- 
haviour of  Lukomsky  were  a  surprise  to  me.  I  did  not 
think  that  Lukomsky  would  go  that  way.  Even  now,  I 
consider  it  probable  that  Lukomsky  was  one  of  the  last 
to  join.  After  all,  the  pith  of  the  affair  lies  no  doubt  in 
Zavoiko,  Aladin  and  Co. 

Raupakh. —  The  question  just  put  by  the  Chairman  is 
of  interest  to  us,  because  the  wording  of  the  prosecution 
is  that  they  are  committed  for  trial  for  rebellion.  What 
are  the  actual  data  that  testified  to  their  participation  in 
a  rebellion? 

Kerensky. —  You  are  now  passing  to  the  question  of  a 
definition  of  the  crime  they  had  perpetrated.  We  con- 
sidered that  Kornilov's  open  disobedience  to  the  head  of 
the  Supreme  Authority  and  his  refusal  to  hand  over  his 
office,  together  with  the  appeals  and  orders  to  the  troops 
that  he  had  issued,  constituted  a  "  rebellion,'*   while  its 


ftW  THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM 

participators  and  adherents  appear  to  be  "abetting  the 
rebelHon."  A  crime  is  always  defined  by  the  acts  of  its 
chief  perpetrator.  I  do  not  know  by  what  other  method 
it  might  be  defined. 

Raupakh, —  By  the  degree  of  Kisliakov's,  Lukomsky's, 
Denikin's,  and  Markov's  participation? 

Kerensky. —  Really,  any  one  would  think  that  when  the 
Provisional  Government  proceeds  to  measures  of  prosecu- 
tion, it  appears  to  be  itself  a  rebellious  organization!  But 
this  depends  on  the  point  of  view.  As  for  myself,  I  have 
no  doubt  whatever  that  a  general,  who  allows  himself  to 
call  the  Provisional  Government  "  agents  of  the  German 
Staff,"  and  declares  himself  to  constitute  a  Government, 
is  a  rebel!  I  do  not  know  wherein  the  irregularity  of  the 
definition  consists. 

Raiipakh. —  I  do  not  object  to  the  definition;  but  were 
there  any  data  against  Denikin,  Lukomsky,  Kisliakov,  Mar- 
kov, and  others  ? 

Kerensky. —  They  continued  to  co-operate  with  the  in- 
surgent general;  these  facts  are  quite  sufficient.  When 
General  Lukomsky  is  ordered  to  take  over  the  post  of 
Supreme  Commander-in-Chief,  which  he  is  bound  in  law 
to  do,  and  to  arrest  Kornilov  in  case  of  resistance,  he  de- 
clares that  he  cannot  do  it  because  he  is  on  the  side  of 
Kornilov.     What  else  is  required? 

Chairman. —  Now  about  Novossiltsev  [the  President  of 
the  Main  Committee  of  the  Officers'  League].  Who  car- 
ried out  his  arrest ;  was  there  no  report  concerning  Novos- 
siltsev's  acts  when  he  was  arrested? 

Kerensky. —  Novossiltsev  was  arrested  on  the  local  ini- 
tiative. 

Chairman. —  He  was  the  President  of  the  Main  Commit- 
tee; so  was  he  not  present  at  Headquarters? 


THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM  m 

Kerensky. —  He  had  just  left  at  the  time. 

Chairman. —  It  looks  as  if  there  had  also  been  an  order 
from  here  for  his  arrest. 

Kerensky. —  I  think  that  if  there  had  been  such  an  order 
it  would  have  been  of  an  administrative  character.  The 
Government,  the  Premier  and  the  Minister  of  the  Interior 
have  the  right  to  arrest  any  one,  if  we  consider  it  to  be 
necessary. 

Chairman. —  I  only  meant  to  ask  for  information;  per- 
haps, sir,  you  possess  some? 

Kerensky. —  Exact  information?  No.  Personally  I  am 
convinced  (under  the  conditions  of  our  detective  system  it 
will  perhaps  be  impossible  to  prove  it)  that  a  portion  of 
the  Officers'  League,  and  especially  of  its  Main  Committee, 
was  very  closely  connected  with  all  the  attempts,  including 
this  one.  I  have  already  said  that  in  the  preparations  that 
were  made  here,  at  Petrograd,  a  portion  of  the  Officers' 
League  had  taken  part.  I  will  not  mention  what  may  be 
called  the,  so  to  say,  **  legal "  telegrams,  which  were  all 
signed  by  Novossiltsev.  How  did  he  behave  during  this 
afifair?  If  he  had  not  left,  I  think  .  .  .  Suppose,  for  in- 
stance, that  de  Semiterre  were  now  to  make  his  appearance 
(after  hiding  himself  when  they  wanted  to  arrest  him, 
which  confirmed  the  suspicions  to  some  extent)  ;  suppose  he 
were  to  put  in  an  appearance  now,  he  would  be  reinstated 
in  his  office  in  the  nicest  way,  for  he  is  an  officer  of  the 
General  Staff  and  ought  to  be  supported,  whereas  we,  the 
Government,  are,  of  course,  incapable  of  displaying  any- 
thing but  open  partiality  and  arbitrariness!  He  could  re- 
main in  the  service ! 

[According  to  trustworthy  information,  de  Semiterre  was 
one  of  the  chief  agents  of  the  conspiracy  at  Petrograd. 
There  "  passed "  through  his  hands  those  persons   who 


THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM 

were  sent  from  Headquarters  and  from  the  fronts  to  the 
capital  "  for  purposes  of  co-operation."  He  kept  one  of 
the  secret  rendezvous  where  the  conspirators  *'  reported," 
and  so  on.  The  moment  before  the  competent  authorities 
arrived  at  his  flat  to  search  it  and  arrest  him,  he  started 
for  Finland.  Unfortunately,  the  technical  side  of  the  con- 
spiracy for  preparing  the  movement  has  remained,  so  far 
as  I  know,  utterly  neglected  in  the  labours  of  the  Com- 
mission of  Inquiry.  That  is  why  the  personalities  of 
Zavoiko,  Aladin,  and  similar  persons  have  become  excess- 
ively prominent  in  this  case.  It  is  only  the  episode  with 
Krimov  that  lifts  a  little  the  curtain  from  the  technical 
side  of  the  case.  This  blank  may  be  explained,  not  only 
by  the  great  cohesion  of  that  milieu  which  directed  the 
military  and  technical  side  of  the  conspiracy,  but  also  by 
the  fact  that,  under  the  influence  of  the  "  counter-attacks  " 
("provocations,"  "misunderstandings,"  etc.),  made  at  the 
time,  and  of  the  clever  campaign  of  defence  carried  out 
in  the  Press,  in  conformity  to  the  German  rule  that  "an 
offensive  is  the  best  defensive,"  the  attention  of  the  Com- 
mission of  Inquiry  was,  in  spite  of  themselves,  chiefly  con- 
centrated on  those  sides  of  the  affair  in  which  public  opinion 
had  taken  a  particular  interest  at  the  time.  In  the  mean- 
time, the  possibility  of  penetrating  by  the  still  fresh  traces 
into  the  very  laboratory  of  the  conspiracy  vanished.  In 
referring  to  Semiterre,  as  a  reply  to  the  question  about 
Novossiltsev,  I  meant  to  lay  stress  on  my  having  had  no 
doubt  as  to  Novossiltsev's  participation  in  Kornilov's  move- 
ment, and  to  point  out  at  the  same  time  to  the  Commission 
of  Inquiry  what  solid  grounds  we  considered  absolutely 
indispensable  before  proceeding  to  take  measures  of  pre- 
caution by  administrative  order. 

Generally  speaking,  it  may  be  noticed  from  the  text  of 


THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM  223 

the  stenogram  that  at  this  point  of  the  examination  I  was 
speaking  in  a  somewhat  irritable  tone.  I  confess  that  I 
was  irritated  at  the  excessive  impartiality  of  some  members 
of  the  Commission,  which  was  already  assuming  the  shape 
of  an  open  inclination  not  to  see  anything  criminal  in  the 
activity  of  the  persons  which  were  prosecuted  in  connection 
with  the  Kornilov  case.  In  this  mood  of  a  part  of  the 
Commission  I  perceived  an  infringement  of  the  almost 
single  instruction  I  had  given  to  the  Commission  of  Inquiry 
at  the  outset  of  its  work :  "  to  carry  on  the  inquiry  with- 
out giving  way  to  any  outside  influences."  I  think  that 
the  whole  character  of  my  examination  testifies  sufficiently 
to  the  fact  that  the  Commission  was  more  than  free  from 
any  "  influence  *'  on  the  part  of  the  Government.  I  was 
of  opinion  that  even  for  the  sake  of  its  own  dignity  the 
Commission  should  not  have  allowed  its  individual  mem- 
bers to  reveal  in  their  questions  traces  of  the  infliuence 
of  that  public  opinion  which  was  pro-Kornilovist. 

I  gave  two  more  instructions  to  the  Commission  of  In- 
quiry. In  my  telegram  of  the  2nd  of  September,  No.  8887, 
addressed  to  the  Chairman  of  the  Commission,  in  which 
I  referred  to  the  inadmissibility  of  "  influences,"  I  in- 
structed  him  to  carry  on  the  inquiry  "  in  the  most  energetic 
manner  and  to  finish  it  in  the  shortest  term."  The  third 
and  last  instruction  that  was  given  by  me  to  the  Chair- 
man of  the  Commission,  verbally,  was  to  the  effect  that 
the  Commission  of  Inquiry  should  confine  its  work  when 
dealing  with  the  military  element,  to  investigating,  as  far 
as  possible,  only  the  culpability  of  the  chief  participators. 
These  two  last  instructions  I  gave  because  I  considered  it 
to  be  indispensable  to  paralyse  within  the  shortest  term 
the  influence  upon  the  army  of  what  was  probably  the 
most  terrible  consequence  of  Kornilovism,  viz.  the  revival 


^24  THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM 

within  the  army  of  the  distrust  by  the  rank  and  file  of  the 
whole  body  of  officers.] 


§28 

Chairman. —  To  come  back  to  newspaper  paragraphs: 
we  have  had  no  deposition  by  Alexeiev,  whereas  the  news- 
papers mentioned  an  order  given  to  Colonel  Korotkov  to 
take  Mohilev.     Was  such  an  order  given? 

Kerensky. —  Yes,  it  was  like  this :  my  plan,  which  happily 
was  accomplished,  consisted  in  settling  the  Kornilov  episode 
as  far  as  possible  in  a  peaceful  manner  without  any  excesses. 
We  summoned  General  Alexeiev,  who  undertook  this  most 
difficult  mission.  But  precisely  at  that  time  we  were  be- 
sieged by  a  number  of  — 

Chairman. —  Of  demands? 

Kerensky. —  Not  only  demands,  but  also  items  of  in- 
formation, which  later  proved  to  have  been  partly  fanciful, 
such  as  Mohilev  being  surrounded  by  fortifications ;  artillery 
and  machine  guns  being  placed  in  position  on  the  slopes  of 
"  Governor's  Mount  "  and  in  the  Governor's  garden.  More- 
over, unauthorized  detachments  of  troops  began  to  arise 
everywhere,  tending  towards  Mohilev  in  order  to  suppress 
Kornilov.     Ultimately  the  Moscow  Military  District  — 

Chairman. —  With  regard  to  the  movement  of  that 
echelon  — 

Kerensky. —  The  commander  of  the  Moscow  Military 
District,  even  after  General  Alexeiev  had  left  for  Head- 
quarters, insisted  most  categorically  that  he  should  be  al- 
lowed to  move  immediately  a  mixed  detachment  of  infan- 
try, artillery,  and  cavalry  in  the  direction  of  Mohilev,  and 
when  Korotkov's  detachment  appeared  at  Orsha  on  its  own 
initiative,  I  sent  a  telegram  to  Colonel  Korotkov  to  the 


THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM  225 

effect  that  he  should  prepare  and  organize  an  offensive,  but 
should  only  act  in  agreement  with  Alexeiev.  In  this  way 
everything  was  brought  into  a  certain  shape. 

Chairman. —  So  that  all  this  movement  of  separate  units, 
and  particularly  of  the  one  organized  by  the  Moscow  Mili- 
tary District,  was  duly  obeying  the  Provisional  Govern- 
ment ? 

Kerensky. —  We  had  to  act  cautiously  in  certain  respects. 
Personally,  I  did  not  particularly  believe  all  these  items  of 
information,  but  at  any  rate  it  was  necessary  to  take  all 
these  rumours  into  account.  Supposing  we  had  not  taken 
any  measures,  and  afterwards  these  rumours  had  turned 
out  to  be  true,  I  would  then  have  definitely  proved  to  be 
"a  traitor  and  a  counter-revolutionary."  The  only  thing 
that  turned  out  to  be  true  was  that  a  state  of  siege  had  been 
proclaimed  at  Mohilev  and  that  a  rather  serious  state  of 
terror  had  prevailed  there.  Kornilov  declared  outright  that 
whoever  was  against  him  would  be  shot.  Strictly  speaking, 
this  saves  all  the  participators  of  the  rebellion,  since  every 
one  of  them  is  now  able  to  claim  that  he  had  been  acting 
under  the  terror  created  at  Mohilev. 

[The  peaceful  settling  of  Kornilov *s  rebellion  at  Head- 
quarters is  one  of  those  recollections  which  affords  me  the 
greatest  moral  satisfaction.  Just  as  at  the  very  outset  of 
the  Revolution,  it  became  now  necessary  to  protect  at  any 
cost  the  life  of  individuals  from  savage  lynchings,  and 
this  I  did.  After  some  hesitation  I  insisted  on  General 
Alexeiev's  acceptance  of  the  post  of  Chief  of  Staff  of  the 
Supreme  Commander.  In  spite  of  all  the  irritation  against 
Alexeiev  in  large  democratic  circles,  notwithstanding  his 
obstinate  personal  refusals  for  forty-eight  hours,  until  the 
real  correlation  of  forces  had  revealed  itself,  I  kept  on 
insisting  on  his  accepting  that  office,  as  soon  as  I  realized 


226  THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM 

that  only  Alexeiev,  owing  to  his  connections  at  Headquarters 
and  to  his  enormous  influence  among  the  higher  miUtary 
circles,  could  carry  out  successfully  the  task  of  transferring 
the  command  painlessly  into  new  hands  from  those  of  Kor- 
nilov.  If  I  remember  rightly,  Alexeiev  was  summoned 
early  in  the  morning  of  August  27th;  That  night  he  was 
already  at  Petrograd,  and  until  the  morning  of  August  30th 
he  would  not  give  any  decisive  reply  to  the  offer  made  to 
him  to  take  up  the  office  of  Chief  of  Staff.  Meanwhile, 
time  was  passing;  the  question  as  to  the  Supreme  Com- 
mand remained  obscure  at  Headquarters;  in  the  very  heart 
of  the  army  there  still  remained  Kornilov,  continuing  to 
issue  technical  orders.  All  this  led  to  great  nervousness 
among  the  masses,  who  had  not  yet  recovered  their  senses 
from  the  panic  that  had  seized  them.  On  this  ground, 
the  disposition  to  start  "  by  themselves  "  to  "  do  away  "  with 
Kornilov  was  growing  more  rapidly  from  hour  to  hour, 
since  the  authorities  either  could  not  "  clear  him  away  " 
from  Headquarters  or  were  "  in  collusion ''  with  him ! 
The  position  was  becoming  truly  critical  since,  not  to 
mention  any  considerations  of  humanity  and  honour,  it 
was  impossible  to  permit  the  slightest  interruption,  and 
still  less  the  shattering,  of  the  work  of  Headquarters.  The 
procrastination  on  one  side  and  the  nervous  insistence  on 
the  other  were  becoming  quite  unbearable!  I  then  had 
to  take  recourse  to  orders  in  the  nature  of  an  ultimatum 
towards  those  who  were  dilatory,  at  the  same  time  restrain- 
ing the  nervous  volunteers  who  were  anxious  to  rush  off 
to  ''  suppress ''  Kornilov.  I  shall  quote  the  Hughesogram 
sent  on  September  ist  by  the  Chief  of  my  Military  Cab- 
inet, Baranovsky,  to  Headquarters,  which  accurately  de- 
scribes the  state  of  things  at  that  time. 
"  A.  F.  Kerensky  fixed  for  General  Alexeiev  the  term  of 


THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM  gg7 

two  hours,  which  expired  at  7.10  p.  m.,  but  there  is  no 
answer  yet.  The  Commander-in-Chief  [i.e.  Kerensky]  de- 
mands that  General  Kornilov  and  his  accompHces  should 
be  arrested  immediately,  since  any  further  delay  would 
threaten  innumerable  calamities.  The  democracy  is  excited 
without  measure,  and  keeps  on  threatening  to  break  out 
with  an  explosion,  the  consequences  of  which  it  is  not 
easy  to  foresee.  Such  an  explosion  in  the  shape  of  a  move 
on  the  part  of  the  Soviets  and  the  Bolsheviks  is  expected, 
not  only  here  at  Petrograd,  but  also  at  Moscow  and  in 
other  cities;  at  Omsk,  the  Commander  of  the  troops  has 
been  arrested  and  the  authority  has  passed  to  the  Soviets. 
The  circumstances  are  such  that  it  is  impossible  to  delay 
any  longer;  the  alternative  is  either  tardiness  and  the  ruin 
of  the  whole  work  for  saving  the  country,  or  immediate 
and  resolute  acts  and  the  arrest  of  the  persons  pointed  out 
to  you.  Then  a  struggle  will  still  be  possible.  There  is 
no  other  alternative,  A.  F.  Kerensky  expects  that  states- 
manlike wisdom  will  prompt  General  Alexeiev's  decision, 
and  that  he  will  arrive  at  it  immediately:  to  arrest  Korni- 
lov and  his  accomplices.  I  am  waiting  at  the  apparatus 
for  a  quite  definite  and  the  only  possible  answer,  to  the 
effect  that  the  persons  who  have  participated  in  the  revolt 
will  be  arrested.  You  ought  to  understand  those  political 
movements  which  arise  from  accusing  the  Government  of 
inaction  and  connivance.  It  is  impossible  to  talk  any  longer. 
It  is  necessary  to  make  up  one's  mind  and  to  act." 

A  little  later  there  came  the  answer  from  General  Alexeiev 
himself:  "About  10  p.  M,,  General  Kornilov  and  the 
others  were  arrested.'^ 

At  the  same  time  General  Verkhovsky,  already  Minister 
of  War,  requested  me,  and  almost  insisted  on  obtaining  per- 
mission, to  send  a  whole  military  expedition  to  Headquar- 


228     THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM 

ters,  and  forwarded  the  following  telegram  to  Alexeiev: — 

"I  am  starting  today  for  Headquarters  with  a  large 
armed  detachment  for  the  purpose  of  making  an  end  to  that 
mockery  of  common  sense  which  is  still  taking  place.  Kor- 
nilov  and  the  others  (whose  names  follow)  must  be  im- 
mediately arrested;  this  is  the  purpose  of  my  journey, 
which  I  consider  to  be  quite  indispensable.'* 

The  excessive  nervousness  and  aggressive  tone  of  Verk- 
hovsky  may  perhaps  be  partly  explained  by  the  conversa- 
tions which  he  had  held  on  August  24th  at  Headquarters, 
as  well  as  by  the  telegram  No.  6457  which  he  had  received 
on  August  27th  from  General  Kornilov  to  the  following 
effect :  "  At  the  present  threatening  moment,  for  the  sake 
of  avoiding  civil  war  and  not  to  give  rise  to  bloodshed 
in  the  streets  of  Moscow,  I  instruct  you  to  subordinate 
yourself  to  me  and  to  carry  out  my  orders  henceforth.'* 

To  Verkhovsky's  repeated  inquires,  as  well  as  to  those 
of  Colonel  Korotkov,  I  kept  on  enjoining  upon  them  "  to 
make  ready,"  but  not  to  start  without  my  permission. 
Only  with  the  greatest  effort  and  by  using  all  my  influence 
and  persistence,  I  managed  to  avert  possible  complications 
at  Headquarters.  Of  course,  in  General  Alexeiev's  dep- 
ositions all  this  striving  of  volunteers  towards  Headquar- 
ters is  transformed  into  some  "  ill  will "  which  wanted  at 
any  price  "  to  push  troops  against  Mohilev."  It  is  not 
difficult  to  guess  where  General  Alexeiev  is  looking  for  the 
source  of  that  ill  will!  Well,  no  matter.  Anyhow,  Gen- 
eral Alexeiev  carried  out  the  task  of  settling  the  matter 
at  Headquarters  with  which  he  had  been  entrusted.  A 
prolonged  co-operation  was  impossible  for  both  of  us. 
Alexeiev  tendered  his  resignation,  which  I  accepted  without 
raising  objections. 

Meanwhile,  I  cannot  help  remembering  that  while  I  was 


THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM  229 

Generalissimo  General  Komilov  was  constantly  guarded, 
throughout  his  detention  at  the  Bykhov  prison,  not  only  by 
soldiers,  but  also  by  his  personal  escort  of  Tekinians,  the 
very  same  with  whom,  and  with  their  machine  guns,  he  had 
come  to  me  at  the  Winter  Palace.  Such  a  double  guard 
was  instituted  by  the  Chairman  of  the  Commission  of  In- 
quiry, not  only  to  prevent  Kornilov  from  escaping,  but  also 
to  protect  him  from  being  lynched  by  the  soldiers.  I  well 
remember  how  fiercely  I  was  attacked  for  it  by  the  Press 
of  the  Left,  and  how  the  future  conniver  at  the  savage 
lynching  of  N.  N.  Dukhonin,  General  Bonch-Bruyevich, 
appeared  before  me  at  the  head  of  a  deputation  from  the 
local  Soviet  with  the  demand  "  to  remove  the  Tekinians 
from  Bykhov,"  as  the  revolutionary  garrison  did  not  trust 
them,  and  to  strengthen  the  guard  over  Kornilov.  I  felt 
indignant  at  such  behaviour  on  the  part  of  a  general  of 
the  Russian  Army  who  had  been  in  the  past  one  of  the 
most  faithful  servants  of  Tsardom,  and  wanted  to  remove 
him  from  Headquarters,  while  I  also  recollect  how  the 
honest  Dukhonin  interceded  for  him.     Such  is  fate!] 

§  29 

Chairman. —  I  have  no  general  questions  to  ask.  Per- 
haps my  colleagues  have  some  questions? 

Kolokolov. —  I  have  questions. 

Kerensky. —  I  wish  to  accompany  my  deposition  by  a 
general  conclusion.  I  think  it  will  prove  very  difficult  and 
perhaps  impossible  for  the  Commission  of  Inquiry  to  estab- 
lish the  actual  trend  of  the  events,  and  the  very  persons 
who  took  part  in  organizing  the  Kornilov  movement.  This 
is  indeed  partly  the  fault  of  the  administration  and  of  our 
Government,  that,  owing  to  the  absence  of  a  detective  de- 


230     THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM 

partment,  we  are  unable  to  furnish  you  with  such  materials, 
which  the  old  regime  could  have  supplied  you  with.  We 
are  unable  to  produce  them.  But  personally,  I  have  no 
doubt  whatever  that  behind  Kornilov  there  was  at  w^ork  a 
quite  definite  group  of  persons,  not  only  united  together 
for  the  preparation  of  the  planned  conspiracy,  but  also  in 
possession  of  large  financial  means  and  in  a  position  to  draw 
amounts  from  the  banks.  For  me  there  is  no  doubt  what- 
ever about  this. 

[General  Alexeiev's  famous  letter  to  Miliukov  of  Sep- 
tember 1 2th,  which  was  published  on  December  12,  191 7, 
in  No.  249  of  the  Izvestia  of  the  Central  Executive 
Committee  of  the  Soviets  of  the  Workmen's  and  Soldiers* 
Deputies,  has  transformed  this  subjective  conviction  of 
mine,  which  was  not  binding  upon  anybody,  into  a  visible 
matter  of  fact  which  nobody  will  be  able  to  deny.  The 
mxain  purpose  of  General  Alexeiev's  letter  claimed  to  be  that 
of  drawing  the  attention  of  the  **  honest  Press  "  to  the 
terrible  position  of  the  "  apparent  participators  in  the  con- 
spiracy '*  who  had  been  arrested  in  connection  with  the 
Kornilov  case  and  whom  the  "  invisible  participators  in 
the  conspiracy,"  the  "  masters  of  the  destinies  "  and  the 
"  wirepullers  of  the  inquiry,"  wanted  to  commit  for  trial 
before  the  most  primitive  of  all  tribunals,  a  revolutionary 
court-martial,  with  its  inevitable  death  sentence.  The  pur- 
pose of  such  wicked  actions  on  the  part  of  the  "  masters 
of  the  destinies  "  the  General  explains  very  simply :  "  The 
crime  of  Kornilov  was  no  secret  to  the  members  of  the 
Government.  This  question  had  been  discussed  with  Savin- 
kov  and  Filonenko  and  through  them  with  Kerensky.  Only 
a  primitive  revolutionary  court-martial  could  hush  up  the 
participation  of  these  persons  in  the  preliminary  negotia- 
tions and  agreements.     Savinkov  has  already  had  to  confess 


THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM  231 

it  in  the  Press.  .  .  .  Kerensky's  participation  is  indisput- 
able/' 

First  of  all,  General  Alexeiev  ought  to  have  started,  not 
merely  by  asserting,  but  by  proving  that  very  ''through 
them  with  Kerensky,"  since  up  to  that  moment  nobody  in 
the  world,  apart  from  General  Alexeiev,  had  known  any- 
thing about  that  "  through."  Secondly,  neither  before  nor 
after  September  12th  has  Sayinkov  ever  "confessed  him- 
self "  in  the  Press  as  guiTfy  of  the  conspiracy,  but  only 
referred  to  those  actual  negotiations  and  agreements  which 
Kornilov  did  not  keep,  and  which  had  nothing  to  do  with 
Kornilov*s  move.  On  what  other  ground  does  General 
Alexeiev  base  his  assertion  of  my  "  indisputable  **  partici- 
pation ?  On  the  movement  of  the  3rd  Cavalry  Corps  headed 
by  Krimov;  on  Kornilov's  telegram  No.  6394  sent  to 
Savinkov  on  the  night  of  August  27th  at  2 130  a.  m.,  con- 
cerning the  establishment  of  martial  law  at  Petrograd;  and, 
lastly,  on  Lukomsky's  telegram  No.  6406,  referring  to  an 
offer  made  to  General  Kornilov  "  in  my  name  '*  by  Savin- 
kov and  Lvov.  That  is  all.  To  anybody  who  has  made 
himself  acquainted  with  this  deposition  of  mine  and  with 
my  explanations  to  the  same,  it  must  be  clear,  I  think,, 
that  it  is  quite  impossible  to  prove  by  that  evidence  my  par- 
ticipation in  the  conspiracy,  unless  one  is  to  place  an  inten- 
tionally false  interpretation  on  the  facts.  General  Alexeiev 
could  neither  ignore  the  story  of  the  Krimov  corps  nor  the 
real  meaning  of  Lukomsky's  telegram,  nor  lastly  the  true 
reasons  for  summoning  the  troops  for  the  disposal  of  the 
Provisional  Government,  since  all  the  documents  required 
for  ascertaining  the  truth  were  accessible  to  him  in  his 
capacity  of  Chief  of  Staff  to  the  Supreme  Commander-in- 
Chief.  In  any  case,  early  in  September,  when  he  was  draft- 
ing his  confidential  denunciation,  he  had  the  opportunity  of 


^ft  THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM 

receiving  every  explanation  he  might  have  required  both 
from  the  Chairman  of  the  Commission  of  Inquiry  and  from 
myself  in  person. 

According  to  him,  "  the  invisible  participators  want  to 
destroy  the  apparent  ones,"  whom  those  who  knew  every' 
thing  are  hound  to  save.  Who  are  they  ?  Alexeiev  writes 
thus : — 

"  The  Kornilov  affair  was  not  the  act  of  a  handful  of 
adventurers;  it  was  supported  by  the  sympathy  and  assist- 
ance of  large  circles  among  our  intellectuals.  .  .  .  You, 
Pavel  Nikolaevitch  (i.e.  Miliukov),  are  aware  to  some  ex- 
tent that  certain  circles  of  our  public  not  only  knezv  about 
everything,  and  not  only  sympathized  with  the  idea,  but 
helped  Kornilov  as  far  as  they  could.  ...  I  have  another 
request;  I  do  not  know  the  address  of  Messrs.  V.,  P.,  and 
others.  The  families  of  the  imprisoned  officers  are  be- 
ginning to  starve.  ...  It  is  my  instant  request  that  they 
should  come  to  their  assistance.  Surely,  they  are  not  going 
to  leave  to  their  fate  and  to  starvation  the  families  of  those 
to  whom  they  were  united  by  the  community  of  ideas  and 
preparations.  I  beg  you  most  instantly  to  take  that  work 
upon  yourself  and  to  let  me  know  the  result.  In  that 
matter  we  officers  are  more  than  interested." 

The  whole  tenor  of  Alexeiev's  letter  would  still  not  have 
constituted  any  serious  indication  of  anybody's  participation 
in  the  Kornilov  conspiracy,  especially  when  one  takes  into 
consideration  General  Alexeiev's  extreme  licence  in  dealing 
with  facts.  This  **  request,"  however,  to  render  assistance 
and  to  start  an  immediate  campaign  in  favour  of  the  accused 
in  the  columns  of  the  *'  honest  Press "  was  accompanied 
by  an  addition  which  is  fatal  for  those  whom  he  had  in 
view :  "  In  that  case  [i.e.  if  Alexeiev's  request  is  not  imme- 
diately complied  with. —  A.  K.],  General  Kornilov  will  be 


THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM 

compelled  to  unfold  extensively  before  the  court  all  the 
preparations,  all  the  negotiations  with  persons  and  bodies, 
as  well  as  their  participation,  in  order  to  show  the  Russian 
people  with  whom  he  was  acting,  what  were  the  real  aims 
he  was  pursuing,  and  how  at  the  critical  moment,  abandoned 
by  all,  he  appeared  with  a  small  number  of  officers  before  a 
hurried  tribunal.  ,  .  .  This  is  the  substance  of  my  appeal 
to  you." 

When  one  is  not  in  possession  of  any  weighty  proofs, 
even  blackmailers  do  not  accompany  appeals  for  assistance 
by  such  unequivocal  threats  of  exposure !  I  shall  not  touch 
upon  the  moral  side  of  such  a  method  of  appealing,  espe- 
cially as  General  Alexeiev  was  evidently  better  acquainted 
v^^ith  the  milieu  he  was  addressing  than  m3'self.  At  any 
rate,  in  the  Retch  of  December  13,  191 7,  the  writer  of 
the  leading  article  is  of  opinion  that  Alexeiev's  letter  con- 
tains nothing  of  a  compromising  nature,  and  that  "  it  re- 
flects the  extraordinary  purity  and  nobility  of  its  author." 
Indeed,  there  are  various  conceptions  of  nobility  and  purity ! 
The  writer  of  that  leading  article  makes  haste,  of  course, 
to  identify  himself  with  "  Alexeiev's  perfectly  correct  view 
on  Kerensky's  double  position  "  in  the  Kornilov  affair.  I 
shall  not  follow,  in  their  methods  of  political  warfare, 
either  Alexeiev  or  the  organ  of  Miliukov ;  I  repeat  once  more 
that  the  letter  of  Alexeiev,  which  is  so  fatal  for  the  partic- 
ipators and  organizers  of  the  Kornilov  move,  should  under 
no  circumstances  be  taken  advantage  of  as  an  instrument 
for  combating  whole  parties  and  groups  of  the  population.] 

§30 

Liber. —  Only  one  question,  Alexander  FeodorovitcH. 
When  the  Government  was  about  to  establish  martial  law 


1 


2S4     THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM 

at  Petrograd,  did  it  not  consider  that  it  might  meet  with 
opposition,  or  at  any  rate  with  a  sharply  negative  attitude 
on  the  part  of  the  Soviets,  and  if  so,  did  it  not  intend  to 
take  some  measures  of  precaution? 

Kerensky. —  I  may  say  that  if  within  the  Government 
the  Bolsheviks  were  spoken  about,  there  were  no  conversa- 
tions whatever  about  the  Soviets,  which  at  that  time  were 
far  from  being  Bolshevik ,  or  about  the  Central  Executive 
Committee. 

Liber. —  I  must  say  definitely  that  according  to  Savin- 
kov's  evidence  this  consideration  has  played  a  great  part. 
He  states  positively  that  one  might  have  expected  opposition 
precisely  on  the  part  of  the  Soviet,  and  if  such  a  supposition 
could  be  entertained,  then  the  presence  of  a  corps  would 
come  useful  in  such  an  emergency  as  well.  It  is  of  im- 
portance to  us  to  establish  whether  the  Government  has 
been  discussing  such  a  contingency  or  not. 

[In  order  to  make  clear  the  kind  of  opposition  on  the 
part  of  the  Soviets  to  which  Savinkov  had  referred,  I  quote 
the  corresponding  extract  from  the  minutes  composed  by 
Generals  Kornilov,  Lukomsky,  and  Romano vsky,  "  About 
the  stay  of  the  Deputy  Minister  of  War  at  Mohilev  during 
the  23rd  and  the  24th  of  August."  These  minutes  were 
drafted  subsequently  to  August  27th,  and  consequently  un- 
der conditions  most  favourable  for  setting  out  the  words  of 
Savinkov  as  near  as  possible  to  the  intentions  of  Headquar- 
ters. According  to  these  minutes,  Savinkov  said  to  Kor- 
nilov :  "  You  know,  of  course,  that  approximately  on  the 
28th  or  29th  of  August  a  Bolshevik  move  is  expected  at 
Petrograd.  The  publication  of  your  demands  carried  out 
through  the  Provisional  Government  would  of  course  serve 
as  an  impulse  for  the  Bolsheviks  to  make  their  move,  if  for 
some  reason  or  another  they  might  otherwise  have  had  to 


THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM  235 

postpone  it.  Though  we  have  enough  troops  at  our  dis- 
posal, we  cannot  altogether  count  upon  them,  all  the  more  so 
as  we  do  do  not  know  yet  what  will  be  the  attitude  of  the 
Soviet  of  the  Soldiers'  and  Workmen's  Deputies  towards 
the  new  law.  The  Soviet  might  also  prove  to  be  against 
the  Government,  and  in  such  case  we  could  not  count  upon 
our  troops.  If,  besides  the  Bolsheviks,  the  members  of  the 
Soviet  of  the  Workmen's  and  Soldiers'  Deputies  should  also 
come  out,  we  would  have  to  act  against  them  as  well." 

Even  from  the  above  expose  of  Savinkov's  words,  it  is 
clear  that  he  was  only  speaking  of  the  Soviets  conjecturally, 
with  regard  to  their  attitude  to  the  future  law,  which  at  that 
time  had  not  been  discussed  by  the  Provisional  Govern- 
ment. But  seeing  that  within  the  Provisional  Government 
there  were  representatives  of  the  Central  Executive  Com- 
mittee of  the  Workmen's  and  Soldiers'  Deputies,  it  is  evi- 
dent that  even  this  hypothetical  contingency  was  an  impos- 
sibility, since  either  the  Military  Bill  would  have  been 
adopted  in  a  shape  acceptable  to  the  whole  of  the  Coalition, 
and  consequently  to  the  Soviets  as  well,  or  the  Coalition 
Government  would  have  ceased  to  exist  before  the  adoption 
of  the  Bill. 

When  Savinkov  came  to  know  about  these  minutes  which 
had  been  drawn  up  post  factum  and  in  his  absence,  he  made 
the  following  note  on  the  text  of  the  same :  **  I  never  used 
such  words  as  'the  demands  of  General  Kornilov';  nor 
did  it  ever  occur  to  me  that  the  Soviets  of  the  Workmen's 
and  Soldiers'  Deputies  would  be  certain  to  act  against  the 
Provisional  Government  should  disorders  arise.  I  per- 
sisted in  the  argument  that  the  3rd  Cavalry  Corps  I  was 
asking  for  from  the  Commander-in-Chief,  at  the  request  of 
the  Premier,  should  be  placed  at  the  disposal  of  the  Pro- 
visional Government  to  defend  the  Government  against  any 


236  THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM 

hostilities,  no  matter  from  what  quarter.  If  at  the  moment 
of  a  Bolshevik  rising  the  Soviets  of  the  Workmen's  and  Sol- 
diers' Deputies  should  happen  to  be  Bolshevik,  then  the  3rd 
Cavalry  Corps  would  be  used  against  those  Soviets  as 
well."] 

Kcrensky. —  You  will  perceive  by  the  composition  of  the 
Government  that  there  could  not  have  been  any  conversa- 
tion about  the  Central  Executive  Committee  of  the  Soldiers* 
and  Workmen's  Deputies,  nor  about  the  Soviet  as  such. 
Nor  had  it  ever  been  intended  to  establish  martial  law  in 
such  forms  as  might  be  odious  to  public  opinion  at  large. 
Lastly,  if  any  conversations  concerning  the  Bolsheviks  did 
occur  (as  you  know,  there  were  rumours  in  circulation  as  to 
the  possibility  of  a  repetition  of  the  events  of  the  3rd-5th 
of  July),  it  was  assumed  that  the  Bolsheviks  would  stand 
on  one  side,  ivhile  the  whole  country  would  stand  on  the 
other  side  (against  them). 

§31 

Kolokolov. —  Allow  me  to  put  a  question.  You  have 
stated,  sir,  that  there  is  no  evidence  of  a  nature  to  establish 
with  complete  exactitude  the  existence  of  a  conspiracy;  still, 
have  you  any  grounds,  the  verification  of  which  might  be 
necessary  for  the  Commission  of  Inquiry? 

Kerensky. —  I  can  only  tell  you  to  ask  M.  T.  Terest- 
chenko,  the  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs,  whether  he  recol- 
lects a  conversation  he  repeated  to  me,  in  which  Zavoiko  had 
been  speaking  of  the  means  "  they  "  had  at  their  disposal  for 
overthrowing  the  Government. 

[During  my  wanderings  after  the  25th  of  October,  I  met 
a  person  who  told  me  that  he  had  certain  knowledge  of 
similar  conversations  held  by  Zavoiko  at  the  beginning  of 
last  year.] 


THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM  237 

I  must  say,  however,  that  at  present  it  is  very  difficult 
generally  to  give  information.  From  the  very  moment  of 
the  Revolution,  people  have  quite  ceased  to  distinguish  in 
our  persons  the  Government  from  private  individuals :  any 
information  we  possess  in  our  capacity  as  members  of  the 
Government  very  rapidly  becomes  the  property  of  the  man 
in  the  street,  and  is  turned  into  a  means  of  settling  personal 
accounts,  or  into  demands  for  proofs  on  the  part  of  the 
persons  interested,  and  so  on.  With  regard  to  a  conspir- 
acy's being  organized  by  a  group  of  military  men,  of  officers, 
we  had  very  exact  information,  and  we  were  watching  its 
participators  as  far  as  we  could  do  so.  The  Komilov  events 
have  shown  that  we  did  know  something.  A  portion  of 
the  Council  of  the  Union  of  the  Cossack  Armies  possessed, 
moreover,  a  great  deal  of  "  information  '*  as  well.  I  have 
no  doubt  whatever  about  that,  too;  but  there  again  the 
thing  cannot  yet  be  proved  formally,  and  so  on.  For  many 
considerations,  however,  it  is  not  desirable  to  carry  on  an 
investigation  in  that  direction  (among  the  military)  at  pres- 
ent ;  and  this  for  the  simple  reason  that  its  results  would  be 
a  poor  compensation  for  its  inevitable  consequences,  to  judge 
by  the  present  temper  of  the  masses.  We  do  not  wish,  and  I 
am  personally  averse  from  it,  to  provide  new  occasions  for 
strife  between  various  groups  of  the  population,  since  a 
group,  as  such,  is  not  responsible  for  the  acts  of  individual 
persons, 

Kolokolov. —  What  were  your  grounds  for  arresting 
Lvov? 

Kerensky. —  It  was  quite  clear  to  me  from  the  whole  con- 
versation that  he  knew  much  more  than  he  was  saying.  I 
took  it  that  he  was  warning  me  at  the  last  moment  of  the 
danger  to  my  person,  either  because  he  had  simply  got 
frightened  or,  perhaps,  because  his  conscience  had  spoken. 


888     THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM 

After  all,  he  had  experienced  nothing  but  good  treatment 
from  me.  But  the  mood  in  which  he  retired  from  the  Pro- 
visional Government  pointed  to  the  possibility  of  his  having 
gone  against  me  from  the  outset.  Then  again,  how  about 
Aladin  ?  I  am  not  sure  whether  you  are  aware  of  Aladin's 
visit  to  Prince  G.  E.  Lvov  at  Moscow.  Just  before  V.  N. 
Lvov  called  on  me,  Virubov  informed  me,  on  behalf  of 
Prince  G.  E.  Lvov,  that  Aladin  had  called  on  the  Prince, 
to  whom  he  said  quite  seriously :  "  Let  Kerensky  bear  in 
mind  that  henceforward  there  must  be  no  changes  within 
the  Government  without  the  consent  of  Headquarters." 
This  had  made  an  impression  on  the  Prince.  Now,  with 
regard  to  agrarian  reform.  I  was  aware  that  they  were 
engaged  in  preparing  an  agrarian  manifesto  or  law;  I  for- 
get the  name  of  that  Professor  from  Moscow. 

Chairman. —  Y-- v. 

Kerensky. —  All  this  goes  to  confirm  that  preparations 
were  going  on. 

Ukraintsev. —  Coming  to  your  statement  that  on  the  ques- 
tion of  the  conspiracy  you  had  a  "  whole  reel  "  of  informa- 
tion from  two  sources,  one  of  which  was  trustworthy,  while 
the  other  was  not  reliable,  could  you  not  let  us  have  it? 
This  would  enable  us  to  find  out  the  conspiracy. 

Kerensky. — No.  I  may  repeat  that  one  set  of  informa- 
tion came  from  the  agents  and  the  other  from  the  counter- 
espionage. There  was  also  a  third  source,  and  subse- 
quently a  fourth  one.  I  handed  over  that  officer  to  the  In- 
telligence Department.     What  was  his  name,  though  ?     Oh, 

yes,  V in.     He  had  also  come  to  warn  me  that  I  was 

threatened  by  an  imminent  — 

Ukraintsev. —  Was  it  not  the  same  officer  who  used  to 
move  in  Cossack  circles  and  who  denounced  Zavoiko  ? 

Kerensky. —  Yes.     About   Zavoiko    unfavourable   news 


THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM  239 

reached  us  long  before.  He  is  altogether  a  man  with  a 
rather  queer  past.  His  stay  and  the  part  he  played  at 
Headquarters  were  strange  and  unintelligible.  Still,  that 
was  the  man  who  exercised  the  greatest  influence  upon  Gen- 
eral Kornilov.  At  the  South-western  front,  Savinkov  had 
once  succeeded  in  removing  him  from  there,  as  Zavoiko's 
influence  was  already  injurious  at  the  time.  But  he  after- 
wards returned,  and  was,  moreover,  joined  by  Aladin. 

[On  his  relations  to  Zavoiko,  General  Kornilov's  evidence 
was  to  the  following  effect :  — 

"  I  made  the  acquaintance  of  V.  S.  Zavoiko  in  April  last 
at  Petrograd.  According  to  the  information  in  my  pos- 
session, he  was  a  few  years  ago  the  Marshal  of  Nobility  of 
the  Haysin  district,  in  the  Government  of  Podolia.  He  had 
been  working  at  the  naphtha  mines  round  Baku,  and,  as  he 
told  me,  was  engaged  in  exploring  the  mineral  resources  of 
Turkestan  and  Western  Siberia.  In  the  month  of  May  he 
arrived  at  Tchernovitsy  and,  after  having  joined  as  a  volun- 
teer the  Daguestan  cavalry  regiment,  he  remained  at  the 
Staff  of  the  army  in  the  capacity  of  my  personal  orderly. 
He  wields  the  pen  with  perfection.  I  therefore  entrusted 
him  with  the  drafting  of  those  orders  and  documents  that 
required  a  particularly  vigorous  and  artistic  style." 

I  have  had  to  refer  more  than  once  to  the  proclamation 
"  To  the  Russian  People,"  which  is  a  splendid  specimen,  not 
only  of  the  artistic  style,  but  also  of  the  cunning  hands  of 
Zavoiko.  It  may  be  seen  from  all  the  circumstances  of  the 
case  that  the  position  of  Zavoiko,  in  the  circles  near  to 
Kornilov,  had  nothing  to  do  with  his  modest  function  of 
orderly.  His  past  as  a  financier  evidently  stood  Zavoiko  in 
good  stead  in  the  way  of  promoting  the  flow  of  those  means 
to  Headquarters  about  which  information  could  be  imparted 
by  V.  and  P.,  who  are  mentioned  in  General  Alexeiev's  let- 


^0  THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM 

ter,  as  well  as  by  the  editors  of  several  newspapers  and 
leaflets  which  were  baiting  me  so  strenuously  throughout  the 
summer  and  glorifying  General  Kornilov.  Zavoiko  is  one 
of  the  shadiest  and  most  repulsive  figures  among  the  con- 
spirators, and  it  is  difficult  to  understand  wherein  lay  the 
secret  of  his  influence  upon  Kornilov.] 

§32 

Ukraintsev. —  You  stated,  among  other  things,  that  an 
offer  of  a  dictatorship  was  made  to  you,  and  that  you  after- 
wards met  the  same  persons  among  those  by  whom  Kor- 
nilov was  surrounded.     Who  were  those  persons? 

Kerensky. —  Conversations  of  that  kind  emanated  from 
the  same  Cossack  circles.     Then,  some  public  men  — 

Ukraintsev. —  This  means  that  you  are  able  to  point  out 
the  circles,  but  no  single  person  ? 

Kerensky. —  I  should  not  care  to  point  them  out. 

Krokhmal. —  But  this  did  not  bear  the  shape  of  a  formal 
offer ;  it  was,  so  to  say,  in  the  nature  of  advice  ? 

Kerensky. —  They  would  introduce  it  in  this  way:  "If 
you  were  to  agree,  we  should  ..."  and  so  on.  But  it  al- 
ways fell  on  fruitless  soil.     Let  us  leave  them  alone! 

Ukraintsev. —  In  that  case,  it  may  be  that  the  very 
offers  did  not  bear  the  character  of  a  concrete  proposi- 
tion ? 

Kerensky. —  No:  when  this  "  public  opinion  "  became  dis- 
appointed with  me  as  a  possible  organizer  and  chief  worker 
for  a  change  in  the  system  of  Government  in  the  direction 
of  a  "  strong  authority,"  they  then  started  to  look  out  for 
another  "  man."  I  consider  that  the  longing  for  finding  a 
man  was  very  strong.  Even  on  August  26th,  V.  Lvov 
thus  expressed  himself  when  conversing  with  somebody: 


THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM  241 

"  He  would  not  agree  to  be  a  dictator,  so  we  shall  give  him 
one!'' 

Liber. —  Has  it  been  reported  to  you  that  on  the  question 
you  are  referring  to,  and  which  was  then  being  discussed, 
Kerensky,  Savinkov,  and  Kornilov  were  named  as  candi- 
dates ? 

Kerensky, —  Yes.  Generally  speaking,  they  were  feeling 
the  ground.  After  my  refusal,  some  of  them  thought  that 
the  best  I  could  do  was  "  to  get  away,"  **  not  to  interfere,'* 
and  "not  to  shuffle  the  cards."  Though  they  themselves 
were  predicting  that  my  retirement  would  be  followed  by 
a  period  of  Bolshevik  violence,  they  were  nevertheless  of 
opinion  that  this  would  afford  them  an  opportunity  of  tri- 
umphing in  the  end.  Kornilov  was  simply  the  unsuccess- 
ful executor  of  other  people's  plans,  for  in  order  to  create 
a  real  dictatorship  in  Russia,  one  had  to  possess  not  only  the 
"  heart  of  a  lion,"  but  also  some  intellectual  qualities  which 
are  neither  given  to  all  nor  frequently  to  be  met  with. 

[General  Kornilov's  personal  qualities  rendered  his  whole 
attempt  to  establish  in  Russia  a  personal  dictatorship  too 
naive  and  thoughtless  for  it  to  be  able  to  count  upon  even  a 
momentary  success.  But  even  any  other  adventure,  con- 
ceived more  seriously  and  carried  out  more  intelligently, 
would  inevitably  have  come  to  the  same  end,  after  a  more  or 
less  prolonged  period  of  struggle;  or  it  would  itself  have 
finally  broken  up  the  State  and  opened  the  gates  to  the  Ger- 
mans, as  was  actually  done  two  months  after  Kornilov 
by  the  anarchist  Bolsheviks,  who  were  politically  more  ex- 
perienced and  clever.  The  tragedy  of  the  position  of  Rus- 
sia at  the  end  of  the  summer  of  1917  lay  precisely  in  its 
not  having  yet  attained  such  political  maturity  as  would 
have  afforded  to  its  leading  political  circles  the  possibility 
of  realizing  to  the  very  end  and  of  carrying  through  the 


U2  THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM 

only  system  of  organizing  the  State  authority  which  alone 
could  still  have  stopped  the  threatening  process  of  the  col- 
lapse of  the  State,  which  had  commenced  together  with  the 
world-war,  viz.  the  system  of  coalitions  between  all  the 
political  parties  that  were  holding  to  the  idea  of  a  State,  in 
order  to  create  a  common  national  Government.  The  con- 
dition of  the  economic  organism  and  of  the  technical  appar- 
atus of  the  State  had  made  it  impossible  to  govern  the 
country  during  war  by  the  strength  of  any  minority  what- 
soever, which  is  always  and  inevitably  reduced  to  applying 
political  terror  as  the  sole  means  of  keeping  the  majority 
in  subjection.  The  stern  reality  which  showed  impera- 
tively to  all  the  conscious  and  responsible  elements  of  the 
country  the  only  way  for  saving  the  State,  by  subordinating 
all  the  interests  and  claims  of  the  different  classes  and  strata 
of  the  population  to  the  needs  of  the  State,  united  all  those 
elements  willy-nilly  round  the  Provisional  Government. 
Any  minority  that  made  up  its  mind  to  combat  the  Govern- 
ment would  necessarily  be  found  in  the  end  to  be  in  alliance 
either  with  the  home-grown  reaction  or  with  its  variety 
from  across  the  frontier.  We  have  seen  what  equivocal 
elements,  in  both  the  political  and  the  social  sense,  were 
surrounding  Kornilov.  More  recently  we  have  seen  some- 
thing still  worse :  we  have  seen  how  the  only  "  Communists  " 
in  the  world  have  saved  Prussian  Junkerdom,  to  whom  they 
have  enslaved,  both  politically  and  economically,  the  Rus- 
sian toiling  masses ! 

Unfortunately,  the  leading  political  circles,  which  could 
not  help  recognizing  that  the  coalition  was  indispensable,  did 
not  support  it  actively  and  fairly.  They  were  only  rather 
afraid  to  take  upon  themselves  the  political  responsibility 
for  the  formal  collapse  of  that  system,  while  in  their  own 
mind  they  were  waiting  for  a  "  saviour,"  whom  some  ex- 


THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM  MS 

pected  from  the  Right  and  others  from  the  Left.  In  their 
"  joyless  love  "  of  the  Coalition  they  were  dreaming  of  a 
**  painless  parting.'*  ^  They  were  waiting  all  the  time  for 
the  moment  when  I  should  '*  leave  "  at  last,  while  they  them- 
selves would  not  let  me  go,  as  they  were  afraid  of  the  re- 
sponsibility. But  while  retaining  me,  they  wanted  somebody 
to  come  and  overthrow  me,  in  the  hope  of  taking  advantage 
of  somebody  else's  crime  for  their  own  political  interests. 
From  October  24th  to  November  ist  I  observed  that  trem- 
bHng  expectation  among  my  "  friends ''  of  the  Left,  just 
as  I  had  noticed  the  same  trembling  expectancy  in  the  Kor- 
nilov  days  among  some  of  the  "  adherents  of  the  Coalition  *' 
on  the  Right.  Those  who  accuse  me  of  not  having 
"  left "  in  time,  and  of  having  somehow  stood  in 
somebody's  way,  ought  to  remember  once  for  all  that 
I  never  sought  power,  nor  did  I  hold  on  to  it.  I 
only  interfered  with  usurpers  and  adventurers.  Politically 
responsible  circles,  far  from  meeting  with  an  impediment 
on  my  part,  had  they  wished  to  form  a  Government  without 
me,  received  repeated  proposals  from  me  to  do  so.  Even  a 
month  before  the  Bolshevik  rising,  at  a  secret  session  of  the 
Bureau  of  the  Central  Executive  Committee  of  the  Soviets 
of  the  Workmen's  and  Soldiers'  Deputies,  jointly  with  the 
Presidium  of  the  Democratic  Conference  and  the  representa- 
tives of  all  the  Socialist  parties,  including  the  Bolsheviks,  I 
raised  the  question  as  to  the  attitude  of  those  present  to- 
wards the  Government,  and  declared  that  on  my  part  I  would 
do  everything  that  was  possible  for  the  painless  and  rapid 
transition  of  the  State  to  a  new  system  of  Government,  if 
those  attending  the  meeting  would  take  upon  themselves  the 
responsibility  for  dissolving  the  coalition  with  the  propertied 

1" Their  love  was  joyless;  their  parting  will  be  painless."    (From 
Russian  poetry.) 


24.4  THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM 

classes  and  point  out  a  person  willing  to  accept  the  task  of 
forming  a  newly  composed  Provisional  Government,  as  I 
personally  could  not  carry  out  the  task  conscientiously.  But 
the  meeting  did  not  prove  sufficiently  resolute  and  bold  to 
undertake  the  responsibility  for  all  the  consequences  of  cre- 
ating a  '*  homogeneous  Government."  At  the  last  Confer- 
ence of  the  Social  Revolutionary  Party,  one  member  of  its 
Central  Committee  put  the  matter  thus :  — 

"  When  one  considers  the  helpless  condition  in  which  the 
democracy  found  itself  (after  the  Democratic  Conference), 
it  will  be  perceived  that  it  had  not  the  strength  for  organiz- 
ing the  Government  in  any  other  way  then  by  handing  it 
over  to  Kerensky.  The  conclusion  to  be  drawn  from  it 
comes  to  this :  a  sacrifice  had  to  be  made  to  the  belief  of  the 
masses  that  it  was  possible  to  do  everything,  whereas  really 
it  is  impossible  to  do  everything.  Still,  that  sacrifice  was 
needed.  We  accordingly  sacrificed  Kerensky,  who  put  up 
with  being  the  victim,  well  knowing  what  was  in  store  for 
him.'' 

This  was  not,  however,  a  sacrifice,  but  the  conscious  exe- 
cution of  one's  duty  to  the  very  end.  I  saw  that  nobody 
was  willing  honestly  to  support  that  form  of  Government  by 
which  alone  it  would  be  possible  to  preserve  the  State  from 
falling  to  pieces.  But  I  could  not,  to  save  my  own  skin, 
meet  the  elemental  force  half-way  and  bring  the  explosion 
nearer,  even  by  a  single  day,  through  my  retirement.  More- 
over, in  my  heart  there  was  still  a  glimmer  of  hope  that  the 
democracy  would  prove  able  to  overcome  all  that  is  dark  and 
brutish  in  itself !] 

§33 

Ukraintsev. —  In  describing  the  conversation  with  V. 
Lvov,  you  mentioned  that  he  made  a  proposal  in  the  form 


THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM  24?5 

of  an  ultimatum;  but  have  you  not  noticed  that  in  his  writ- 
ten report  he  had  replaced  the  phrase  "  General  Kornilov 
demands  "  by  "  General  Kornilov  proposes"? 

Kerensky. —  If  I  had  noticed  it,  I  should  have  said  to 
him :  "  Write  it  down  just  as  you  said  it."  But  I  merely 
folded  the  paper  and  put  it  in  my  pocket. 

[Strictly  speaking,  there  is  no  difference  whatever  be- 
tween *'  Kornilov  demands  "  or  "  proposes  "  this  or  that. 
A  proposal  may  be  in  the  nature  of  an  ultimatum,  as  a  pro- 
posal is  frequently  merely  a  more  delicate  form  of  a  demand 
or  an  order.  I  myself  used  often  to  write :  "  I  propose  to 
So-and-So  to  do  this."] 

Ukraintsev. —  You  only  paid  attention  to  the  points? 

Kerensky. —  Yes,  just  to  the  points,  and  then  I  put  it  in 
my  pocket.  The  very  circumstances  of  the  conversation 
were  so  convincing  to  me.  Indeed,  I  never  dreamt  at  the 
time  that  public  opinion  would  ever  see  fit  to  make  me  out 
a  sort  of  accomplice  of  the  Kornilov  conspiracy  or  of  a 
rather  unintelligible  and  equivocal  personage.  Had  I  been 
able  to  foresee  anything  of  the  kind,  I  should  perhaps  have 
arranged  everything  quite  differently  on  that  particular  eve- 
ning. But,  at  any  rate,  I  consider  that  I  did  all  that  was 
essential  by  nipping  the  attempt  in  the  bud  with  extraordi- 
nary rapidity. 

Ukraintsev. —  Were  you  in  possession  of  any  information 
to  the  effect  that  General  Kornilov  had  precisely  charged  the 
3rd  Corps  with  an  attack  against  the  Provisional  Govern- 
ment, or  was  such  an  attack  only  discerned  in  the  move- 
ment upon  Petrograd  ? 

Kerensky. —  No,  I  discerned  it  in  the  position  that  was 
occupied  by  Krimov,  and  also  in  the  fact  that,  contrary 
to  the  decision  arrived  at,  the  "  Savage  Division  "  was  on  its 
way  to  Petrograd,     All  their  calculations  were  generally 


Ue  THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM 

based  on  the  "  Savage  Division."  It  seems  to  me  that  Lvov 
has  simply  exploded  the  whole  thing.  He  perhaps  let  the 
cat  out  of  the  bag  a  day  or  two  too  early  [or  blabbed  out 
more  and  in  a  different  tone  than  he  ought  to  have  done]. 
Had  Krimov's  detachment  managed  to  get  here,  it  would 
not  have  proved  so  easy  to  dispose  of  it,  seeing  that  in  such 
a  case  there  would  have  come  into  play  those  forces  that 
were  waiting  here  for  events  to  develop,  that  is  to  say,  those 
messengers  who  had  gathered  here,  and  those  groups  which 
had  been  organized  for  the  purpose  of  rendering  aid  at  the 
right  moment  from  the  rear. 

Ukraintsev. —  Did  you  have  the  impression  from  Savin- 
kov's  report  on  army  reforms  that  greater  importance  was 
attributed  to  them  from  a  general  political  point  of  view 
than  from  the  purely  military  one  ? 

Kerensky. —  On  August  loth,  I  accepted  Savinkov's 
resignation  because  I  considered  his  report  to  be  an  unwar- 
ranted act  on  the  part  of  a  man  whom  I  had  myself  put  into 
a  responsible  post.     I  was  set  before  an  accomplished  fact. 

It  is  altogether  evident  that  Savinkov  wanted  at  all  costs 
to  unite  me  and  Kornilov  in  spite  of  ourselves.  It  seems  to 
me  that  Savinkov  and  Filonenko  had  been  taken  advantage 
of  in  the  whole  affair.  Savinkov  never  aspired  at  doing 
away  with  the  Provisional  Government  or  with  myself.  He 
never  had  such  a  plan.  But  he  imagined  himself  to  be  the 
cleverest  of  all,  whereas  in  reality  there  were  people  found 
who  outwitted  him.  He  was  only  an  instrument  that  was 
made  to  do  its  share  in  the  work  that  was  carried  on  round 
Kornilov. 

[In  his  deposition  Savinkov  confirmed  my  conjectures, 
when  he  said :  "  Though  I  witnessed  all  these  increasingly 
strained  relations,  I  did  not  give  up  the  hope  that,  by  work- 
ing together,  A.  F.  Kerensky  and  General  Kornilov  would 


THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM  247 

manage  to  realize  a  firm  revolutionary  Government,  and  I 
endeavoured  with  all  my  strength  to  bring  about  a  rapproche- 
ment between  A.  F.  Kerensky  and  General  Kornilov/'] 

Ukraiutsev. —  One  more  question  concerning  the  conver- 
sation that  took  place  on  returning  from  Headquarters  after 
the  Conference  of  July  i6th.  Did  not  Filonenko  propose 
the  formation  of  a  special  War  Cabinet  within  the  Pro- 
visional Government  ? 

Kerensky, —  Not  to  my  recollection.  I  had  no  conversa- 
tions whatever  with  him.  I  remember  the  conversation 
held  here  on  x\ugust  29th.  As  I  said  before,  Filonenko  was 
indeed  endeavouring,  with  the  help  of  Savinkov,  to  trans- 
form the  conversation  held  at  Headquarters  about  a  dic- 
tatorship into  one  which  might  be  represented  as  dealing 
with  a  subject  which  had  also  been  talked  about  within  the 
Provisional  Government,  viz.  a  War  Cabinet.  But  the 
one  was  as  distant  from  the  other  as  heaven  from  earth,  and 
they  had  nothing  in  common  between  them.  One  must  be, 
or  pretend  to  be,  an  idiot  to  suggest  seriously  that  either  the 
Provisional  Government  or  myself  could  ever  think  of 
Filonenko  as  a  possible  member  of  the  Provisional  Govern- 
ment. It  is  not  only  an  absurd,  but  a  ridiculous  supposi- 
tion !  It  was  merely  an  awkward  expedient  for  getting  out 
of  a  foolish  position.  I  repeat  once  more  that  Filonenko 
did  have  a  conversation  with  Kornilov,  but  that  it  had  noth- 
ing to  do  with  a  **  War  Cabinet.** 

Chairman. —  Allow  me  to  thank  you,  sir,  for  your 
evidence. 

[Whoever  reads  my  evidence  to  the  end  will  understand 
what  a  will  and  what  a  degree  of  faith  in  the  final  triumph 
of  truth  one  had  to  possess  in  order  silently  to  bear  all  the 
furious  baiting  that  was  going  on.     To  look  011  in  silence 


248     THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM 

while  the  poison  of  doubt  was  penetrating  ever  deeper  into 
the  very  masses  of  the  people,  severing  one  by  one  my  close 
relations  with  them;  to  see  how  even  the  most  conscious 
circles  of  democracy  were  unable  to  grasp  the  reasons  for 
the  Government's  silence,  which  they  mistook  for  a  con- 
firmation of  "  revelations  "  that  had  produced  the  impres- 
sion of  convincing  "internal  evidence."  (I  quote  from 
resolutions  of  the  Bureau  of  the  Central  Executive  Com- 
mittee of  the  Soviets  of  the  Workmen's  and  Soldiers'  Depu- 
ties of  September  12th.) 

Who  has  raised  his  voice  in  the  defence  of  the  men  who 
were  being  hunted  down  with  impunity,  merely  because,  in 
the  fulfilment  of  their  duty  to  the  State  and  to  the  public, 
they  kept  silent,  bound  as  they  were  by  the  secrecy  of  the 
Inquiry,  which  was  shamelessly  broken  by  the  others?  It 
is  only  now  that  I  have  obtained  the  possibility  to  put  in  my 
word. 

Too  late,  as  it  seems.     The  work  has  been  done. 

The  words  I  uttered  at  the  Moscow  Conference  have 
turned  out  to  be  true:  "  If  the  people  should  prove  short  of 
sense  and  conscience,  then  the  Russian  State  will  perish, 
flooded  by  a  wave  of  collapse,  disintegration,  and  treachery." 

And  the  people  newly  born  to  freedom,  so  great  in  the  past, 
but  now  deceived  and  degraded,  is  dancing  and  grimacing 
in  a  repulsive  fool's  cap  before  its  cruel  master  of  Berlin. 

But  do  not  lose  heart !  Do  not  curse  the  popular  masses ; 
do  not  desert  them.  Go  to  the  people  with  words  of  stern 
truth;  rouse  its  slumbering  conscience,  and,  sooner  than  you 
think,  its  manliness  will  revive  and  rekindle  the  sacrificial 
flame  of  its  love  of  Motherland  and  Freedom ! 


KERENSKY  AND  KORNILOV 
A  Reply 

I  MUST  commence  my  observations  on  Mr.  Wilcox's 
articles  "  Kerensky  and  Kornilov  "  in  the  September  and 
October  issues  of  the  Fortnightly  Review  with  a  short  intro- 
duction which  is  called  for  by  some  of  his  concluding  words. 
On  page  517  he  says:  **  True,  the  chain  of  evidence  is  not 
yet  complete.  One  of  the  chief  witnesses  has  yet  to  be  heard 
—  Kerensky.  So  far  he  has  withheld  from  publication  his 
version  of  the  affair,  but  by  doing  so  he  has  left  uncontra- 
dicted statements  by  his  own  colleagues  and  agents  gravely 
impugning  his  constancy,  stability,  and  consistency  —  not 
to  say  more !  Perhaps  he  will  now  speak  out  and  fill  up  the 
only  serious  gap  that  still  remains  in  the  story  of  the  Kor- 
nilov affair.'*  This  only  serious  gap  has  long  since  been 
filled;  my  version  of  the  Kornilov  affair  was  published  in 
Russia  in  June  of  this  year.  Immediately  upon  my  arrival 
in  England  I  took  steps  to  prepare  ian  English  translation  of 
my  book  on  the  Kornilov  affair,  and  if  this  English  version 
has  not  yet  seen  the  light  it  is  only  because  serious  obstacles 
have  crossed  its  path  which  could  hardly  have  been  expected 
in  free  England.  However,  this  English  version  is  due  to 
appear  in  the  near  future,  and  this  circumstance  allows  me 
to  make  my  remarks  about  Mr.  Wilcox's  articles  quite  short 
and  without  detailed  arguments. 

I  do  not  think  there  is  any  need  for  me  to  explain  why  I 
was  silent  as  long  as  I  was  in  power,  and  before  the  Bol- 

249 


250     THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM 

sheviks'  coup  de  main  destroyed  the  possibility  of  General 
Komilov  being  brought  to  trial.  The  Commander-in-Chief 
of  the  Russian  Armies  commits  a  grave  crime  of  State  at  the 
climax  of  the  war;  he  endeavours  to  compel  the  Government 
by  force  of  arms  to  "  carry  out  his  program,"  i.e.,  he  openly 
attempts  an  armed  rising  against  the  governmental  authori- 
ties of  his  country.  After  the  failure  of  this  attempt,  the 
Provisional  Government  appointed  a  Special  Commission  of 
Inquiry  to  examine  the  circumstances  of  the  affair  and  to 
bring  to  trial  the  General  v^ho  had  overstepped  his  duty,  as 
well  as  his  accomplices.  Was  it  possible  for  me,  the  Prime 
Minister  of  the  Provisional  Government  and  the  principal 
witness  in  the  affair,  to  infringe  the  secrecy  of  the  prelimi- 
nary legal  investigation  and  to  announce  before  the  trial  my 
own  opinion  and  my  evidence  about  the  affair?  Of  course 
not;  silence  before  the  trial  is  the  elementary  duty  of  all 
witnesses,  and  it  was  thus  that  every  witness  in  the  Kornilov 
affair  behaved  who  was  not  interested  in  hiding  the  truth  of 
the  matter.  But  besides  this  last  section  of  witnesses  there 
were  the  accused  and  those  who  had  participated  too  closely 
with  them,  and  finally  the  accomplices  of  General  Kornilov 
who  remained  at  liberty  outside  the  scope  of  the  inquiry. 
Some  of  this  group  of  people  who  were  implicated  in  the 
Kornilov  affair  organized  a  Press  campaign,  systematically 
working  upon  public  opinion  for  their  own  purpose.  With 
this  aim  they  at  various  times  published  parts  of  the  ma- 
terials from  the  inquiry,  which  were  favourable  to  them, 
largely  declarations  of  the  accused  and  of  witnesses  who  had 
grounds  for  fearing  that  they,  too,  would  be  accused ;  occa- 
sionally they  even  resorted  to  falsification.  As  far  as  I 
remember  rightly,  the  President  of  the  Extraordinary  Com- 
mission of  Inquiry  into  the  Kornilov  affair  had  twice  to 
warn  public  opinion  about  the  necessity  of  refraining  from 


THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM  251 

all  judgment  and  declarations  about  the  affair  until  the  trial. 
However,  the  more  than  biased  campaign  in  the  Press  con- 
tinued. But  the  Government  did  not  resort  to  reprisals  upon 
those  organs  of  the  Press  which  so  rudely  abused  the  young 
freedom  of  speech  in  Russia.  The  Government  considered 
that  a  public  and  independent  trial  would  be  the  best  answer 
to  this  campaign  of  calumny;  and  that  this  trial,  better  than 
any  repressions,  would  teach  the  need  to  use  properly  the 
liberty  of  the  Press.  But  the  anarchy  which  has  temporarily 
enveloped  Russia  destroyed  the  possibility  of  a  legal  trial  in 
the  Kornilov  affair.  Hence  the  biased  and  lying  informa- 
tion which  had  been  published  in  the  Press  became  for  the 
time  being  the  sole  source  of  information  about  the  Kornilov 
affair  both  in  Russia  and  in  all  the  rest  of  Europe. 

I  make  these  introductory  remarks  in  order  to  show 
whence  these  fictions  arise  which  are  being  circulated  in 
all  directions  as  the  truth  about  the  circumstances  of  Kor- 
nilov's  rebellion  and  in  order  to  emphasize  that,  while  I  shall 
set  out  the  principal  inaccuracies  of  Mr.  Wilcox,  I  do  not 
wish  to  cast  any  doubts  whatsoever  upon  the  mistaken  good 
faith  of  their  author. 

It  is  to  be  confessed,  however,  that  under  the  influence  of 
the  biased  materials  at  his  disposal,  Mr.  Wilcox  has  been 
drawn  so  strongly  to  the  side  of  his  hero  —  Kornilov  —  that 
he  has  sometimes  been  ready  even  to  some  extent  to  "  cor- 
rect "  the  facts  if  these  did  not  fit  in  his  scheme  of  events 
which  is  so  well  disposed  towards  General  Kornilov ;  but  of 
this  I  shall  speak  later. 

Mr.  Wilcox  commences  his  article  with  the  words :  "  Ker- 
ensky's  open  conflict  with  Kornilov"  (thus  he  strangely 
terms  General  Kornilov's  rising  against  the  Provisional  Gov- 
ernment) *'  w^as  the  final  turning  point  of  the  Russian  Revo- 
lution."    With  this  I  am  wholly  in  agreement.     I  agree  also 


ftSft  THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM 

that "  From  that  moment  the  triumph  of  Bolshevism  and  the 
dissolution  of  Russia  into  primeval  chaos  became  inevitable. 
The  Brest  treaties,  with  all  they  have  meant  for  the  Allies, 
follov^red  as  a  matter  of  course,  and,  for  that  reason,  prob- 
ably no  other  single  event  has  had  so  decisive  an  influence 
on  the  course  of  the  war  as  the  Kerensky-Kornilov  im- 
broglio.'* Mr.  Wilcox  continues :  "  It  is,  therefore,  of  con- 
siderable importance  that  we  should  understand  the  true 
meaning  of  this  incident,  and  be  able  justly  to  apportion  the 
responsibility  for  the  disastrous  consequences  that  issued 
from  it." 

Mr.  Wilcox's  whole  article,  indeed,  is  an  attempt  to  find 
this  true  meaning  of  the  events  in  order  to  be  able  justly  to 
apportion  the  responsibility,  and  certainly  the  true  meaning 
of  the  events  in  Mr.  Wilcox's  version  inevitably  leads  to  the 
complete  vindication  of  General  Kornilov,  and  the  whole  re- 
sponsibility for  the  disastrous  consequences  justly  falls  upon 
his  opponents,  and  chiefly  upon  me.  It  cannot  be  otherwise ; 
by  the  use  of  data  collected  with  a  previously  determined 
purpose  by  people  who  are  interested  in  hiding  the  truth,  one 
cannot  find  the  truth. 

But  I  am  not  writing  now  in  order  to  establish  the  truth ; 
my  task  is  much  more  modest.  I  wish  only  to  show  by  a 
few  examples  the  complete  inaccuracy  of  the  information 
upon  which  Mr.  Wilcox  founds  his  "  true  meaning  of  this 
incident."  If  I  succeed  in  showing  this,  there  will  be  ex- 
posed the  complete  contradiction  between  the  events  as  set 
out  by  Mr.  Wilcox  and  what  actually  took  place;  and  if 
this  contradiction  is  established,  any  conclusions  whatever 
about  the  just  apportioning  of  responsibility  on  the  basis 
of  Mr.  Wilcox's  historical  study  will  be  clearly  quite  impos- 
sible. Thus,  in  commenting  on  Mr.  Wilcox's  article,  I  am 
setting  myself  a  quite  negative  task. 


THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM  253 

Turning  to  the  facts,  I  must  say  that  it  is  quite  impossible 
not  only  to  deal  with,  but  even  to  note  all  the  divergencies 
from  facts  of  which  the  articles  are  full.  For  this  it  would 
be  necessary  for  me  to  write  whole  series  of  articles.  I 
shall,  therefore,  mention  only  the  chief  ones. 

The  first  article  in  the  September  issue  is  of  an  intro- 
ductory character.  Indeed,  it  sets  out  facts  which  have 
very  little  connection  with  the  history  of  Kornilov's  con- 
spiracy. In  it  Mr.  Wilcox  writes  of  the  circumstances  of 
Savinkov's  acquaintance  with  General  Kornilov,  of  their 
activities  on  the  South-Westem  front,  of  the  reformative 
work  of  Savinkov  and  Kornilov,  and  of  the  fate  of  their 
memoranda.  All  these  facts  precede  the  rising  only  in  point 
of  time,  but  they  have  no  internal  connection  with  it  what- 
ever. The  reformist  activities  of  Kornilov  and  Savinkov 
and  the  conspirative  work  of  Kornilov  and  Zavoiko,  Krimov, 
and  the  others,  are  two  quite  separate  processes,  only  paral- 
lel in  time.  To  prove  this,  it  is  enough  to  say  that  not  only 
I  was  Savinkov  not  an  accomplice  in  the  conspiracy,  but,  as 
I  will  be  seen  later,  the  conspirators  actually  deceived  him  at 
!  the  critical  moment.  However,  the  history  of  Savinkov's 
acquaintance  with  Filonenko  and  Kornilov  on  the  South- 
western front,  their  mutual  relations,  the  appointment  of 
Kornilov  as  Commander-in-Chief,  his  journey  to  Petrograd 
with  his  memorandum  to  the  Provisional  Government,  in 
short,  all  what  happened  before  the  Moscow  conference,  has 
a  great  psychological  significance.  In  his  exposition  Mr. 
Wilcox  continually  assures  his  reader  that  everything  good 
that  was  done  in  the  Russian  Army  in  the  summer  of  last 
year,  and  all  the  initiative  for  reforms,  all  the  attempts  to 
improve  the  fighting  capacity  of  the  Russian  troops  and  to 
save  the  front  from  disaster  were  entirely  the  work  of  Sav- 
inkov and  Filonenko;  and  chiefly  of   Kornilov  and  his 


264     THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM 

party.  On  the  other  hand,  all  the  events  which  serve  as  a 
kind  of  prologue  to  the  tragic  history  of  September  8th-i2th 
are  made  to  create  the  conviction  in  the  mind  of  the  reader 
that  Kerensky  and  his  friends  were  the  whole  time  applying 
the  brake  to  the  reformers'  great  undertakings,  and  that 
Kerensky  was  wavering  the  whole  time,  so  to  speak,  be- 
tween good  and  evil,  and  only  after  the  Moscow  conference 
did  he  wish  to  enter  on  the  path  of  good,  i.e.,  to  come  over 
to  the  side  of  Kornilov's  party  —  alas !  only  in  order  once 
more  and  for  the  last  time  to  betray  this  party  —  by  his 
weakness,  at  best  —  and  consequently  the  task  of  saving  the 
country  also. 

Unfortunately  lack  of  space  prevents  me  from  analysing 
the  opening  portion  of  Mr.  Wilcox's  work,  and  from  show- 
ing fact  by  fact  that  his  exposition  does  not  correspond  with 
reality.  All  his  first  article  is  artificially  connected  by  Mr. 
Wilcox  with  the  events  of  September  8th-i2th  by  the  fol- 
lowing phrase :  — 

"When  Kerensky  returned  to  Petrograd  on  August  30th  from 
the  Moscow  Congress  he  had  perceptibly  incHned  to  the  side  of  the 
Kornilov  party,  for  he  asked  Savinkov  to  continue  in  office  as 
Acting  Minister  of  War  and  withdrew  his  demand  for  the  resigna- 
tion of  the  Headquarters  Commissary,  Filonenko.  He  also  ac- 
knowledged that  in  principle  he  was  in  agreement  with  Kornilov's 
recommendations,  and  instructed  Savinkov  to  have  the  Bills  em- 
bodying them  finally  revised  and  prepared  for  submission  to  the 
Cabinet." 

I  will  commence  my  examination  of  Mr.  Wilcox^s  articles 
with  this.  It  is  true  that  after  the  Moscow  Conference  I 
altered  my  instructions  about  Savinkov's  resignation  and  in- 
structed him  to  complete  his  preparations  for  changes  at  the 
Ministry  of  War,  but  this  was  not  at  all  because  I  had  ''  per- 
ceptibly inclined  "  to  the  side  of  the  Kornilov  party,  but  from 


THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM  255 

quite  different  motives.     On  August  31st,  i.e.,  immediately 
after  the  Moscow  Conference,  Savinkov  made  the  follow- 
ing announcement  in  the  Press :  "  I  may  inform  you  that  I 
am  remaining  at  the  head  of  affairs  in  the  War  Office,   .    .    . 
and  by  Kerensky's  instructions  I  can  again  work  in  com- 
plete agreement  with  him  to  bring  to  life  that  program 
which  he  indicated  in  some  passages  of  his  speech  at  the 
Moscow  Conference,  and  with  which  I  and  the  Commander- 
in-Chief,  General  Kornilov,  are  wholly  in  agreement.   .    .    . 
It  would  be  a  mistake  to  think  that  I  had  proposed  to  im- 
pede the  functions  of  the  Army  organizations,  and  the  news 
to  that  effect  which  appeared  in  the  Press  is  absolutely  in- 
correct.  .    .    .   Neither  I  nor  General  Kornilov  ever  pro- 
posed anything  of  the  sort.     Like  A.  F.  Kerensky,  we  stood 
for  the  preservation  and  strengthening  of  the  Army  organ- 
izations."    It  is  clear  from  this  statement  that  Savinkov 
was  remaining  at  his  post  after  the  Moscow  Conference 
only  because  he  had  promised  beforehand  to  work  in  full 
agreement  with  me.     And  thus  after  the  Moscow  Confer- 
ence not  only  did  I  not  incline  to  the  side  of  the  Kornilov 
party,  but  Savinkov's  and  Kornilov's  paths  also  completely 
separated.     Savinkov  returned  to  his  work  at  the  Ministry, 
where  he  fully  completed  his  preparations  for  the  projects 
of  Army  reforms  which  had  been  initiated  in  the  War  Office 
on  my  instructions  long  before  Savinkov  took  charge  there 
or  Kornilov  was  appointed  Commander-in-Chief.    Savinkov, 
on  the  one  hand,  went  to  Headquarters  on  September  3rd 
with  these  projects  to  the  conference  which  had  been  ar- 
ranged there  of  the  representatives  of  the  War  Office  with 
the  Staff  of  the  Commander-in-Chief,  the  Commissaries  at 
the  Front,  and  the  representatives  of  the  elective  Army  or- 
ganizations.    The  Commander-in-Chief,  on  the  other  hand, 
and  his  party,  i.e.,  the  group  of  conspirators,  to  which  Savin- 


266    THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM 

kov  had  never  belonged,  were  steadily  engaged  in  preparing 
their  rebellion.  And  as  it  happened  those  further  decisive 
steps  which,  according  to  Mr.  Wilcox,  were  taken  by  me  two 
days  after  my  return  from  the  Moscow  Conference  in  the 
same  direction,  i.e.,  in  the  direction  of  the  Kornilov  party, 
were  in  fact  in  part  directly  aimed  at  liquidating  the  anti- 
Governmental  movement  which  had  grown  up,  and  were 
partly  called  for  by  the  necessity  of  guarding  the  Capital 
and  the  Provisional  Government  from  all  surprises  from  the 
Right  and  from  the  Left. 

I  need  not  tell  here  how  already  at  the  beginning  of  the 
year  there  had  sprung  up  in  certain  circles  of  Russian  society 
a  notion  of  strong  authority,  and  how  a  whole  tendency  in 
favour  of  a  military  dictatorship  had  gradually  been  or- 
ganized and  had  spread,  and  how  on  this  basis  there  were 
gradually  founded  conspirative  organizations  which  set 
themselves  the  aim  of  establishing  by  force  this  regime  in 
Russia.  I  will  only  mention  that  at  the  time  of  the  Moscow 
Conference  this  conspirative  movement  had  grown  so  ripe 
that  its  organizers  thought  even  of  declaring  a  dictatorship 
at  the  very  moment  of  the  Moscow  Conference.  Thanks  to 
the  temper  of  the  great  majority  of  the  Congress  it  was 
found  necessary  to  put  this  plan  aside,  and  these  people  had 
to  concentrate  all  their  energy  for  the  preparation  of  a  real 
coup  d'etat  prepared  according  to  all  the  rules  of  conspiracy. 
The  chief  centre  of  this  conspiracy  was  Headquarters.  This 
is  why  I  instructed  Savinkov  when  he  left  for  the  conference 
about  Army  reforms  to  "  liquidate,"  as  Mr.  Wilcox  puts  it, 
the  political  department  of  the  Commander-in-Chief's  Staff 
(page  502)  and  the  Chief  Committee  of  the  Officers' 
League ;  the  intention  was  not  entirely  to  liquidate  the  last, 
but  only  to  remove  it  from  Mohilev  to  another  town.  Mr. 
Wilcox  has  set  out  Savinkov's  first  two  instructions  cor- 


THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM  257 

rectly;  but  he  has  given  them  a  meaning  which  does  not 
correspond  with  the  facts. 

But  the  other  two  instructions  which  Mr.  Wilcox  gives  as 
if  they  were  from  me  he  expresses  quite  inaccurately :  — 

"  Savinkov  states  that  he  was  charged  by  the  Minister  Presi-        \ 
dent:  .   .   .   (3)  to  obtain  Kornilov's  consent  to  the  formation  of 
a  distinct  military  district  out  of  Petrograd  and  its  immediate 
environs,  so  that  a  state  of  war  might  be  declared  in  that  area 
separately." 

i 

In  actual  fact,  after  the  taking  of  Riga,  Kornilov  himself 
insisted  to  the  Provisional  Government  upon  the  declara- 
tion of  martial  law  in  Petrograd  and  upon  the  handing  over 
of  all  the  troops  of  the  Petrograd  military  district,  including 
the  Petrograd  garrison,  to  the  exclusive  orders  of  Head- 
quarters. The  Government  realized  the  necessity  of  hand- 
ing over  to  the  orders  of  the  Commander-in-Chief  the  troops 
of  the  Petrograd  military  district,  in  view  of  the  proximity 
of  the  rear  of  the  Army  to  the  Capital  after  the  taking  of 
Riga,  but  it  could  not  agree  to  the  demand  to  hand  over  to 
the  orders  of  the  Commander-in-Chief  the  troops  of  Petro- 
grad and  its  nearest  environs,  because  the  Provisional  Gov- 
ernment, like  every  Government,  could  not  remain  in  its 
residence,  especially  in  such  a  disturbed  time  of  war  and 
revolution,  without  any  force  to  defend  it  which  would  be 
entirely  and  exclusively  at  its  command.  The  Head  of  the 
War  Office,  together  with  the  Head  of  my  Military  Cabinet, 
was  only  meant  to  work  out  at  Headquarters  the  technical 
conditions  for  the  temporary  exclusion  of  Petrograd  and  its 
surroundings  from  the  composition  of  the  Petrograd  mili- 
tary district,  and 

"  (4)  To  request  the  dispatch  to  the  capital  of  a  cavalry  corps  to 
help  the  Government  to  enforce  its  new  policy  there,  and  in  par- 


g58  THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM 

ticular  to  suppress  a  BoisheviV  rising,  which,  according  to  the  re- 
ports of  the  counter-espionage,  was  to  take  place  almost  immedi- 
ately in  conjunction  with  a  German  landing  and  an  insurrection  in 
Finland." 

Nothing  of  the  sort.  The  real  motive  for  the  summoning 
of  the  cavalry  corps  was  published  in  the  Press  by  Savinkov: 
"  I  asked  the  Commander-in-Chief  for  a  cavalry  corps  at  the 
demand  of  the  Prime  Minister  in  order  to  establish  martial 
law  in  reality  in  Petrograd.  This  was  called  for  by  the 
strategic  necessity  of  subordinating  the  Petrograd  military- 
district  to  the  orders  of  the  Commander-in-Chief  in  view  of 
the  last  happenings  at  the  front.  The  plan  of  declaring 
martial  law  in  Petrograd  was  approved  by  the  Provisional 
Government."  It  is  obvious  that  this  cavalry  corps,  as  it 
was  to  be  at  the  disposal  of  the  Provisional  Government, 
was  meant  to  defend  it  from  all  the  attempts  to  overthrow 
it,  from  whichever  side  they  might  come,  as,  for  example, 
the  combined  force  had  protected  the  Provisional  Govern- 
ment at  the  beginning  of  July  from  the  attempts  of  the 
Bolsheviks. 

Thus,  of  the  four  "  decisive  steps  "  towards  the  Kornilov 
party,  two  were  directed  directly  against  his  party,  and  the 
two  others  were  called  for,  as  I  have  already  said,  by  the 
necessity  to  protect  the  Provisional  Government  from  all 
attacks  both  from  the  Left  and  from  the  Right.  Mr. 
Wilcox  would  not  pervert  the  meaning  of  my  instructions 
to  Savinkov  thus  if  he  had  not  been  dealing  with  the  mate- 
rials collected  by  the  Kornilovists,  or  if,  at  least,  he  had  been 
able  to  deal  with  it  critically.  But  yet,  on  page  503,  our 
author  has  a  passage  which  might  lead  one  to  doubt  his  im-^^^ 
partiality  and  the  genuineness  of  his  desire  to  discover  the  -" 
true  meaning  of  the  events.     Quoting  the  conversation  in 


THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM  259 

regard  to  my  four  instructions  which  took  place  between   \ 
Kornilov  and  Savinkov  in  the  presence  of  Generals  Lukom-  / 
sky,  Baranovsky,  and  Romanovsky,  Mr.  Wilcox,  entirely  on 
his  own  account,  makes  the  following  addition :  — 

"Of  the  plan  thus  outlined  only  one  feature  was  the  result  of 
Savinkov*s  independent  initiative:  that  was  the  request  that  the 
cavalry  corps  should  not  be  under  Krimov.  Also,  on  his  own  re- 
sponsibility, Savinkov  urged  that  the  *  wild  '  or  '  savage  '  division, 
which  was  composed  of  semi-civilized  tribesmen,  should  not  be  in- 
cluded in  the  forces  sent  to  Petrograd." 

Yet,  without  doubt,  Mr.  Wilcox  had  at  his  disposal  the  tijxt 
of  Kornilov's  private  interview  with  Savinkov,  passages 
from  which  are  mentioned  by  the  author  on  pages  502-503, 
from  which  it  is  plain  that  Savinkov  was  speaking  about 
General  Krimov  and  the  savage  division  not  on  his  own 
"  independent  initiative  "  and  "  on  his  own  responsibility," 
but  exclusively  by  my  instructions.  Even  if  Mr.  Wilcox 
had  not  had  before  his  eyes  the  text  of  Kornilov's  conversa- 
tion with  Savinkov,  even  so  he  need  not  have  spoken  of  the 
"  independent  initiative  "  of  Savinkov,  since  he  will  not  find 
any  evidence  of  such  initiative  anywhere  in  the  published 
materials  about  the  Kornilov  affair.  This  passage  is  the 
result  of  his  own  **  independent  creation." 

But  why  did  Mr.  Wilcox  do  this  ?  What  serious  signifi- 
cance has  this  suggestion  in  the  explanation  of  the  "  true 
meaning  "  of  the  events?  I  can  answer  plainly  that  it  is  of 
vast  importance,  because  this  invention  is  an  attempt  to  con- 
ceal one  of  the  principal  proofs  against  General  Kornilov. 
We  must  note  the  phrase  that  follows  this  interesting 
passage :  — 

"  He  states  that  Kornilov  promised  to  fulfil  both  these  requests, 
which,  however,  he  failed  to  do." 


S60  THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM 

Trifles,  indeed,  to  which  it  is  not  worth  while  to  pay  at- 
tention !  Probably  the  reader  of  Mr.  Wilcox's  articles  has 
simply  passed  over  this  phrase  "  promised  to  fulfil "  but 
"  failed  to  do  "  so.  Nevertheless,  this  promise  and  non-ful- 
filment have  a  huge  significance  in  the  whole  history  of  the 
dispatch  of  the  cavalry  corps  to  Petrograd,  which  in  its  turn 
is  one  of  the  principal  episodes  of  the  affair,  without  proper 
explanation  of  which  it  is  quite  impossible  to  understand 
the  significance  of  the  events  of  September  8th-i2th. 

My  "  agreement "  with  Kornilov  is  mainly  shown  by  this 
call  for  troops,  as  if  for  the  purpose  of  using  them  in  joint 
activity  with  Kornilov  at  Petrograd.  Again,  my  "  be- 
trayal "  of  Kornilov  and  his  party  is  mainly  shown  by  my 
sudden  stopping  of  the  movement  of  the  cavalry  corps  which 
had  been  summoned  to  Petrograd  by  the  Government  itself 
in  agreement  with  the  Commander-in-Chief. 

It  is  true  that  the  Government,  desiring  to  protect  itself 
from  all  surprises,  wished  to  have  at  its  complete  disposal  a 
fresh  and  well-disciplined  military  force.  Having  reason 
to  mistrust  General  Krimov  and  those  in  command  of  the 
savage  division,  and,  moreover,  considering  this  division  to 
be  insufficiently  disciplined  for  service  in  a  city,  I  asked 
Savinkov  to  tell  General  Kornilov  from  me  that  in  the  force 
sent  for  the  disposal  of  the  Provisional  Government  the 
savage  division  should  not  be  included,  and  that  General 
Krimov  should  not  be  appointed  to  the  command  of  the 
force.  Knowing  that  these  two  restrictions  were  absolutely 
necessary  conditions  for  the  dispatch  of  troops  to  Petrograd, 
Savinkov  twice  spoke  about  it  to  General  Kornilov.  Re- 
ceiving his  promise  strictly  to  fulfil  both  these  instructions 
of  mine,  Savinkov,  "  fully  satisfied,"  as  Mr.  Wilcox  himself 
says,  returned  to  Petrograd  and  at  once  on  the  7th  of 
September  he  informed  me  of  the  matter  and  also  of  General 


THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM  261 

Kornilov's  loyal  attitude  towards  him.  General  Kornilov 
not  only  promised  not  to  send  Krimov  to  Petrograd,  but  at 
the  proposal  of  the  Commander-in-Chief  General  Krimov 
was  appointed  by  the  Provisional  Government  as  Com- 
mander of  the  nth  Army  on  the  South-Western  front.  But 
at  the  same  time,  however,  that  Kornilov  was  promising 
Savinkov  not  to  send  Krimov  to  Petrograd,  General  Krimov 
at  Headquarters  was  working  out  a  plan  for  the  occupation 
of  Petrograd  and  for  introducing  there  a  state  of  siege. 
Moreover,  he  was  appointed  Commander  of  the  Petrograd 
Army  without  the  Provisional  Government's  being  in- 
formed, and  he  left  for  Petrograd  with  the  cavalry  corps, 
at  the  head  of  which  marched  the  savage  division. 

Krimov  left  for  Petrograd  not  to  put  himself  at  the  dis- 
posal of  the  Government,  but  having  with  him  special 
instructions  from  General  Kornilov.  On  September  7th- 
9th,  there  approached  Petrograd  not  troops  which  had  been 
summoned  by  the  Government,  but  in  the  guise  of  these  the 
troops  of  General  Kornilov's  force  whose  aim  was  hostile  to 
the  Government.  When  these  troops  were  near  enough  to 
Petrograd  on  the  evening  of  September  9th,  V.  Lvov  came 
to  me  with  General  Kornilov's  ultimatum.  Now,  I  think, 
the  reader  will  understand  why  Mr.  Wilcox  or  his  inspirers 
had  to  invent  the  tale  of  Savinkov's  "  independent  initi- 
ative." The  whole  story  of  General  Kornilov's  rising  is 
dark  and  difficult  to  understand  unless  the  circumstances  of 
the  dispatch  of  the  cavalry  corps  to  Petrograd  are  explained. 
It  must  be  said  that  General  Kornilov  himself  did  not  con- 
ceal his  intentions  to  use  force  of  arms  against  the  Pro- 
visional Government.  Thus,  Mr.  Wilcox  himself  says,  on 
page  514:  — 

"  In  the  Army  Orders  which  he  posted  in  Mohilev  on  September 
loth  and  nth,  but  which  he  was  prevented  by  the  Government  pro 


262  THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM 

hibition  from  circulating  further,  and  in  the  statement  prepared  by 
him  for  the  Judicial  Commission,  Kornilov  gives  a  very  full  exposi- 
tion of  his  motives  for  refusing  to  surrender  the  Chief  Command 
and  attempting  to  compel  the  Government  by  force  of  arms  to 
carry  out  his  program." 

On  page  5 1 5  we  find :  — 

"  Feeling  that '  further  hesitation  would  be  fatal,*  Kornilov,  hav- 
ing assured  himself  of  the  support  of  most  of  the  other  command- 
ing generals,  decided  to  use  the  3rd  Cavalry  Corps  to  compel  the 
Government  ..." 

But  the  conspirators  and,  like  them,  Mr.  Wilcox  are  only  un- 
successful in  their  attempts  to  represent  all  this  story  in  such 
a  way  as  to  suggest  that  the  decision  to  "  use  "  the  3rd 
Cavalry  Corps  came  into  the  head  of  General  Kornilov 
"  suddenly,"  when  he  was  convinced  that  Kerensky  was 
endeavouring  to  break  his  arrangement  with  him  and  that 
the  Government  had  again  fallen  under  the  influence  of 
the  "  Bolshevist  majority  in  the  Soviets." 

According  to  the  conspirators'  version  this  sudden  deci- 
sion came  to  General  Kornilov  only  on  September  loth 
after  he  had  received  at  Headquarters  the  text  of  my  proc- 
lamation to  the  population  of  September  9th,  where  I 
seemed  to  declare  General  Kornilov  a  "  traitor."  General 
Kornilov  himself  gives  the  same  explanation  in  one  of  his 
own  depositions.  But  this  explanation  cannot  withstand 
criticism.  On  September  6th  Krimov  at  Headquarters  was 
already  working  out  his  plan  of  approach  upon  Petrograd. 
On  September  7th  Kornilov's  troops  in  the  guise  of  the 
Government  troops  were  already  moving  on  Petrograd. 
On  September  Slh-Qth  there  took  place  and  were  concluded 
General  Kornilov's  arrangements  with  the  Generals  at  the 
front,  by  whom  he  was  convinced  "of  the  support  of  the 


THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM  26S 

other  commanding  Generals."  On  September  9th  General 
Kornilov  sent  a  proposal  to  the  Commanders  of  the  military 
divisions  at  the  rear  to  take  orders  only  from  him,  and  on 
the  same  day,  September  9th,  General  Krimov's  force  began 
its  march  upon  Petrograd.  Finally,  already  on  the  evening 
of  September  8th  there  took  place  at  Headquarters  the  final 
conference  about  the  nature  of  the  dictatorship  (General 
Kornilov,  Aladin,  Zavoiko  and  Filonenko  took  part),  and 
General  Kornilov  by  telegraph  invited  certain  prominent 
politicians  to  come  immediately  to  Headquarters  to  discuss 
"  State  matters  "  of  extraordinary  importance,  i.e.,  to  estab- 
lish a  new  Government  attached  to  the  dictatorship. 

It  is  clear  from  this  short  chronology  how  energetically 
everything  was  being  prepared  for  the  moment  of  General 
Krimov's  entry  into  Petrograd.  The  measures  w^hich  I  took 
simultaneously  (on  the  night  of  September  loth)  against 
the  further  approach  of  Krimov's  force  led  to  the  complete 
failure  of  the  adventure,  "  As  soon  as  Kornilov  realized 
that  Krimov's  expedition  had  failed  he  did  everything  in 
his  power  to  prevent  that  civil  war"  (page  516),  says  Mr. 
Wilcox,  thus  in  fact  recognizing  the  significance  of  Gen- 
eral Krimov's  force  in  the  events  of  September  8th-i2th. 
I  am  sorry  to  have  harped  so  long  on  Mr.  Wilcox's  inven- 
tion of  Savinkov's  "  independent  initiative  "  in  the  episod 
of  the  dispatch  of  the  Cavalry  Corps,  "  at  the  disposal  of 
the  Government."  Every  one  who  has  read  the  articles  I  \ 
am  discussing  and  is  now  acquainted  with  my  remarks  about 
them  will  understand  how  important  it  is  to  determine  the 
genuine  facts  which  were  connected  with  General  Krimov's 
name,  facts  which,  thanks  to  Mr.  Wilcox's  independent 
inventions,  remained  unknown  to  the  readers  of  his  articles, 
which  were  supposed  to  be  an  attempt  to  facilitate  an  un- 


264  THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM 

derstanding  of  "  the  true  meaning  of  the  incident.'*  These 
facts  destroy  every  possibility  of  connecting  the  summoning 
of  the  troops  with  any  sort  of  agreement  I  am  supposed 
to  have  made  v^ith  General  Kornilov's  party,  and  at  the 
same  time  prove  beyond  doubt  the  reality  of  the  quite  definite 
form  of  General  Kornilov's  and  his  party's  activity. 

But  Mr.  Wilcox  writes  mainly  of  the,  so  to  speak,  intimate 
side  of  my  relations  with  General  Kornilov  and  his  party 
through  V.  Lvov  (my  "  friend  ")  whom  I  instructed  "  se- 
cretly "  to  conduct  the  negotiations  with  Headquarters. 

"Lvov  is  a  man  of  eminently  mediocre  talents,  and  the  role 
into  which  he  thrust  himself  here,  on  the  grounds  of  his  close 
personal  friendship  with  Kerensky,  was  merely  that  of  a  messen- 
ger, but  the  effects  of  his  intervention  shook  the  political  world 
like  an  earthquake."     (Page  504.) 

In  the  first  place,  there  was  never  any  close  personal  friend- 
ship, or  even  any  friendship  whatever,  or  close  relations, 
between  V.  Lvov  and  me.  Indeed,  not  only  was  there  no 
friendship,  but  after  the  compulsory  exit  of  V.  Lvov  from 
the  Provisional  Government  in  July  of  last  year,  he  was 
extremely  hostile  towards  me.  He  never  hid  this,  and  even 
declared  that:  "Kerensky,  c'est  mon  ennemi  mortel." 
And  on  September  8th,  late  in  the  evening,  he  said  to  one 
of  his  friends,  in  a  state  of  great  excitement :  "  Kerensky 
did  not  want  to  be  a  dictator,  so  we  shall  give  him  one." 
Secondly,  V.  Lvov  never  was  my  "  messenger." 

"  It  may  be  stated  here  that  Kerensky,  in  his  evidence  before 
the  Special  Commission,  admitted  that  Lvov  went  to  Headquar- 
ters at  his  request."     (Page  505.) 

says  Mr.  Wilcox.  Nothing  of  the  kind  was  said.  On 
the  contrary,  when  I  gave  my  evidence  before  the  Special 


THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM  265 

Commission  I  declared  that  even  the  word  "  Headquarters  " 
was  not  mentioned  during  my  first  conversation  with  V. 
Lvov  on  September  4th.  And  that  I  never  sent  him  with 
anyTnstructions  and  that  all  this  episode  consisted  mainly 
in  that  V.  Lvov,  like  many  others  at  that  time,  discussed 
the  weakness  of  the  Government  and  suggested  to  me  that 
our  authority  should  be  strengthened  by  the  inclusion  in  the 
Provisional  Government  of  new  elements  who  had  actual 
strength  in  the  country.  This  conversation  took  place  im- 
mediately after  the  Moscow  Conference,  where  the  question 
had  been  raised  of  a  closer  union  between  the  democracy 
and  the  privileged  classes,  and  therefore  this  theme  of  con- 
versation was  quite  natural  on  V.  Lvov's  part,  all  the  more 
so  as  precisely  at  the  time  there  had  taken  place  at  Moscow 
a  political  conference  of  the  group  of  public  men  with  whom 
V.  Lvov  had  been  in  close  connection  in  the  Duma.  I  would 
enquire  how  Mr.  Wilcox  can  affirm  that  I  admitted  on 
examination  that  which  I  never  said  and  which  is  not  in 
the  stenographic  report  of  my  examination  which  is  about 
to  be  published  in  England?  This  time  Mr.  Wilcox  is 
not  guilty  of  "  independent  initiative."  He  is  only  repro- 
ducing a  phrase  from  the  forged  resume  of  my  examination 
which  the  Kornilovists  published  in  the  Press  instead  of  my 
original  deposition,  which  was  in  their  hands.  Besides  this 
unsuccessful  reference  to  myself,  Mr.  Wilcox  adds  that 
Aladin  and  Dobrinsky  —  the  accused  in  the  Kornilov  affair 
—  declared  that,  according  to  V.  Lvov's  words :  "  Ker- 
ensky  empowered  him  to  negotiate  with  Headquarters  for 
the  formation  of  a  new  Government."  He  said  that  "  Ker- 
cnsky  wished  the  negotiations  to  be  secret,  as  he  feared 
that  attempts  might  be  made  on  his  life  from  the  side  of 
the  parties  supporting  him  if  anything  was  divulged  before 


266  THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM 

a  definite  result  had  been  reached."  But  Lvov,  in  spite 
of  all  his  "  invalid  condition,''  does  not  confirm  this  rub- 
bish in  any  way  in  any  of  his  depositions.* 

But  Mr.  Wilcox  would  probably  not  have  referred  to 
Aladin  and  Dobrinsky  at  all  if  he  had  considered  the  matter 
more  seriously.  He  would  have  realized  in  that  case  that 
these  two  gentlemen  together  with  Zavoiko  were  precisely 
the  organizers  of  Lvov's  journey  to  me,  first  on  September 
4th  for  reconnaissance,  and  later,  on  September  8th,  to 
present  Kornilov's  secret  ultimatum.  The  point  is  that, 
w^hen  the  conspiracy  was  sufficiently  ripe,  when  the  troops 
and  Krimov's  detachment  might  enter  Petrograd  any  day, 
the  organizers  of  the  whole  adventure  had  to  find  a  means 
of  penetrating  to  me  besides  the  normal  methods  of  com- 
munication betw^een  Headquarters  and  me  as  Prime  Min- 
ister and  War  Minister.  At  first  Aladin  personally  under- 
took the  attempt,  but  I  categorically  refused  to  receive  him. 
Then  he  tried  with  equal  unsuccess  to  penetrate  to  me  with 
the  help  of  the  ex-Prime  Minister,  Count  G.  E.  Lvov,  who, 
however,  refused  to  help  him  in  this.     But  Count  G.  E. 

1  Mr.  Wilcox,  by  the  way,  so  blindly  follows  his  favourite  sources  of 
information  that  occasionally  he  falls  into  quite  humorous  situations. 
Explaining  by  his  invalid  condition  V.  Lvov's  "confused  and  frag- 
mentary "  declarations,  Mr.  Wilcox,  without  any  attempt  to  be  critical,  *\ 
repeats  Lvov's  words  how  "  his  health  had  been  broken  and  his  memory 
impaired  by  a  month  of  solitary  confinement  in  the  Dowager  Tsaritza's 
room  at  the  Winter  Palace,  where  his  sleep  was  continually  disturbed 
by  Kerensky  singing  operatic  roulades  in  the  adjoining  apartment." 

Could  not  Mr.  Wilcox  guess  that,  even  if  I  had  wished  to  disturb 
Lvov's  valuable  health  with  my  arias,  with  the  enormous  amount  of 
work  which  occupied  me  for  twenty  hours  a  day  and  compelled  me 
the  whole  time  to  be  with  people,  I  could  not  have  been  able  to  spend 
whole  nights  in  the  neighbouring  room  to  Lvov's  singing  "operatic 
roulades"  there.  I  assure  Mr.  Wilcox  that,  if  I  had  wished  to  break 
Lvov's  health  in  some  such  manner,  I  should  have  placed  ten  big  drums 
in  Lvov's  own  room.  Really,  there  should  be  some  limits  to  human 
credulity. 


THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM  267 

Lvov  thought  it  well  to  inform  me  of  his  uneasy  surprise 
that,  when  Aladin  received  his  refusal  and  was  leaving 
him,  he  very  significantly  asked  him  to  inform  me,  the 
Prime  Minister,  that  henceforward  no  changes  in  the  com- 
position of  the  Provisional  Government  ought  to  take  place 
without  the  consent  of  Headquarters.  Aladin  and  Co.  after 
this  unsuccess  decided  to  make  use  of  V.  Lvov,  rightly  con- 
sidering that  he,  as  a  Member  of  the  Duma  and  an  ex- 
Member  of  the  Provisional  Government,  could  at  any  time 
easily  have  an  interview  with  me.  Thus,  on  September 
3rd,  after  a  conference  with  Aladin  and  Dfobrinsky  in  Mos- 
cow, Lvov  came  to  Petrograd,  and  at  once,  on  September 
4th,  had  an  interview  with  me.  On  September  5th  he  was 
again  in  AIoscow,  meeting  Aladin  and  Dobrinsky  again. 
On  the  same  day  he  left  for  Mohilev  with  Dobrinsky,  and 
with  Aladin' s  letter  to  Zavoiko.  On  September  6th  he 
reached  Headquarters,  where  he  was  in  the  company  of  the 
same  Dobrinsky  and  of  Zavoiko,  and  in  the  evening  he 
was  able  to  have  an  interview  with  General  Kornilov.  At 
this  interview,  at  the  conclusion  of  which  Zavoiko  also 
was  present,  he  was  given  instructions  by  the  Commander- 
in-Chief.  With  the  first  train  after  this  interview  with 
General  Kornilov  V.  Lvov  came  to  Petrograd,  and  on  Sep- 
tember 8th  he  came  to  me  there  almost  straight  from  the 
station  with  General  Kornilov's  "proposal."  This  haste 
is  quite  intelligible  when  one  remembers  that  at  this  time 
General  Krimov's  detachment  was  already  fairly  near  to 
Petrograd. 

But  let  us  admit  for  a  moment  that  I  sent  Lvov  with 
instructions  to  General  Kornilov.  With  what  instructions  ? 
On  this  question  it  is  impossible  to  receive  any  plain  and 
coherent  answer  from  the  people  in  Kornilov's  party.  Mr. 
Wilcox  refers,  on  page  505,  to  General  Kornilov's  state- 


£68  THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM 

ment  in  his  deposition  to  the  Commission  of  Enquiry,  that 
Lvov,  coming  in  my  name,  had  only  made  enquiries,  but 
that  he  (Kornilov)  himself  in  reply  to  these  enquiries  had 
spoken  of  the  necessity  of  a  dictatorship  in  some  form  or 
another.  Meanwhile,  on  September  9th  again,  Kornilov 
himself  told  Savinkov  on  the  direct  wire  that  Lvov  had 
come  to  him  wath  a  proposal  from  the  Prime  Minister  to 
"  accept  the  dictatorship  and  announce  this  fact  through 
the  present  Provisional  Government." 

V.  Lvov  declared  in  all  his  depositions  that  he  had  pro- 
posed nothing  in  my  name,  but,  in  the  deposition  which 
Mr.  Wilcox  mentions,  V.  Lvov  actually  announces  that 
Kornilov  not  only  did  not  propose  any  ultimatum  to  him, 
but  that 

"  Kornilov  submitted  to  him  '  no  kind  of  ultimatum/  and  what 
passed  between  them  was  a  '  simple  conversation,'  in  the  course 
of  which  various  desires  in  the  sense  of  strengthening  the  Gov- 
ernment were  discussed." 

And  yet  on  the  same  September  8th  Lvov  himself  confirmed 
before  a  witness  that  the  proposals  which  he  had  set  out  in 
writing  came  direct  from  General  Kornilov.  Whence  does 
this  disagreement  come  between  the  two  parties  to  the  con- 
versation? Why  does  General  Kornilov  report  the  same 
conversation  with  Lvov  in  a  quite  different  way  ?  Why  did 
he  in  the  course  of  time  deny  his  own  declaration  that  I 
myself  had  proposed  to  him  through  Lvov  a  coup  d'etat 
against  myself? 

The  matter  is  easily  explained.  Neither  those  who  sent 
Lvov  to  me,  nor  Lvov  himself,  knew  until  afterwards  that 
my  conversation  with  Lvov  on  September  8th,  which  they 
supposed  had  taken  place  between  us  two  alone,  had  in 
actual  fact  been  overheard,  unknown  to  Lvov,  by  a  third 


THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM  269 

person.  This  person,  the  Assistant  of  the  Director  of  the 
Militia  (PoHce)  Department,  gave  the  following  evidence 
to  the  juge  d'instruction  on  September  9th,  the  day  after 
the  conversation  of  Lvov  with  me.  "  I  happened  to  be 
in  Kerensky's  room,  and  intended  to  leave  in  view  of  the 
conversation  he  w^as  about  to  have  with  Lvov.  But  Ker-^ 
ensky  asked  me  to  stay  and  I  remained  in  his  room  during 
the  whole  period  of  the  conversation.  Kerensky  brought 
with  him  two  documents :  first,  he  read  out  aloud  to  Lvov 
the  tape  of  the  telegraphic  direct  wire  from  Headquarters, 
which  contained  Kerensky's  conversation  with  General  Kor- 
nilov,  the  same  which  you  are  showing  me  now.  And 
Lvov  confirmed  the  correctness  of  the  conversation  set  out 
on  the  tape.  Then  Kerensky  read  aloud  to  Lvov  Lvov's 
own  note,  which  you  are  showing  me  now,  and  Lvov  con- 
firmed also  the  correctness  of  this  document,  declaring  that 
all  that  was  proposed  in  this  note  came  from  General  Kor- 
nilov.  .  .  .  Further,  Lvov  said  that  the  public  and  every 
one  at  Headquarters  were  so  roused  against  Kerensky  and 
the  Provisional  Government  that  General  Kornilov  could 
not  answer  for  Kerensky's  personal  safety  in  any  place 
in  Russia,  and  therefore  Kerensky's  and  Savinkov's  jour- 
ney to  Headquarters  was  essential;  and  Lvov  on  his  side 
gave  Kerensky  *  good  advice  '  to  accept  and  carry  out  Gen- 
eral Kornilov's  conditions.  Advising  Kerensky  to  fulfil 
General  Kornilov 's  demands,  Lvov  said  that  General  Kor- 
nilov offered  posts  in  the  new  Cabinet  of  Ministers  he  was 
forming  to  Kerensky  —  as  Minister  of  Justice  —  and  to 
Savinkov  —  as  Minister  of  War  and,  I  think,  of  Marine.'* 
On  September  8th  General  Kornilov  did  not  yet  know 
of  this  witness's  account,  but  afterwards  he  did  know  of  it, 
and  this  explains  the  change.  But  here  is  the  original  text 
of  the  document  which  Mr.  Wilcox  so  disdainfully  calls 


870  THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM 

"a  few  detached  thoughts."  It  is  printed  on  page  io6 
of  the  Russian  text  of  my  book  "  The  Kornilov  Affair  '* : — 

"General  Kornilov  proposes  (i)  to  declare  martial  law  in 
Petrograd;  (2)  to  give  all  the  military  and  civil  power  into  the 
hands  of  the  Commander-in-Chief;  (3)  the  resignation  of  all 
Ministers,  including  the  Premier  himself,  and  the  transfer  tem- 
porarily of  control  from  the  Ministers  to  their  assistants  until 
the  establishment  of  the  Commander-in-Chief's  Cabinet. — (Signed) 
V.  Lvov.     Petrograd,  August  26th  (September  8th),  1917." 

Thus,  if  Mr.  Wilcox  had  made  use  of  all  the  materials,  and 
not  only  of  the  evidence  cunningly  shufHed  by  the  conspira- 
tors, he  himself  could  have  shown  that  Lvov  had  not  simply 
"  jotted  down  a  few  detached  thoughts,"  but  set  out  in  an 
accurate  form  General  Kornilov's  proposal,  that  I  did  not 
snatch  the  document  and  put  it  into  my  own  pocket  in  order 
not  to  give  Lvov  the  opportunity  to  become  acquainted 
with  what  he  himself  had  written,  but,  on  the  contrary, 
that  I  read  him  his  document  and  he  confirmed  its  correct- 
ness; that  although  Lvov  was  arrested,  this  was  not  imme- 
diately after  his  setting  out  on  paper  General  Kornilov's 
proposal,  but  only  after  this  had  been  confirmed  on  the 
direct  wire  by  General  Kornilov  himself. 

I  would  advise  the  reader  now  to  read  again  my  conversa- 
tion on  September  8th  with  General  Kornilov  on  the  direct 
wire  (October  issue,  pp.  507-508),  and  to  compare  it  with 
these  "  detached  thoughts  "  of  Lvov  and  with  the  above 
declaration  made  by  our  witness  who  was  present  with  us 
during  our  conversation.  Then  every  one  will  see  plainly 
that  I  had  good  reason,  after  all  these  conversations,  to 
conclude  that  Lvov  was  acting  as  a  plenipotentiary  for  Gen- 
eral Kornilov,  and  that  General  Kornilov  himself  confirmed 
to  a  sufficient  degree  what  Lvov  had  said  to  me.  "  Yester- 
day evening  during  my  conversation  with  the  Prime  Min- 


THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOf^SHEVISM  271 

ister  on  the  direct  wire  I  confirmed  to  him  what  I  had  said 
through  Lvov,"  said  General  Kornilov  on  September  9th 
to  Savinkov  on  the  direct  wire. 
Even  Mr.  Wilcox  agrees  that 

"  The  Minister-President  asked  for,  and  received,  a  confirmation 
of  Lvov's  message,  but  neither  of  the  two  speakers  indicated  what 
the  message  was,  except  so  far  as  the  single  point  of  the  journey 
to  Headquarters  was  concerned." 

Thus  General  Kornilov  answers  the  questions,  put  in  a 
conspirative  manner,  as  only  a  man  would  answer  who 
thoroughly  knew  what  significance  is  contained  in  these 

.  questions,  which  would  be  mysterious  for  outsiders.  One 
may  ask  why  Mr.  Wilcox  did  not  think  it  necessary  to  give 
his  readers  the  text  of  V.  Lvov's  "  detached  thoughts." 
Why  does  he  hide  in  his  pocket  the  little  key  to  my  myste- 
rious conversation  with  General  Kornilov  ?  By  the  way, 
on  page  508  Mr.  Wilcox  says  that  V.  Lvov  was  not  present 
at  the  apparatus  at  the  time  of  my  conversation  with  Gen- 
eral Kornilov,  that  he  did  not  know  to  what  abuse  his  name 
was  being  put,  and  that  afterwards  he  protested  against 
the  freedom  which  the  Prime  Minister  had  taken  with  it. 
From  the  evidence  given  above  by  the  person  who  was 
present  at  my  second  conversation  with  Lvov  when  I  had 
in  my  hands  already  the  tape  record  of  my  conversation 
with  General  Kornilov,  it  is  clear  that  Lvov  not  only  did 
not  protest  against  the  abuse  which  I  had  made  of  his  name, 
but  on  the  contrary  confirmed  the  conversation,  i.e.,  he 
acknowledged  that  I  had  not  in  my  conversation  with  Gen- 
eral Kornilov  transgressed  those  limits  which  had  pre^ 
viously  been  arranged  between  me  and  Lvov.  I  had  to 
hold  my  conversation  with  General  Kornilov  on  the  direct 

^*  wire  without  Lvov  only  because  the  latter  arrived  nearly 


^«  THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM 

an  hour  later  than  the  time  we  had  arranged,  and  it  was 
impossible  to  make  General  Kornilov  wait  any  longer  at 
the  apparatus. 

"  *  Before  the  Special  Commission/  continues  Mr.  Wilcox,  *  Ker- 
ensky  replied  that  in  view  of  the  gravity  of  the  situation  he 
felt  entitled  to  make  use  of  this  ruse  in  order  to  induce  Kornilov 
to  talk  more  freely  than  he  might  otherwise  have  done." 

I  never  said  anything  of  the  kind  to  the  Commission  of 
Enquiry;  I  said  only  what  I  have  just  repeated.  In  this 
case  Mr.  Wilcox  has  been  made  a  victim  of  the  falsification 
of  my  deposition  of  which  I  have  already  spoken.  This 
silence  of  Mr.  Wilcox  about  Lvov*s  document  has  served 
the  same  purpose  as  his  act  of  direct  creation  in  regard  to 
the  '*  independent  initiative  "  of  Savinkov.  Because  of  this 
silence  about  Lvov's  document  the  events  of  the  evening  of 
September  8th,  which  saw  the  beginning  of  the  formal 
liquidation  of  the  Kornilov  adventure,  remain  for  Mr.  Wil- 
cox's readers  unintelligible  and  obscure.  And  Mr.  Wilcox, 
following  his  sources,  is  able  to  explain  the  whole  liquidation 
as  a  tragic  misunderstanding  brought  about  by  the  unex- 
plainable  interference  of  my  "  messenger,"  V.  Lvov.  All 
attempts  to  liquidate  this  misunderstanding  painlessly  were 
in  vain,  since  the  Prime  Minister,  under  the  influence  of 
this  evil  counsellor  Nekrassov,  and  of  the  Petrograd  Council 
of  Workmen's  and  Soldiers'  Deputies,  after  some  wavering 
refused  to  hold  out  the  hand  of  reconciliation  to  General 
Kornilov,  and  "  by  the  evening  of  September  loth  the 
breach  between  Kornilov  and  Kerensky  was  complete  and 
final." 

Of  course,  in  reality,  this  was  not  at  all  the  case.  Lvov's 
arrival  and  the  answers  given  to  me  by  General  Kornilov 
on  the  direct  wire  on  the  evening  of  September  8th,  in  con- 


THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM  273 

nection  with  the  approach  of  the  Cavalry  Corps  towards 
Petrograd,  made  the  situation  absolutely  clear  to  me.  Tak- 
ing into  account  all  that  had  preceded  and  all  the  serious 
information  we  had  about  the  preparation  of  a  conspiracy, 
I  had  no  doubt  that  only  by  the  most  decisive  and  speedy 
measures  was  it  possible  to  smother  at  the  very  outset  the 
conflagration  which  was  beginning,  and  to  save  my  country 
from  the  upheaval  towards  which  those  short-sighted  poli- 
ticians and  bold  adventurers  wished  to  drive  it. 

On  the  night  of  September  9th  the  Provisional  Govern- 
ment gave  me  special  plenipotentiary  powers  to  liquidate  the 
revolt.  I  took  immediately  the  most  essential  measures  in 
order  to  stop  the  further  advance  of  General  Krimov's 
force  upon  Petrograd,  and  I  proposed  to  the  Government 
to  dismiss  General  Kornilov  from  his  position  and  to  call 
him  to  Petrograd,  etc.  Mr.  Wilcox  declares,  on  page  510, 
that  I  received  on  the  night  of  September  9th  "  full  powers," 
i.e.,  that  I  became  in  fact  dictator,  and  consequently 

"  Kerensky  must  bear  the  entire  responsibility  for  everything 
that  was  done  in  the  name  of  the  Government  during  those  days. 
In  particular  his  appointment  as  Commander-in-Chief  must  have 
been  his  own  work,  and  not,  as  it  was  officially  announced  to  be, 
a  Cabinet  decision." 

The  responsibility  for  all  that  the  Government  did  in  those 
days  lies  upon  me,  and  I  am  quite  prepared  to  bear  it.  But 
still,  I  did  not  ask  for  full  powers  for  myself  on  September 
9th,  nor~drdT  receive  the  same;  but  I  was  given  powers 
only  "  to  take  quick  and  decisive  measures  to  cut  off  at  the 
roots  all  attempts  upon  the  sovereign  power  of  the  coun- 
try and  upon  the  civil  rights  which  have  been  won  by  the 
Revolution,"  as  was  stated  in  my  official  proclamation  to 
the  population.  Therefore  my  taking  over  the  duties  of 
Commander-in-Chief  was  not  "my  own  work,"  but  was 


g74     THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM 

„    the  common  decision  of  the  members  of  the  Provisional 

Government,   brought  about  by  special  circumstances   of 

y*»i  •     which  this  is  not  the  place  nor  the  time  to  speak. 

L>^  ^^  ,    I  think  that  I  have  sufficiently  established  the  lack  of 

\,X^^  correspondence  between  Mr.  Wilcox's  exposition  and  the 

real  events  which  took  place  in  Russia  between  September 

4th  and  14th.     Therefore  I  shall  only  briefly  touch  upon 

certain  other  contradictions,  the  significance  of  which  is  by 

itself  sufficiently  plain. 

"  During  the  9th  of  September,*'  says  Mr.  Wilcox,  "  Ker- 
ensky  took  no  absolutely  irretrievable  step,"  but  on  the 
night  of  September  loth,  at  the  time  when  General  Alexeiev, 
whom  Kerensky  asked  to  resume  the  Chief  Command,  came 
to  know  in  Kerensky's  quarters  in  the  Winter  Palace  of  the 
documents  about  the  Kornilov  affair,  Kerensky  "appar- 
ently "received  the  Executive  Committee  of  the  Petrograd 
Soviet.  "  We  do  not  know  what  passed  between  Kerensky 
and  the  Committee,"  continues  Mr.  Wilcox,  but  he  hints 
very  plainly  that  the  hostile  and  uncompromising  position 
of  the  Petrograd  Soviet  after  this  conference  acted  disas- 
trously on  Kerensky's  conduct  and  that  the  Soviet  drove 
him  to  the  uncompromising  step  of  publishing  the  proclama- 
tion in  which  the  word  "  treason  "  was  for  the  first  time 
used  and  applied  to  the  activities  of  Kornilov.  Not  only 
does  Mr.  Wilcox  not  know  what  took  place  between  me  and 
the  Committee  on  the  night  of  September  loth,  but  nobody 
in  the  world  knows,  because  no  conference  between  me  and 
the  Executive  Committee  of  the  Petrograd  Soviet  took  place 
either  on  the  night  of  September  loth  or  altogether  during 
the  whole  time  when  the  Kornilov  affair  was  being  liqui- 
dated. Not  "  apparently,"  but  absolutely  certainly  in  this 
instance,  Mr.  Wilcox  or  his  inspirers  have  consciously  de- 


THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM  275 

sired  to  give  their  suggestions  the  appearance  of  actuaHty. 

So  far  as  the  terrible  proclamation  is  concerned  with  the 
word  "  treason,"  inspired,  forsooth,  by  the  Soviet,  "  It  has 
been  admitted  by  Kerensky,"  says  Mr.  Wilcox,  "  that  this 
proclamation  was  the  work  of  Nekrassov,  the  Minister  of 
Finance,  and  was  sent  along  the  railway  lines  without  the 
Minister  President's  knowledge."  According  to  Vladimir 
Bourtzeff,  he  adds,  the  text  of  the  proclamation  came  as  a 
complete  surprise  to  me. 

I  never  confessed  anything  of  the  kind,  and  here,  once 
more,  Mr.  Wilcox  is  making  a  quotation  from  my  forged 
deposition.  The  text  of  my  proclamation  to  the  people  of 
September  9th  from  first  to  last  was  revised  by  me  jointly 
with  the  Minister  of  Finance,  Nekrassov,  and,  what  is  more, 
there_is_no  word  "  treason "  or  declaration  of  Kornilov 
as  a  traitor  In  tTiis' proclamation.  Here  is  the  correspond- 
ing place  in  this  proclamation :  "  Considering  that  in  the 
presentation  of  these  demands  to  the  Provisional  Govern- 
ment in  my  person  there  was  evidenced  the  desire  of  certain 
circles  of  Russian  society  to  take  advantage  of  the  serious 
position  of  the  country  to  establish  in  it  a  state  of  Govern- 
ment which  was  contrary  to  the  conquests  of  the  Revolu- 
tion, the  Provisional  Government  has  thought  is  necessary 
.  .  ,'*  and  there  follows  a  list  of  measures  taken  by  the 
Government  and  an  appeal  to  the  citizens  to  keep  calm. 
That  is  all. 

Mr.  Wilcox  again  returns  to  the  question  of  the  disastrous 
influence  of  the  Soviet  upon  me,  and  hints  transparently 
why  I  refused  Milioukov  and  General  Alexeiev's  request 
to  allow  them  to  interfere  in  my  conflict  with  General 
Kornilov  and  to  endeavour  to  bring  the  opposed  sides  to  a 
compromise :— 


276  THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM 

"  Bogdanoff,  one  of  the  chief  Soviet  officials,  boasted  at  a  meet- 
ing that  the  Political  Department  of  the  Petrograd  Soviet,  hearing 
of  the  mediation  of  Alexeiev  and  MiUoukov,  '  acted  with  all  energy 
and  prevented  any  kind  of  agreement  between  Kornilov  and  the 
Government.' " 

Perhaps  Bogdanoff  boasted  this,  although  I  have  never 
either  heard  or  read  anything  about  this  before.  But  the 
Soviet  could  not  have  any  influence  upon  my  refusal  to  allow 
A.lexeiev  and  Milioukov  to  interfere,  however  much  it 
wanted  to,  for  the  simple  reason  that  when  I  heard  Miliou- 
kov's  and  Alexeiev 's  request,  I  refused  it  on  the  spot  de- 
cisively and  categorically.  "  At  the  same  time  the  Soviets 
usurped  to  themselves  many  of  the  functions  of  Govern- 
ment," states  Mr.  Wilcox.  Yes,  indeed,  Kornilov's  rising, 
arousing  in  the  masses  a  psychology  of  absolute  distrust 
for  the  authorities,  resuscitated  Bolshevism  in  the  Soviets 
and  their  tendency  to  usurp  the  functions  of  government, 
but  this  happened  rather  later,  and  the  Government  fought 
against  it  the  whole  time.  The  liquidation  of  General 
Kornilov's  rebellion  was  conducted  by  the  Provisional  Gov- 
ernment so  independently  of  all  influences  that  it  was  pre- 
cisely from  the  side  of  the  Soviet  circles  that  I  was  re- 
proached for  not  desiring  in  those  difficult  days  to  lean  upon 
the  Soviet  and  the  Soviet  organizations.  One  of  the  most 
prominent  democratic  leaders  and  my  personal  friend  ac- 
tually reproached  me  publicly  for  this,  saying  that  my  ''  head 
had  been  turned  "  by  power. 

At  the  end  of  his  study  Mr.  Wilcox  says  that  Kornilov 

*'  wanted  to  emancipate  it  [the  power]  from  the  illicit  and  para- 
lysing influence  of  the  Soviets.  In  the  end  this  influence  destroyed 
Russia,  and  Kornilov's  defiance  of  the  Government  was  the  last 
faint  hope  of  arresting  the  process  of  destruction.'* 


THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM  277 

This  quite  corresponds  with  the  first  words  of  Kornilov's 
proclamation  on  September  9th  where  he  declares  war  on 
the  Government :  **  Forced  to  an  open  rising,  I,  General 
Kornilov,  declare  that  the  Provisional  Government,  acting 
under  the  influence  of  the  Bolshevist  majority  in  the 
Soviets,  .  .  ."  This  is  an  obvious  falsehood,  since  before 
the  Kornilov  rising  there  had  not  been  a  Bolshevist  ma- 
jority in  a  single  Soviet,  and,  as  it  happened,  in  the  time 
preceding  Kornilov's  rising  the  political  influence  of  the 
Soviets  was  less  than  at  any  other  time  of  the  Revolution. 
In  the  summer  the  organs  of  local  government  which  had 
been  created  on  the  basis  of  universal  suffrage  had  begun  to 
function;  the  excitement  of  the  first  months  of  the  Revo- 
lution was  \^earing  off,  and  the  Soviets  were  losing  their 
exclusive  significance  in  the  life  of  the  masses.  This  healthy 
and  normal  evolution  was  acclaimed  in  the  Press  by  the  most 
active  members  of  the  Central  Executive  Committee  of  the 
Soviets  themselves.  The  absurd  attempt  of  General  Kor- 
nilov to  force  matters  to  a  crisis  destroyed  all  this  intense 
half-year's  labour  to  construct  a  national  machine,  and  it 
again  threw  the  masses  on  to  the  path  of  anarchy  and  ruin. 
Within  a  week  after  the  Kornilov  rising  the  Soviets  were 
captured  by  the  Bolsheviks.  Then  everywhere  Bolshevist 
majorities  came  into  being,  and  there  began  under  thU 
motto  *'  All  power  to  the  Soviets  "  the  fatal  conflict  of  the 
unbridled  masses  with  statesmanship  and  order  in  Russia, 

The  Kornilov  adventure  was  the  prologue  to  the  Bolshe- 
vist's coup  d'etat.  Had  there  been  no  September  9th,  then& 
would  have  been  no  November  7th. 

But  Kornilov  himself  loved  Russia  deeply  in  his  own  way, 
and  it  was  not  bad  faith  but  lack  of  knowledge  and  political 
experience    which    urged    him    upon    the    disastrous   path 


ns  THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM 

whither  certain  irresponsible  groups  of  political  and  finan- 
cial jobbers  and  political  adventurers  enticed  him.  Zavoiko, 
Aladin,  and  the  rest  were  only  casual  people,  and  with  am- 
biguous pasts ;  behind  their  backs  stood  influential  anonymi- 
ties who  at  the  decisive  moment  saved  themselves,  but  aban- 
doned Kornilov. 

Permit  me  in  conclusion  to  make  a  somewhat  long  quo- 
tation from  a  letter  of  General  Alexeiev  written  on  Sep- 
tember I2th,  19 17,  to  the  now  new-fledged  Germanophil 
Milioukov;  it  throws  a  bright  light  behind  the  screens  of 
the  Kornilov  rebellion: — 

*'  *  The  Kornilov  affair  was  not  the  affair  of  a  group  of  adven- 
turers, and  you  know  to  a  certain  degree  that  certain  circles  of 
our  society  not  only  knew  all  about  it,  not  only  sympathized  with 
the  idea,  but  helped  Kornilov  as  far  as  they  could.  ...  I  have 
one  more  question:  I  do  not  know  the  addresses  of  Vyshne- 
gradski,  Poutiloff,^  and  the  others.  The  families  of  the  im- 
prisoned officers  are  beginning  to  starve,  and  I  insist  on  their 
coming  to  their  aid.  Surely  they  will  not  abandon  to  their  fate 
and  to  starvation  the  families  of  those  to  whom  they  were  linked 
by  the  common  bond  of  an  idea  and  preparation.  ...  In  that 
case  li.e.j  if  this  demand  is  not  immediately  satisfied]  General 
Kornilov,*  General  Alexeiev  continues,  *  will  be  forced  to  declare 
in  detail  before  the  court  the  whole  plan  of  preparation,  all  the 
conversations  with  persons  and  groups  and  their  participation, 
in  order  to  show  the  Russian  people  with  whom  he  was  working 
what  real  aim  he  was  pursuing,  and  how,  abandoned  by  all  in 
jfcfHs  moment  of  need,  he  had  to  appear  before  an  improvised  court 
wim  only  a  small  number  of  officers.' " 

Comment  is  needless. 

A.  Kerensky. 

1  Well-known  Russian  financiers  who  stood  at  the  head  of  a  certain 
group  of  Banks. —  A.  K. 


''WHO'S  WHC  AND  "WHERE'S  WHERE" 
OF  PEOPLE  AND  PLACES  OCCURRING  IN 
THE  TEXT 


Aladin. —  Member  (for  the  Gov- 
ernment of  Simbirsk)  of  the 
first  Duma.  Belonged  to  the 
Toil  Party.  Acquired  popular- 
ity and  renown  through  his 
speeches  in  the  Duma.  On  the 
eve  of  the  dissoljition  of  the 
first  Duma,  Aladin  went  to  Eng- 
land as  a  member  of  the  dele- 
gation sent  by  the  Duma  for 
the  purpose  of  conveying  its 
message  of  sympathy  to  the 
British  Parliament,  and  when 
the  Duma  was  dissolved  he  re- 
mained in  that  country.  His 
subsequent  activity  was  of  such 
a  character  that  it  changed  al- 
together the  attitude  towards 
Aladin  of  his  political  friends, 
so  that  he  soon  lost  his  pres- 
tige and  even  the  esteem  he 
formerly  enjoyed  in  the  Russian 
democratic  and  intellectual  cir- 
cles- During  the  latter  years  of 
his  sojourn  in  England  he  even 
became  the  London  correspond- 
ent of  the  Novoie  Vremia. 
Aladin  has  been  formally  struck 
out  from  the  rolls  of  the  Toil 
Party.  In  the  summer  of  1917 
Aladin  returned  to  Russia. 

Alexeiev. —  General,  Professor  at 
the  General  Staff  Academy. 
One  of  the  highest  military  au- 
thorities in  Europe.  Played  a 
prominent  part  in  the  Russo- 
Japanese  War.    During  the  first 


period  of  the  present  war,  under 
the  Grand  Duke  Nicholas  as 
Commander-in-Chief,  General 
Alexeiev  directed  the  operations 
of  the  North-western  front  and 
distinguished  himself  by  his  or- 
ganizing ability  and  by  the  skill 
with  which  he  managed  to  ex- 
tricate his  troops  from  awk- 
ward and  critical  positions. 
After  the  grave  situation  of 
1915,  when  the  Grand  Duke 
Nicholas  was  relieved  of  the 
post  of  Generalissimo,  General 
Alexeiev  took  over  the  Supreme 
Command  in  the  capacity  of 
Chief  of  the  Staff  of  the  nom- 
inal Commander-in-Chief  —  the 
late  Tsar  Nicholas.  At  the  de- 
cisive moment  of  the  Revolu- 
tion, Alexeiev  lent  his  support 
to  the  Duma  and,  together  with 
other  generals,  advised  the  Tsar 
to  abdicate  according  to  the  de- 
mand of  the  Duma.  The  Pro- 
visional Government  appointed 
Alexeiev  Commander-in-Chief, 
which  office  he  held  until  the 
end  of  May,  1917.  Immediately 
after  Kornilov's  rebellion,  Alex- 
eiev resumed  for  a  short  period 
his  military  activity  in  the  ca- 
pacity of  Chief  of  the  Staff  of 
the  Generalissimo,  Kerensky ; 
however,  he  only  remained  in 
this  office  for  a  fortnight,  when 
his  place  was  taken  by  General 
Dukhonin. 


279 


THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM 


Altvater. —  Rear  -  Admiral.      In 

1916  Altvater,  then  a  captain, 
served  in  the  Naval  Staff  at  the 
Tsar's  Headquarters.  In  1917 
was  attached  to  the  Commander 
of  the  Army  Group  of  the 
Northern  front.  After  the  Bol- 
shevik coup  d'etat,  Altvater  ac- 
cepted service  under  the  Bol- 
shevik Government  and  partici- 
pated, in  an  "  expert  "  capacity, 
in  the  Brest-Litovsk  negotia- 
tions. After  that  ignominious 
action  Altvater  continued  to 
collaborate  with  Trotsky. 

AvKSENTiEV. —  A  leader  of  the 
Social  ^.evolutionary  Party.  In 
1905  was  a  member  of  the  Pet- 
rograd  Soviet  of  Workmen's 
Delegates.  Was  arrested  by  the 
Witte  administration  in  No- 
vember of  that  year,  together 
with  other  members  of  the 
Soviet,  and  deported  to  Siberia, 
whence  he  escaped  and  fled 
abroad.    Until   the   amnesty   of 

1917  Avksentiev  lived  abroad, 
chiefly  in  France,  taking  an  act- 
ive part  in  the  life  of  Social 
Revolutionary  centres  and  the 
party  Press.  Not  long  before 
the  war,  Avksentiev  with  his 
friends  founded  a  paper  Pot- 
chin  ("The  Beginning"),  an 
organ  of  Social  Revolutionary 
revisionism,  in  which  he  em- 
phasized the  necessity  of  bring- 
ing Socialist  principles  into 
agreement  with  the  ideas  of 
State  and  nationality;  he  also 
struggled  against  the  interna- 
tionalist extremism  in  his  party. 
During  the  war,  Avksentiev,  to- 
gether with  Plekhanov  and  other 
Russian  Socialist  supporters  of 
national     defence,     started     a 


paper,  Prisiv  ("The  Appeal"),     \ 
of  a  sharply  pro-war  and  anti- 
German    character,    which    em- 
phasized the  liberating  effect  of      \ 
the  war  on  Russia  and  the  in- 
evitable downfall  of  the  autoc-      i 
racy.    On  his  return  to  Russia      \ 
in   the   spring   of    1917,   Aksen- 
tiev  became  one  of  the  foremost      '\ 
representatives  of  that  wing  of      ^ 
the  Social  Revolutionary  Party 
which    supported    national    de-      i 
fence     and     national     interests. 
The  first  All-Russian  Congress      ] 
of  Peasants  elected  Avksentiev 
as    Chairman    of    the    Central      ] 
Committee      of      Peasants.    In      ' 
July,  Avksentiev  became  a  mem-      ] 
ber  of  the  Provisional  Govern-      '■ 
ment   as    representative   of   the 
peasants'         organizations.    He 
took  the   portfolio  of   Minister 
of  the  Interior,  in  which  office 
he    remained    until    the    begin- 
ning of  September.    The  Coun-      - 
cil  of  the  Republic    (a  sort  of      \ 
provisional      Parliament      con-      \ 
voked  by  the  Government  to  sit 
until  the  Constituent  Assembly      : 
met)     elected     Avksentiev     its      i 
Chairman.    An    ardent    patriot 
and   supporter   of   the   national 
defence,  Avksentiev  was  a  bit-      j 
ter  enemy  of  Bolshevism;  it  is 
no  wonder  that  after  their  vie-      I 
tory  the  Bolsheviks  sought  him 
out   everywhere    and,   when   at      \ 
last  they  found  him  at  Petro-       ■ 
grad,    imprisoned    him    in    the 
fortress  of  SS.  Peter  and  Paul. 
Avksentiev  was   elected  to  the      \ 
Constituent   Assembly   by   sev-      ] 
eral  constituencies.  ] 

Bagration. —  Prince.  A  fighting  • 
general.  During  the  summer  of  ' 
1917    and    the    Kornilov    rebel- 


THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM 


281 


Hon  he  was  in  command  of  the 
Caucasian  native  division  ("  the 
savage  division"). 

Bagratuni. —  General,  Officer  of 
the  General  Staff;  participated 
in  the  present  war.  From  the 
early  summer  of  1917  until  the 
Bolshevik  coup  d'etat  he  was 
Chief  of  Staff  of  the  Petrograd 
Military  District. 

Baku. —  A  town  in  Transcau- 
casia, on  the  coast  of  the  Cas- 
pian Sea;  centre  of  exceedingly 
rich  oil  wells. 

Balavinsky.—  a  barrister.  A 
well-known  Moscow  public  man. 
Has  taken  part  for  many  years 
in  the  revolutionary  movement. 
Belonged  to  the  Social  Revolu- 
tionary Party,  and  has  been 
prosecuted  by  the  police.  Has 
worked  much  during  the  war  in 
public  organizations  under  the 
Provisional  Government.  Has 
been  invited  by  the  Ministry  of 
the  Interior  to  act  as  one  of 
the  Directors  in  charge  of  the 
organization  of  the  local  ad- 
ministrative and  police  services. 

Baluiev.—  General.  Officer  of 
the  General  Staff.  During  the 
summer  of  1914  was  in  com- 
mand of  a  special  army  on  the 
South-western  (Galician)  front. 
Later  he  was  appointed  Com- 
mander of  the  Western  front,  in 
which  office  he  remained  until 
the  Bolshevik  coup  d'etat, 

Baranovsky.—  General.  Officer 
of  the  General  Staff.  A  fighting 
general.  Fought  in  many  bat- 
tles in  the  Carpathians  and  East 
Prussia.    During     1916     Bara- 


novsky was  active  in  the  Staff 
of  the  General  Headquarters  of 
the  Commander-in-Chief.  When 
Kerensky  became  Minister  of 
War,  Baranovsky  was  sum- 
moned by  him  to  Petrograd  and 
appointed  chief  of  the  Min- 
ister's military  cabinet.  In 
September,  191 7,  Baranovsky 
exchanged  this  post  for  that  of 
Quartermaster-General  of  the 
Northern  front.  After  the  Bol- 
shevik revolt  he  was  arrested  in 
Pskov  and  imprisoned  in  the 
fortress  of  SS.  Peter  and  Paul, 
where  he  remained  for  several 
months. 

Bereditchev.—  An  important  Jew- 
ish town ;  after  the  retreat  from 
Galicia  it  was  the  residence  of 
the  Headquarters  of  the  South- 
western front. 

Bernadsky.—  Professor.  Special- 
ist on  financial  questions.  Took 
part  in  the  liberation  movement 
of  1905.  One  of  the  founders 
of  the  Radical  Democratic 
Party,  which  began  to  grow 
after  the  Revolution  and  strove 
to  organize  the  consistently  re- 
publican and  democratic,  al- 
though non-socialist,  elements 
of  the  Russian  urban  population. 
In  July,  1917,  Bernadsky  was  ap- 
pointed Deputy  Minister  to 
Nekrassov,  the  Minister  of 
Finance;  in  September,  after 
the  Kornilov  rebellion,  he  be- 
came a  member  of  the  Provis- 
ional Government  as  the  Min- 
ister of  Finance.  After  the 
Bolshevik  coup  d'etat,  Bernad- 
sky was  arrested  and  impris- 
oned in  the  fortress  of  SS. 
Peter  and  Paul. 


28^ 


THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM 


BiKHOV. —  A  small  town  not  far 
from  Mohilev,  where  the  G.  H. 
Q.  were  situated.  This  town 
was  selected  for  the  confine- 
ment of  General  Kornilov  and 
his  accomplices  up  to  the  time 
of  their  trial.  In  the  first  days 
after  the  Bolshevik  coup  d'etat, 
Kornilov  and  his  friends  es- 
caped from  Bikhov  to  the  Don. 

Bontch-Bruievitch.  —  General. 
Officer  of  the  General  Staff. 
Was  a  close  collaborator  of 
General  Ruzsky.  After  the  lat- 
ter's  retirement  he  remained 
Chief  of  the  Staff  of  the  Nor- 
thern front  until  the  beginning 
of  September.  He  is  a  brother 
of  the  writer  Bontch-Bruievitch 
(a  prominent  Bolshevik  and  a 
close  collaborator  of  Lenin). 
After  the  Bolshevik  coup  d'etat 
the  general,  until  recently  a 
zealous  servant  of  the  Tsardom, 
managed  to  adapt  himself  to  the 
•*  Communist "  Government. 

General  Bontch-Bruievitch,  to- 
gether with  Trotsky,  Krilenko, 
and  other  Bolshevik  military 
authorities,  has  had  a  hand 
in  all  ignominious  acts  of  the 
Bolsheviks. 

Brussilov. —  General.  One  of  the 
most  brilliant  fighting  com- 
manders of  the  Russian  army; 
famous  for  his  remarkable  of- 
fensive in  Galicia  in  the  year 
1916,  which  not  only  proved  a 
serious  blow  to  the  Austrian 
army  on  the  Russian  front,  but 
also  saved  the  Italian  army 
from  the  (up  to  then)  success- 
ful offensive  of  the  Austro-Ger- 
mans.  Although  far  from  be- 
ing equal  to  Alexeiev  in  mili- 
tary knowledge  and  theoretical 


qualification  for  his  high  post, 
Brussilov  was  endowed  with 
qualities  inestimable  in  an  army 
leader:  initiative,  boldness,  and 
a  talent  for  rousing  the  spirit 
of  his  soldiers.  After  the  de- 
feats of  1915,  Brussilov  began 
to  sympathize  with  the  libera- 
tion movement,  supported  the 
pubHc  organizations  in  their 
work  at  the  front,  and,  on  the 
eve  of  the  Revolution,  was  in 
touch  with  representatives  of 
the  opposition  groups  of  the 
Duma.  When  the  Revolution 
broke  out,  Brussilov  took  openly 
and  unhesitatingly  the  side  of 
the  people,  thereby  preserving 
to  a  considerable  extent  the 
South-western  front  (Galicia) 
from  anarchy  and  disaggrega- 
tion. In  May,  19 17,  the  Pro- 
visional Government,  on  the  ini- 
tiative of  A.  R  Kerensky  (who 
then  accepted  the  portfolio  of 
Minister  of  War),  appointed 
Brussilov  Commander-in-Chief. 
Under  his  direction  the  Russian 
Revolutionary  Army  took  the 
offensive  on  the  ist  of  July, 
1917-  It  met  with  a  serious 
check  towards  the  end  of  that 
month,  and  General  Brussilov, 
tired  and  overworked,  was  re- 
lieved by  the  Provisional  Gov- 
ernment of  the  Supreme  Com- 
mand, which  was  entrusted,  on 
the  initiative  of  A.  F.  Kerensky, 
to  General  Kornilov.  During 
the  bombardment  of  Moscow  by 
the  Bolsheviks,  Brussilov  was 
seriously  wounded  by  a  piece  of 
shrapnel  penetrating  into  his 
room,  and  one  of  his  legs  had 
to  be  amputated. 

BuBLiKOv. —  Important     man     of 
business.    Graduate  of  the  In- 


THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM 


stitute  of  Ways  and  Communi- 
cations. Was  member  of  the 
fourth  Duma.  When  the  Revo- 
Uition  broke  out,  Bublikov,  on 
an  order  of  the  Duma  Commit- 
tee, occupied  with  a  detach- 
ment the  Ministry  of  Ways  and 
Communications  and  the  Cen- 
tral Railway  Telegraph,  there- 
by accelerating  the  "  winding- 
up  "  of  the  old  regime. 

Dan  (Gurvitch.) — A  leader  of 
the  Social  Democratic  Party 
(Mensheviks) ;  a  publicist; 
member  of  the  medical  profes- 
sion. During  the  war  was  de- 
ported to  Eastern  Siberia  in  the 
"  administrative  manner "  (i.e. 
without  a  court  trial).  From 
the  first  days  of  the  Revolution 
was  one  of  the  leaders  of  the 
Petrograd  Soviet.  After  Tchk- 
heidze  left  for  the  Caucasus, 
Dan  acted  as  Chairman  of  the 
Central  Executive  Committee 
of  the  Soviets.  Together  with 
the  majority  of  his  party  (Men- 
sheviks), Dan  recognized  the 
necessity  both  of  continuing  the 
war  and  of  the  Socialist  parties 
participating  in  a  "bourgeois" 
Government,  although  person- 
ally he  was  far  from  being  a 
warm  supporter  of  these  prin- 
ciples. 

De  Semitter. —  Colonel  of  the 
General  Staff.  Participated  in 
the  officers'  plot.  (Particulars 
in  the  book.) 

DiBENKO. —  Sailor  of  the  Baltic 
Fleet.  Prominent  agent  of 
Lenin  and  Trotsky  at  Helsing- 
fors.  After  the  Bolshevik  coup 
d'etat  was  appointed  People's 
Commissary  of  Marine.    Among 


the  Bolshevik  agents  this  igno- 
rant demagogue  has  been  con- 
spicuous for  his  impudence  and 
cruelty.  After  the  Brest-Litovsk 
peace  he  quarrelled  with  Trot- 
sky and  started  a  demagogic 
campaign  against  him  in  the 
navy.  He  was  accused  by  the 
Bolshevik  authorities  of  em- 
bezzling public  money. 

DoLGORUKY. —  Prince.  General ; 
participated  in  the  present  war. 
In  August,  1917,  was  in  com- 
mand of  the  army  corps  sta- 
tioned in  Finland. 

DuKHONiN. —  General.  One  of 
the  most  brilliant  amongst  the 
younger  officers  of  the  General 
Staflf.  Took  a  very  active  and 
important  part  in  the  planning 
and  execution  of  Brussilov's 
offensive  in  Galicia  in  1916.  In 
the  year  1917,  Dukhonin,  then 
Chief  of  the  Staff  of  the  South- 
western front,  organized  the 
July  offensive.  Dukhonin  was 
endowed  with  an  extraordinary 
organizing  ability.  He  was  in- 
timately acquainted  with  the 
conditions  of  life  of  the 
common  soldiery  and  under- 
stood their  mentality,  so  that 
he  managed  to  get  on  very 
well  with  his  soldiers,  while 
fully  safeguarding  the  authority 
and  the  dignity  of  a  Chief. 
Shortly  after  Kerensky  became 
Commander-in-Chief,  Dukhonin 
was  appointed  his  Chief  of 
Staff.  He  then  proceeded,  to- 
gether with  General  Diedrichs 
(now  commanding  the  Tchekho- 
Slovak  troops  in  Russia),  to 
work  out  a  scheme  for  the  re- 
organization of  the  Russian 
army  in  order  to  have  its  fight- 


^4 


THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM 


ing  capacity  restored  by  the 
spring  of  1918.  The  Bolshevik 
revolt  put  an  end  to  this  work 
at  its  very  beginning;  as  to 
General  Dukhonin  himself,  he 
met  a  martyr's  death  at  the 
very  moment  of  his  departure 
from  his  Headquarters  after 
they  had  been  captured  by  the 
Bolsheviks.  He  was  torn  to 
pieces  by  an  infuriated  mob  of 
Bolshevik  sailors,  in  the  pres- 
ence of  the  Bolshevik  "military 
authorities" — Krilenko  at  their 
head  —  who  looked  on  without 
interfering. 

DuTOV.—  A  Cossack.  Chairman 
of  the  Council  of  the  All-Rus- 
sian Union  of  Cossackdom. 
Has  carried  on  an  aggressive 
campaign  against  the  Provis- 
ional Government-Ataman  of 
the  Orenburg  Cossackdom. 
Took  part  in  the  organizing  of 
a  movement  in  the  troops 
against  the  Provisional  Govern- 
ment. 

Erdelli.—  General.  An  exemplary 
Guards  officer.  During  the 
third  year  of  the  war  com- 
manded an  army  at  the  South- 
western front.  A  typical  rep- 
resentative of  the  high  military 
bureaucracy,  who  managed  to 
adapt  himself  for  some  time  to 
the  new  state  of  things  in  the 
army.  After  the  Revolution 
and  before  August,  1917,  Erdelli 
was  considered  as  one  of  the 
liberal  generals  and  a  friend  of 
the  elected  soldiers*  organiza- 
tions. However,  after  the  ap- 
pointment of  General  Denikin 
to  the  post  of  Commander  of 
the    South-western    front,    Er- 


delli sharply  changed  his  policy 
and  joined  the  military  reaction. 

GoBETCHiA.— Member  of  the  So- 
cial Revolutionary  Party;  lived 
for  many  years  in  France  as 
a  political  refugee.  After  the 
March  Revolution  he  returned 
to  Russia  and  went  to  the  front, 
in  the  capacity  first  of  the 
deputy  of  Savinkov,  the  com- 
missary of  the  7th  Army,  then 
of  the  commissary  of  that 
army. 

GoTZ,  A.—  Prominent  member  of 
the  Social  Revolutionary  Pa.ty 
and  member  of  the  Central 
Committee  of  that  party.  At 
the  time  of  the  old  regime  was 
a  member  of  the  terrorist  or- 
ganization of  the  Social  Revolu- 
tionary Party.  Belongs  to  that 
wing  of  the  Social  Revolu- 
tionary Party  which  is  clearly 
in  favour  of  national  defence 
("  Oborontzy  ") .  Supported  the 
idea  of  a  Coalition  Government. 
Gotz  returned  to  Russia  after 
the  Revolution  from  Siberia, 
where  he  was  imprisoned  with 
hard  labour. 

GuTCHKOV,  A.  T.— A  representa- 
tive of  the  wealthy  Moscow 
merchant  circles  of  old  stand- 
ing. One  of  the  foremost  Mos- 
cow Conservative  public  men. 
During  the  Japanese  War, 
Gutchkov  was  the  representa- 
tive at  the  front  of  the  Red 
Cross.  Fought  in  the  South- 
African  War  as  a  volunteer  in 
the  Boer  army.  During  the 
liberation  movement  of  1905-6, 
Gutchkov  placed  himself  at  the 
head  of  the  bourgeois  ele- 
ments which  opposed  that  move- 


THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM 


£85 


ment  At  the  municipal  and 
Zemstvo  congresses  he  always 
fought  the  influence  of  the 
Cadet  Party.  V/as  a  decided 
adversary  of  any  kind  of  self- 
government  of  the  small  nation- 
alities of  Russia.  He  even  was 
opposed  to  an  autonomy  of 
Poland,  and  approved  of  Stoli- 
pin's  hostile  policy  towards  Fin- 
land. Gutchkov  founded  the 
"  Party  of  the  17th  of  October  " 
(date  of  the  famous  Tsar's 
Manifesto  in  190S).  usually 
called  the  "Octobrist"  Party. 
Gutchkov  approved  of  all  the 
reactionary  measures  of  the 
Government  in  1905,  and  with 
his  and  his  party's  authority 
supported  the  dissolution  of  the 
second  Duma  and  the  illegal  re- 
strictions of  the  electoral  rights 
of  the  people,  enforced  by 
Stolipin  on  the  3rd  of  June, 
1907.  After  this  coup  d'etat, 
Gutchkov,  together  with  his 
party,  entered  the  third  Duma, 
where  he  was  the  leader  of  the 
majority  nearly  for  the  whole 
time  of  its  existence,  and  at 
one  period  was  the  Speaker  of 
that  Duma.  As  a  member  of 
the  Duma,  Gutchkov  worked 
much  in  the  Army  and  ,Navy 
Commission,  and  made  many  a 
disclosure  concerning  the  shady 
aspects  of  the  military  bureau- 
cracy. He  also  struggled 
against  generals  of  the  type  of 
Sukhomlinov,  and  against  irre- 
sponsible and  disastrous  inter- 
ference of  the  Grand  Dukes  in 
military  affairs.  Gutchkov  or- 
ganized a  group  of  military  men 
who  rallied  to  him,  and  thereby 
he  gained  from  the  Tsar  the 
name  of  "  Young  Turk."  In 
internal  politics  Gutchkov  ener- 


getically supported  Stolipin,  in 
whom  he  saw  a  strong  weapon 
for  the  purpose  of  establishing 
in  Russia  a  very  moderate, 
strictly  bourgeois  constitutional 
monarchy.  The  ever-growing 
irresponsible  influence  of  the 
nobility  and  Court  circles  in  the 
Government,  which  was  quickly 
relapsing  into  frankly  auto- 
(Cratic  ways,  the  servility  of 
Stolipin  himself,  drove  the  very 
prudent  and  cunning  Gutchkov 
towards  the  end  of  the  third 
Duma  into  making  speeches 
in  the  opposition  spirit  with 
steadily  increasing  frequency. 
Beaten  at  the  elections  for  the 
fourth  Duma  in  the  Moscow 
constituency,  Gutchkov  became 
a  member  of  the  State  Council, 
to  which  he  was  elected  by  the 
Curia  of  Industry  and  Com- 
merce. The  regime  of  a  Ras- 
putin, a  Sukhomlinov  and  a 
Sturmer  reconciled  Gutchkov  to 
the  political  tendencies  against 
which  he  was  struggling  a  short 
time  before,  if  it  did  not  bring 
him  nearer  to  them.  During 
the  war,  being  at  the  head  of 
the  War  Industries  Committee, 
Gutchkov  came  in  touch  even 
with  certain  Labour  circles. 
While  travelling  at  the  front, 
Gutchkov  strengthened  his  old 
connections  and  established  new 
ones  amongst  the  High  Com- 
mand circles,  which  connections 
would  have  proved  extremely 
useful  in  the  event  of  a  well 
planned  and  a  prudent  coup 
d'etat.  The  outburst  of  the 
Revolution  brought  confusion 
into  this  game,  but  at  first  did 
not  rebuff  Gutchkov,  who,  not- 
withstanding his  open  monarch- 
ism,  entered  the  first  Provision- 


286 


THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM 


al  Government,  naturally  as  the 
Minister  for  War.  Such  was 
the  elementary  force  of  the 
pressure  of  the  soldier  masses 
at  the  beginning  of  the  Revo- 
lution, that  it  was  the  lot  of 
Gutchkov,  a  Conservative  and 
a  partisan  of  strictest  discipline, 
to  sanction  measures  which  re- 
sulted in  destroying  that  disci- 
pline. The  trial  proved  too 
much  for  him,  and,  foreseeing 
what  would  be  the  results  of 
his  own  decrees,  the  prudent 
and  cunning  Gutchkov  aban- 
doned his  dangerous  post  in 
good  time. 

GuTER. —  General.  Was  in  com- 
mand of  an  army  on  the  South- 
western front  under  Brussilov. 
In  the  spring  of  1917,  when 
Brussilov  was  appointed  Com- 
mander-in-Chief, Gutor,  upon 
the  recommendation  of  the 
latter,  was  entrusted  with  the 
command  of  the  South-western 
(Galician)  front,  which  he  held 
when  the  July  offensive  began. 
After  the  German  break  through 
at  Tarnopol,  Gutor  was  de- 
prived of  his  command  for 
reasons  explained  later  in  the 
book  itself,  and  his  place  was 
taken  by  General  Kornilov. 

Iakubovitch. —  General.  A  young 
officer  of  the  General  Staff. 
Took  part  in  the  Japanese  War, 
particularly  in  the  defence  of 
Port  Arthur.  At  the  most 
critical  moment  of  the  Revolu- 
tion, Iakubovitch,  together  with 
a  few  other  officers  of  the  Gen- 
eral Staff,  reported  to  the  Revo- 
lutionary Committee  of  the 
Duma  and  put  himself  at  its 
disposal  for  the  fight  for  free- 
dom.   Iakubovitch      was      ap- 


pointed member  of  the  Military      ] 
Commission   of   the   Duma,   of 
which  the  object  was  to  direct      ] 
the  local  garrison  and  to  settle       ' 
questions    relative    to    military       , 
matters,  until  such  time  as  the       i 
normal  activity  of  the  Ministry       ; 
of  War  and  of  the  local  mili- 
tary institutions  was  completely 
resumed.    When   Kerensky   be- 
came Minister  of  War,  Iakub- 
ovitch was  appointed  Assistant 
Minister  of  War,  in  which  of- 
fice he  remained  up  to  the  time       ] 
of  the  Bolshevik  counter-revo- 
lution. \ 

IvERSKAiA. —  The     especially     re- 
vered     ikon      of      Our     Lady 
of    Iversk,    which    is    kept    in       j 
Moscow  in  a  special  chapel  near       \ 
one  of  the  gates  of  the  Krem- 
lin.   It  was  the  customary  pro-       ; 
ceeding    of    the    Tsars,    when       ; 
coming  to  Moscow,  to  visit  that 
chapel  on  their  way  to  the  Pal- 
ace in  order  to  pray  before  the 
ikon. 

Kaledin.— General.    A     Cossack.       ' 
Took  an  important  part  in  this 
war.    After   the  old   rights   of 
self-government,   of   which   the 
autocracy     deprived    the     Cos- 
sacks,   were    restored    to    them 
by  the  Provisional  Government, 
Kaledin    was    elected    the    first        ] 
Ataman  of  the   Don   Cossacks,        ' 
i.e.,  head  of  the  executive  power       ^ 
in  the  territories  on  the  River        \ 
Don     inhabited     by     Cossacks. 
According  to   the   old   Cossack        1 
law,  every  district  is  governed 
by  the  "circle,"  a  sort  of  elec- 
ted body  with  both  administra- 
tive   and    legislative    functions, 
which  nominates  for  a  certain 
period  all  the  officials,  with  the        i 


THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM 


^87 


Ataman  at  their  head.  On  his 
entering  that  office,  General 
Kaledin  became  a  supporter  of 
a  wide  autonomy  of  the  Cos- 
sack territory  and  acquired  a 
great  popularity  amongst  the 
Cossacks.  At  the  Moscow  Con- 
ference (summoned  by  the  Pro- 
visional Government  in  order 
that  the  critical  situation  at  the 
front  and  in  the  country  might 
be  discussed  by  representatives 
of  the  nation),  Kaledin  de- 
clared in  the  name  of  the  whole 
of  Russian  Cossackdom  that 
the  latter  favoured  a  Republi- 
can form  of  government. 
After  the  Bolshevik  counter- 
revolution, Kaledin  placed  him- 
self at  the  head  of  the  anti- 
Bolshevik  movement  on  the 
Don.  Kaledin  did  not  under- 
estimate the  elementary  force 
of  the  anarchist  wave  which 
carried  off  the  whole  of  the 
soldier  masses  and  was  even 
spreading  to  the  poorer  ele- 
ments of  Cossackdom ;  he  there- 
fore acted  in  a  very  prudent 
way,  avoiding  collision  with  the 
Bolsheviks,  which  he  considered 
then  premature.  This  gave  rise 
to  conflicts  between  Kaledin 
and  the  other  leaders  of  the 
movement.  In  February,  1918, 
Kaledin  committed  suicide  by 
shooting  himself. 

Kamenev  (Rosenfeld).  —  A 
prominent  Social  Democrat  of 
the  Bolshevik  wing.  Propagan- 
dist and  publicist.  For  many 
years  a  close  collaborator  of 
Lenin.  During  the  war  he  car- 
ried out  a  propaganda  on  Lenin- 
ist lines  in  connection  with  the 
war  in  Russian  Labour  circles 
and  led  the  Bolshevik  group  in 


the  fourth  Duma.  At  the  be- 
ginning of  191S,  Kamenev,  to- 
gether with  the  five  Bolshevik 
members  of  the  Duma,  was 
arrested  and  tried  for  de- 
featist propaganda  and  for  par- 
ticipation in  the  Social  Demo- 
cratic Party.  When  giving 
evidence,  Kamenev  declared 
that  he  did  not  in  the  least  share 
Lenin's  program  in  connection 
with  the  war.  Together  with 
the  Bolshevik  deputies,  he  was 
deported  to  Siberia.  After  the 
amnesty  of  1917  he  returned  to 
Petrograd,  and  on  Lenin's  re- 
turn to  Russia,  became  his 
zealous  collaborator.  He  has 
always  acted  in  a  very  prudent 
and  equivocal  way.  After  the 
Bolshevik  coup  d'etat  he  was 
for  a  short  time  one  of  the 
People's  Commissaries,  i.e. 
Lenin's  Ministers,  as  well  as 
Chairman  of  the  Central  Execu- 
tive Committee  of  the  Soviet. 
However,  with  his  customary 
prudence  Kamenev  soon  chose 
to  accept  a  diplomatic  mission 
abroad.  He  was  appointed 
"Ambassador"  to  Vienna,  but 
on  his  way  there  fell  into  the 
hands  of  Finnish  White  Guards 
and  was  imprisoned.  The  first 
delegation  to  Brest-Litovsk  in- 
cluded Kamenev,  but  he  pre- 
ferred to  avoid  participation  in 
the  second. 

Kamkov  (Katz).— Social  Revo- 
lutionary. Prosecuted  by  the 
Tsar's  Government  for  his  revo- 
lutionary work,  Kamkov  at  the 
very  beginning  of  his  activity 
fled  abroad  and  spent  there 
many  years  as  a  political  refu- 
gee. Graduated  at  a  German 
University;     then     studied     in 


^88 


THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM 


Paris.  During  the  war  joined 
the  extreme  internationalist 
wing  of  the  Social  Revolution- 
ary Party.  For  some  time  was 
editing  in  Switzerland  a  small 
paper  for  Russian  prisoners  in 
Germany.  On  his  return  to 
Russia  after  the  amnesty, 
Kamkov  became  one  of  the  lead- 
ers of  the  extreme  internation- 
alist **  irreconcilables  "  of  his 
party.  That  wing  of  the  Social 
Revolutionary  Party  was  in 
practice  very  near  to  the  Bol- 
sheviks, striving  as  it  was  for 
dictatorship  of  the  proletariat 
and  of  the  labouring  peasants, 
and  for  transforming  the  war 
of  nations  into  a  social  war  of 
classes.  The  theoretical  differ- 
ences between  the  Left  wing 
and  the  Centre  of  the  Social 
Revolutionary  Party  soon  led  to 
an  actual  split.  Even  before 
the  Bolsheviks'  coup  d'etat  the 
Left  Social  Revolutionaries  were 
everywhere  supporting  the  Bol- 
sheviks; after  the  victory  of 
Lenin,  they  openly  joined  the 
Bolshevik  movement.      Ex- 

pelled from  the  Social  Revolu- 
tionary Party  at  the  Party  Con- 
gress in  November,  1917.  Kam- 
kov and  his  friends  declared 
that  they  formed  a  separate 
"  Left  Social  Revolutionary " 
Party,  and  sent  their  representa- 
tives to  the  Council  of  People's 
Commissaries,  i.e.,  Lenin's  ad- 
ministration. This  co-operation 
with  the  Bolsheviks  ceased  after 
the  Brest-Litovsk  peace,  since 
the  majority  of  the  Left  Social 
Revolutionary  leaders,  includ- 
ing Kamkov,  did  not  see  their 
way  to  recognize  that  treaty 
and  to  share  with  the  Bolshe- 
viks the  shame  of  it.    Accord- 


ing to  latest  information  (as 
yet  unconfirmed),  Kamkov  has 
fallen  a  victim  to  the  Bolshevik 
terror  for  the  part  he  took  in 
the  organizing  of  Count  Mir- 
bach's  assassination  in  Moscow. 

Karaulov.— A  Cossack  of  the 
Tersk  region.  Graduated  at  the 
Petrograd  University.  Was  a 
member  of  the  fourth  Duma; 
was  prominent  in  local  and 
Cossack  public  affairs.  When 
the  right  of  self-government 
was  restored  to  the  Cossacks  by 
the  Provisional  Government, 
Karaulov  was  elected  Ataman 
(Head)  of  the  Tersk  Cossack- 
dom.  After  the  Bolshevik  coup 
d'etat  Karaulov  was  killed  in 
a  skirmish  with  revolted  Cau- 
casian mountaineers. 

Kartashev.— Son  of  an  Ural 
peasant;  an  exceedingly  gifted 
religious-philosophical  thinker. 
A  deeply  sincere  believer  in 
Orthodox  Christianity,  he 
strove,  under  the  old  regime, 
for  a  complete  liberation  of  the 
Church  from  the  tutelage  of 
the  State,  because  the  latter  was 
killing  the  soul  of  the  Church 
and  had  made  it  a  kind  of 
police  institution.  Professor  at 
the  Theological  Academy  of 
Petrograd,  he  was  dismissed  be- 
cause of  his  religious  democ- 
ratism. Together  with  the 
well-known  writer  Merejkovsky 
and  a  few  others,  who  strove 
for  the  regeneration  of  the 
Church,  Kartashev  founded  in 
Petrograd  the  "  Society  of  Re- 
ligious Philosophy,"  where  he 
has  often  spoken  in  defence  of 
the  peasant  before  the  Russian 
Intelligentsia,    and    boldly    de- 


THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM 


289 


nounced  the  servility  of  the 
Synodal  Church,  pointing  out 
the  necessity  of  destroying  the 
autocracy  which  was  ruining 
and  debauching  the  Church  and 
depraving  the  masses  of  the 
people.  It  was  because  he 
thirsted  after  the  regeneration 
of  the  Church  that  this  remark- 
able religious  thinker  was 
driven  to  join  the  active  ene- 
mies of  the  autocratic  regime. 
Being  a  supporter  of  the  sepa- 
ration of  the  Church  from  the 
State  for  the  sake  of  the  com- 
plete freedom  of  the  former, 
Kartashev  entered  the  Pro- 
visional Government  after  the 
abolition  of  the  office  of  the 
High  Procurator  of  the  Holy 
Synod,^  and  became  the  first 
Minister  of  Cults,  in  July,  1917. 
In  August  of  that  year  Karta- 
shev, in  the  name  of  the  Pro- 
visional Government,  opened  the 
All-Russian  Church  Congress 
in  Moscow,  the  object  of  which 
was  to  establish  quite  independ- 
ently a  new  and  free  constitu- 
tion for  the  Orthodox  Church 
of  Russia.  At  the  time  of  the 
Bolshevik  coup  d'etat  Karta- 
shev was  arrested  and  impris- 
oned in  the  fortress  of  SS. 
Peter  and  Paul. 

KiSHKiN. —  A  member  of  the 
medical  profession.  A  promi- 
nent member  of  the  Liberal 
opposition.  Leader  of  the  Mos- 
cow Left  Cadets.  Took  part  in 
the  municipal  work  of  Moscow. 
During  the  war  was  one  of  the 
founders  of  the  All-Russian 
Union    of    Zemstvos,    and,    in 

1  Under  the  old  regime  a  govern- 
ment official  with  wide  powers  to  con- 
trol the  church. 


spite  of  Government  opposition, 
rendered  inestimable  services 
to  the  Russian  army  by  organiz- 
ing the  sanitary  department  and 
supplying  the  army  with  clothes 
and  better  food.  In  his  strug- 
gle against  the  autocracy  Kish- 
kin  always  strove  to  unite  all 
the  Liberal,  Democratic,  and 
Socialist  parties  for  the  fight 
against  the  common  enemy. 
During  the  first  days  of  the 
Revolution  Kishkin's  activity 
in  Moscow  was  very  important, 
in  that  he  united  all  the  revo- 
lutionary forces  for  their  com- 
mon objects.  The  old  regime 
was  overthrown  in  Moscow  in 
a  perfectly  painless  and  blood- 
less way.  Kishkin  was  then 
appointed  Commissary  of  the 
Provisional  Government  in 
Moscow.  He  remained  in  that 
office  till  September,  1917,  when 
he  was  offered,  and  accepted, 
the  portfolio  of  Minister  of 
Public  Assistance.  Kishkin  al- 
ways enjoyed  the  full  confidence 
of  wide  circles  of  Russian  so- 
ciety because  of  his  loyal  char- 
acter and  consistent  democratic 
activity.  During  the  Bolshe- 
vik coup  d'etat  he  was  arrested 
at  a  sitting  of  the  Cabinet  and 
was  imprisoned  in  the  fortress 
of  SS.  Peter  and  Paul. 


KisLiAKov.—  General.  Military 
engineer.  Was  assistant  Min- 
ister of  Ways  of  Communica- 
tion. Has  been  attached  to  the 
General  Headquarters  and  was 
in  charge  of  all  matters  con- 
nected with  transport  for 
military  purposes.  Was  ar- 
rested together  with  General 
Kornilov. 


290 


THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM 


Klembovsky.—  General.  Was  in 
command  of  the  Northern 
front  during  the  summer  of 
1917.  After  Kornilov's  rebel- 
lion Klembovsky  was  relieved 
of  his  command,  his  place  be- 
ing taken  by  General  Tchere- 
missov. 

KoKOSHKiN.—  Learned  historian ; 
an  authority  on  public  law  and 
a  publicist.  Prominent  Mos- 
cow politician;  belonged  to  the 
opposition.  One  of  the  found- 
ers and  leaders  of  the  Consti- 
tutional Democratic  Party 
("  Cadets  " —  the  most  impor- 
tant Liberal  party  in  Russia), 
Kokoshkin  was  elected  to  the 
first  Duma,  and,  when  the  lat- 
ter was  dissolved,  he  signed  the 
manifesto  of  Viborg  (inviting 
the  nation  to  refuse  to  provide 
recruits  and  to  pay  taxes,  etc.), 
for  which  action  he  was  con- 
demned to  prison  and  disfran- 
chised. Kokoshkir  was  a 
permanent  member  of  the  Cen- 
tral Committee  of  the  Consti- 
tutional Democratic  Party.  At 
the  very  beginning  of  the  Revo- 
lution Kokoshkin,  as  an  author- 
ity on  the  constitutional  law, 
was  invited  by  the  Provisional 
Government  to  preside  over  an 
Extraordinary  Legal  Commis- 
sion attached  to  that  Govern- 
ment. Later  he  presided  over 
the  Commission  entrusted  with 
working  out  the  Electoral  Law 
of  the  Constituent  Assembly. 
In  July,  191 7,  Kokoshkin  was  in- 
vited by  Kerensky  (upon  recom- 
mendation of  the  Constitutional 
Democratic  Party)  to  enter  his 
Coalition  Cabinet,  in  which  Ko- 
koshkin received  the  port- 
folio of   State   Controller,  and 


he  remained  in  that  office  up  to       I 
the   time    of    Kornilov's    rebel-       ^ 
lion.    He    was    elected    to    the       \ 
Constituent    Assembly,    and    in       \ 
December,  191 7,  came  to  Petro- 
grad  from  Moscow,  the  nth  of       \ 
that  month  being  the  date  (new       \ 
style)    primarily    fixed    by    the 
Provisional  Government  for  the 
opening  of  the  Constituent  As- 
sembly.   There  Kokoshkin  was       I 
arrested     by     the      Bolsheviks 
(while  on  a  visit  to  the  Countess 
Panin)    and  imprisoned  in  the 
fortress  of  SS.  Peter  and  Paul. 
With  a  weak  constitution   and       ' 
suffering  from  tuberculosis,  his       J 
health    rapidly    declined    there, 
and    his    friends    succeeded    in       ] 
having    him     transferred     (to-       \ 
gether    with    Shingarev)    to    a       j 
private    nursing    home.    There, 
on   the   very   night   of   his   ar- 
rival   and    on    the   eve    of   the       ^ 
Constituent  Assembly,  the  suf-       l 
fering  Kokoshkin  was  atrocious- 
ly murdered  in  his  bed  by  the 
infuriated    Red    Guards.     Such 
was  the  tragic  end  of  this  man, 
whose   knowledge,    impartiality,        \ 
and  energy  were  instrumental  in 
creating  the   most   perfect   and 
just  Electoral  Law  of  the  Rus-       ; 
sian  Constituent  Assembly. 

KoLOKOLOv.    —    A     civil     judge.       ; 
Member  (appointed  by  the  Gov- 
ernment) of  the  Commission  of 
Inquiry    for   the    Kornilov    Af- 
fair. 

KoNovALov. —  One  of  the  most 
important  Moscow  manufac- 
turers, a  well-known  Liberal 
public  worker  of  Moscow.  ; 
Was  a  member  of  the  fourth 
Duma,  where  he  belonged  to  the 
Progressive  group;  and,  during 


THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM 


291 


the  last  years,  took  an  active 
part  in  the  liberation  move- 
ment. As  a  politician  Kono- 
valov  always  strove  to  create 
a  single  wide  front  in  opposi- 
tion to  the  Government,  to  unite 
Liberal,  Democratic,  and  So- 
cialist Parties  for  a  joint  attack 
on  the  autocracy.  After  the  de- 
feat of  the  Russian  armies  in 
1915,  Konovalov  participated  in 
organizing  a  coup  d'etat  which 
was  then  being  prepared.  Kono- 
valov was  a  member  of  the 
first  administration  of  the  Pro- 
visional Government,  where  he 
was  the  Minister  of  Commerce 
and  Industry.  In  June,  1917, 
Konovalov  resigned  that  office, 
but  in  September  he  resumed  it 
in  the  last  administration  of  the 
Provisional  Government,  where 
he  was  also  Vice-President  of 
the  Council  of  Ministers.  Dur- 
ing the  Bolshevik  coup  d'etat 
Konovalov  was  arrested  at  the 
sitting  of  the  Cabinet  and  re- 
mained imprisoned  for  a  long 
time  in  the  fortress  of  SS. 
Peter  and  Paul. 


KoRNiLov.— General.  A  Cossack, 
an  officer  of  the  General  Staff, 
and  a  fighting  officer  of  excep- 
tional bravery.  When  a  young 
officer,  Kornilov  made  an  ex- 
tremely dangerous  journey  in 
Afghanistan  for  intelligence 
purposes.  During  the  present 
war  he  became  famous  for  his 
escape  from  an  Austrian  pris- 
oners' camp.  His  further  activ- 
ity is  described  in  this  book. 
According  to  reliable  informa- 
tion, Kornilov  was  killed  during 
his  struggle  against  the  Bolshe- 
viks. 


KoROTKOv.—  Colonel.  A  fighting 
officer.  Member  of  the  Execu- 
tive Committee  of  the  Armies' 
Group  on  the  Western  front. 
At  the  time  of  Kornilov's  re- 
bellion Korotkov  with  a  de- 
tachment of  troops  marched  on 
the  Stavka   (G.H.Q.). 

KovEL. —  This  town  was  captured 
by  the  Austro-Germans  in  1915. 
The  attempts  made  in  19 16  to 
retake  this  important  strategic 
centre  were  badly  organized  and 
therefore  unsuccessful,  and  cost 
the  Russian  army  terrible  sacri- 
fices. 

KovNo.—  A  first-class  fortress,  not 
far  from  Vilna.  Has  been  cap- 
tured by  the  Germans,  together 
with  the  whole  of  its  artillery 
and  immense  ammunition  stores, 
owing  to  criminal  negligence  of 
the  High  Command.  The  Gov- 
ernor of  the  fortress,  who  left 
Kovno  at  the  most  critical  mo- 
ment, has  been  condemned  and 
imprisoned  with  hard  labour. 

Krilenko.—  Ensign.  Participated 
in  the  present  war.  An  active 
member  of  the  Bolshevik 
Party.  In  1905  Krilenko,  then 
student  of  Petrograd  Univers- 
ity, became  conspicuous  in  party 
propaganda  and  was  widely 
known  as  a  powerful  speaker 
(under  the  nickname  of  "  Com- 
rade Abraham").  Was  tried 
for  participating  in  the  Petro- 
grad Social  Democratic  organ- 
ization. Later  Krilenko  gradu- 
ated at  the  University  and  was 
in  the  Civil  Service  in  the  prov- 
inces. After  the  Revolution  of 
1917,  Kerensky  was  elected  first 
a  member,  then  Chairman,   of 


£9^ 


THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM 


the  Executive  Committee  of  the 
nth  Army  on  the  Galician 
front,  where  he  carried  on  an 
energetic  propaganda  in  favour 
of  Bolshevism  and  against  the 
offensive.  After  the  Bolshevik 
rising  in  Petrograd  in  July,  1917, 
Krilenko  was  arrested  by  the 
military  authorities,  but  was  re- 
leased later  by  the  judicial  au- 
thorities, the  evidence  against 
him  being  deemed  insufficient. 
He  was  appointed  Commander- 
in-Chief  in  the  first  days  of  the 
Bolshevik  counter-revolution, 
and,  with  a  detachment  of  sail- 
ors and  Red  Guards  seized  the 
General  Headquarters,  where 
the  Chief  of  the  General  Staff, 
General  Dukhonin,  was  atro- 
ciously murdered  at  the  railway 
station,  under  the  very  eyes  and 
without  the  interference  of 
Krilenko.  Even  before  the 
Brest-Litovsk  peace,  Krilenko 
completely  destroyed  the  Rus- 
sian army  by  his  ignominious 
and  treacherous  order  authoriz- 
ing each  unit  at  the  front  to 
conclude  a  separate  armistice 
with  the  enemy,  which  order 
was  fully  exploited  by  the  Ger- 
man Staff.  At  the  critical  mo- 
ment of  the  Brest  negotiations, 
Krilenko,  without  waiting  for 
definite  information  about  their 
result,  ordered  the  demobiliza- 
tion of  the  army,  thereby  leav- 
ing Russia  completely  at  the 
mercy  of  the  Central  Powers 
and  making  the  German  Staff 
the  unchallenged  master  of  the 
Bolshevik  Government. 


Krimov.—  General.  A  fighting  of- 
ficer. Full  particulars  in  the 
book. 


Krokhmal, —  Barrister.  Promi- 
nent member  of  the  Social 
Democratic  Party;  elected  by 
the  Central  Executive  Commit- 
tee of  the  Soviet  of  Soldiers* 
and  Workmen's  Deputies  to  sit 
on  the  Commission  of  Inquiry 
for  the  Kornilov  Affair. 

Kronstadt. —  A  fortified  city  on 
the  Gulf  of  Finland.  Built  by 
Peter  the  Great  to  protect  ^he 
approaches  to  Petrograd,  Kron- 
stadt has  lost  of  late  its  strategic 
importance.  In  the  times  of 
Tsardom  there  were  quartered 
in  Kronstadt  the  disciplinary 
battalions  of  the  Baltic  Fleet, 
whither  the  worst  characters  of 
all  the  crews  were  sent  for  pun- 
ishment and  correction.  There 
were  also  a  garrison,  docks, 
workshops,  etc.  In  1906  the 
Kronstadt  garrison  responded  to 
the  dissolution  of  the  first  Duma 
by  an  unsuccessful  rising.  When 
the  Revolution  broke  out  in 
1917  most  revolting  acts  of  vio- 
lence were  committed  in  Kron- 
stadt on  the  officers,  mostly  by 
the  punished  sailors  of  the  disci- 
plinary units.  The  Commander 
of  Kronstadt  was  torn  to  pieces ; 
many  officers  were  murdered; 
others  were  thrown  into  mili- 
tary prisons  and  kept  there  in 
conditions  even  more  cruel  than 
those  in  which  sailors  had  been 
kept  in  the  same  prison  before 
the  Revolution.  Such  was  the 
fury  of  the  sailors'  revenge  for 
the  past,  that  neither  the  first 
Minister  of  Marine  in  the  Pro- 
visional Government,  A.  T. 
Gutchkov,  nor  the  military  judi- 
cial authorities  could  do  any- 
thing to  better  the  lot  of  their 
officers.    The  situation  was  only 


^HE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM 


^93 


altered  through  the  intervention 
of  the  Cabinet,  more  especially 
of  Kerensky,  The  sailors  al- 
lowed a  special  commission 
delegated  by  Kerensky  to  in- 
vestigate the  position  of  the  of- 
ficers and  gradually  to  release 
them  and  to  bring  them  out  of 
Kronstadt.  The  unhealthy  past 
of  Kronstadt,  the  concentration 
there  of  vicious  elements  of  the 
navy,  of  political  police-agents 
and  German  spies  in  great 
numbers  —  all  this  made  Kron- 
stadt an  especially  easy  prey  for 
the  corrupting  Bolshevik  propa- 
ganda. 


KuzMiN". —  Captain  in  the  Russian 
army.  Graduated  as  an  engi- 
neer. Took  part  in  the  Japan- 
ese War.  During  the  revolu- 
tionary movement  of  1905  Kuz- 
min  placed  himself  at  the  head 
of  the  revolted  garrison  of 
Krasnoiarsk  (Siberia)  and  of 
the  revolutionary  municipal  au- 
thorities. He  was  sentenced  to 
death  (in  his  absence)  by  the 
punitive  expedition  of  General 
Rennenkampf.  He  fled  from 
Russian  territory  and  lived  first 
in  Paris,  then  on  Mount  Athos. 
Later  he  voluntarily  returned  to 
Russia,  surrendered  to  the  au- 
thorities, and  was  sentenced  by 
court-martial  to  a  long  imprison- 
ment with  hard  labour.  On  his 
return  to  Petrograd  after  the 
Revolution  Kuzmin  was  ap- 
pointed, in  May,  1917,  Deputy- 
Commander  of  the  troops  of 
the  Petrograd  Military  District. 
Owing  to  his  revolutionary  rec- 
ord, Kuzmin  enjoyed  a  great 
moral  authority  among  the  sol- 
diery   and    successfully    fought 


against  Bolshevik  tendencies  in 
the  army. 

Lebedev. —  A  Social  Revolutionary 
under  the  old  regime.  Organ- 
ized and  participated  in  the  rev- 
olutionary movement  amongst 
the  troops.  Prosecuted  because 
of  this  activity,  Lebedev  was 
compelled  to  take  refuge  abroad 
and  lived  for  a  long  time  in 
France.  After  the  declaration 
of  war  Lebedev  fought  in  the 
ranks  of  the  French  army,  and 
returned  to  Russia  when  an 
amnesty  was  granted  in  Russia 
to  officers  of  the  French  army 
who  won  military  distinctions. 
After  Gutchkov's  withdrawal 
from  the  Ministry  of  Marine, 
the  new  Minister  of  Marine 
(Kerensky)  appointed  him 
Chairman  of  the  Commission  for 
the  purpose  of  revising  the 
Statute  of  the  Navy.  In  that 
capacity  he  resisted  with  con- 
siderable success  the  excessive 
demands  of  the  sailors,  a  task 
which  proved  to  be  too  much 
for  the  previous  Chairman  of 
that  Commission,  the  Right  Oc- 
tobrist  Savitch.  Later  entrusted 
with  the  administration  of  the 
Ministry  of  Marine,  Lebedev 
carried  on  an  energetic  struggle 
against  the  Bolshevik  defeatist 
propaganda  amongst  the  sailors, 
and  was  nearly  always  busy  in 
visiting  for  that  purpose  the 
ships  of  the  Baltic  navy.  An 
enthusiastic  patriot  and  a  warm 
supporter  of  the  national  de- 
fence, Lebedev  has  been  com- 
pelled, since  the  Bolshevik  revo- 
lution, to  remain  in  hiding,  as 
he  is  being  sought  for  by  un- 
disciplined bands  of  Bolshevik 
sailors. 


294 


THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM 


Letchitsky.— A  fighting  general 
of  old  traditions.  After  the 
Revolution  it  became  impossible 
for  him  to  serve  in  the  army 
under  the  new  conditions. 


was  appointed  Chief  of  the  Staff 
of  the  Generalissimo  Brussilov, 
in  which  office  he  remained  up 
to  his  arrest  in  connection  with 
Kornilov's  rebellion. 


Liber. —  A  prominent  Social  Dem- 
ocrat (Menshevik).  At  the 
time  of  the  Provisional  Govern- 
ment Liber  was  one  of  the  most 
active  members  of  the  Presi- 
dency of  the  Central  Executive 
Committee  of  the  Soviet  of 
Soldiers'  and  Workmen's  Depu- 
ties. Member  (elected  by  the 
Central  Executive  Committee  of 
the  Soviet  of  Soldiers'  and 
Workmen's  Deputies)  of  the 
Commission  of  Inquiry  for  the 
Kornilov  Affair. 

LuGA. —  A  provincial  town  half- 
way between  Pskov  and  Petro- 
grad,   on  the  Warsaw  railway. 

LuKOMSKY. —  General.  An  officer 
of  the  General  Staff;  professor 
at  the  War  Academy.  Has  had 
a  brilliant  military  career  and, 
when  still  a  comparatively 
young  man,  was  appointed 
Deputy-Minister  to  the  Minister 
for  War,  General  Polivanov. 
WTien  the  place  of  the  latter 
was  taken  by  General  Sukhom- 
linov,  Lukomsky  went  into  the 
army  as  a  divisional  commander 
and  fought  with  his  division  in 
a  number  of  battles,  having 
especially  distinguished  himself 
during  most  difficult  operations 
in  the  Carpathians.  His  double 
experience  as  an  administrator 
and  as  a  fighting  general  made 
him  particularly  suitable  for  one 
of  the  highest  posts  in  the  army ; 
and    in   May,    1917,    Lukomsky 


Lvov.— Prince  G.  A.  well-known 
Zemstvo  worker.  Was  a  mem- 
ber of  the  first  Duma.  A  vet- 
eran of  the  Liberal-Constitu- 
tional movement  of  the  Zemstvos. 
Was  a  member  of  the  famous 
delegation  of  Zemstvos  and 
towns  in  1905  which  presented 
Tsar  Nicholas  H  with  an  ad- 
dress pointing  out  the  necessity 
of  establishing  a  constitutional 
government.  A  remarkable  or- 
ganizer, Lvov  created  at  the 
beginning  of  the  war  the  All- 
Russian  Union  of  Towns,  and 
rendered  inestimable  services  to 
the  Russian  army  by  creating  an 
exemplary  system  of  sanitary 
institutions  and  by  supplying  the 
army  with  food,  clothes,  and 
even  with  ammunition.  All  the 
best  elements  of  the  Zemstvos 
rallied  around  Lvov,  and  the 
Union  of  which  he  was  the 
leader  has  played  an  exceedingly 
important  part  in  uniting  during 
the  war  the  enemies  of  Tsardom 
for  the  fight  against  the  latter. 
When  the  old  regime  was  over- 
thrown, Prince  Lvov  proved  to 
be  the  only  one  whose  candi- 
dature to  the  premiership  was 
unopposed,  as  both  Liberal  and 
Democratic  circles  recognized 
how  greatly  he  had  deserved  of 
the  State,  and  held  him  person- 
ally in  great  esteem.  After  the 
Bolshevik  rising  in  July,  1917, 
Lvov  left  the  Provisional  Gov- 
ernment, in  which  he  held  office 
both  as  Prime  Minister  and 
Minister  of  the  Interior. 


THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM 


^96 


Lvov,  V.  N. —  A  big  landowner. 
Was  a  member  of  the  third  and 
fourth  Dumas.  Belonged  to  the 
parties  of  the  Right.  In  the 
fourth  Duma  was  a  member  of 
the  so-called  Centre,  a  small 
group  consisting  mainly  of  Con- 
servative landowners  and  oc- 
cupying a  middle  position  be- 
tween the  Octobrists  and  the 
Nationalists.  When,  during  the 
war,  a  new  Conservative-Liberal 
majority  was  formed  in  the 
Duma,  under  the  name  of  "  Pro- 
gressive Coalition,"  the  group 
of  the  Centre  formed  its  right 
wing.  Lvov  represented  that 
group  in  the  first  Provisional 
Government,  where,  having  been 
considered  in  the  Duma  a  spe- 
cialist on  Church  questions,  he 
was  given  the  portfolio  of  the 
High  Procurator  of  the  Holy 
Synod  of  the  Orthodox  Church. 
In  July,  1917,  Lvov  left  the  Pro- 
visional Government  and  the 
office  of  High  Procurator  was 
discontinued,  as  being  contrary 
to  the  principle  of  the  autonomy 
of  the  Orthodox  Church  and 
hateful  to  the  Church  because 
of  its  historical  traditions. 

Maklakov. —  A  Moscow  barrister, 
powerful  political  and  courts 
speaker,  one  of  the  foremost 
Liberal  politicians.  In  1904, 
when  certain  political  crimes 
were  taken  out  of  the  jurisdic- 
tion of  the  administrative  au- 
thorities to  be  tried  by  special 
courts,  and  thus  the  so-called 
"political  cases"  were  resumed 
in  Russia,  Maklakov  with  a  few 
of  his  colleagues  organized  the 
Moscow  Group  of  Counsel  for 
the  defence  of  political  crim- 
inals.   Maklakov  was  a  member 


of  the  Cadet  Party,  where  he 
occupied  a  position  on  the  right 
wing.  Was  a  member  of  the 
second,  third,  and  fourth  Dumas. 
During  the  war  Maklakov  was 
in  sympathy  with  the  coup  d'etat 
which  was  then  being  prepared. 
In  the  first  days  of  the  Revolu- 
tion, before  a  Provisional  Gov- 
ernment was  formed,  the  Duma 
Executive  Committee  appointed 
Maklakov  Commissary  of  the 
Ministry  of  Justice.  In  the 
summer  of  1917  Maklakov  was 
appointed  Ambassador  of  the 
Provisional  Government  to 
France. 

Markov. —  General.  One  of  the 
younger  generals  belonging  to 
the  General  Staff;  a  close  col- 
laborator and  adviser  of  General 
Denikin  and  a  permanent  Chief 
of  Staff  of  the  latter.  His  atti- 
tude towards  the  elected  military 
organizations  contributed  much 
towards  straining  the  relations 
between  these  bodies  and  Gen- 
eral Denikin.  Markov  helped  to 
prepare  the  Kornilov  movement 
at  the  South-western  front. 

Martov  (Zederbaum). —  One  of 
the  oldest  Social  Democratic 
leaders  in  Russia ;  publicist.  For 
many  years  collaborated  in  the 
leading  party  organs ;  under  the 
old  regime  lived  mostly  abroad 
as  a  political  refugee.  After 
the  split  of  the  Russian  Social 
Democratic  Party  into  Bolshe- 
viks (under  Lenin)  and  Men- 
sheviks,  Martov  assumed  the 
leadership  of  the  latter.  During 
the  war  Martov  neither  shared 
the  anti-Marxian  and  extremist 
attitude  of  Lenin  towards  the 
war,  nor  did  he  join  the  sup- 


296 


THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM 


porters  of  the  national  defence 
C'  Oborontzy ")  ;  he  was  the 
most  important  representative 
of  the  so-called  "  international- 
ist" point  of  view,  which  may 
be  described  as  a  sort  of  ma- 
levolent neutrality  towards  the 
war.  On  his  return  to  Russia 
after  the  Revolution,  Martov, 
together  with  a  small  group  of 
his  friends,  adopted  in  his  ar- 
ticles an  attitude  of  hostility 
towards  the  Provisional  Gov- 
ernment and  the  national  demo- 
cratic movement  of  the  "  oboron- 
tzy." During  that  first  period 
of  the  Russian  Revolution, 
Martov,  while  keeping  in  prac- 
tice aloof  from  Lenin's  enter- 
prises, lent  to  Bolshevism  his 
theoretical  and  moral  support, 
mostly  by  his  contributions  to 
the  Novoia  Jicn,  edited  by  the 
famous  Russian  writer,  Maxim 
Gorky.  After  the  Bolshevik 
coup  d'etat  Martov  became  a 
bitter  opponent  of  Lenin,  Trot- 
sky and  Co.,  whom  he  pro- 
claimed the  greatest  and  most 
dangerous  enemies  of  the  pro- 
letariat and  of  the  whole  of 
democracy. 

MiLiUKOV. —  Learned  historian ; 
late  lecturer  at  the  Moscow 
University;  author  of  the  well- 
known  works  "The  Russian 
State  under  Peter  the  Great," 
"  Essays  on  the  Russian  Cul- 
ture," and  others.  One  of  the 
founders  and  the  leader  of  the 
Constitutional  Democratic  Party. 
Member  of  the  third  and  fourth 
Dumas.  Has  taken  a  prominent 
part  in  the  liberation  movement 
which  has  been  going  on  in 
Russia  for  the  last  twenty 
years.    Actively  participated  in 


the  March  Revolution  (of  1917),    \ 
first  as  a  member  of  the  Execu-     i 
tive  Committee   elected   by  the    i 
Duma  to  direct  the  events,  then     ' 
as    the    Minister    for    Foreign     i 
Affairs  of  the  first  Provisional     ; 
Government.     After  having  been     ; 
in  office  for  nearly  two  months,     ' 
Miliukov,     who     supported    an 
aggressive   policy  in   the   ques- 
tion of  war  aims,  disagreed  with 
the  views  held  by  the  majority 
of  the  members  of  the   Provi-     } 
sional     Government    upon    the 
immediate  object  of  the  Russian     < 
foreign  policy,  and  at  the  begin-    ; 
ning  of  May,  191 7,  he  resigned    i 
office.    Since  then  Miliukov  has     ' 
been  in  opposition  to  the  Gov-    ■ 
ernment. 

MiRONOv.—  Sanskrit  scholar  and  a    ! 
Social-Revolutionary  journalist. 
Took    part    in    the    liberation    ; 
movement  of  1905-6.    Lived  long    ' 
in  Paris  as  a  political  refugee.     : 
On    his    return    to    Russia   col-    ^ 
laborated    in    the    Academy    of    ■ 
Sciences.    In  the  spring  of  1917,     ■ 
after   the   Revolution,    Mironov 
placed   himself   at   the  disposal 
of  the  Ministry  of  War  for  work    i 
of   counter-espionage.    He   was     i 
the  head  of  the  counter-espion- 
age department  of  the  Staff  of    ; 
the  Petrograd  Military  District, 
and  specialized  in  the  matter  of 
German   influences  in  the  Bol- 
shevik Party, 

MiTAVA  (=MiTAu).— The  capital 
of  Courland.    Captured  by  the 
Germans  at  the  beginning  of  the    | 
war.    In  the  winter  of   19 16  a 
Russian  offensive  took  place  in    ; 
the  direction  of  Mitava,  which    : 
was    badly   organized    and    un- 
successful. 


THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM 


297 


MoHiLEV. —  Administrative  centre 
of  the  Province  (Government) 
of  Mohilev.  Was  the  residence 
of  the  General  Headquarters 
from  the  summer  of  1915  up  to 
the  Bolshevik  counter-revolu- 
tion. It  was  the  scene  of  the 
murder  of  General  Dukhonin. 
At  present  Mohilev  is  in  the 
hands  of  the  Germans. 

MojAiSK. —  A  provincial  town,  not 
far  from  Mosco\y. 

MuRAViEV,  Captain. —  Naval  offi- 
cer. Participated  in  the  present 
war.  Muraviev  was  a  flag- 
captain  attached  to  the  Minis- 
ter of  Marine,   Kerensky. 

Nabokov,  V.  D. —  Son  of  a  Min- 
ister of  Justice  under  Alexander 
the  Second;  a  big  landowner; 
specialist  on  penal  law.  Was  a 
lecturer  upon  penal  law  in  the 
*'  Privileged  School  of  Law " 
until  the  time  of  the  liberation 
movement  of  1905-6,  in  which 
movement  he  participated  as  a 
publicist  and  a  prominent  mem- 
ber of  the  Constitutional-Demo- 
cratic Party.  Nabokov  was  a 
member  of  the  first  Duma  and 
was  sentenced  to  three  months' 
imprisonment  and  deprived  of 
political  rights  for  having  signed 
the  Viborg  Manifesto  (which 
invited  the  nation  to  refuse 
levies  and  moneys  to  the  Gov- 
ernment on  account  of  the  dis- 
solution of  the  Duma).  Pre- 
viously Nabokov  had  been 
deprived  of  his  rank  at  Court 
for  having  published  articles 
against  the  Government,  more 
especially  one  protesting  against 
the  Jewish  pogrom  at  Kishinev 
(1903).    After    the    Revolution 


Nabokov  was  appointed  Director 
of  Affairs  to  the  Provisional 
Government,  member  of  a  spe- 
cial Legal  Commission  attached 
to  the  Government,  and  to  re- 
port on  Caucasian  affairs. 
Later  he  was  appointed  mem- 
ber of  the  Senate. 

Nekrassov. —  Graduate  of  Insti- 
tute of  Ways  and  Communica- 
tions. Member  of  Tomsk  (Si- 
beria) in  the  third  and  fourth 
Dumas,  where  he  was  promi- 
nent as  the  leader  of  the  Left 
wing  of  the  Cadets,  in  opposi- 
tion to  the  Right  wing  under 
the  leadership  of  Miliukov.  His 
political  work  began  when  he 
was  elected  to  the  Duma,  in 
whose  assembly  Nekrassov  soon 
took  his  place  amongst  the  fore- 
most and  most  active  members 
of  the  opposition  and  worked 
hard  in  trying  to  effect  a  coali- 
tion of  dift'erent  groups  of  the 
opposition  (Liberals,  Democrats, 
and  Socialists),  which  coalition 
Nekrassov  (together  with  his 
political  friends)  considered 
most  essential  as  a  preparatory 
step  towards  the  struggle  for 
wresting  the  power  from  the  old 
regime.  When  war  was  declared 
Nekrassov  temporarily  aban- 
doned politics  and  went  to  the 
front  as  the  Chairman  of  the 
"Union  of  Towns,"  for  the 
purpose  of  organizing  at  the 
front  hospitals,  supply-centres, 
baths,  etc. 

After  the  terrible  defeats  of 
1915,  when  the  criminal  activity 
of  the  Court  Camarilla  (Raspu- 
tin and  others)  became  even 
more  apparent,  Nekrassov  re- 
sumed his  political  life  and  took 
an  active  part  in  the  work  of 


^98 


THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM 


the  organizations  which  were 
preparing  the  coup  d'etat.  The 
spontaneous  outburst  of  the 
suffering  masses  in  March,  1917, 
put  an  end  to  the  work,  and, 
instead  of  an  organized  coup 
d'etat,  resulted  in  a  people's 
revolution,  which  for  a  while 
made  of  the  Duma  a  national 
revolutionary  centre.  The  Gov- 
ernment created  by  that  centre 
naturally  included  Nekrassov, 
who  became  Minister  of  Ways 
and  Communications.  During 
the  first  four  months  of  the 
Revolution  Nekrassov  (with  a 
few  others)  also  represented  in 
the  Government  the  Cadet 
Party.  At  the  beginning  of 
July  Nekrassov  went  to  Kiev 
as  a  member  of  the  Government 
delegation  for  the  settlement  of 
the  Ukrainian  question.  As  his 
views  upon  this  matter  proved 
irreconcilable  with  those  of 
other  Cadet  members  of  the 
Government,  Nekrassov  left 
both  his  party  and  the  Govern- 
ment, but  shortly  afterwards  re- 
entered the  Cabinet  as  a  non- 
party politician.  He  received 
the  portfolio  of  Minister  of 
Finance,  and  was  also  appointed 
Vice-President  of  the  Council  of 
Ministers.  After  the  Kornilov 
rebellion  Nekrassov  went  to  Fin- 
land as  Governor-General,  where 
he  was  still  at  the  time  of  the 
Bolshevik   revolt. 

NovossiLTSEV. —  A  big  landowner. 
A  Zemstvo  worker  and  a  poli- 
tician. Cadet  (Constitutional- 
Democrat)  of  the  Right.  Was 
a  member  of  the  fourth  Duma, 
but  resigned  his  seat  a  consid- 
erable time  before  the  expiration 
of     his     mandate.    Upon     the 


declaration  of  the  war  Novos-     \ 
siltsev  was  called  to  the  colours     ' 
as    a   reserve   officer.    First  he 
was    at    the    front,    then    was 
transferred    to    General    Head- 
quarters, where  he  took  an  im- 
portant part   in   organizing  the 
All-Russian     Officers'     League.     '> 
Was    Chairman    of    the    Main     \ 
Committee     of     that     League.     ; 
After  the  Kornilov  rebellion  was     i 
arrested  by  the  Government.        ■'. 

Oldenburg. —  Member  and  Perma- 
nent Secretary  of  the  Academy     ; 
of   Sciences    of    Petrograd;    an 
authority  on  Sanskrit  and  Budd- 
hism.   Member   of  the   Central     ^ 
Committee  of  the  Constitutional-    1 
Democratic      Party      (Cadets),     j 
Although  a  brilliant  scholar,  he     ' 
has   never   kept  himself   within 
the  sphere  of  purely  academic 
interests;    even   from   an   early     ; 
age  he  took  an  active  part  in 
the  liberation  movement  and  has 
done  all  he  could  to  promote  the 
education  of  the  Russian  people. 
In   July,    1917,    Oldenburg   was    \ 
invited  to  join  the  Provisional     ' 
Government  as  Minister  of  Ed-     ^ 
ucation. 

Omsk. —  Seat  of  administration  of 
the  Steppes  region  of  Western 
Siberia. 

Oranienbaum. —  A  small  town  on    ' 
the  coast  of  the  Gulf  of  Finland, 
opposite    the    Isle    of    Kotlin,     ; 
where     Kronstadt    is    situated. 
An    imperial    residence. 

PoLiVANOV. —  General.    Very    able     j 
General  Staff  officer.    Was  for 
some  time   (in  the  days  of  the 
third   Duma)    Assistant  Minis- 
ter for  War.    Belonged  to  the 


THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM 


299 


officers*  circles  which  rallied  to 
Gutchkov;  and,  together  with 
the  latter,  carried  on  a  struggle 
against  Sukhomlinov  and  his 
camarilla.  After  the  debacle  of 
the  Russian  armies  in  1915  and 
the  fall  of  Sukhomlinov,  Poli- 
vanov  was  appointed  Minister 
for  War;  he  tried  to  meet 
Russian  society  half-way  in  its 
efforts,  resisted  by  the  majority 
of  the  Government,  to  come  to 
the  aid  of  the  army.  Polivanov 
also  tried  to  organize  collabora- 
tion with  the  Duma.  In  short, 
his  policy  was  to  a  certain  extent 
a  Progressive  one.  He  did  not 
remain  long  Minister  of  War, 
because  of  his  differences  on 
many  points  with  the  ever-grow- 
ing reaction  of  Government 
circles.  After  the  Revolution 
Gutchkov,  then  Minister  of  War, 
appointed  Polivanov  Chairman 
of  the  Extraordinary  Commis- 
sion newly  established  by  the 
Ministry  of  War  for  the  pur- 
pose of  revising  the  Military 
Code  with  a  view  to  bringing 
it  into  agreement  with  the  new 
revolutionary  conditions  of  life 
in  the  army.  This  Commission, 
which  was  known  as  "  Polivan- 
ov's  Commission"  and  is  well 
remembered  for  its  disastrous 
results,  was  composed  partly  of 
military  officials  appointed  by 
the  Ministry,  partly  of  elected 
delegates  of  soldiers*  organiza- 
tions and  representatives  of  the 
Petrograd  Workmen's  and  Sol- 
diers' Soviet.  Under  the  influ- 
ence of  the  general  atmosphere 
in  the  first  period  of  revolution- 
ary excitement,  the  Commission 
imprudently  went  much  too  far 
in  meeting  the  wishes  and  de- 
mands of  the  soldiers  and  the 


Soviet's  representatives,  who 
wanted  radically  to  modify  the 
whole  army  discipline  and  the 
relations  between  the  body  of 
officers  and  the  rank  and  file. 
When  in  May  Kerensky  became 
Minister  of  War,  he  stopped  the 
work  of  this  Commission  and 
started  gradually  to  wind  up  the 
awkward  legacy  of  its  reforma- 
tory activities. 

Pronin.— Colonel.  Officer  of  the 
General  Staff.  In  1917  served 
on  the  Staff  of  the  Commander- 
in-Chief.  Was  Vice-Chairman 
of  the  Main  Committee  of  the 
All-Russian  Officers'  League 
(for  particulars  of  which  see 
book) . 

Protopopov.—  The  last  Tsarist 
Minister  of  the  Interior;  big 
landowner  of  the  Government 
of  Simbirsk  and  an  important 
manufacturer,  supplying  cloth  to 
the  army.  In  1916  was  elected 
Marshal  of  the  Nobility  of  his 
province.  A  retired  officer.  Was 
a  member  of  the  third  Duma 
and  Deputy-Speaker  of  the 
fourth  Duma.  Protopopov  be- 
longed to  the  Octobrist  Party 
and  displayed  always  rather 
Progressive  tendencies.  He  tried 
to  be  on  good  terms  with  the 
moderate  and  even  the  extreme 
opposition  groups  of  the  Duma, 
at  the  same  time  conserving 
very  friendly  relations  with  the 
bureaucratic  circles.  When  the 
Special  Commission  was  formed 
for  the  purpose  of  inquiring  into 
the  criminal  conduct  of  Sukhom- 
linov, the  Minister  for  War, 
Protopopov  became  the  repre- 
sentative of  the  Duma  on  it, 
both  by  election  and  by  appoint- 


300 


THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM 


ment  of  the  Government.    Dur- 
ing the  war  Protopopov  became 
intimate     with     the     Rasputin 
circles     and     came     under    the 
patronage  of  Rasputin.    In  Sep- 
tember,   1916,    Protopopov    was 
appointed   Minister   of   the   In- 
terior, being  designated  for  that 
post  by  the  Rasputin  circles  and 
insistently     supported     by     the 
Tsarina.    Once  Minister  of  the 
Interior,  at  the  very  time  when 
the   whole   of    Russian   society, 
the   Duma,   and   even   his   own 
party  were  carrying  on  a  bitter 
fight     against     the     crumbling 
Tsardom,  Protopopov  soon  for- 
got  his    "  Liberalism  "   and   be- 
came a  docile  tool  in  the  hands 
of    the    Court    Camarilla.    He 
rapidly  became  one  of  the  best 
hated  men  in  Russia.    After  the 
assassination  of  Rasputin,  Pro- 
topopov tried  to  keep  his  posi- 
tion   by    assuring    the    Tsarina 
and  her  intimates  that  Rasputin 
was  in  mystical  communication 
with  him,  and  even  that  Raspu- 
tin's   spirit    had    incarnated    in 
him.    When      the      Revolution 
broke     out,     Protopopov,     who 
only     with     difficulty     escaped 
lynching,    appeared    before    the 
Duma   and   voluntarily   surren- 
dered to  the  revolutionary  au- 
thorities.    Protopopov    was    re- 
cently shot  by  the  Bolsheviks. 

PuGATCHEV  Movement  (Pugat- 
chevstchina). —  Towards  the  end 
of  the  eighteenth  century,  during 
the  reign  of  Catherine  the  Great, 
an  exceptionally  powerful  spon- 
taneous rising  of  the  peasant- 
serfs  broke  out  in  the  Urals  and 
in  the  Volga  provinces.  Taking 
revenge  on  their  age-long  op- 
pressors —  the     landlords  —  the 


peasant  masses  everywhere  mas- 
sacred their  masters  and  burnt 
down  the  estates  and  plundered 
the  property  of  the  nobles.  At 
the  head  of  the  mutineers  was 
an  ignorant  Cossack,  Emelian 
Pugatchev,  who  declared  himself 
to  be  the  Emperor  Peter  III 
(the  husband  of  Catherine  the 
Great,  who  was  dethroned  by 
her  and  later  strangled  by  one 
of  her  lovers).  Violent  an- 
archical mass  movements  are 
often  called  in  Russia  "  pugat- 
chevstchina  "  after  this  leader  of 
the  peasants'  rising. 

PuRiSHKEViTCH. —  A  militant  reac- 
tionary. In  Plehve's  time  was 
in  the  Civil  Service  in  the 
capacity  of  official  for  special 
missions.  Publicist.  In  1905  he 
helped  to  organize  the  "Black 
Hundreds."  A  violent  anti- 
Semite.  Participated  in  the 
"  League  of  United  Nobility " 
and  the  "Union  of  the  Russian 
People."  Later  created  the  rival 
reactionary  "  League  of  Arch- 
angel Michael,"  subsidized  by 
the  Government.  Purishkevitch 
specialized  in  systematic  attacks 
on  the  Universities  and  on  public 
men  prominent  in  popular  edu- 
cation. Was  a  member  of  the 
second,  third,  and  fourth  Dumas, 
where  he  became  notorious  for 
his  unbearable  and  scandalous 
behaviour.  For  some  time  Pu- 
rishkevitch enjoyed  exceptional 
patronage  in  the  highest  govern- 
mental circles,  when  he  and  his 
League  and  its  provincial  bran- 
ches played  the  part  of  a  volun- 
tary police  organization,  literally 
terrorizing  the  people  by  their 
espionage  and  denunciations.  Pu- 
rishkevitch carried  on  a  violent 


THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM 


301 


campaign  against  all  non-Rus- 
sian nationalities  and  cults 
within  the  Empire.  In  the 
fourth  Duma,  upon  the  declara- 
tion of  the  war,  Purishkevitch 
stopped  his  destructive  and  anti- 
public  work  and  displayed  con- 
siderable energy  in  his  activity 
with  the  Red  Cross.  Under 
pressure  of  the  horrors  of  the 
Rasputin  regime,  Purishkevitch, 
although  a  monarchist,  began  to 
act  as  an  opponent  of  the  re- 
gime, and  finally  participated  in 
the  assassination  of  Gregory 
Rasputin. 

Raupakh. —  A  colonel.  Military 
lawyer;  member  (appointed  by 
the  Government)  of  the  Com- 
mission of  Inquiry  for  the  Kor- 
nilov  Affair. 

RoDZiANKO. —  A  big  landowner. 
Has  been  many  times  elected 
"Marshal  of  the  Nobility"  of 
the  provinces  where  his  estates 
were  situated.  During  the  lib- 
eration movement  of  1905  he 
joined  the  reactionary  forces  of 
bureaucracy  and  nobility.  At 
the  time  of  the  first  Duma  he 
was  elected  by  the  nobility  to 
the  State  Council  (the  Upper 
House).  Was  a  member  of  the 
"Union  of  the  Nobles"  which 
demanded  and  obtained  the  dis- 
solution of  the  first  Duma  and 
directed  the  reactionary  policy 
of  Stolipin.  During  the  period 
of  reaction  which  set  in  after 
the  dissolution  of  the  first 
Duma,  Rodzianko  was  the  lead- 
er of  Lis  Government  (province) 
in  the  campaign  of  the  reaction- 
ary nobility  against  the  Zemst- 
vos  and  against  all  the  acquisi- 
tions gained  through  the  libera- 


tion movement  of  1905.  After 
the  reforms  of  the  electoral  law 
of  the  Duma  illegally  enforced 
by  Stolipin,  when  a  reactionary 
majority  was  artifically  created 
by  means  of  a  curial  system  of 
elections,  Rodzianko  was  sent  to 
the  third  Duma  by  the  land- 
owner curia  of  the  Government 
of  Ekaterinoslav  (Ukraina). 
There  he  joined  the  Octobrist 
Party  led  by  Gutchkov.  That 
party  formed,  together  with  the 
Nationalist  group,  the  majority 
in  the  third  Duma.  The  Rus- 
sian people  remember  well  the 
activity  of  that  majority,  tend- 
ing to  destroy  all  the  cultural 
and  constitutional  gains  of  1905- 
6;  the  persecutions  of  the  non- 
Russian  nationalities  of  the  Em- 
pire (Finns,  Poles,  Jews,  etc.), 
and  finally,  its  Land  Act,  con- 
trary to  the  interests  of  the  im- 
mense majority  of  the  Russian 
peasantry.  During  the  last 
years  of  that  Duma,  Rodzianko 
was  elected  Speaker.  He  was 
re-elected  to  the  fourth  Duma, 
of  which  he  also  was  the  Speak- 
er during  all  the  five  years  of 
its  existence ;  and,  together  with 
the  majority  of  that  Duma, 
Rodzianko  performed  a  rapid 
evolution  towards  the  Left. 
The  regime  of  Rasputin  drove 
even  the  most  devoted  support- 
ers of  the  Tsardom  into  the  op- 
posite camp.  The  criminal 
anti-patriotic  activity  of  the 
Court  Camarilla  during  the  war 
not  only  allayed  the  fear  of 
revolution  in  the  mind  of  peo- 
ple like  Rodzianko,  but  actually 
convinced  them  that  the  Revo- 
lution was  possible,  nay,  inevi- 
table. During  the  winter  of 
1916  Rodzianko  had  even  some- 


302 


THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM 


thing  to  do  with  the  preparatory 
organizing  of  a  coup  d'etat. 
And  so  the  Revolution  did  not 
take  by  surprise  this  former  re- 
actionary; after  a  short  hesita- 
tion Rodzianko,  on  the  after- 
noon of  February  27th,  191 7, 
definitely  joined  the  movement, 
accepted  the  chairmanship  of 
the  Executive  Committee  of  the 
Duma,  and  sent  to  the  Tsar 
Nicholas  the  famous  telegram 
in  which  he  urged  him  to  abdi- 
cate. Rodzianko  was  also  a 
member  of  the  delegation  to  the 
Grand  Duke  Michael  which  pre- 
sented the  latter  with  a  similar 
demand.  Having  been  left  out 
of  the  Cabinet  of  the  Provision- 
al Government,  Rodzianko  re- 
mained, after  the  Revolution, 
Speaker  of  the  Duma.  As  the 
importance  and  the  authority  of 
the  Duma  were  rapidly  diminish- 
ing, Rodzianko  went  even 
more  into  the  shade,  and  since 
then  did  not  take  any  positive 
part  in  the  events.  After  July, 
1917,  Rodzianko  openly  went 
over  to  the  opposition  to  the 
Provisional  Government  and 
again  passed  through  a  rapid 
evolution  —  this  time  from  Left 
to  Right.  The  political  story  of 
Rodzianko  is  interesting  because 
he  may  be  considered  a  typical 
representative  of  his  class. 

RoMANovsKY. —  General.  Officer 
of  the  General  Staff.  In  1917 
was  Quartermaster-General  at 
the  Staff  of  the  Commander-in- 
Chief.  Romanovsky  was  ar- 
rested with  General  Kornilov. 

RuzsKY. —  General.  Took  a  prom- 
inent part  in  the  war,  at  the 
beginning  of  which  he  partici- 


pated in  the  first  offensive  in 
Galicia;  afterwards  he  was  in 
command  of  the  Northern  army. 
For  some  time  Ruzsky  has  been 
very  popular  in  wide  circles  of 
Russian  society. 

Samarin. —  General.  Officer  of 
the  General  Staff  and  a  fight- 
ing officer.  Took  part  in  the 
present  war.  For  a  time  was 
Chief  of  Staff  of  General  Kor- 
nilov. Under  Kerensky  as  Min- 
ister of  War,  Samarin  held  the 
office  of  Assistant-Chief  of  the 
Military  Cabinet  of  the  Minis- 
ter; later  he  was  appointed  to 
command  the  troops  of  the  Ir- 
kutsk Military  District  in 
Siberia. 

SAi«f. —  A  river  in  Eastern  Galicia. 
There  the  German  army  under 
General  Mackensen  effected  the 
famous  break  through  of  1915, 
when  Russian  troops,  lacking 
ammunition,  almost  entirely 
without  artillery  (owing  to  the 
criminal  policy  of  the  Minister 
of  War,  Sukomlinov,  and 
others),  were  subjected  to  a 
sweeping  drum-fire  and  were 
compelled  to  a  hurried  retreat 
from  Galicia.  Shortly  upon  this 
retreat,  followed  the  fall  of 
Warsaw,  the  retaking  by  the 
Austrians  of  the  first-class  fort- 
ress of  Peremyshi  (Przemysl), 
taken  by  the  Russians  at  the 
cost  of  enormous  sacrifices,  and 
so  on. 

"  Savage  "  Division.—  The  Cauca- 
sian cavalry  division  formed  by 
the  Tsar's  brother,  the  Grand 
Duke  Michael,  of  representa- 
tives of  Moslem  Caucasian 
tribes  which  were  exempt  from 


THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM 


303 


0^ 


conscription.  This  division  con- 
sisted of  exceedingly  brave  but 
utterly  uncivilized  mountaineers, 
and  was  commanded  by  officers 
selected  by  the  Grand  Duke. 
Among  these  officers  there  were 
many  Guards  and  young  men 
belonging  to  aristocratic  fam- 
ilies. The  division  was  con- 
sidered quite  "  free  from  infec- 
tion "  of  revolutionary  propa- 
ganda, and  therefore  particularly 
suitable  for  carrying  out  the 
plan  of  the  plotters.  The  di- 
vision distinguished  itself  in 
the  war  by  the  exceptional  bold- 
ness of  its  cavalry  charges  on 
the  enemy  and  by  its  rather  easy 
ways  with  the  peaceful  popula- 
tion. 

Savinkov. —  One  of  the  foremost 
revolutionaries;  member  of  the 
Social  Revolutionary  Party.  A 
partisan  of  terrorism,  Savinkov 
organized  and  co-operated  in 
the  most  important  political 
assassinations  in  Russia 
(Plehve,  Grand  Duke  Sergius, 
and  others).  Spent  many  years 
abroad  as  a  political  refugee, 
and  has  written  during  that 
period  several  novels  from  the 
life  of  revolutionaries,  which 
enjoyed  a  great  success.  On  his 
return  to  Russia  after  the  Revo- 
lution, Savinkov  went  to  the 
Galician  front  as  the  Commis- 
sary of  the  7th  Army,  to  which 
post  he  was  appointed  by  the 
Minister     of     War,     ^erensky, 

^upon  a  recommendation'^Of  "^the 
Central  Executive  Committee  of 
the  Soviet.  There  Savinkov 
,  carried  on  an  intense  struggle 
f  against  the  Bolshevik  tenden- 
j  cies,  and  at  the  peril  of  his  life, 
'   restored  discipline   in   some  of 


K 


the  most  debauched  regiments. 
By  that  activity  Savinkov  con- 
siderably contributeTtolFe  suc- 
cess of  the  offensive  on  the  ist 
of  July,  1917,  at  Brzezany. 

When    Kerensky   became    ac- 
quainted on  the  spot  with  Savin- 
koy's    work,    he   appointed   hTm'^^C, 
Fii-st   Commissarj-^pf  the  Min- 
ister   of    War   attached    to    the 
ronimaiuler  of  the  Army  group'" 
of     tlic      Sonth-wosteni     fronfjT. 
thereliy    creating-    a    new    office  I 
with  very  wide  powers.     Savin-  J 
kov's  activity  since  that  appoint-  J 
ment  is   described  in  the  book  ' 
itself. 

Savitch.— Member  of  the  third 
and  fourth  Dumas.  Octobrist. 
One  of  the  close  collaborators 
of  Gutchkov.  In  the  Duma  he 
was  considered  a  specialist  on 
matters  connected  with  the  navy. 
Was  for  some  time  Chairman  of 
the  Army  and  Navy  Commission 
of  the  Duma.  After  the  Revo- 
lution the  Minister  of  War  and 
Marine  (Gutchkov)  formed  at 
his  Ministry  a  Commission  simi- 
lar to  that  of  Polivanov  (q.v.) 
at  the  Ministry  of  War,  and 
appointed  Savitch  to  act  as  its 
Chairman. 

Selivanov. —  General.  A  fighting 
general.  During  the  July  of- 
fensive was  in  command  of  an 
army  corps;  then  was  in  com- 
mand of  an  army  at  the  Galician 
front. 

Shablovsky. —  Military  -  Naval 
Prosecutor  (Procureur)  Gener- 
al; Chairman  of  the  Extraor- 
dinary Commission  of  Inquiry 
for  the  Kornilov  Affair.  Under 
Tsardom,     Shablovsky     was     a 


S04i 


THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM 


prominent  barrister  who  special- 
ized in  the  defence  (mostly  in 
the  Baltic  provinces)  of  per- 
sons prosecuted  by  the  Tsar's 
Government  on  account  of  their 
revolutionary  and  political  activ- 
ity. 

Shingarev. —  Member  of  the 
medical  profession.  Was  promi- 
nent in  the  Zemstvos  both  as 
medical  man  and  as  Zemstvo- 
Councillor.  Publicist.  After 
having  graduated  at  the  Uni- 
versity, Shingarev  gave  up  his 
University  career  and  settled  in 
the  country  in  order  to  treat 
peasants.  Shingarev  took  part 
for  many  years  in  the  Zemstvo 
and  liberation  movement.  He 
was  a  member  of  the  second, 
third  and  fourth  Dumas.  Was 
a  member  of  the  Cadet  Party, 
vice-chairman  of  its  Duma 
group  and  a  member  of  the  Cen- 
tral Committee  of  the  party. 
In  the  third  Duma  he  special- 
ized in  questions  of  finance.  In 
the  fourth  Duma  he  also  worked 
much  in  the  Army  and  Navy 
Commission,  and  later  became 
its  chairman.  He  was  a  popu- 
lar speaker  in  the  Duma.  After 
the  Revolution  Shingarev  be- 
came Minister  of  Agriculture, 
and  then  Minister  of  Finance. 
He  left  the  Government  at  the 
beginning  of  July,  together 
with  other  representatives  of  his 
party,  because  of  their  differ- 
ences with  the  Government  on 
the  Ukrainian  question.  Under 
Shingarev  as  Minister  of  Agri- 
culture were  laid  the  foundations 
of  the  radical  agrarian  reforms. 
Having  been  elected  to  the  Con- 
stituent Assembly  in  November, 
1017,  Shingarev  came  to  Petro- 


grad  in  time  for  the  date  fixed 
by  the  Provisional  Government 
for  the  convocation  of  the  As- 
sembly—  the  28th  of  Novem- 
ber. On  the  eve  of  that  day 
Shingarev,  together  with  Ko- 
koshkin  {q.v.),  was  arrested  by 
the  Bolsheviks  and  imprisoned 
in  the  fortress  of  SS.  Peter 
and  Paul.  Transferred  to  a 
private  nursing  home  on  the 
day  before  the  dissolution  of  the 
Constituent  Assembly,  the  suf- 
fering Shingarev  was  atrocious- 
ly murdered  in  bed  by  the  Bol- 
shevik guards. 

Skobelev. —  Descendant  of  schis- 
matic peasants  (Molokani)  who 
were  in  past  time  deported  to 
the  Caucasus.  Son  of  an  im- 
portant Baku  trader.  Was  edu- 
cated at  the  Vienna  Polytechnic 
cal  Institute.  A  social  Demo- 
crat (Menshevik),  Skobelev 
when  still  a  young  man  was 
elected  to  the  fourth  Duma  by 
the  Russian  population  of 
Transcaucasia.  Joining  the  So- 
cial Democratic  group  in  the 
Duma,  Skobelev  by  his  frequent 
speeches  and  questions  on  im- 
portant occasions  came  to  the 
foreground  and  acquired  a  wide 
reputation.  Skobelev  did  not 
remain  within  the  bounds  of 
party  activity,  and  participated 
in  the  general  opposition  and 
revolutionary  movement,  not 
being  afraid  of  co-operating 
with  the  bourgeoisie.  Skobelev 
took  a  most  intimate  part  in 
the  Revolution  from  the  first 
day,  and  when  the  Petrograd 
Soviet  of  Workmen  and  Sail- 
ors' Delegates  had  been  formed, 
he  was  elected  its  Vice-Chair- 
man,   In    the    Soviet    Skobelev 


THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM 


305 


always  energetically  supported 
the  necesssity  of  national  de- 
fence and  of  a  co-operation  of 
the  Revolutionary  democracy 
with  the  Liberal  bourgeoisie,  if 
the  country  and  the  Revolution 
were  to  be  saved.  In  the 
month  of  May  Skobelev  became 
a  member  of  the  first  coalition- 
al  Provisional  Government  as 
the  head  of  the  then  created 
Ministry  of  Labour,  in  which 
office  he  remained  up  to  the  time 
of  Kornilov's  rebellion. 

SoLDAU. —  A  town  in  East  Prus- 
sia, near  which  was  routed  the 
Russian  detachment  under  Gen- 
eral bamsonov,  whereupon  Rus- 
sian troops  began  a  disorderly 
retreat  in  the  autumn  of   1914. 

Stcheglovitov. —  A  prominent  re- 
actionary politician  of  the  last 
years  of  Tsardom.  A  lawyer 
and  a  well-known  specialist  on 
penal  law.  Stcheglovitov  up  to 
1906  always  emphasized  his 
liberal  ideas  and  independence 
of  the  governmental  influences. 
When  (in  the  late  'nineties  and 
first  years  of  1900)  Stcheglovi- 
tov was  High  Prosecutor  (Ober- 
Procuror)  of  the  Criminal 
Court  of  Error  (Cassation)  of 
the  Senate,  he  even  gained  the 
nickname  of  the  **  Red  Procur- 
eur,"  because  of  his  bold  actions 
in  defence  of  the  law  courts  and 
courts  statutes.  During  that 
period  Stcheglovitov  was  a  con- 
tributor (together  with  most  of 
the  prominent  jurists  in  oppo- 
sition to  the  Government)  to 
the  judicial  review  The  Law, 
which  carried  on  an  energetic 
struggle  against  the  autocracy. 
After  Stcheglovitov  had  been 


appointed  Minister  of  Justice,  in 
the  time  of  the  first  Duma  and 
before  the  dissolution  of  the  lat- 
ter, he  strove  to  keep  friendly 
relations  with  its  Constitution- 
al Democratic  majority.  The 
dissolution  of  the  Duma  and 
the  decisive  victory  of  the 
Stolipin  reaction  at  a  stroke 
transformed  the  "Red  Pro- 
cureur"  into  one  of  the  black- 
est heroes  of  the  last  ten  years 
of  Tsardom.  Stcheglovitov  lit- 
erally "  burnt  all  that  he  used  to 
adore,  and  adored  all  that  he 
used  to  burn."  Like  all  rene- 
jgades,  Stcheglovitov  tried  to 
make  people  forget  his  old  sins ; 
thus,  he  knew  no  bounds  in  his 
jeering  mockeries  at  justice  and 
humanity.  Being  one  of  the  few 
clever  ministers  educated  in 
statesmanship  among  the  many 
ignorant  high  dignitaries  of  the 
last  period  of  the  old  regime, 
Stcheglovitov  became  the  source 
of  ideas  and  inspirations  to  the 
Government  reaction;  and  he 
was  clever  at  giving  political 
and  civilized  appearances  to  the 
wildest  enterprises  of  the  Black 
Hundreds.  He  protected  assas- 
sins hired  by  reactionaries  from 
a  judicial  prosecution;  shut  his 
eyes  to  the  fact  that  torture 
was  being  employed  during  in- 
quiries into  political  crimes ; 
and  under  his  rule  the  judicial 
authorities  manufactured  false 
documents  for  the  purpose  of 
concocting  evidence  to  convict 
the  enemies  of  the  autocracy. 
He  hunted  down  the  independ- 
ent Press  and  all  the  non-Rus- 
sian nationalities  of  the  Empire, 
more  especially  the  Jews,  Poles, 
and  Finns.  The  crowning 
"judicial"  achievement  of  this 


306 


THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM 


renegade  jurist  was  when  he 
used  the  barbarous  mediaeval 
judicial  procedurei,  which  he 
had  introduced,  for  the  purpose 
of  manufacturing  evidence 
against  Beiliss,  the  Jew  accused 
of  a  ritual  murder  of  a  Chris- 
tian boy.  Stcheglovitov  actu- 
ally succeeded  in  destroying  all 
justice  in  the  courts  of  Tsarist 
Russia,  and  thereby  contributed 
perhaps  more  than  anybody  else 
to  the  fall  of  Tsardom.  In  spite 
of  all  those  efforts,  however, 
this  former  Liberal  always  re- 
mained somewhat  suspect  to  the 
pillars  of  the  Court  reaction; 
and  so  Stcheglovitov's  dream 
of  becoming  Prime  Minister 
was  never  realized.  In  1916, 
he  retired  from  the  Ministry  of 
Justice  and  was  appointed  Presi- 
dent of  the  State  Council.  He 
was  the  first  of  the  Tsar's  digni- 
taries to  be  apprehended  (on  the 
first  day  of  the  Revolution,  at 
his  house  by  a  group  of  citi- 
zens), and  was  brought  to  the 
Duma  and  handed  over  to  Ker- 
ensky,  who  had  him  arrested  in 
the  name  of  the  Revolutionary 
Authority.  Recently  Stche- 
glovitov has  been  shot  by  the 
Bolsheviks. 

Struve. —  Professor,  learned 

economist,  publicist  and  philo- 
sopher. Collaborated  with 
Plekhanov  and  Lenin.  In  the 
'nineties  Struve  was  one  of  the 
foremost  followers  of  and  au- 
thorities on  Marxian  doctrines 
in  Russia.  He  wrote  the  first 
manifesto  laying  down  the  pro- 
gram of  the  Russian  Social 
Democratic  Party,  and  actively 
contributed  to  the  first  successes 
of  that  party  both   among  the 


Intelligentsia  and  in  Labour 
circles.  Later,  he  lost  faith  in 
the  philosophical  and  political 
ideas  of  Marxism  and  left  the 
Social  -  Democratic  Party. 

Struve  then  took  a  prominent 
part  in  the  idealist  (neo-Kan- 
tian)  movement,  which  at  that 
time  was  rallying  a  considerable 
part  of  the  Russian  Intelligent- 
sia. At  the  same  time  in  poli- 
tics he  joined  the  Liberals.  Be- 
fore the  liberation  movement  of 
1905,  Struve  went  to  Stuttgart, 
where  he  edited  a  Russian  news- 
paper, Osvobojdenie  ("  Libera- 
tion " ) ,  devoted  to  propaganda 
against  the  Tsardom  and  in 
favour  of  a  parliamentary  con- 
stitution for  Russia.  In  spite  of 
all  measures  taken  by  the 
Tsarist  police,  that  periodical 
was  brought  into  Russia  in 
great  numbers  by  the  agents  of 
the  "  Union  of  Liberation,"  a 
very  large  Liberal-Democratic 
•secret  organization  which  arose 
in  Russia  towards  the  end  of 
the  last  century  for  the  purpose 
of  carrying  on  a  struggle  against 
the  Tsardom.  This  union  ab- 
sorbed and  organized  all  the 
non- Socialist  elements  among 
the  Intelligentsia,  the  Zemstvo 
and  municipal  workers,  scientists 
and  writers.  There  is  hardly  a 
single  prominent  public  man  in 
Russia  who  has  not  been  at 
some  time  a  member  of  this 
secret  society.  The  paper  edited 
by  Struve  abroad  was  its  secret 
organ.  In  1905,  after  the 
famous  Manifesto  of  the  17th 
of  October,  when  open  political 
work  became  possible  in  Russia, 
the  "  Union  of  Liberation  "  fell 
to  pieces,  its  main  body  form- 
ing the  Cadet  Party,  while  its 


THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM 


307 


Right  wing  joined  the  Octobrist 
Party,  and  its  democratic  ele- 
ments were  dispersed  among  dif- 
ferent Sociahst  parties.  On  his 
return  to  Russia  after  the  17th 
of  October,  Struve  became  a 
prominent  Constitutional  Demo- 
crat and  a  member  of  the  Ceji- 
tral  Committee  of  that  party. 
He  was  a  member  for  Petrograd 
of  the  second  Duma.  In  his 
evolution  from  Social  Democ- 
racy to  Liberalism,  Struve 
reached  the  Right  wing  of 
the  Constitutional  Democratic 
Party,  passed  through  it,  and 
was  working  with  the  political 
elements  occupying  a  position 
still  further  Right  who  may  be 
described  as  Liberal-Conserva- 
tives. Being  an  ardent  support- 
er of  the  centralist  idea,  Struve 
was  rather  hostile  to  the  aspira- 
tions of  the  non-Russian  na- 
tionalities. After  the  Revolution 
of  1917,  Miliukov,  then  Minister 
of  Foreign  Affairs,  placed 
Struve  at  the  head  of  the  new- 
ly formed  Economic  Depart- 
ment of  the  Ministry  of  Foreign 
Affairs.  He  was  also  very 
active  in  the  High  Council  of 
Economics  attached  to  the  Pro- 
visional Government,  and  later 
was  a  member  of  the  Provision- 
al Council  of  the  Republic 
(Provisional  Parliament).  At 
present  Struve  is  a  leader  of 
the  monarchist  movement  in 
Russia. 

Stutchka. —  A  Lett  barrister,  a 
violent  Bolshevik.  After  the 
Bolshevik  coup  d'etat  Stutchka 
took  a  very  active  part  in  the 
destruction  of  the  Russian  ju- 
dicial machinery.  The  absurd 
and  barbarian  "courts"  estab- 


lished by  the  Bolsheviks  have 
received  in  Russia  the  contempt- 
uous nickname  of  "  Stutchka's 
courts." 

Tarnopol. —  A  town  in  Eastern 
Galicia.  It  was  near  that  town 
that  the  Austro-German  troops 
succeeded  on  the  19th  of  July 
1917,  at  the  very  moment  of  the 
Bolshevik  revolt  in  Petrograd, 
in  breaking  through  the  Rus- 
sian front,  whereupon  the  Rus- 
sian army  was  compelled  to 
evacuate  Galicia.  This  retreat 
was  of  such  a  character  as  to 
remind  one  of  many  episodes  of 
the  catastrophic  retreat  of  the 
Russian  army  at  the  time  of  the 
old  regime  in  1915. 

TcHEREMissov.—  General.  Profes- 
sor at  the  War  Academy.  One 
of  the  ablest  officers  in  the  Rus- 
sian army,  who,  however,  did 
not  enjoy  the  general  confidence 
of  the  Staff  circles,  owing  to 
his  somewhat  hesitating  policy. 
At  the  critical  moment  of  the 
Bolshevik  revolt.  Tcheremis- 
sov,  then  at  Pskov  (south-east 
of  Petrograd),  in  the  capacity 
of  the  Commander  of  the  Nor- 
thern front,  adopted  a  passive 
attitude,  and  thereby  contri- 
buted, perhaps  unwillingly,  to 
the  success  of  the  revolt. 

TcHERNov.— One  of  the  founders 
of  the  Social  Revolutionary 
Party;  Chairman  of  its  Central 
Committee;  publicist.  As  a 
political  refugee  has  spent 
many  years  abroad,  in  France, 
and  especially  in  Switzerland. 
On  his  return  to  Russia  after 
the  Revolution  he  became  (in 
May,  1917),  member  of  the  Pro- 


308 


THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM 


visional  Government  as  Minister 
of  Agriculture,  in  which  office 
he  remained  until  the  Kornilov 
rebellion,  when  he  joined  the 
opposition,  demanding  the  for- 
mation of  a  homogeneous  So- 
cialist Government.  Before  the 
Bolshevik  coup  d'etat  Tchernov 
carried  on  a  personal  campaign 
against  Kerensky,  trying  to  in- 
duce his  party  to  come  to  an 
agreement  with  the  Bolsheviks 
and  occupying  a  somewhat  am- 
biguous position  towards  the 
question  of  the  continuance  of 
the  war. 

TCHERNOVITSI  (  CzERNOVICH)  . — 

The  capital  of  the  Austrian 
Province  of  Bukovina. 

Terestchenko. —  Belongs  to  a 
well-known  Russian  family  of 
very  wealthy  sugar-refiners.  A 
gentleman  of  independent 
means  Terestchenko  from  the 
beginning  of  the  war  devoted 
himself  entirely  to  work  in  pub- 
lic organizations  at  the  front; 
he  was  one  of  the  creators  of 
the  Military  Industrial  Commit- 
tees which,  after  the  debacle  of 
1915,  took  the  initiative  in  re- 
equipping  the  Russian  army. 
While  working  at  the  front  and 
in  those  public  bodies,  Terestch- 
enko was  driven  to  believe  defi- 
nitely in  the  necessity  for  a  coup 
d'etat.  His  wide  social  connec- 
tions, which  included  military 
circles,  made  it  possible  for 
Terestchenko  to  do  considerable 
work  in  that  direction.  When 
the  Provisional  Government  was 
being  formed,  Prince  Lvov, 
Chairman  of  the  All-Russian 
Union  of  Zemstvos,  who  was 
himself  marked  out  for  the  post 


of  Prime  Minister,  proposed 
(together  with  several  other 
persons)  that  Terestchenko 
should  be  made  Minister  of 
Finance.  Thus  Terestchenko 
became  a  member  of  the  first 
Revolutionary  Government, 

where  he  was  the  only  one  who 
had  never  before  been  elected  to 
a  Legislative  Chamber.  After 
Miliukov  left  the  Government, 
Terestchenko  accepted  the  port- 
folio of  Minister  for  Foreign 
Affairs,  in  which  office  he  re- 
mained until  the  Bolshevik  coup 
d'etat.  Having  been  arrested 
by  the  Bolsheviks  at  the  sitting 
of  the  Cabinet,  Terestchenko 
was  imprisoned  in  the  fortress 
of  SS.  Peter  and  Paul,  where 
he  remained  for  several  months. 

Trotzky  (Bronstein).— Well- 
known  Social  Democrat;  propa- 
gandist and  publicist.  A  re- 
markable demagogic  speaker. 
During  the  Revolution  of  1905 
he  was  a  member  of  the  Petro- 
grad  Soviet  of  Workmen's  Dele- 
gates, then  formed  for  the  first 
time.  Trotzky  was  among  those 
Labour  leaders  who  contributed 
much  to  the  defeat  of  the  first 
Russian  Revolution  by  their  ex- 
tremist watchwords  and  their 
irreconcilability.  Having  been 
arrested,  together  with  the  other 
members  of  the  Soviet,  on  an 
order  of  the  Government  of 
Count  Witte,  Trotzky  was,  with 
the  others,  sentenced  to  be  de- 
ported to  Siberia,  whence  he  es- 
caped and  fled  abroad.  Until  1917 
Trotzky  lived  in  different  Euro- 
pean centres  and  took  an  impor- 
tant part  in  the  Russian  Social- 
Democratic  movement,  where  he 
stood  for  a  middle  course  be- 


THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM 


^9 


tween  the  Mensheviks  and  the 
Bolsheviks.  During  the  present 
war  Trotzky  joined  the  militant 
Socialist  Pacifists,  being  espe- 
cially hostile  to  England.  The 
Revolution  of  1917  found  him  in 
America,  whence  he  returned  in 
April  to  Russia,  via  England 
and  Sweden.  Profiting  by  the 
full  freedom  reigning  there, 
Trotzky,  who  knew  how  to  re- 
main prudently  in  the  back- 
ground until  the  right  moment, 
carried  on  a  tenacious  and  ut- 
terly unscrupulous  struggle  for 
power,  together  with  Lenin. 
The  ill-fated  Kornilov  rebellion 
exasperated  the  workmen  and 
soldiers  and  drove  them,  from 
supporting  a  Social  Revolution- 
ary and  Menshevik  Government, 
into  the  arms  of  the  Bolsheviks 
and  Anarchists;  thus  the  road 
was  opened  for  Trotzky  to  the 
chair  of  the  Petrograd  Soviet. 
After  this  Trotzky  began  openly 
to  work  for  an  armed  rising  and 
the  disorganization  of  the  de- 
fence of  the  country.  It  is  most 
characteristic  of  the  man  and 
his  kind  that,  while  preparing  a 
dictatorship  and  the  dissolution 
of  the  Constituent  Assembly, 
the  Bolshevik  demagogues,  with 
Trotzky  and  Lenin  at  their 
head,  adopted  as  their  war-cry 
the  immediate  convocation  of  the 
Assembly  and  the  alleged  resist- 
ance to  it  of  the  Provisional 
Government;  similarly,  the  de- 
struction of  Russia's  military 
power  was  started  in  the  name 
of  the  "  Revolutionary  Organiza- 
tion by  Workmen  and  Soldiers 
of  the  Defence  of  Petrograd," 
which  the  Provisional  Govern- 
ment began  to  evacuate  in  order 
(the   Bolsheviks  pretended)    to 


surrender  it  to  the  Germans. 
With  the  chairmanship  of  the 
Petrograd  Soviet  begins  a  new 
period  of  Trotzky's  activity,  not 
yet  concluded  and  intimately 
connected  with  the  terrible  and 
treacherous  work  of  Lenin  and 
his  collaborators. 

Trubetzkoy. —  Prince  G.  N.  Diplo- 
mat. Supporter  of  an  active 
policy  in  the  Balkans.  Has  been 
Russian  Minister  to  Serbia,  then 
was  Director  of  the  Near  East 
Department  in  the  Ministry  for 
Foreign  Affairs.  One  of  the 
close  collaborators  of  Miliukov 
at  the  time  when  the  latter  was 
Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs. 
Later,  when  that  office  was  taken 
over  by  M.  I.  Terestchenko, 
Trubetzkoy  became  head  of  the 
Diplomatic  Department  attached 
to  the  General  Staff,  which  of- 
fice he  relinquished  after  Kor- 
nilov's  rebellion. 

TsERETELLi.—  A  Georgian  (of 
Georgia  in  the  Caucasus).  One 
of  the  leaders  of  the  Social- 
Democratic  Party  (Menshe- 
viks). His  speeches  in  the  sec- 
ond Duma  in  1907  gave  him  a 
wide  renown.  That  Duma  was 
dissolved  by  Stolipin  after  a 
life  of  a  few  months,  and  on  an 
order  of  the  Government  the 
whole  of  its  Social-Democratic 
faction  was  committed  for  trial 
on  a  false  charge  of  organizing 
an  armed  mutiny  of  the  troops. 
Together  with  several  of  his 
comrades,  Tseretelli  was  con- 
demned b3^  the  Imperial  Court 
to  imprisonment  in  Siberia  with 
hard  labour,  and  he  was  only 
liberated  and  returned  to  Rus- 
sia    after     the     amnesty    pro- 


310 


THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM 


claimed  by  the  Provisional  Gov- 
ernment. On  his  arrival  in 
Petrograd  in  April  1917,  Tsere- 
telli  became  one  of  the  beloved 
leaders  of  the  Russian  democ- 
racy and  the  guiding  leader  of 
the  Soviets.  A  very  decided 
defender  of  the  necessity  of 
continuing  the  war  for  the  sake 
of  the  national  defence,  and  an 
honest  supporter  of  the  idea  of 
a  coalitional  governmenl  based 
upon  the  co-operation  of  the 
Liberal,  Democratic  and  Social- 
ist Parties,  Tseretelli,  became 
in  May,  1917,  a  member  of  the 
first  Coalitional  Cabinet  as 
Minister  of  Post  and  Telegraph, 
and  later  as  Minister  of  the  In- 
terior. At  the  beginning  of 
August,  Tseretelli  relinquished 
office,  because  it  was  highly 
necessary  for  him  to  concen- 
trate his  efforts  in  directing  the 
policy  of  both  the  Petrograd  and 
the  Central  Soviets  and  in  the 
struggle  against  the  Bolshevik 
agitation. 

TuMANOv.—  Prince.  Officer  of  the 
General  Staff.  In  the  very  first 
days  of  the  Revolution  Tumanov 
reported  at  the  Duma,  together 
with  a  few  other  officers  of  the 
General  Staff,  and  placed  him- 
self at  the  disposal  of  the  people 
for  the  struggle  against  the 
autocracy.  Was  a  member  of 
the  Military  Commission  of  the 
Duma,  which  during  the  transi- 
tion period  of  the  revolutionary 
days  played  the  part  of  the  Su- 
preme Military  Authority  and 
restored  order  in  the  Petrograd 
garrison.  Was  Assistant  Mini- 
ster of  War  during  Kerensky's 
office  at  that  Ministry.  During 
the  Bolshevik  counter-revolution 


Tumanov  was  atrociously  tor- 
tured to  death  in  the  street,  and 
his  body  was  thrown  into  the 
Ekaterininsky    Canal. 

Ukraintsev. —  A  colonel.  Mili- 
tary lawyer,  member  (appointed 
by  the  Government)  of  the  Com- 
mission of  Inquiry  for  the  Kor- 
nilov  Affair. 

Vassilkovsky. —  General.  A  Cos- 
sack. Participated  in  the  pres- 
ent war.  After  the  July  Bolshe- 
vik rising  was  appointed  Com- 
mander of  the  troops  of  the 
Petrograd  Military  District. 

Velitchko. —  General.  Professor 
of  military  engineering;  a  well- 
known  specialist.  In  1917,  Ve- 
litchko was  at  the  head  of  all 
engineering  troops  and  organiza- 
tions at  the  front. 

Verderevsky. —  Rear- Admiral.  A 
remarkable  naval  officer.  Served 
first  in  the  Black  Sea  then  in 
the  Baltic.  After  the  Japa- 
ese  War,  Verderevsky  took  a 
very  active  part  in  the  work  of 
recreating  and  reorganizing  the 
Baltic  Fleet.  He  was  a  mem- 
ber of  the  Staff  of  Admiral 
Essen.  A  few  months  before 
the  war,  he  retired  from  the 
service  on  his  own  initiative. 
After  the  declaration  of  war 
Verderevsky  returned  to  the 
Baltic  Fleet,  where  he  was 
placed  in  command  first  of  a 
cruiser,  then  of  the  first  cruiser 
squadron,  and  afterwards  of  the 
submarine  division  comprising 
the  British  submarines  on  Rus- 
sian service.  At  the  moment 
when  the  Revolution  broke  out, 
Verderevsky     was     at     Revel, 


THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM 


311 


where  a  considerable  part  of  the 
Baltic  Fleet  was  concentrated; 
he  directed  the  events  in  the  fleet 
in  those  days,  and  has  done 
much  to  maintain  order  and 
peaceful  relations  between  of- 
ficers and  men.  The  Minister 
of  Marine,  Gutchkov,  appointed 
him  Chief  of  the  Staff  of  the 
Baltic  Fleet;  later,  in  May  1917, 
he  was  appointed  by  the  then 
Minister  of  Marine,  Kerensky, 
Commander  of  the  Baltic  Fleet. 
Verderevsky  held  this  post  at 
the  time  of  the  first  Bolshevik 
rising  (July,  1917).  Under 
pressure  of  the  sailors,  who  were 
in  sympathy  with  the  Bolshe- 
viks, he  refused  to  carry  out 
the  orders  of  the  Provisional 
Government  to  send  a  destroy- 
er squadron  to  the  Neva  to  fight 
the  mutineers.  The  Provisional 
Government  then  ordered  Ver- 
derevsky to  come  to  Petrograd, 
to  be  arrested  and  tried  for  high 
treason.  A  judicial  inquiry 
which  took  place  immediately 
established  that  Verderevsky's 
real  motive  in  his  act  of  open 
insubordination  towards  the 
Government  was  his  wish  to 
save  the  officers  of  the  Baltic 
Fleet  from  being  lynched  by  the 
sailors,  and  to  maintain  to  some 
extent  the  fighting  capacity  of 
the  fleet.  When  all  the  circum- 
stances of  the  affair  were  cleared 
up,  the  inquiry  against  Verderev- 
sky immediately  ceased.  After 
the  Kornilov  rebellion  Verderev- 
sky was  appointed  Minister  of 
Marine. 

Verkhovsky. —  General.  A  young 
officer  of  the  General  Staff. 
Before  the  revolution  of  1905, 
when    a    pupil    of    His    Maj- 


esty's Own  Corps  de  Pages, 
he  was  sent  to  the  army  as  a 
private,  because  of  his  sympa- 
thy with  the  liberation  move- 
ment. He  participated  in  the 
Japanese  War  and  was  awarded 
the  soldier's  Cross  of  St. 
George.  Took  part  in  the  pres- 
ent war.  After  the  Revolution 
Verkhovsky  participated  in  the 
organization  of  the  Central 
Executive  Committee  of  the 
Black  Sea  Fleet,  an  elected  body 
where  the  sailors  worked  in 
harmony  with  the  officers,  and 
for  a  long  time  conserved  the 
discipline,  organization,  and 
fighting  capacity  of  the  Black 
Sea  Fleet.  In  May  1917,  Verk- 
hovsky was  promoted  colonel 
and  given  a  command  on  a  fight- 
ing sector  of  the  front.  During 
the  same  month  he  was  ap- 
pointed Commander  of  the 
Moscow  Military  District,  where 
he  remained  up  to  the  Kornilov 
rebellion,  after  which  he  was 
appointed  Minister  for  War. 
Not  long  before  the  Bolshevik 
coup  d'etat  Verkhovsky,  with- 
out being  authorized  by  the 
Provisional  Government,  de- 
clared in  the  Army  and  Navy 
Commission  of  the  Council  of 
the  Republic  that  it  was  neces- 
sary to  conclude  peace  immedi- 
ately, for  which  declaration  he 
was  de  facto  relieved  of  his 
ministerial  duties  and  was  or- 
dered to  depart  immediately 
from  Petrograd  "on  leave." 

ViRUBOv,  V.  v.— An  ex-officer. 
Was  active  in  the  Zemstvos. 
One  of  the  close  collaborators  of 
Prince  Lvov  in  the  organizing 
of  the  All-Russian  Union  of 
Zemstvos.    A  Moderate  Liberal, 


312 


THE  PRELUDE  TO  BOLSHEVISM 


but  an  active  adversary  of  autoc- 
racy and  the  dynasty.  Took  an 
important  part  in  the  libera- 
tion movement  of  the  last  years. 
During  the  war  Virubov  stayed 
nearly  always  at  the  front  as  a 
representative  of  the  All-Rus- 
sian Union  of  Zemstvos.  He 
has  studied  thoroughly  the  needs 
and  conditions  of  army  life. 
When  Kerensky  was  Command- 
er in  Chief,  Virubov  was  ap- 
pointed Assistant  of  the  Chief 
of  his  Staff  for  civil  matters. 

Zarudny. —  Son  of  the  famous 
collaborator  in  judicial  reforms 
under  Emperor  Alexander  II. 
Himself  a  prominent  jurist, 
Zarudny  retired  from  the  bench 
as  a  protest  against  its  reaction- 
ary policy  and  went  over  to 
the  bar,  where  he  soon  be- 
came prominent.  A  remarkable 
speaker,  Zarudny  in  1904  was 
continually  travelling  all  over 
Russia  in  order  to  defend  in 
civil  and  military  courts  hun- 
dreds of  political  criminals,  i.e., 
active  opponents  of  the  autoc- 
racy. By  his  energy  he  saved 
many  of  them  from  the  gallows 
or  imprisonment  with  hard  la- 
bour, and  revealed  the  crimes 
of  Stcheglovitov's  "justice." 
Immediately  after  the  revolution 
of  1917  Kerensky  invited  Zarud- 
ny to  the  post  of  First  Assistant 
to     the     Minister     of     Justice. 


Zarudny  was  entrusted  with  the 
direction  of  the  legislative  work 
at  the  Ministry,  and  prepared  a 
series  of  reforms  in  the  spirit 
of  the  noble  traditions  of  the 
judicial  reformers  of  the  'six- 
ties, among  whom  his  father 
had  been  prominent.  In  the 
summer  of  1917,  Zarudny  be- 
came Minister  of  Justice,  in 
which  office  he  remained  until 
September,  1917. 

Zavoika. —  A  character-sketch  of 
Zavoiko  will  be  found  in  the 
text  of  the  book. 

Zenzinov,  v.—  Prominent  revolu- 
tionary journalist.  Leading 
member  of  the.  Central  Commit- 
tee of  the  Social  Revolutionary 
Party.  Partisan  of  terrorism  in 
the  time  of  the  old  regime.  Be- 
longs to  that  wing  of  the  Social 
Revolutionary  Party  which  is 
clearly  in  favour  of  the  nation- 
al defence  ("  Oborontsy  ")  ;  sup- 
ported the  idea  of  a  coalitional 
government,  i.e.  based  upon  the 
co-operation  of  the  Liberal, 
Democratic  and  Socialist  Part- 
ies. Zenzinov  returned  shortly 
before  the  Revolution  from 
'*  Russkoie  Usstie,"  his  place  of 
exile  in  Siberia,  a  little  village 
situated  to  the  north  of  the 
Polar  Circle,  on  the  coast  of  the 
Arctic  Ocean,  where  he  spent 
five  years. 


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